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SUMMARY
(he French trade union movement has traditionally 
been viewed as 'deviant' in that its majority 
Confederations have mobilised against oapitalism long 
after unions in other developed countries have found 
accomodation within it.
From the mid-1970s, as unemployment began to mount, 
political mobilisation was seen as insufficient by many 
activists and there were calls for the unions to address 
immediate problems, which implied a greater 
understanding, if not acceptance, of economic structures 
ar»d the management of industry. The arrival of a Left 
government in 1981 helped this development while 
further diluting the attractions of overt revolutionary 
mobilisation.
The thesis charts the evolution of this 'proposition 
force' unionism in France and investigates concrete 
cases of union initiatives in the post-1981 period.
The unions' actual achievements are slim, mainly 
because the labour movement remains riven by ideological 
and political differences: consequently, numerical
weakness is endemic, united action on specific proposals 
is rare and the employers' reading of the economy is 
allowed to prevail.
However, some of the Confederations have pushed 
through a doctrinal renewal which has given them the 
potential to be more effective than in the past in the 
field of employment - seen as the key issue of the late 
twentieth century, in terms of both volume and quality,
in an international economy where labour -flexibility is 
a major requirement.
Their effectiveness now hinges on political choices, 
including the alliances they forge between themselves, 
but the omens are not good.
After a period of reappraisal, the largest 
Confederation, the CGT, is seen retreating into a 
reactionary isolationism, influenced by a Communist 
Party which remains dominant within it despite its 
electoral decline.
The CFDT’s new pragmatism has failed to attract 
workers or convince employers and it may have been 
overtaken as second largest Confederation by FD, which 
shuns the 'counter—p l a n ' movement.
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INTRODUCTION
The developed world has now been in the throes of a 
profound economic crisis for over a decade. The crisis 
is structural in that it results from changes in the 
international economic order and its destabilising 
effects on industry have been exacerbated by rapid 
technological advance. Millions of jobs have been lost 
in manufacturing industry<x>.
Western trade unions have therefore seen their 
membership bases eroded and have been searching for ways 
not only to arrest the decline in jobs but also to 
organise in those sectors which previously they have 
neglected or which have proved resistant.
They have attempted - with varying degrees of 
determination - to shake off the old image of domination 
by male, middle-aged, skilled or semi-skilled workers 
and sought to attract more women and young members into 
their ranks. This, in turn, has obliged them to face up 
to social and cultural changes over and above the 
changes in the labour market
Reflecting this crisis of identity, unions in all 
western countries have had to question their approach to 
fundamental aspects of trade union activity.
Governments throughout the developed world have, 
sooner or later, adopted similar policies to overcome 
the crisis and these have run counter to union 
priorities of jobs and maintained purchasing power. The
Int/1
onus has been put on 'squeezing out' inflation, wage 
controls (under various guises) and a refusal to
subsidise loss-making firms.
Companies have been obliged to adapt to shrinking or 
low-growth markets and intense international 
competition. In'order to improve unit costs, jobs have 
been shed and wages held down. New technologies have - 
for the time being at least - increased the pressure on 
jobs and provided a further incentive for companies to
reduce wage bills to free the vast sums needed for
investment.
Unions are left in something of a quandary. They may 
be successful at holding up wages in those areas where 
they are strongest but, in a period of low growth and
assuming tight monetary control, this is theoretically - 
and often in practice - at the expense of less 
wel1-organised sectors. In effect, such union 
'successes' may underpin the emergence of a dual labour 
market comprising a wel1-organised, secure 'core' sector 
and a 'peripheral' body of 'insecure' workers in
'precarious' jobs.
Furthermore, the 'bastions' of unionism are
precisely those firms in traditional industries most 
under pressure due to foreign competition, saturated 
markets, lack of investment in the past, alternative 
products and so on. Hence the problems of the steel
industry, motor cars, textiles and coalmining, to name 
the most prominent. More than ever in the past,
governments in the developed world have been refusing
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political and social pressures to save jobs in these 
areas in the face of 'economic realities'.
Unions have long seen the need to influence economic 
policy at the highest level - be it by formal links with 
parties (as in the UK), by mobilising to put pressure on 
the legislature (in France, especially) by lobbying (the 
US), or by other methods. This has become all the more 
urgent given the depth of the current recession and 
government's role in it through monetary policy.
However, the unions have needed, if they are to
appear credible, to look beyond the old Keynesian 
remedies of reflation via public spending as governments 
of both left and right have opted for deflationary
measures and - even in France - denationalisation, the 
withdrawal of 'the stifling hand of the state' from
business and a renewed faith in the entrepreneur have
come to the fore.
Unions have had to rethink their economic prognoses 
and pay more attention to demonstrating the soundness of 
their arguments. The need to adapt has been keenly felt 
at workplace level where jobs are being displaced by 
technology and whole units are being shut down as 
'uneconomic'.
No union can simply let this pass but neither can it 
simply repeat demands for jobs to be retained in the 
face of declining markets, cheaper competition or 
product obsolescence. Thus, unionists have had to answer 
employers' demands for 'flexibility'; they have argued 
for a shorter working week, sometimes accepting novel
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rotas; and they have foregone wage rises for even 
temporary job reprieves.
A major problem facing unions in many countries, one
which undermines their power at both national and
workplace level, is membership loss. In part, this 
'deunionisation' is the result of the fall in employment 
in traditional centres of union strength and the
parallel failure to organise in newer sectors and among 
women, youth, etc, as noted above.
But there is a wider problem - a trend towards 
individualised work relations. This may be due to 
conscious employer policy (Dourdan I and II; Morville, 
1985; Vacarie 1979), the decline in class consciousness 
(Touraine et a l , 1984) or wider societal and cultural
trends. It is not a problem that is likely to go away 
soon.
The Crisis of French Trade Unionism
The French labour movement is particularly affected 
by the problems listed above and there is widespread 
agreement that unionism there is in crisis (see Landier, 
1981; Adam, 1983; the analyses of the CFDT, etc).
The level of unionisation is not the best indicator 
of union influence or power in France but the fact 
remains that, as a percentage of the workforce, it is 
around the lowest in the developed world and falling. 
Worse, this dwindling membership is spread among five 
rival Confederations, divided along political,
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philosophical, religious and sectoral lines, plus a host 
of autonomous Federations and svndicats.
A union of unemployed workers has sprung up and, 
even if its media attention looks overdone<3>, it has 
served to highlight the embarrassing failure of the 
Confederations to organise here, despite sporadic 
efforts.
Compounding the problem of deunionisation is 
demobilisation. Again, this will be treated at length 
later: suffice to note here that the number of days lost 
due to strikes was at a 20 year low in 1984 when 
fieldwork for this thesis was begun.
The largest union, the Confederation Ginerale du 
Travail (CGT), has repeatedly failed in its attempts to 
call general strikes or demonstrations. Workers at its 
'bastion', Renault, have mostly failed to follow calls 
for action to oppose job losses. Elsewhere in the car 
industry, and in steel, there have been outbreaks of 
violence but ultimately little success in fighting 
cutbacks, even if certain 'social' measures have been 
conceded by the authorities, as palliatives.
In the mid-1970's, the two largest unions at the 
time, the CGT and the Confederation Franpaise 
Dimocratique du Travail (CFDT), banked a great deal on 
the election of a Left government and mobilised towards 
that political end, neglecting matters closer to the 
ground. They paid for this when the Union of the Left 
(Socialists, Communists and Left Radicals) fell apart in 
acrimony prior to the 1978 elections (Johnson, 1981).
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Demoralisation set in amongst mi 1 itants and if CGT-CFDT 
'unity-in-action ' spluttered on -formally, the paths of 
the two Confederations began to diverge significantly.
The CFDT adopted a 'recentrage'. refocussing on 
bread and butter demands closer to the workplace and 
giving fresh priority to bargaining. More radically, in 
the field of industrial policy, the CFDT began to 
develop a 'svndicalisme de propositions' - mobilising 
behind 'counter-plans' in apposition to the closedowns, 
redundancies and cutbacks demanded by employers. Social 
transformation was still the avowed aim but the accent 
was placed on autonomous union action in the industrial 
and economic fields (Lange et a l , 19S2: 60).
At one point, the CGT seemed to be moving in a 
similar direction but eventually took a more 
'traditional ' line, falling in behind Communist Party 
(PCF) attacks on the Socialists and then the CFDT (Lange 
et a l , 1982; Ross, 1984: 74-84).
Thus, neither Confederation, for different reasons, 
had much to do with the election of Frangois Mitterrand 
as President in May 1981 and the Socialist Party (PS) 
landslide in the subsequent legislative elections.
Nonetheless, both clearly expected a great deal from 
the new government which included four PCF ministers. 
The other three Confederations, less or not at all 
involved in the political fortunes of the Left, were 
more reserved in their reception.
However, there was a general air of expectancy 
abroad in June 1981. This, after all, was the first Left
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government since the immediate post-World War Two 
coalition - and that is remembered with no great 
affection on the Left, perhaps because it presided over 
a sharp fall in working class incomes and because many 
had much more revolutionary expectations' at the time. 
Left emotions are more aroused by memories of the 1936 
Popular Front government even if its real achievements 
were small beside those of the post-war coalition 
(Johnson, 1931s 23-32).
On the non-Communist Left (and even among certain 
groups in the centre) expectations were high. And if the 
minority position of the PCF vis-a-vis the Socialists 
was a source of disquiet for the former, in the
circumstances it had little choice but to go into talks 
and accept the four ministerial portfolios offered it.
In the labour movement, the CFDT in particular was 
keen to grasp the opportunities offered by the
unexpected turn of events and many of its supporters 
found their way into ministerial cabinets or other 
official positions.
Yet the Socialist victory was not without
ambiguities for the union movement. Similar problems had 
faced unions in other countries - in the UK, Australia 
and Spain, for example: in a period of economic crisis,
how far should the unions go in supporting a Left
government (in return for, say, nationalisations, 
welfare packages or job programmes) and national 
priorities at the expense of sectoral interests and 
wages? Can a trade union give priority to broad
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political considerations over its own industrial and 
economic concerns? Should the unions demand that
governments subsidise 'lame duck' industries on mainly 
job considerations?
There were other problems more peculiar to France, 
however.
The French labour movement is usually described as 
having two wings - one 'reformist', comprising the 
autonomous and idiosyncratic Force Ouvriere (FO), the 
Christian CFTC and the cadres' union, CGC; and the other 
'revolutionary', made up of the CGT and CFDT.
If revolutionary is a misnomer, at least the latter 
two aim for a wholesale transformation of society 
towards socialism. However, this is meant in different 
senses by each and there are further differences of 
emphasis inside each Confederation. Neither has any 
experience of working with a 'friendly' government; 
neither - and this is the crucial point - can be seen to 
be working too closely with any government because of 
the French attachment to non-alignment in their unions.
This concept dates from the Amiens Congress of the 
CGT in 1906. What came to be known as 'La Charte 
d 'Amiens' affirms the independence of the union from any 
political grouping and its intention to organise all 
workers of whatever political or philosophical 
persuasion, as long as they do not introduce into the 
union 'the opinions they hold outside', that is, 
political reasoning or motivation.
The union aims to improve workers' conditions but
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this is only one aspect of its role: it also works
towards the emancipation o-f the workers, the overthrow 
of capitalism by means of a general strike. (Text 
reproduced in Reynaud, 1975b: 26-7).
While there is an evident revolutionary syndicalist 
influence in the Charter, most observers underline the 
tactical considerations of the period. Some unionists 
wanted to forge closer links with the Socialists, 
unified in a single party the previous year. Yet it was 
a fragile alliance*** and unionists were concerned not 
to import squabbling into the union. Hence the alignment 
behind a syndicalist motion, "une conception du 
syndicalisme comme se suffisant a lui-meme, assumant la 
totalite des interirts de la classe ouvriere et porteur 
de son avenir."(Mouriaux, 19S2: 42). (A) <a>
The Charter is thus less a rejection of politics
than an assertion that the union can look after the 
interests of the working class; between the lines, a 
certain scorn for political parties can be detected:
...1'apolitisme n'est done pas prudence 
ou reserve, encore moins repli sur des 
preoccupations purement professionnelles...La 
Charte d'Amiens est moins un pacte de 
neutralite (meme si elle a servi tactiquement 
a neutraliser les tendances opposees qui 
coexistaient dans le mouvement) qu'une 
proclamation de mefiance a 1 'egard de toute 
1 'organisation politique. (Reynaud, 1975a: 68) (B)
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Today, the Charter is interpreted in various ways by 
the different Confederations - FQ, in particular, 
frequently cites it to support its brand of apolitical 
unionism but the revolutionary aspects are forgotten.
However, the main purpose in devoting space to 
Amiens here is to underline the difficult position of 
the union movement vis-a-vis an ostensibly 'friendly' 
government.
For the notion of non-alignment still carries 
enormous normative weight in France. Several things 
follow from this. Any union which appears to endorse a 
government programme - however edged with caveats - is 
open to sanction from members, the wider workforce and, 
crucially, the other Confederations. Inter— Confederation 
vitriol is an enduring feature of French union life and 
this whatever the ad hoc alliances which may obtain.
Reaction, naturally, is likely to be even more 
hostile if the government subsequently takes steps which 
directly hit wages and jobs. The CGT has been harmed by 
its association with the PCF: it has suffered even more 
with the PCF in government. The CFDT, closely associated 
with the PS in the public mind, has also been seriously 
compromised and, as will become clear, has reacted by 
accelerating its move towards 'reformism', at the cost 
of internal dissent.
A French Confederation is unlikely ever to negotiate 
the sort of Social Contract agreed between the British 
TUC and the Labour government in the late 1970s. FO, the
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reformist union which argues strongly for "la politique 
contractuel1e 7 and negotiations as the best means to 
safeguard the workers' interests is perhaps the most 
hostile to any alliance with government or the State.
Besides, a divided movement could probably never 
agree in its entirety to any contract and certainly 
Confederations would not have the discipline to make it 
stick on the ground.
The fundamental anti-capital ism of much of the 
French labour movement also has implications for union 
activity on job losses. Until very recently, any attempt 
to intervene positively in matters such as work
organisation and industrial restructuring was seen as 
tantamount to class col1aboratian by the CGT and CFDT, 
while FO tends not to see any legitimate role in such 
areas, beyond comment and action if necessary to oppose 
harmful effects.
As we will see, this position has altered
considerably - at least as regards the CGT and CFDT - 
over the last decade and both unions saw the possibility 
of real advance under the Left government. Actual 
results have been disappointing - but the Mitterrand 
presidency has helped cement this fundamental change in 
union thinking, even if contradictions persist.
A further ambiguity of this period centres on the
nature of the link between the CGT and the PCFs for
present purposes, it is enough to suggest that the CGT 
represented a potential source of contestation for as 
long as PCF ministers were 'hostages' in the government
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and the Party itself had to rein back criticism of the 
Soci ali sts.
Yet the PCF was unable to turn on the CGT 'tap' at 
will: indeed, the stresses caused by this period of Left 
government opened up cracks in an organisation usually 
portrayed as homogenous, not to say monolithic.
Finally, this period saw an attempt to alter the 
face of French industrial relations. Institutional 
regulation of conflict is weak in France and bargaining 
is not well developed: negotiations have typically been 
seen as the formal endorsement of positions reached 
through a trial of strength rather than a method of 
resolving conflicts of interest.
The Socialists introduced an annual obligation on 
employers to negotiate on wages and work time at firm 
level. Parallel to and somewhat predating this 
legislation, the CFDT began to adopt a more positive 
approach to bargaining and, as with the union's attitude 
to industrial plans, this period of Socialist rule has 
helped underpin the trend.
The employers - individually and in their peak 
organisation - were at first defensive in 1981 but soon 
moved back onto the offensive as the Socialist 
government backtracked on economic policy and espoused 
notions of 'flexibility' dear to managers. The influence 
of employer attitudes on union behaviour remains 
important in France and some of the changes referred to 
above may be arrested or deformed because of the
Int/12
anti-unionism which still prevails among a large number 
of employers.
It will be obvious from the above that if the 
Mitterrand victory in May 19S1 opened up a new era in 
French political and economic life, that'date does not 
coincide precisely with particular changes in trade 
union attitudes and behaviour. However, changing 
political perspectives both prio^..to and from May 1981 
were as important to union development as structural 
change in the economic, industrial and social fields 
which provided the impetus. In particular, the septennat 
provided a fertile period for new initiatives to develop 
in response to the evident need for unions to adapt 
traditional policies.
A central test of the unions' ability to adapt lay
in their reaction to employment problems, which entailed 
reflection on questions of work organisation and company 
management, particularly in the old manufacturing 
industries which were both heavy users of labour and 
centres of union strength. The research therefore
focused on this area.
However, the substantial change in labour
legislation enacted during the period has not been 
neglected. Certain aspects - greater access to
information and resources, the right to discuss working 




The central problem, then, was whether, in the 
context of a period of Left government and in the face 
of mass unemployment, French trade unions would be 
prepared to argue and act for piecemeal reform of the 
industrial and economic system, or whether the 
'revolutionaries' would continue to mobilise for 
wholesale political transformation and the 'reformists' 
limit themselves to bread-and-butter issues.
The nature (or absence) of significant change from 
1981 was to be explained although that date was, from 
the beginning, seen as a somewhat artificial cut-off 
point. As suggested above, a better periodisation might 
begin with the collapse of the Union de la Gauche in 
1977-3, while individual Confederations have reacted to 
different external and internal stimuli at different 
dates.
The working hypotheses fell under four broad 
headings relating to:
a) the decentralisation of union activity;
b) the 'rationalisation' of French industrial 
relations;
c) the saliency of party-union links;
d) the reassertion of 'maximalism' in the CGT and 
beyond.
It was suspected that regional dislocations caused 
by industrial restructuring would lead to a shift in the
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•focus o-f trade union activity, away -from the national 
stage down to regional and company level- Important 
changes in labour legislation would underpin this 
changes indeed, the very aim of the 1982 Auroux laws 
seemed to be the institutionalisation of conflict at 
firm level, with strengthened unions having more access 
to financial and industrial information, understanding 
employers' problems and incorporating these into their 
analyses and demands (Hypothesis one).
However, hostility on the part of the employers, 
especially as regards any enlarged area of negotiation, 
was likely to undermine the application of the Auroux 
laws. Furthermore, even the aim of stimulating more wage 
bargaining seemed unlikely to be realised due to the 
unpromising economic climate (Hypothesis two).
The continuing saliency of party-union links, and 
especially the PCF-CGT connection, was seen as central, 
given the French concept of non-aligned unionism, 
outlined above. I envisaged the PCF, declining as a 
political force, tightening its grip on its major 
industrial asset, the C G T <<S,> (the third hypothesis) and 
this had implications for CGT action on job losses and 
industrial restructuring.
In particular, this presaged a revival of CGT 
'maximalism' (Hypothesis four): by maximalism was meant 
(following Lange et a l , 1982: 10 and 74) the outlook
which sees the only way out of crisis as entailing a 
fundamental break with capitalist economic and social 
arrangements, that break being effected by prior
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political change. This involved the control o-f the state 
apparatus with the union mobilising to that end, 
subjugating its industrial role to the requirements o-f a 
political party. Piecemeal re-form o-f the economic system 
via union pressure was not contemplated.
In the post-May 1981 context, then, even the 
structural re-forms implemented by the
Socialist-Communist government were seen as inadequate 
and maximalism implied an ouvrieriste (or 'hard Le-ft') 
emphasis on the mass mobilisation o-f the working class, 
the de-fence of traditional industries and the 
denunciation of those unions which tempered their
criticism of the government and employers as
'col 1aborationist'.
The absence of visible political links helped FO to 
bolster its reputation as an 'independent' union which 
fought for the workers irrespective of the colour of the 
government. The fifth hypothesis was that FO's advance 
would be arrested as CGT opposition revived and that the 
CFDT, lacking the solid doctrinal base of the larger 
Confederation and suffering from a pro-government image, 
would to a certain extent be towed along in the CGT's 
wake.
In France, unions have tended to compete for members 
and votes in workplace elections by aggressive rhetoric 
and action, seeking to 'outbid' their rivals' demands, 
upping the stakes repeatedly to appear more concerned 
than the others with the workers' interests. (See Rioux, 
1972: 18-19 and Mothe, 1973: especially chapter four,
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for this concept of 'surenchere7).
Thus, I initially expected more outright opposition 
to plant closures than reasoned 'counter-plans', even if 
action and mots d'ordre were more differentiated at a 
local level than in the past (Hypothesis six).
Lange, Ross and Vannicelli, in their book on union 
attitudes towards the economic recession of the 1970s, 
Unions. Change and Crisis (1982), argue that the Italian 
and French movements did not fundamentally change their 
framework of analysis of the economy with the onset of 
crisis; rather, they reacted to that crisis 'on the 
basis of frameworks which had been developed prior to 
crisis and in other circumstances' (Lange et a l , 1982: 
8) .
For these authors, 'the nature of union-politics 
relationships was the most important variable in 
explaining different union responses to crisis' (Lange 
et a l , 1982: 9). Thus, the dramatic change in the
political life of France following the Socialist success 
of May/June 1981 was expected to fundamentally alter 
union attitudes and behaviour.
Lange and his colleagues (the French section was 
principally the work of George Ross) chose to compare 
the evolution of Italian unions with those of the French 
Confederations. Writing just as the Socialist and 
Communist ministers took office, they forecast that 
changes in France were likely to be dramatic, in 
contrast to the tentative integration of the Italian
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Communist Party (PCI) into the 'government arena' in the 
mi d-1970s.
Central to the evolution of Italian unionism was the 
relative openness of the PCI and its willingness to 
relax its grip on the Confederazione Generale Italiana 
del Lavoro (CGIL), the main union confederation.
The CGIL was then obliged to adapt in the face of a 
threat to its dominant position from the Confederazione 
Italiana Syndicati Lavoratori (CISL). As a result, it 
began to focus more directly on bread-and-butter issues 
such as wages and to work for the reform of the Italian 
state and industry, seeking not a new mode of
accumulation beyond capitalism but a new type of 
development within capitalism.
The French Communist Party is widely seen as one of 
the more 'hardline' of Western parties: a brief
flirtation with 'Eurocommunism' (Ross, 1980) was brought 
to an end when the PS seemed to be gaining most from the 
'unitary' approach and developments abroad (Afghanistan, 
Poland) saw the French party once more lining up behind 
the Soviet Union.
The links between the PCF and the CGT are well 
documented (see esp. Ross, 1982). It is enough here to 
note that nearly all of the CGT Federations and regional 
bodies are headed by Communists. A careful balance
between PCF and non-PCF members is maintained on the 
Bureau Confederal but the composition of Federation and 
Regional teams, plus the 'filtering' of delegates to the 
triennial conference, ensures that the Party link
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(remembering the Leninist 'transmission belt' -formula 
for such links) is a vital factor in CGT orientations.
One of the hypotheses centred on this factor and 
particularly the likely effect of the decline in the PCF 
vote in 1981, confirmed in subsequent elections. The
dismal showing of the the PCF leader and presidential 
candidate Georges Marchais set off debates as to
strategy and analyses within the Party.
I thought that some unionists, might take advantage 
of this weakness to loosen the Party-union links, long 
seen as a liability in some quarters, but that the more 
likely outcome was that the Party would look to the CGT 
as its main asset in rebuilding its oppositionist 
credentials (its departure from government always seemed 
likely, sooner or later) and would therefore seek to 
tighten its grip on the union.
As for the other Confederations, the CFDT has been 
harmed by its association (in the public mind, due in 
part to a certain affinity of vision with some elements 
of the PS) with the government.
This, as noted above, gave FO and the other two
Confederations the possibility of enlarging their
audience.
The implications of this for the complex balance
between the Confederations are outlined in Chapters 1 
and 2. Briefly here, this period of left rule seems to
have confirmed the isolation of the CGT and what some
see as its historic decline, while a majority for 
'reformism' now appears to exist - though this majority
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remains a heterogeneous, contradictory grouping, still 
prone to violent disagreement.
I hypothesised that once the CGT's period of 
'soutien critique' was over, the progress of the 
'reformist' unions would be arrested or reversed. In 
fact, the CGT's decline does not seem to have ended and 
- more important - it has not managed, with rare
exception, to set the pace in trade union matters as it 
once could.
There has been a reassertion of maximalism within 
CGT ranks - but this has not been a strong influence on 
the other Confederations. The CFDT in particular has 
continued on its novel if unsteady path towards a
'svndicalisme de propositions'.
However, the CGT's maximalism has perhaps changed 
form since it too now tends to propose 
'counter-solutions' in troubled firms and branches: a 
central place in this thesis is given over to an
examination of the nature of CGT plans, especially in 
comparison with initiatives taken by the CFDT and, 
sometimes, the other Confederations.
I closely studied union action in four firms where 
there have been disputes over jobs - Renault, SKF, 
Kodak-Path£ and Chapelle Darblay. By talking to
activists and analysing union proposals, I have 
detected a shift in emphasis in recent years. jtowards a more positive
'proposition force' unionism; and 
if the origins of this shift lie beyond May 1981, the
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political chanaement then allowed it to develop and it 
is likely to persist, despite apparently meagre results.
If some unions are now prepared to tackle previously 
taboo subjects such as work organisation and industrial 
policy, does this imply a move away from 'class' 
unionism and a desire for a more contractual form of 
industrial relations?
The signs here are contradictory but, as regards the 
CFDT at least, there has been considerable movement. At 
Confederation level, and in certain influential 
Federations, the CFDT seems to be edging towards the 
idea of bargaining as 'donnant-donnant'. 'give and 
take'. This in itself is something of a revolution in 
France where negotiation is more often than not merely 
the formal recognition of positions reached after action
by unions and where gains thus achieved ('acquis') are
seen as sacrosanct. This is the position both of the CGT 
and, generally, of FO despite its attachment to 1 a 
politique contractuel1e and negotiation.
The CFDT's position is that in a period of crisis 
unions should not cling to acquis if their replacement 
or renovation might better serve the interests of
workers.
This view was at the centre of the CFDT's 'openings' 
towards the employers in the talks on flexibility at the 
end of 19S4. In many ways these negotiations 
encapsulated all the problems facing French unionism in 
the 19S0s: the need to adapt to the economic and
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industrial context; their relationship to the state, 
government and employers; the 'contract versus 
legislation' debate; the relationship of the centrale 
to the mi 1itants inter— Confederation rivalry and so on. 
I have thus chosen to analyse these talks in some depth 
in Chapter S.
The change of direction by the CFDT obviously has 
implications for the second hypothesis on the attempted 
'rationalisation' of French industrial relations- By 
'rationalisation', I mean the strengthening of 
workplace institutions with the intention of stimulating 
a more consensual treatment of conflict closer to the 
point of production, on the lines of relations prevalent 
elsewhere in northern Europe. It is evident that the PS 
government sought to take the heat out of union-employer 
(and union-government) relations which in France 
frequently boil over and pose a direct threat to the 
state (see, for example, Kesselman, 19S3a).
As noted above, bargaining has never been as central 
to industrial relations in France as in the UK, the US, 
Sweden and elsewhere. The majority Confederations in 
France have hitherto been proponents of a unionism of 
mobilisation, seeking to put pressure on the state or 
employers through the establishment of favourable 
rapports de force. The 'reformists' have usually been in 
a minority.
This has not stopped agreements being made: one
union, even one representing a minority, can legally 
sign an agreement on behalf of the whole workforce
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concerned. Thus, a certain division of labour has been 
established - the CGT and CFDT mobilising and putting 
pressure on employers, FO signing where the first two 
have been reluctant, thereby consolidating the advances 
achieved (Reynaud, 1975a: 186).
Negotiations are difficult in the majority of firms 
and even at branch level they may entail little more 
than unilateral awards by the employers.
In this context, the introduction of an annual 
obligation to negotiate over wages and working time in 
firms where unions are organised constitutes a 
fundamental change in French industrial relations. I 
suggested in the second hypothesis that this law (one of 
a series on labour legislation known as the lois Auroux 
after the labour minister who introduced them in 1982) 
might not live up to the ambitions of its sponsors 
because of the difficult economic context and the 
hostility of the patronat■ (Indeed, its introduction 
coincided with a government-imposed wages freeze...).
Thus far, the picture as regards results is far from 
clear. But employer practices have certainly evolved and 
there is now a much greater emphasis, from them, on 
firm-level negotiations, although the suspicion remains 
that the main intention is to circumvent unions rather 
than genuinely bargain with them.
Other aspects of the Auroux laws also tend to 
reinforce the emphasis on enterprise level affairs. The 
first hypothesis was that the provisions of these laws, 
plus administrative decentralisation and the effects of
restructuring, might help stimulate a 'svndicalisme de 
propositions' and indeed, a new-found interest in the 
details of company life has emerged which leads one to 
question the validity of what have been seen as the 
'traditional models' of unionism in France.
At the outset, I felt that economic factors might 
both assist and constrain union development - assist, in 
that the problems posed to companies might be met by 
positive solutions from the union side; constrain, in 
that the problems were so severe and the French penchant 
for technocratic solutions administered by the Parisian 
industrial and civil service elites so ingrained that 
unions would be denied any significant role.
Both these suppositions were correct and even if FO 
is still reluctant to venture onto the terrain of 
industrial policy, the rest of the labour movement 
actively seeks to intervene here.
However, the 'political' variables were perhaps more 
instructive, overall, in explaining change - or 
regression - as Lange et al (1982) contended. Yet it is 
not only a question of union-party links or the party 
composition of government though the latter certainly 
helped cement a move towards 'positive' union 
contributions, a decentralisation of union activity and 
a greater willingness to bargain by some.
Beyond these factors, the specific French notion of 
political non-alignment has also proved to be vital to 
any understanding of recent developments on the French
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labour scene. Not only has it helped bolster the 
influence of FO at the expense of the CGT and CFDT: it 
has also spurred the renewed striving for autonomy by 
the CFDT which has led it towards an acceptance of 
bargaining as the centrepiece of industrial relations 
and the search for a union role in industrial strategy 
in the mixed economy.
Fi eldwork
Work in the field was undertaken at the end of 1934 
and the first six months of 1985. As explained above, I 
focused on four firms with employment problems where 
there had been well publicised action over jobs and 
interviewed activists and regional officials concerned.
My schedule of open-ended questions related to the 
position of the particular firm but also to wider 
matters - the government's achievements, the state of 
the economy, the 'flexibility' negotiations and the 
options facing a trade union under a Left government.
In all of the firms, one or more of the unions had 
printed copies of their analyses and proposals which I 
obtained: cuttings from the union, financial and general 
press supplemented these first-hand investigations.
During the same period I interviewed officials 
concerned with economic and industrial policy in all the 
major Confederations as well as participants in the 
'flexibility' negotiations from both the union and 
employer sides and I was able to attend three Confederal 
conferences.
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The union press was analysed in depth -from September 
1934 to June 1935 and I was able to consult issues going 
back to May 1931 and beyond where necessary.
An extensive literature search was undertaken before 
commencement of the fieldwork though, - as indicated 
above, recent developments suggest some of the 'classic' 
works need to be brought up to date.
A detailed examination of the new and existing 
(pre-1981) legislation was undertaken and activists 
questioned on the real impact of the changes in the 
workplace.
NOTES
1. There were 4.74 million workers employed in 
manufacturing industry in France in 1934 against 5.46 
mln in 1976; in the UK, there were 5.53 million in 1984 
against 7.23 million in 1976. (Year Book of Labour 
Statistics (1936) Geneva: ILO).
2. See the ETUC document, Work and Workers in the 
Society of Tomorrow. Milan Conference, May 1935; and the 
papers presented to the ECUIS conference on 'The Role of 
Trade Unions in the Coming Decade', Maastricht, 
20th-22nd November 1935. A selection of the papers is 
now published in Spyropoulos (ed.) (1986).
3. A call to a national demonstration in Paris in 
May 1985 met with little response.
4. The Party split again in 1920 after the Communist 
majority won the Tours Congress vote on membership of 
the Third International (Fauvet, 1977).
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5. All main quotations in French are marked with a 
capital letter and translations (my own) appear at the 
end of each chapter, following the numbered notes.
It was decided to use the original quotations in the 
body of the text to retain more of the flavour of union 
life in France, certain expressions having only 
approximate counterparts in English. For a brief 
discussion of the difficulties of translation in this 
branch of the social sciences, see the note by Michael 
Rose and myself in Rose (ed.) (1987).
Throughout the text, an effort has been made to use 
non-sexist terminology. Where 'he', 'his', etc have been 
unavoidable, it is not, of course, intended to convey 
that all activists, union leaders, employers or whatever 
are male.
6. Of course, the Party still enjoyed control of a 
significant number of town and regional councils plus a 
solid, if declining, body of loyal members, not to 
mention important business interests.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) '... a conception of trade unionism as being 
sufficient in itself, taking in all the interests of the 
working class whose future lies with it.' (Mouriaux, 
1982s 42).
(B) '... so this apolitical attitude is neither 
prudence nor reserve, even less a retreat into purely
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sectional concerns... The Amiens Charter is less a pact 
of neutrality (even if it served tactically to
neutralise the tendencies which opposed each other 
within the movement) than a proclamation of mistrust 
towards all forms of political organisation.' (Reynaud, 
1975a: 63).
1. TRADE UNIONISM AND FRENCH 'EXCEPTIONALISM'
A trade union is, first and foremost, an 
agency and a medium of power. Its central 
purpose is to permit workers to exert,' 
collectively, the control over their 
conditions of employment which they cannot 
hope to possess as individuals], and to do so 
largely by compelling the employer to take 
account, in policy- and decision-making, of 
interests and priorities contrary to his own.
(Hyman,1975: 64)
That definition (by a British Marxist scholar) would 
appear uncontroversial at a basic analytical level and 
might seem applicable to any union in the Western 
industrialised world. Yet, in a survey of the labour 
movements of Europe, Kendall (1975: 33) notes that:
In the past the worker's decision to join 
a union (in France) has represented at least 
as much a reflex of class consciousness as 
any intent to organize in a practical fashion 
for better conditions and improved job 
control.
With its divisions, its numerical weakness and its 
various ideological bases, the French labour movement
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has always been something of a 'deviant' case in the
industrialised world. Its majority wing has been termed 
'maximalist' (Lange et a l , 19S2: 10) in that it has
usually seen the best prospects -for advancing working 
class interests as lying in the political arena - 
involving a rupture with capitalism - and it has 
therefore mobilised to this end. Partly for ideological 
reasons (a refusal to 'collaborate/ with capitalism) and 
partly because employers have anyway proved reluctant to 
see the unions as industrial partners in France and 
bargaining structures are weak, the CGT has preferred to 
advance via legislation rather than through negotiated 
contracts with employers: it has typically, then, tried 
to rally large numbers of workers behind strikes called 
with the intent of applying political pressure on the 
state, a tactic which has brought significant gains in 
terms of legislation and even pay rises - as in 1936 and 
1963 - when the government felt a greater urgency to
settle than the patronat.
However, a 'reformist' wing has been prepared to 
negotiate and recent changes in the labour movement 
suggest an eclipse of the majority 'revolutionary' 
tradition in France. The differences between the
Confederations and an examination of the industrial 
relations system (or systems) in France form the basis
of the following three chapters: in the rest of this
chapter I am more interested in examining the
'exceptionalism' of French unionism at a theoretical 
level and highlighting specific features such as its
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radicalism which have set it apart from other models.
Trade Unions - Opponents of Capitalism?
On the basis of a study across several countries 
from 1900 to 1956, Ross and Hartman (1960) forecast a 
'withering away of the strike' as a form of union 
action. Class antagonism was waning and unions were more 
active in the political arena, as.now constituted, where 
they seemed to act as little more than pressure groups 
on the government.
Flanders (in McCarthy, 1972; and Flanders, 1968) 
also sees a decline in class antagonism: conflict exists 
but is managed through 'rules' which unions have helped 
elaborate to obtain protection from the market and 
employers. The resulting 'system' is characterised by 
agreement and compromise, a mutual recognition of 
interests by both sides of industry (see Poole, 1981: 
61) .
Others who take the pluralist view, Clegg, for 
example, see unions as oppositional institutions (in 
McCarthy, 1972) wi thi n the existing socio-economic 
framework. Collective bargaining structures (when they 
exist) are seen by him as the main determinant of trade 
union behaviour, though France proved an exception since 
political action rather than negotiation was the main 
concern of unions there (Clegg, 1976).
Some authors have seen this apparent decline in 
conflictual social relations as a universal feature of 
advanced societies. Thus, Kerr et al (1973) saw labour
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protest waning and the power of ideology declining in 
the face of an industrialising process which had common 
features in all developed countries due to the 
similarity of the technical problems to be faced. A 'web 
of rules' develops in the work place: workers are no 
longer attracted by alternatives to the prevailing 
industrial order and seek only to increase their share 
in the gains... Protest is most apparent in what these 
authors term a 'glacial impact', that is, through the 
establishment and functioning of formal procedures 
through which industrial relations problems are 
processed. All this is widely accepted by the workforce: 
indeed, labour leaders may even form part of the 'elite' 
which oversees the industrialising process. In short:
The road to industrialisation is paved 
less with class warfare than with class 
alliances (Kerr et a l , 1973: 226)
and
the 'iron law of technology' (292) (allowing for the 
stage of development and some autonomy in the elite's 
strategic policy decisions) sees industrial structures 
in all countries converging towards a 'relative 
uniformity' in what some modern analysts term the 
'regulation of labour' (See the works by Boyer and 
Cori at).
Yet, Gallie's cross-national research (1978) has 
shown that similar technology does not at all lead to 
any convergence in industrial relations systems. Kerr et
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al specif ical ly referred to refineries (where Gallie did 
his survey) as examples of the deterministic effect of 
technology, but Gallie (1973: 315) found that
the advanced sector tends to become to a 
considerable degree assimilated into the 
broader social-structural patterns of the 
particular society in which it, emerges.
Hyman (1975) sees the view of trade unionism as 
being essentially involved in job regulation as 
reflecting conservati ve sociological preoccupations 
centred on the desirability of order. Writing from a 
Marxist perspective, he is as much concerned with how 
conflict is generated as with the way it is controlled. 
Those authors who see the trade union function as 
revolving around collective bargaing (eg. Flanders 1963) 
are for Hyman simply making deductions on the basis of 
what unions currently do. Both external pressures 
(ideological and economic, primarily) and internal ones 
(the need for organisational preservation, for instance) 
push unions, or union leaders, in this direction.
However, such incorporation cannot eliminate 
conflict which is inherent in the capitalist system and 
may simply lead to higher incidences of unorganised 
dissent such as absenteeism or sabotage:
... efforts to suppress specific 
manifestations of conflict, without removing
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the underlying causes of unrest, may merely 
divert disorder into different channels 
(Hyman, 1975: 189).
Furthermore, action remains at the heart of a trade 
union's function: collective bargaining is mere ritual 
unless backed up by the threat of collective action. 
Thus, for Hyman (1975: 190) it-is quite in order to 
present 'industrial conflict as the central reality of 
industrial relations'.
Hyman, like other authors in the late 1970s 
(especially, Crouch and Pizzorno (Eds) 1978) saw the 
rise in industrial conflict in western industrialised 
nations as proof that institutionalisation was not 
without contradictions.
However, it is far from clear what sort of 
opposition to existing social arrangements this 
industrial conflict implied and what the specific role 
of the unions was within this rising tide of discontent. 
Certainly, some of the essays in the Crouch and Pizzorno 
volumes show national unions struggling to take over
issues which involve groups and concerns beyond their
traditional constituencies.
On a broader theoretical level, the view of the
trade union as an oppositional working class organism is 
not without problems. The classic Marxist view is 
usually taken to be that of Lenin in What Is To Be Done? 
(1902) in which he states that, left to itself, a labour 
movement is only capable of stimulating 'trade union
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consciousness' which aimed no higher than piecemeal 
economic (or sometimes political) advance within the 
capitalist system- The workers only achieved class 
consciousness when their mass organisations were guided 
by the vanguard in the revolutionary political parties.
Now, Hyman (1971: 41-3) has argued that this view
was only held by Lenin at a specific period and both
before and after (especially after the events of 1905) 
he considered trade union action to have a pedagogic 
function in raising the political consciousness of the 
masses. Hyman himself (1971: 50-3) takes the view that
the limits of 'trade union consciousness' vary markedly
depending on the historical context and material 
improvements can be either palliatives or stimulants 
depending on whether they are conceded by or snatched 
from the employers. Therefore, 'no general theory is 
available to relate the struggle for material reforms to 
the development of consciousness'. However, he appears 
to follow Gramsci and the theorists of the British Shop 
Stewards' Movement such as Cole in advancing the 
potential of 'encroaching control', social revolution as 
a process rather than an act:
... while such theories need not exclude 
the perspective of a 'classic' revolutionary 
climax, they emphasise the possibility and 
even the necessity of inroads wi thi n 
capitalism as a basis for eventual transition 
to socialism (1971: 47).
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This conclusion is particularly interesting as 
regards the case of the labour movement in France since 
the relative merits o-f the revolutionary grand soir and 
the potentiality o-f piecemeal reform have" long been the 
subject of debate in that country.
In the next chapter I will show that several 
'models' of unionism co-exist in F/-ance<x> including one 
which espouses the sort of consensual approach outlined 
at the start of this section. However, here I address 
the question of why a radical trade unionism persists 
there and what form of activism this gives rise to - a 
mi 1i tanti sme which is currently in decline and 
contributing to the problems of the French trade union 
movement.
Radical Unionism in France
In his book on Consciousness and Action among the 
Western Working Class. Mann (1973) concluded that the 
working class did not carry within itself a new form of 
social order, that revolutionary consciousness was 
unlikely to develop in most capitalist countries.
Yet Mann was careful to make a distinction as 
regards Italian and, especially, French workers. He was, 
after all, writing just five years after the May 1968 
explosion and there is ample survey evidence to show 
that workers in France are more radical than those of 
other countries even if the nature and extent of this
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radicalism is the source o-f lively academic debate 
(Gallie 1978 and 1983; Hamilton 1967; Lash 1984).
Mann himsel-f (1973: 71) argues that socialism is not 
spontaneous but a learned process, the product o-f 'the 
continuous experience o-f the worker in his productive 
life and the interpretation of this experience by 
organised groups over a considerable period of time'.
When discussing international variations in 
consciousness (Ch. 4), Mann sees union doctrines as 
central: 'reformist' unions focus on wages and sign away
job controls and, with no alternatives formulated by 
their leading elements, workers reconcile themselves to 
the existing situation; whereas 'revolutionary' unions 
'foster job dissatisfaction' and workers renew demands 
for control. Leaving aside the question of control for 
the time being (French unions have been ambiguous in 
their attitude to control issues within a capitalist 
system) it should be noted that the centrality of unions 
to this dissatisfaction (and therefore radicalism) in 
France has been questioned, not least by Gallie (1983: 
115) :
Overall, what is striking is that even 
non-unionised French workers would appear to 
be highly radical in their social attitudes 
... and exposure to CGT doctrine would appear 
primarily to heighten what is already an 
exceptionally high level of resentment among 
French workers.
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For Gallie, class resentment is generated by 
experience at work and only then built upon by left wing 
organisations; political parti es 'can mould the 
political interpretation that workers give to their 
class resentments' (145) and in this respect their 
contribution is greater than that of the unions.
In fact, Gallie argues (1983; Ch 7) that union 
members in France choose their Confederation on the 
basis of pre-existing political attitudes. However, one 
might argue that unions in turn play a crucial role in 
support of the French Left by sustaining the workers' 
sense of social injustice (Hamilton, 1967; Mouriaux, 
1981: 175).
For Hamilton (1967; 6), the objective work situation 
is less important than the 'perceptions of that 
situation, a frame of reference learned from “informal 
opinion leaders"'. Radicalism is not a 'natural' 
response to deprivation, it has to be brought out by 
uni ons.
However, Hamilton does feel there is more than one 
type of radicalism - a 'revolutionary' attitude which is. 
a response to deprivation, part of a larger rural, 
radical tradition; and the 'Pro-Soviet' attitude which 
is actively shaped by a union or party. The former, of 
course, can 'feed' the latter, with rural radicals 
migrating to the cities where the 'point of entry' to 
industry is often controlled by the CGT which, with the 
PCF, is seen as providing the 'Pro-Soviet' frame of
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reference.
Lash (1934) is even more insistent than Hamilton 
(and quite opposed to Gallie) in stressing the 
ideological and organisational determinants of 
militancy. Further, he sees French radicalism as 
primarily politicals on industrial matters, the US 
workers he compared them with were more hostile to 
management and more inclined to.*collective action. In 
contrast to Gallie, Lash plays down the influence of the 
work situation and locates the main determinants of 
radicalism in political and trade union socialisation, 
like Hamilton.
My own data do not throw any new light on this 
debate - that was not the purpose of the research in 
question. However, it was essential to highlight the 
radicalism of French workers in general and the part 
played by unions in either maintaining or even fostering 
this radicalism.
It should be clear that a union which seeks to 
radicalise its members (and the wider work force) with a 
view to changing economic and political structures will 
act quite differently to one which concentrates 
primarily on a representative function and the pursuit 
of immediate economic interests, or even one which 
allies these immediate concerns with wider social aims 
which it pursues through close links with a (usually) 
social democratic political party. In the next chapter, 
the effect of this on union doctrine and ideology is
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examined; in the concluding sections here, the 
implications for members of a unionism of mobilisation 
are outlined.
Trade Union Activism in France
Reynaud (1975a: 130-3) notes that, in terms of
decision-making, French Confederations are highly 
centralised, the national councils and in particular the 
Central Bureaux wielding effective power and the 
triennial conference reduced for the most part to a 
forum for discussion and the formal ratification of 
general orientations. However:
Cette centralisation et cette stabilite 
(des equipes dirigeantes) n'impliquent 
cependant pas que les confederations soient 
tr<ls puissantes. Elies ont une grandeautorite 
morale. Mais elles n'ont ni les moyens de 
controle ni les moyens financiers qui leur 
permettraient de diriger de maniere 
autoritaire... Ils animent un corps de 
militants a qui ils presentent les vues 
d'ensemble et les politiques a long terme dont 
1 'action locale a besoin, qui les respectent, 
mais sans que la discipline soit rigoureuse. (A)
There is often an uneasy relationship between the 
mi 1itant in the workplace, the full-time official and, 
especially, the appointed (unelected) headquarters
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staff. (This is especially so in the CFDT, 'une 
organisation foncierement anti-hierarchique' according 
to Hamon and Rotman (1982; 360)).
Mothe (1973) divided French activists into three 
categories: the tribun who rallies the workers behind 
the union line though his power is rooted in the 
workshop; the doctrinaire who provides doctrinal 
coherence; and 1 'administrati-f who makes the 
organisation tick. Mothe reckons that French unionism is 
based predominantly on the first two, with full-time 
officials looked upon as somewhat 'impure' (due 
ironically to the success of the CGT in forcing home the 
ouvrieriste message that real workers, the ones that 
produce the wealth, get their hands dirty) and 
Confederations in the past have seemed almost apologetic 
about recruiting 'experts'. His argument, in 1973, was 
that if French unions were to play their full part in 
social institutions and be really efficient and powerful 
(he used the Swedish example as a model), then 
technocrats and modern methods had to be brought in.
A decade later, some of these criticisms are no 
longer valid. Both the CGT and the CFDT boast new 
headquarters filled with modern equipment and extensive 
back-up staff.
However, the mi 1itant remains crucial in France: the 
vast majority of the workforce in most sectors is 
unorganised and for any action to succeed the mi 1itant 
has to convince these workers to back his section's 
demand (and, where necessary, oppose those of rival
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sections) . Where the call -for action has come from the 
Confederation, Federation or local Union, the mi 1itant 
is required to translate demands or doctrine into 
concepts that the rank and file can grasp.
As disaffection with the main Confederations grows, 
the role of the mi 1itant is all the more important and 
any weakening of the link between union and activist 
will necessarily impact on this -.fragile link between 
union and worker. This is precisely what seems to be 
happening at presents there is a crise du militantisme 
which is a large factor in the crise du svndicalisme.
Rose (1984: 2) argues that the former signifies more 
than a simple fall-off in participation:
It is also a crisis for conventional 
expectations about the role of the union 
activist and its associated values: it is as 
much an uncertainty about viable and 
desirable patterns of behaviour - that is to 
say, about a normative model - as about a 
lack of recruits to militant activity as 
traditionally conceived.
Landier (1981: 131-2) seems to ascribe the main 
cause for the crisis in French unionism to the dashing 
of the Left's political hopes in 1977-8. However, he, 
too, sees a change in the form of activism, the 
quasi-religious devotion of (especially) PCF, CGT and 
CFDT activists being eroded in the face of rival,
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perhaps more individual interests. (For Landier, this 
explains why those unions which require only a minimum 
commitment such as FO are less affected by the crise du 
mi 1itantisme) . More limited, 'single issue' movements 
may have taken the place of unions with .the decline of 
traditional industries, the change in the composition of 
the workforce and the waning of class consciousness (see 
also Touraine et a l , 1984).
Analysis of this change has been pushed furthest by 
the CFDT (FO does not recognise any problem while the 
CGT tends to see the decline in membership in terms of 
the political and economic conjuncture).
Landier (1981: Annexe II) publishes CFDT leader
Edmond Maire's May 1980 report on his Confederation's 
strategy to stem the decline in membership, which 
entails a recognition of socio-economic change in and 
beyond the workplace. Mai re recognises that French 
unionism has worked better in snatching gains at moments 
of struggle rather than developing action with a view to 
more sustained, more enduring advances.
The key to consolidating real gains lay in building 
a solid membership base in each workplace and Maire 
outlined several steps needed to secure this, in 
particular a deeper analysis of concrete realites which 
affected the workforce, though without any jettisoning 
of the ideological bases of CFDT unionism; and the 
provision of services (credit schemes, cultural 
activities, discount shopping, insurance...) to attract 
members no longer swayed by the appeals to class
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solidarity which may have worked in the past.
Daniel Vidal (1963) has suggested, based on a survey 
of the orientations of French mi 1itants. that union 
action and ideology are relatively autonomous. This may 
have some truth at the plant level, but the problems of 
the CFDT and the CGT in the 1970s invite caution: the 
overwhelming ideological and political content of action 
was clear (discontent was 'globalised' and national days 
of action became the preferred mode of expression) and 
the demoralisation which resulted from the failure of 
the Union de la Gauche alienated not only the 
non-unionised but members and activists, too.
Increasingly, however, the tensions between broad 
Confederation aims and workplace realities are partly 
overcome by the relative freedom given to svndicats to 
frame local demands, taking into account national 
policies. Consequently, the 1930s have seen a flowering 
of union 'proposals' in troubled firms but often within 
a framework, a general perspective, forged at a national 
1evel.
This does not mean that there is usually 
concertation between svndi cats of rival Confederations. 
Quite the contrary: workplace life is still
characterised by intense rivalry, with workers 
constantly faced with the need to choose between the 
Confederations - in elections for deleauls and comit£s 
but also now for the elction of Prud'hommes (who sit on 
industrial tribunals) and administrators for the social
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security system. Because of these election campaigns the 
activist has to 'insister en permanence' (Mothe, 1973: 
S3-5) and the accent is put on the essential differences 
between the Confederations. Each activist has to assert 
the commitment of his or her svndi cat and the corollary 
of this is that it will usually support any group of 
workers in dispute with management however hopeless the 
cause and however much a grievance might be based on 
misconceptions (Dubois et al , 197S: 73; Moth€, 1973:
121) .
As a result, the potential for conflict is 
heightened and factory life in France is considerably 
more tense than in, say, Britain or Germany, with 
friction resulting from volatile relations between 
workers, unions and management continually feeding upon 
itself, fuelled by the hyperbole and rhetoric coming 
from all sides.
It might be argued with Hamilton (1967: 293) that at 
least this situation has pre-empted the
bureaucratisation and tendency towards oligarchy that 
Michels (1915) said was characteristic of Left 
organisations. However, at local level - and often on 
the national stage, too - the main result would appear 
to be surench^re - each union trying to 'outbid' the 
others' demands or raise the stakes of action until 
claims become unrealisable and workers are alienated.
Lange et al (1932) have outlined the factors (the 
loosening of the PCI hold an the CGIL, the threat posed 
to the latter by the strengthening of the CISL, etc)
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which prompted the Italian Confederations to work 
together in the 1970s: in France, such alliances seem as 
distant as ever. Ideology, electoral competition and the 
crucial position of mi 1 itants schooled in confrontation 
unionism all contribute to French divisiveness and the 
ad hoc alliances formed in specific circumstances 
provide no basis for common solutions to the chronic 
problems faced by workers.
This is the background to the current 'crisis of 
unionism' which is affecting the French labour movement. 
The next chapter examines the internal differences in 
the French labour movement by looking at the history and 
the doctrine of the five main Confederations but this 
section ends with a study of the quantitative aspects of 
French unionism and of the meaning of union 'power' in 
France.
Trade Union Membership in France
Any attempt at estimating the membership strength 
and financial resources of the French labour movement is 
fraught with difficulties: quite simply, the
Confederations' own figures are not reliable. The most 
thorough examination of union numbers (and how these are 
arrived at) is in Landier (1931: Ch. II) on which much
of the following is based.
In both the CGT and FG, members buy a card every 
year and each month a stamp should be bought and 
attached to the card: at the triennial conference of
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both Confederations, each svndi cat is then entitled to a 
vote -for every ten monthly stamps placed- In actual 
■fact, according to Landier and other observers, the 
average member at FO buys only 7.5 stamps and at the CGT 
less than six: Harmel (19S2: 11) claims that 'several
hundreds of thousands' of CGT pseudo-svndiaues only have 
one or two stamps.
The CFDT's card is free: the-Confederation releases 
the number of 'regular subscribers', based on an 
'average' member purchasing between eight and nine 
stamps per year. However, since membership is disrupted 
by various factors (redundancy, change of job, sickness, 
etc) the CFDT reckons that a third of its 'faithful' 
members 'suspend their membership' each year and it 
takes this into account when giving overall membership 
figures.
In terms of stamps placed, which Landier sees as the 
most objective criterion of the direct influence of each 
Confederation, FO and the CGT were equal at 7.5 million 
each; the CFDT was some way behind at seven million (on 
1979 figures).
His estimate of CGT membership in 1930 was 1,450,000 
(excluding retired members) based on internal figures 
supplied by each Union Departementale.
The CGT General Secretary Henri Krasucki stated on a 
TV programme in October 1934 that his Confederation had 
between 1.3 million and 1.4 million active plus around
300,000 retired members.
Landier (cited in Liberation of 28th March 1935) has
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estimated the 1984 membership at just 870,000. The 
French metal and mining industries' employers' 
organisation, the UIMM, came up with a similar figure of
835.000 for 1984 on the basis of internal CGT 
statistics. This represents a fall of over fifty percent 
in just ten years. The CGT's merchant navy federation 
which - rare if not unique among CGT constituents - 
situates itself amongst the opposition to the CGT 
leadership spoke of the Confederation having 'less than
800.000 members' at its 1985 conference (cited in Le 
Monde's report of the UIMM study, 7th November 1985).
In March 1985, the CGT launched an appeal for funds, 
ostensibly to 'give itself the means' to fight the 
government's 'anti-working class' policies. However, the 
financial strain caused by the construction and 
equipment of the new Montreuil headquarters and the 
staffing costs there have obviously been aggravated by 
the decline in membership (See Le Matin. 25th March 
1985).
The financial position of the CFDT appears to be 
healthier but it, too, has suffered an erosion of its 
membership since the mid-1970s. In 1980 it claimed 
790,922 'regular' members out of an overall membership 
of 963,200, excluding retired workers numbering some
75.000 (Hamon and Rotman, 1982: 413). The official 
figures for 1983 were 681,000 and 885,671 respectively 
(Le Monde. 11th June 1985) and an official 1983 figure 
of 967,170 including retired members is reported in
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Tempignaqe Chretien of 10th-16th June 1985.
According to the figures released at its November 
1984 conference, FO had 1,150,000 members in 1982 and 
was therefore entitled to boast that it had become the 
second largest Gonfederation. On the basis of FC's 
financial report, Landier estimated its membership at
983.000 in 1978 and so what he suggested was a regular 
three percent rise in membership may have been 
maintained.
However, it should be noted that F0 Magazine, in 
theory distributed to each member, only had a print run 
of just over 700,000 in 1984 (Liaisons Sociales. 
Document W/210, 19th December 1984) and the UIMM study 
very cautiously advanced a figure of 600,000 members.
In the absence of any financial or other data on 
which to base any estimate, Landier, in 1981, repeats 
the CFTC's own figure of 250,000 members. At its 
November 1984 conference, the Confederation claimed
280.000 members while the UIMM study opts for a figure 
of 200,000.
The same study offers a figure of 150,000 for the 
CGC in 1983, around half the total officially claimed. 
Le Monde of 16th October 1984 suggests a figure of
143.000 'regular dues payers'. UGICT, the cadres union 
of the CGT, claims 320,000 members, already included in 
the overall Confederation total, while UCC-CFDT claims
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50,000, UCI-FO 60,000 and UGICA-CFTC 10,000. However, 
these cadre unions organise different categories and 
figures are not strictly comparable.
The autonomous teachers' union FEN claimed 540,000 
members in 1977 and officially had 451,000 in 1984 (Le 
Matin. 4th February 1985) but external observers have 
suggested a figure of just 300,000 is closer 
(Liberation. 9th-10th February 1985).
A variety of independent unions exist, forever prey 
to schisms or just simply disappearing to re-emerge 
under a new siale. The Confederation Nationale du 
Travai1 . of anarchist inspiration, has existed since the 
war while the Confederation Generale des Svndicats 
Independants. formed after the war by unionists who had 
been active in Vichy-sanctioned svndicats. Communists 
who had left the party in 1939 and Gaullists seeking to 
give the General's working class constituency some 
roots, survived until 1977 when it merged with the CFTC.
Special mention should be made of the Confederati on 
des Svndicats Libres which is well implanted in the 
Citroen and Talbot car factories but whose trade union 
credentials are disputed. It sometimes seems to function 
as the disciplinary arm of management and bitter, often 
violent, disputes have seen it in direct confrontation 
with the many immigrant workers employed by the Peugeot 
group (Benoit, 1982; Lopes, 1984).
Autonomous svndi cats exist in many industries and 
firms and exert a real influence in some sectors (for
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example, the state railways, the Parisian metro and bus 
system, the police and -freight transport, though the 
lorry drivers who caused such chaos at the beginning o-f 
19S4 tended to be owner— drivers)<2>.
Union membership in France has always been volatile 
but now, as in many other countries, it is -falling 
sharply. The UIMM study estimates unionisation at only 
13.85 percent or 15 percent i-f FEN and the various 
independent unions are included. Even i-f this is a study 
conducted by an employers' organisation, there is little 
doubt that it is as accurate an appraisal as the 
statistical data will allow.
Landier (1981: 68-70) argues that the crisis o-f 
unionism in France is in fact the crisis of a certain 
type of unionism - the politicised, militant, 
confrontation unionism practised by the CGT and the
CFDT, especially in the 1970s. There is some basis in
fact for this assertion: CGT and CFDT membership began 
to fall back from 1976 and 1977 respectively, at the 
height of the mobilisation behind the Union de la Gauche 
banner. Conditions on the ground were neglected (as the 
CFDT's Maire subsequently admitted) and demoralisation 
really set in when the electoral pact of the PS and PCF 
fell apart in acrimony.
However, what is contestable in Landier's thesis is 
the assertion that the 'reformist' unions (with the 
exception of the CGC, beset by specific problems
relating to the categories it recruits) are making
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steady progress in terms of membership. Quite simply, 
the available data are insufficient to substantiate such 
claims for either FO or the CFTC. Indeed, the report 
presented to the CFTC conference in 19S4 (p.35) states 
that electoral progress has not been translated into any 
rise in membership which had remained stable overall 
'for several years', though that in itself may be seen 
as an achievement.
What is undeniable is that F0* and the CFTC have 
scored big successes with the general public and the 
non-unionised workforce. As outlined earlier, union 
activism in France is different to that practised in the 
UK, the US and most other developed countries in that, 
routinely, unions need to win over non-members to win 
disputes: the response of such workers is crucial when
only a minority of employees in most firms are 
unionised.
The influence of each Confederation is regularly 
tested in France by workplace elections for delegues du 
personnel (workplace representatives) and comi tes 
d'entreprise (works committees) as well as by certain 
nationwide elections. (One might be sceptical about the 
real significance of votes cast in the latter as any 
guide to a Confederation's 'strength', especially when 
workers are increasingly ignoring mots d'ordre. but they 
are useful as an indicator of how attractive a union's 
image - if not its detailed policy - is to the public).
Of particular note amongst these elections were 
those for social security administrative boards in
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October 19S3<3>. The CGT headed the union list with 
28.19 percent, FO had 25.17 percent, the CFDT 13.33 
percent, the CGC 15.93 percent and the CFTC 12.30 
percent. Many observers noted that 'reformist' unions 
were now apparently in a majority position and Le Nouvel 
Qbservateur of 28th October 1933 wondered: 'Est-ce la
fin du syndicalisme de contestation?'
However, one should bear in mind that FO has long 
played a very active role in these bodies, and that the 
electorate (some 29 million people) stretches well 
beyond the active workforce. A more reliable test of 
union influence among workers may be found in the 
elections for members of industrial tribunals (consei1s 
de prud'hommes) involving all employees (employers are 
obliged by law to register them). In 1932, the CGT 
polled 36.3 percent (42.26 percent in the previous 
elections of 1979); CFDT 29.5 percent (23.21 percent); 
FQ 17.73 percent (17.32 percent); CGC 9.64 percent (5.24 
percent); and CFTC 3.46 percent (7.19 percent) (Figures 
for 1932 from Lefranc, 1934: 122; for 1979 from Landier, 
1981: S3).
There is a clear decline in the CGT vote but in this 
instance, at least, it is mainly to the benefit of the 
CFDT.
Finally, a real indication of each Confederation's 
audience in offices and factories - and one measurable 
over a long period - is given by the elections for 
workplace committees, which are obligatory in companies 
of over fifty employees and can also be set up by
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agreement in smaller enteprises. Elections are held 
every two years so the results for 19S3 are best 
compared with those of 19S1, 1932 with 1930, and so on 
(see Appendix One).
The decline in the CGT vote from over .50 percent in 
1966 to just 23.5 percent in 1933 is remarkable. Over 
half the votes lost by the CGT during this period appear 
to have been 'transferred' to non-unionised candidates 
and these, for the first time in 1933, formed the second 
largest 'bloc' of representatives, ahead of the CFDT.
The success of such candidates is obviously 
something more than a local phenomenon: one might argue 
that it is both a facet of the lost hegemony of the CGT 
among the working class and an indicator of the disquiet 
workers feel at the divisiveness of the labour movement; 
on a broader plane, it may reflect the desire of workers 
to be represented by colleagues who may be more prepared 
to concentrate on local conditions than the union men 
who see problems through the prism of Confederation 
doctrine and policy.
Mouriaux (1933: 70) has argued:
Sans que 1 'adhesion soit envisages, de 
nombreux salaries se reconnaissent dans les 
organisations representatives. (B)
That remark should perhaps be qualified in view of 
the trend discussed above, especially in the context of 
a participation rate of just 69 percent in these
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electi ons.
Both FO and the CFTC have moved ahead in the 1980s 
and the CFDT vote made steady p r o g r e s s u p  until 1983. 
However, the figures underline the caution with which 
one should treat FO's claims that it is .now the second 
largest Confederation. Some progress has been made in 
terms of its electoral audience but the real change may 
simply be at the level of its public exposure. With the 
CGT and the CFDT compromised by their association with 
an unpopular government, FO's notion of non-alignment 
has proved a rallying point for workers not only 
disillusioned by the 'Left experiment' but maybe 
actively threatened with the loss of their jobs. As the 
CGT was mostly quiescent till early 1984 and the CFDT 
tended to accept the need for (negotiated) restructuring 
which might entail job loss, or job displacement, FO may 
have looked attractive to those interested in redundancy 
payments or even fighting to save the jobs, irrespective 
of the economic arguments. To quote the UIMM report in 
Le Monde of 7th November 1985:
...a 1 'evidence, FO se developpe dans les 
secteurs ou le decouragement et la 
resignation alimentent la tentation du repli 
corporatif... (C)
In terms of actual members, FO has made one 
spectacular breakthrough in the high profile education 
sector<B) (helped in no small part by Trotskyite
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defectors from FEN - see Le Monde, 16th May 19S4) and 
this has helped give substance to the notion of an 
overall advance when in fact the picture is quite 
patchy.
FO's power base remains the Fonction Publigue (the 
civil service, hospitals, the postal service, etc). At 
its 1984 conference, it announced that 55 percent of its 
membership now worked in the private sector: however, a 
survey of delegates revealed that only 36.3 percent came 
from private companies, 51.62 percent were from the 
Fonction Fublioue and 12.07 percent were from 
nationalised industries. The largest FO Federation 
remains that of the Services Publics et Sante (Liaisons 
Sociales. Document W/210, 19th December 1984): although 
the government created 240,000 jobs in the public sector 
between 1981' and 1983 as part of its employment strategy 
(Machin and Wright, 1985: 76), further new expansion was 
not countenanced after the 1982 policy change. There is 
no evidence that F0 is recruiting in sectors where 
unionism is traditionally weak nor in the newer 
'sunrise' industries and its Federations in 
manufacturing industries are presumably losing members 
as fast as the CGT and CFDT given the overall picture of 
job losses. (The largest Federation in both the CGT and 
CFDT is that of the (combined) engineering and mining 
workers. Citing an internal CGT document, Liberation of 
12th February 1985 reported that membership of the CGT's 
Federation des Travailleurs de la Metalluraie fell by 
around 21.5 percent between 1983 and 1984).
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The CFTC's strongest group is its teachers' 
Federation with the miners in second place, almost the 
entire mining Federation having opted to join the CFTC 1 
in the 1964 split (Reynaud, 1975a: 109).
French Confederations are organised along both 
industrial and geographical lines and representatives 
from both these levels are present in their governing 
bodi es.
The implantation of each Confederation at a regional 
level varies, naturally, according to the degree of 
industrialisation, but also according to the history of 
an area, its cultural and political associations. The 
CGT tends to be strongest in those areas which have been 
industrialised the longest - the Parisian area, 
Rhone-Alpes, the Nord... In areas which have a more 
conservative and (particularly) catholic tradition, such 
as Brittany, Lower Normandy and Alsace, the CFDT tends 
to be stronger (Mouriaux, 1982: 19). The CFTC is
proportionately strong in these same areas but it is 
also well represented in the mining area of 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais for the historical reasons referred 
to above. FO is strongest in those areas with a 
socialist and lay tradition, notably in the north and 
south-west, but a change may be underway with FO now 
faring better in elections in areas which do not 
necessarily have a socialist character (Bergounioux, 
1982: 54-6).
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The Concept of 'Union Power' in France
French unions are represented on various planning 
and industrial bodies as well as on the important social 
security boards (though these are more often than not 
run by coalitions o-f FO, CGC and management 
representatives) .
However, any measurement o-f union power in France 
today must address their capacity to influence key 
economic decisions concerning employment - the issue of 
the 19S0s. And in this instance, strength on the ground, 
in the workplace, is crucial.
A central aim of the Auroux laws of 1932 was, 
precisely, to build up union strength in the workplace 
in order that unions could bargain on a more equal 
footing with employers. Svndi cats were only legally 
recognised in the workplace from 1969: before, and
indeed after, a solid membership base in firms was not 
vital to the French notion of union 'power'. Unions 
gained their legitimacy from votes in elections and a 
large part of their resources came from various state 
and local council subsidies, not to mention the 
facilities provided (by law, for the most part) by 
employers (Adam, 1983).
The ambiguity of such legitimacy and the fragility 
of this model of unionism have been laid bare in the 
last decade as traditional allegiances have declined, 
employers have adapted their personnel policies and the 
unions have failed to address the needs of new 
'communities' (as Segrestin (1931) has termed them: see
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also Adam 1983; Landier 1981; Touraine et a l , 1984;
Morvilie, 1985).
The picture has emerged o-f a labour movement whose 
real power is latent. Unionisation varies a great deal 
by industry and region and much depends on the energy o-f 
activists in local svndi cats. Their relationship to the 
potential supporter (see Adam et al , (1970) -for the
concept o-f the 'svmpathisant episodiaue') is crucial if 
latent power is to be translated into real strength at 
vital moments. Together with the highly ideological 
atmosphere, the hostility of employers to worker 
organisations and the related weakness of bargaining 
structures, this relationship helps to explain why 
industrial relations in France is characterised by 
phases of calm followed, as frustrations build up, by 
explosions which frequently lend an insurrectionary air 
to industrial disputes.
Kesselman (1983bs 291-2) has noted that such 
disputes always posed a potential threat to the highly 
centralised French state: Prefects responsible directly 
to the government had the power to intervene in local 
disputes and, faced as they usually were by intransigent 
employers, workers therefore saw political action as 
the best way to advance their interests especially as so 
much of industrial life is regulated anyway by 
government-enacted legislation. For Kesselman, the whole 
thrust of the Socialists' decentralisation and labour 
relations reforms after 1981 was designed to take the 
heat out of industrial conflict and institutionalise
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relations at workplace level. Since these changes 
potentially affect not only the unions' ability to act 
on employment but the whole face of industrial relations 
in France, the Auroux laws will be examined in detail in 
Chapter 4. The next chapter examines . some of the 
doctrinal issues which underpin the structural features 
of French unionism outlined here, with the emphasis put 
on recent developments.
NOTES
1. I am concerned with differentiating the main 
Confederations but alternative typologies have been 
attempted (eg by Durand et al in Socioloaie du Travail. 
2/63, 1963) in which categories of action and activists
may be located in more than one Confederation.
2. Further details on the smaller Confederations and 
autonomous unions can be found in Reynaud, 1975a: 100 
and 117; Rioux, 1972: 122-5; Adam, 1970; and Agnes, 
1930).
3. These were the first elections since 1962, 
administrators having simply been designated by unions, 
employers and other bodies from 1967. In 1962, the CGT 
had 44.3 percent, the CFTC (shortly to became the CFDT) 
20.97 percent, F0 14.73 percent and the CGC 4.65 
percent.
4. Unspectacular, though, when set beside the 
claimed 50 percent rise in membership between the schism 
of 1964 and the mid-1970s.
5. In the important professional elections to
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education committees in December 19S4, FO scored 11.9 
percent against 2.4 percent in 1932; FEN 53.5 percent 
(66); and SGEN-CFDT 14 percent (15.5).
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'It does not follow from the centralisation and 
stability of the union leadership that the 
Confederations are very powerful. They have a great 
moral authority but lack both the control and the 
financial means needed to govern in any authoritarian 
manner... They provide the activists with the overall 
view and the long term policies to guide action at local 
level and these are respected - but discipline is not 
strict. ' (Reynaud, 1975a: 133).
(B) 'Without feeling any great desire to join, a 
great many employees identify with the main unions.' 
(Mouriaux, 1933: 70).
(C) 'The evidence shows that FO is making progress 
in those sectors where lack of fight and resignation 
underpin a temptation to fall back on purely 
self-centred issues.' (The UIMM, quoted in Le Monde. 7th 
November 1935).
2- THE TRADE UNION CONFEDERATIONS IN FRANCE
The French union movement can be broadly divided 
into two arms, one 'revolutionary' and one 'reformist', 
to use the designated terms (see especially Landier, 
1980: Ch. 2).
The -former is distinguished primarily by a desire to 
transform society (its pro jet de societe): like the
reformists, the revolutionary uni,ons naturally defend 
the 'moral and material interests' of the workers but an 
attempt is always made to situate claims in the wider 
social, economic and political context and use 
grievances to raise class consciousness.
Distinct strategic choices follow from the 
ideological positions of both wings. The reformists are 
prepared to negotiate and sign agreements with 
employers: strikes are seen as a sometimes necessary 
last resort. For the revolutionaries, a strike has a 
value in itself (Reynaud, 1975a: 164) and the simple
fact of mobilising workers is as important as any 
results gained. The strike is a symbol of working class 
unity and contributes to the rapports de force (the 
balance of power between unions and employers): this, 
rather than any argument used in negotiations, is what 
wrings concessions from the employer or state.
Before looking at the ideology and doctrine of each 
of the five main Confederations, it is necessary to 
rapidly run through the history of unionism in France in
order to provide the background to current ideological 
stances and divisions- (See Lefranc, 1934, 1951 and 1969 
•for classic histories).
A Brie-f History o-f Trade Unionism in France
The Le Shapelier law o-f June 1791 outlawed all 
combinations o-f working men (and employers) and while 
unions were officially tolerated „ fram 1S6S (probably 
because the government needed some way of controlling 
the growth in working men's associations (Lefranc, 1934: 
10)), they were only formally legalised in 1334.
There was already a tendency to organise on both 
regional and occupational lines. This is important in 
that links between workers of different trades helped 
offset any concentration on narrow sectional aims and 
therefore provided a foundation for the cl ass unionism 
which has remained a bedrock of the French labour 
movement (Kassalow, 1969: 114).
The CGT was constituted in 1395, made up of a 
variety of local, regional and national groupings; 
single trade unions; industrial federations; and the 
Federation Nationale des Bourses du Travail, town-based 
organisms which provided support and educational 
services for svndi cats. It was in the Bourses, too, that 
the idea of the general strike took root, the 
anarcho-syndicalist notion that unions and workers could 
seize power through their own industrial action without 
the need for political parties.
This aloofness from parties was enshrined in the CGT
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statutes at the founding Limoges conference and the 
Amiens conference of 1906 confirmed and elaborated on 
this non-alignment, as outlined in the introduction.
The union was an autonomous social unit, independent 
of party, employer and the state. It should be stressed 
that even if the 'Amiens Charter' resulted from
contemporary tactical manoeuvring (Mouriaux, 19S2: 
38-42), the notion of independence rapidly became a 
central tenet of French trade unionism.
Most modern observers (Galli-e, 1983: 190-3; Lash,
1984: 213, for example) play down the importance of 
revolutionary syndicalism but certain of its features 
are still important today - the independence from
parties, employers and the state, of course; but also 
the notion of the general strike as the ultimate
sanction of working class power; and the idea of
unionism as the work of 'minorities agissantes' (Lefranc, 
1984: 3 o ) , conscious activists, inevitably a minority of 
the workforce, working away to raise the awareness of 
the masses and prompt them to action. Although the CGT
in particular aspires to be a 'mass' organisation, the
minority situation of French unions still sees activists 
filling this sort of role.
However, revolutionary syndicalism per se was all 
but laid to rest in 1914 when international
proletarianism lay down before jingoist sentiment.
During the Great War, unions moved closer to the state, 
often managing to extract considerable concessions in 
return for attempts (not always successful) to impose
calm on the industrial -front.
At the end o-f the war, the circumspect attitude o-f 
CGT leaders Jouhaux (later to help -found FO) and 
Merrheim seemed treacherous to some who had 
revolutionary ambitions and this minority broke away to 
•form the CGT Unitaire in 1921.
In 1919, the CFTC was -formed and 'pluralism' was 
hence-forth a -feature o-f French unionism. However, 
domestic and international events (the rise o-f -fascism, 
the creation o-f the Popular Front, Stalin's acceptance 
of the French state's right to national defence) 
prompted a merger of the 'two CGT's' in 1936. The strike 
wave of that year (largely spontaneous in the wake of 
the Popular Front victory) ended with the success of 
several long-standing union demands (the recognition of 
representatives in firms - d§leaues du personnel - in 
particular) and the Blum government committed itself to 
introducing a legal 40 hour week and paid holidays. CGT 
membership rose by perhaps 150 percent to 2.5 million 
during the strike wave and the union claimed five 
million by the end of the year. (The CFTC claimed 
500,000 at the end of 1936).
However, CGT membership had fallen back to a million 
by 1939 with internal divisions again hardening due to 
the political ambitions of the ex-Unitaires (close to 
the PCF), the failure of a 193S strike against 
government economic policy and differing perceptions of 
the international political scene. The pro-communist 
elements were finally expelled in the wake of the
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Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 and were farced
underground when the government pronounced the 
dissolution of all Communist-linked organisations.
After the French defeat, some unionists rallied to 
the Vichy government (strikes were outlawed and unions 
became little more than corporatist vehicles run on 
industrial lines) and others reluctantly opted for a
politique de presence to fight for the workers within
the restrictive context. Others, both former CGT and 
CFTC members moved underground and from April 1943 
linked up with the pro-Communist unionists. These forces 
promoted both legal (under Vichy) activity and
clandestine action. By their work in the Resistance (at 
least, after the Nazi invasion of Russia) the Communists 
and their supporters among the unionists won themselves 
a pre-eminent position among the working class.
Soon after the end of the war, the CFTC asserted its 
trade union credentials by cutting its links with the 
Christian Democrat MRP and dropping the specific 
reference to the pontifical encyclicals in its statutes. 
In 1944, it refused the merger suggested by the CGT and 
henceforth, while the latter claimed to be the only 
legitimate union for the working class and denounced 
union divisions, other Confederations argued for 
'pluralism' as a vital element of labour movement 
democracy.
This pluralism was enlarged soon after the war, 
first by the founding of the Confederation Generale des 
Cadres, then by the schism which saw the emergence of FO
in 1947-S in the wake o-f violent strikes called by the 
CGT to oopose French acceptance of Marshal 1 Aid (and 
perhaps also aimed at restoring PCF ministers to the 
cabinet). At the same time, the Federation de 
1 "Education Nationale (FEN) also quit the CGT but, 
wishing to remain unified, opted for autonomy<1>.
FO consolidated itself<=B>, its main areas of 
strength lying in the public sector and civil service 
(especially the post office - FO svndi cats here took the 
lead in a 1953 strike wave).
The CGT, from supporting the reconstruct!on efforts 
of the post-war tripartite government, moved onto the 
offensive as worker discontent mounted in the difficult 
years of the late 1940s. Furthermore, the PCF was 
increasing its hold on the Confederation, the Communist 
leaders and activists still drawing dividends from their 
role in the Resistance. CGT leaders were allowed to 
occupy official positions in parties following a vote 
which modified the union rules in 1946 (Mouriaux, 1982: 
90) .
The Cold War years saw the CGT still incontestably 
in a majority position vis-a-vis the other 
Confederations but it was under repeated attack from the 
government for its "subversive" activities. A strike in 
1952 against the arrival of the US General Ridgeway was 
a failure, paving the way for heightened anti-CGT (and 
anti-PCF) repression: CGT General Secretary Benoit
Frachon actually had to go into hiding in 1953 
(Mouriaux, 1982: 98).
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Between 1952 and 1960, the CGT was eliminated -from 
its position on the committees of the Plan, state sector 
administrations, ILO delegations and European organisms 
and was effectively kept out of most negotiations 
between unions and employers from 1948 (Harmel, 1982: 
40~15 Mouriaux, 1982: 191). In fact, it was the
mediation of the CFDT which brought the CNPF (the 
employers' organisation) and the. CGT back round the 
table in 1966 (Hamon and Rotman, 1982: 178),
The emergence of the CFDT was perhaps the most 
significant development in French unionism after the end 
of the Cold War period. It was born in 1964 from the 
'deconfessionalised' CFTC (a Confederation basing its 
action on 'Christian social morality' continuing under 
those initials) and was the culmination of a process 
begun some 20 years earlier by unionists looking to 
build a strong, democratic organisation, solidly on the 
Left, which could stand up to the CGT without being 
guided by any visceral anti-communism, as with FO.
Some elements in the old CFTC had actively sought a 
merger with FO and FEN (Hamon and Rotman, 1982) but both 
were suspicious of the CFTC's clerical origins and FO 
would not countenance any unified action with the CGT, a 
central aim of those who engineered the transition to 
the CFDT.
A 'unity in action' pact was eventually signed by 
the CFDT and CGT alone at the start of 1966 and some 
analysts (for example Dubois, 1984) have pointed to this 
as an important factor in the resurgence of strike
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activity in the late 1960s and indeed the May 196S 
explosion. However, as in 1936, the strike wave of this 
period rather took the unions by surprise and if the 
CFDT generally supported 'new' qualitative demands and 
tried to use the favourable rapports de force to gain 
structural changes such as the legal recognition of 
unions in the workplace, the CGT seemed more intent on 
fixing demands within traditional limits and preventing 
the workers from being 'contaminated' by aauchistes on 
its left.
At its 1970 conference the CFDT formally embraced 
socialism though the emphasis on autoaestion (worker 
self-management) and democratic planning set it apart 
from the more centralist CGT approach.
It grew rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
overtaking F0 as second largest Confederation.
The mid-1970s were dominated by political 
developments, in particular the Common Programme for 
government adopted by the PS and PCF in 1972 and 
endorsed enthusiastically by the CGT, the CFDT remaining 
aloof though broadly sympathetic to the Union de la 
Gauche. (The other Confederations remained theoretically 
non-aligned though links with parties on the Right have 
been alleged in some cases).
The collapse of Left unity and the resulting failure 
at the 197S elections prompted elements within both the 
CFDT and the CGT to reconsider their strategy and 
alliances, a reappraisal made urgent by the economic 
problems which beset the western world from 1973-4.
Trade Union Doctrine in France
Having situated the Confederations historical1y , it 
is necessary to examine the doctrines of each. The 
treatment of the subject here is not comprehensive: the 
aim is to differentiate each Confederation and further 
highlight French 'specificities' and particular 
attention is paid to aspects of doctrine which affect 
the core concerns of this thesis.
The CGT embodies a Marxist conception of unionism 
(Mouriaux, 19S2: 126) and sees itself as a class-based,
mass organisation. According to the first article of its 
rule book, the CGT organises workers irrespective of 
political, religious or philosophical opinions in order 
to defend their 'moral and material, economic and 
occupational' interests. That classic formula may also 
be said to apply to the rest of the French labour 
movement. However, beyond that:
...la CGT s'assigne pour but la 
suppression de 1 'exploitation capitaliste, 
notamment par la socialisation des moyens de 
production et d'echange. (A)
The CGT sees its task as relating to both immediate 
and long term interests and the latter entail the 
elimination of a form of social organisation which 
systematically exploits the workers.
As outlined above, historically (and theoreti cal1v 
still today) the French labour movement has considered 
itsel-f capable al one o-f overthrowing the capitalist 
system and, indeed, organising production and 
distribution in the new society. This is an important 
aspect o-f its avowed non-alignment.
However, Landier (1931: 175-9) argues that nowadays 
the CGT merely pays lip service to the notion o-f 
independence enshrined in the Amiens Charter and that 
the union is no more than a relay o-f PCF policy. For 
Harmel (1932: 18-29), too, the CGT is the Leninist mass
organisation par excellence, the 'transmission belt' -for 
the Communist vanguard <3>.
Other analysts are less dogmatic. Mauriaux (1932: 
202-3) -follows Lavau in his opinion that the CGT and the 
PCF share the same 'ecosystem':
Nes du grand schisme qui a traverse le 
mouvement ouvrier apres la Premiere Guerre 
mondiale, partageant le meme souci d'assurer 
a la classe ouvriere une expression 
independante et unie, puisant dans le meme 
vivier humain, les deux organisations ont 
une histoire solidaire. S'il est polemique 
et reducteur de presenter la branche 
syndicale comme un simple relais de 
1 'avant-garde politique, il est apologetique 
et abstrait de proclamer, sans plus de 
commentaire, son independance. (B>
2/10
Mauriaux notes that CGT and PCF sections may coexist 
uneasily in some larger firms**** and that exchanges at 
any level (workplace, regional, national) between party 
and union are never unidirectional.
Furthermore (and especially in the period o-f most 
concern to us) 'transmission belt' theorists tend to 
posit both union and party as homogeneous blocs when in 
reality di-f-ferences o-f opinion and even tendencies can 
exist within each<0>. It seems likely that Communists 
within the CGT were urging PCF Ministers to quit the 
Mauroy government long before June 1984 because of 
rising discontent among members with policies which 
restricted wage rises and hit employment.
Ross (19S2) feels that CGT—PCF links vary, depending 
on the period, between straight 'transmission beltism' 
(as in the Cold War years) and what he terms 'relative 
autonomy', by which he means that the union concentrates 
on trade union action proper but still takes the options 
within the union sphere of activity which best reflect 
the Party's goals.
In fact, the term 'devolved authority' used by 
Morris (1933) may be more appropriate since the 
'autonomy' can always be revoked by the Party.
It is clear that only a minority of CGT members can 
also be in the PCF. However, PCF members are prominent 
in the ruling bodies of the union. Following what is by 
now a tradition, the Bureau Confederal elected at the 
42nd conference in November 1935 comprised nine PCF
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members and nine others. The executive commission 
elected by conference comprised o-f 76 percent PCF 
members (Le Monde. lst-2nd December 19S5). According to 
Landier (19S1: 178), the ComittS Con-federal National . the 
next highest body which meets twice a year and which is 
composed of the secretaries of the geographical Unions 
and industrial federations was close to being 100 
percent Communist. The PCF thus has a solid presence at 
all the major decision-making levels and if the exact 
nature of union-party interchanges is uncertain, the 
party's input can only be considered substantial <e5> .
This inevitably causes problems and whenever the 
CGT's stands have been too partisan (the 1950s, the late 
1970s, 1984 onwards) it has alienated part of its
membership. On occasions the distinction between 
defending the workers' interests and following the 
policy options of the PCF may be hard to define. At 
other times - the 1950s agitation for peace and against 
US imperialism, for example - the connection between the 
workers' situation and their union's policies is less 
clear.
However, the CGT sees part of its function as the 
raising of class consciousness and political strikes are 
called to that end. Furthermore, strikes are held to be 
important in themselves, as explained above. Solidarity 
is demonstrated, and issues are given a generality which 
kindles opposition to the very system which throws up 
disputes. The CGT in this way builds up those variables 
of class consciousness isolated by Touraine (1966):
identity (with members o-f one's own class); opposition 
(to capitalism): totality (o-f this opposition); which 
helps the -formation of the image of an alternative 
soci ety.
The typical CGT tactic, especially during the 1970s, 
was to push local grievances onto a national stage and 
funnel discontent into 'days of action' when 24 hour 
work stoppages would be marked -by demonstrations in 
Paris and provinical centres. More often than not, this 
form of action is aimed at the government, even if the 
stated aim is not to overthrow it.
Dubois et al (1978: 67-8) emphasise the political
import of strikes in France and their words are 
especially applicable to the CGT:
...the proportion of strikes with a 
political significance is considerable: 
something like one strike in two has, for 
those militants who led it, a direct 
political significance or provides a 
necessary hardening of attitudes towards the 
establishment.
The symbolic aspect of its activity shows through, 
too, in the CGT attitude towards negotiations. The CGT 
is not a great signer of agreements - negotiations are 
just as much about presenting class positions as 
bargainings* and the idea of fixed term agreements on 
either the US or even the UK model is anathema to the
Conf ederat i on:
Assurement, ni la CFDT ni la CGT ne sont 
pretes a accepter des clauses de 'paix 
sociale' ; elles affirment meme expl icitement 
qu'un accord constate une situation et'que sa 
validite aisparait quand la situation change. 
(Reynaud, 1975a: 1S3) (C)
Until recently the CGT has been reluctant to get 
involved in 'qualitative' issues, preferring to 
concentrate on matters such as wages, job guarantees and 
pension schemes where the interests o-f worker and 
employer are both clear and to a large extent 
antagonistic. This is the result o-f its class conception 
o-f unionism: the CGT is wary of tackling subjects which 
might implicate it in any way in the workings of 
capitalist structures.
However, as will be detailed later, economic and 
political factors have recently obliged the CGT to adopt 
a more offensive stance, especially when it comes to the 
proposal of counter-plans in firms undergoing 
restructuri ng.
One might also compare the changing attitude of the 
CGT to the Plan since its inception (Mouriaux, 19S2: 
182—3).
Force Ouvriere, as we have seen, was born from a 
schism in the CGT at the end of 1947 and has always
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considered itself the continuation of the 'old' CGT - 
before the 'Communist takeover' - and the embodiment of 
the principle of non-al i gnment <ej>. It allows itself to 
comment on political developments and government 
orientations but does not attempt to influence them 
unless labour interests are directly invol ved * .
It should be emphasised that despite the retention 
in the statutes of the old CGT
objective of the 'disappearance of the (distinction 
between) employers and workers', FO nowadays describes 
itself as a reformist organisation and its selective 
reading of the Amiens Charter reflects this. The 
employer is undoubtedly the enemy and strength is 
required to extract concessions: but any revolutionary
perspective is missing, perhaps because, for FO, the 
classless society is a myth and an independent trade 
union will always be necessary. Bergounioux, (1932: 
67-8) describes FO as the latest repository of the old 
French labour tradition of proudhonism: there will
always be conflict in society and therefore a 
counterweight is needed to offset the power of employers 
and the state<xo>.
Thus, in the article Contrepoids ou Contre-Douvoir 
in the special issue of FO Hebdo. 1603, 21st November 
1979, the idea of the union as an 'alternative power' is 
deemed dangerous since, if it succeeds, no 
'counterweight' will be left to defend those still 
called upon to labour. In 1906, the Amiens Charter saw 
the union as the vehicle to manage the workshop and run
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the wider economy. FO re-fuses any such role.
However, FO is not entirely faithful to even a 
reformist reading o-f Amiens. Lion Jouhaux , -founding
spirit o-f FO, had pushed the CGT in a reformist
direction in the inter-war years and advocated a union 
presence in state bodies which he saw as a legitimate 
way of representing workers' interests at the highest 
level. FO now refuses all but a consultative role. 
Bergounioux (1932: 69) argues that in its search for 
doctrinal solidity, vital to withstand CGT pressure in 
the post-war years, it has banked all on its 
'neutrality' and independence: the economic and
political arena are strictly differentiated and real
union intervention is only countenanced in the
former411 * .
In the workplace, as in state committees, FO makes 
the workers' views known and demands information: it
accepts a 'checking' role (controle in French) but 
rejects any input into management (gestion).
The notion of the union as a counterweight leads FO 
to espouse collective agreements as the surest way to 
advance workers' interests. Nonetheless, FO's concept of 
negotiation is still idiosyncratic from an Anglo-Saxon 
perspective and if it signs more readily than the CGT, 
it shares the latter's notion of acquis - gains made in 
one set of negotiations are sacrosanct and not to be 
bargained away in another - and agreements are not 
necessarily seen as binding.
It is misleading to dismiss FO as a 'professional
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contract signer' as Lange et al do (1982: 87), all the 
more so since FO is even more heterogeneous at svndi cat 
level than the other Con-f ederati ons. It includes 
old-style (SFIO) Socialists, revolutionary syndicalists, 
Gaullists - systematic RPR in-filtration has been 
alleged, especially since 1981 - and TrOtskyites: all
shades a-f opinion are present<l2> and this is perhaps a
major reason why FO policies seem so unadventurous 
(which in turn explains why analysts can justifiably
talk of the 'remarkable stability' of such a potentially 
volatile organisation <cf. Rioux, 1972: 87)): in order
to avoid provoking the apposition of such and such a 
political tendency, FO has built a body of doctrine 
around the notion of 'neutrality' and uses this to 
reduce its official stance on most issues to a sort of 
'lowest common denominator' which all sides can relate
to:
...trap de ses positions sont encore 
exprimees negativement... Les contraintes 
qu'imposent sa diversite interne engagent 
necessairement Force Ouvriere a la prudence 
(Bergounioux, 1982: 126). (D)
Rival Confederations sometimes accuse FO svndi cats 
of being 'house unions' and management may occasionally 
have had a hand in setting them up to offset CGT 
influence. However, FO's unionism is generally not 
tepid. It will strike when it feels the necessity
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(though it refuses all appeals -for common action with 
the CGT at national level) and its rhetoric can be just 
as violent as that of its rivals. It is scathing towards 
the 'communism' of the CGT and the intellectual 
pretensions of the CFDT. If its reformist practice takes 
it close to the CGC and the CFTC, its class basis and 
refusal of any management role leaves it some distance 
from the former and its fundamental anti-clericalism 
makes it an uneasy partner for tbe latter (and indeed 
the CFDT, still tainted by its confessional origins...).
In one fundamental respect the CFDT provides a 
direct contrast to FO: whereas the latter shuns the
political field, the CFDT actively embraces it, seeing a 
legitimate role for a Left union either autonomously or 
as the equal partner of the political parties of the 
Lef t .
The CFTC's metamorphosis was no overnight phenomenon 
but the patient work of activists impelled by various 
forces - experience of the Resistance; changes in the 
Catholic church and the related growth in activist 
organisations such as the Jeunesse Quvriere Chretienne; 
the desire to see a democratic force on the Left capable 
of challenging the hegemony of the PCF and the CGT; the 
radicalising effect of anti-imperialist struggles in 
Indochina, Algeria and elsewhere, and so on (Hamon and 
Rotman, 19S2).
The central aspects of CFDT doctrine are hard to pin 
down, partly because of ambiguity, partly because they
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are in -flux, more than ever so today.
Even as the CFTC it was in -favour o-f 'democratic
planning' (Reynaud, 1975a: 268-71; and CFDT, 1971)
though it gradually became more and more disillusioned 
with the procedures and results o-f the state planning
apparatus. The desire of some CFDT leaders (including 
current General Secretary Edmond Maire) and PSU<x:r> 
members to propose a 'counter— plan'<l,<,,,> to the official 
Fifth Plan caused ructions at the.J.965 conference:
...on les accusait d'enteriner les lois 
d'un systeme q u 'i1 faudrait abattre. (Hamon 
and Rotman, 1982: 171). (E)
That debate is still alive today as internal opposition 
to the current 'modernist' line shows (Raybould, 1985a).
The CFDT embraced the spirit of May 1968 more 
readily than the other Confederations, especially the
cultural and liberatarian aspects; but it also took 
advantage of the rapports de force established at the 
time to push for the legal recognition of union sections 
in the workplace which was enshrined in a December 1968 
law. The May events reinforced the anti-productivist and 
anti-statist aspects of CFDT thought which lay behind 
its scepticism over the Common Programme.
Following 1968, gauchiste elements found a home in 
the radicalised CFDT but the leadership, concerned about 
undesirable external influences, proceeded to a purge in 
some of the more turbulent local unions (Mouriaux, 1984:
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98). The Annecy Congress o-f 1976 con-firmed the 
leadership line, described by Hamon and Rotman (1982: 
284) as an attempt to dissociate (acceptable) 'cultural 
le-ftism' -from 'political leftism' (unacceptable, 
particularly given the French concept o-f union 
non-alignment).
The mi 1 itants who engineered the change -from the 
CFTC to the CFDT were -firmly on the Le-ft (though - 
another idiosyncrasy in the French context - they were 
more influenced by UK Labour theorists such as Richard 
Crossman than Marx - see Hamon and Rotman, 1982: 92-3) 
but socialism was only formally embraced by the 
Confederation at its 1970 conference which voted for the 
three 'pillars' of CFDT action - democratic planning, 
the socialisation of the means of production and 
autogestion. The latter, which translates as 'worker 
self-management', was seen as both an end and the means: 
the proposers of the motion (including Edmond Maire) 
argued that social transformation did not slot neatly 
into the revolutionary phases of the conquest of power, 
the transition to socialism, then socialism itself.
This concept was not unopposed: one current argued
that democratic planning and autoaesti on were only 
possible after the 'collective appropriation' of 
capital; another that the electoral road to change was 
not the only one and that union action ought not to be 
bound by 'legalism',..
Similar arguments continued (and continue) to rage 
within the Confederation. Thus, at the Annecy
2/20
conference, even if the delegates re-elected Maire en 
masse and helped him defeat the aauchi stes. several 
'oppositionists' were voted into leading positions. 
Debate centred on the instruments of transition and what 
was feasible in any transitionary stage. The Left
opposition argued that any Left government in 197S 
should not hold back on a radical break with capitalism
(which led this group to work closely with the CERES
tendency in the PS). Maire argued, that the union could
not be the agent of a political programme and should not
be content to let its members became the 'assistes de la 
gauche au pouvoir', that is, over— reliant on gifts from 
a friendly government.
Shortly before, the CFDT had been a prime mover in 
the Assises du Socialisme (whose proceedings were
published in 1974). The results proved disappointing to 
the unionists but the Confederation broadly remained
close to the new PS. This entailed a revi si on rather
than a rejection of the concept of non-alignment. It is 
useful here to sketch the debate which has exercised the 
CFDT from around 1967, ranging the advocates of the 
'strategie commune' against those of the 'strategie 
autonome' (Hamon and Rotman, 19S2: 166-77) <ies>.
Edmond Maire was the prime mover of the 'strat-Cgie 
commune' which envisaged a strong union drawing up its 
own political programme and stimulating its political 
allies (that is, the non-Communist Left) with its 
proposals. The relationship would be one of 
complementarity,
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...ce qui induisait en retour une 
pluralite de fonctions, la reconnaissance par 
les politiques du syndicalisme comme agent 
specifique de la transformation sociale.
(Maire, interviewed in Hamon and Rotman,
19S2: 172). (F)
The union would agree on 'objectives -for government' - 
not quantitative demands but structural re-forms. There 
would be a moral commitment but no 'no strike' deal. The 
workers had to understand that even with a Le-ft 
government, there was a limit to what could be achieved: 
in return for 'economic responsibility', 'realism', the 
government would agree on a hierarchy of demands to be 
granted as and when possible.
Against this, advocates of the 'strategie autonome' 
held a more traditional view. The union represents 'les 
gouvernes pas les gouvernants' (a phrase heard 
frequently from FO activists): it reacts to government 
options and should not be drawing up lists from which 
the government can then choose. The union's independence 
is not to be compromised in this way.
The alternative strategy is seen as a 'head office' 
phenomenon, 'un syndicalisms d'&tat-major'. Further, 'ce 
qui est rationnel economiquement n'est pas toujours 
raisonnable socialement'. From this perspective, the 
strike is the best method of advancing - pushing 
employers as far as they can go. Negotiations a chaud
(in the heat o-f the moment) are preferrable by -far to 
clinical agreements drawn up with potential governments. 
This is the traditional French unionism - militant, 
non-aligned, in permanent opposition and never likely to 
be tainted by the -failure o-f a '-friendly' government.
This was the argument which won out in the mid-1960s 
- hence the 'unity in action' pact with the CGT which 
was intended to reconstruct a balance o-f power 
•favourable to the workers. The, subsequent jump in 
industrial action, May 196S and (amongst other things) 
the achievement of a 35 percent rise in the minimum wage 
which clearly failed to cause any collapse of the 
economy seemed to bear out the arguments of the 
'strategie autonome' advocates.
However, subsequent developments (the recession, the 
collapse of the Union de la Gauche) led Maire to reopen 
the debate.
Feeling certain that the Right would be re-elected 
in 197S and hold onto power for a considerable period, 
Maire and others felt the need to 'recentre' their 
union's actions it had been drawn by the CGT into too 
many 'days of action' which were primarily political and 
ultimately sterile. It was necessary to refocus union 
activity, aim for advances closer to the ground through 
negotiation. The emphasis was to be on realistic, 
realisable demands: to that end, secret meetings were
held with employers' leaders and government officials at 
the end of 1977 to see what they might be prepared to 
bargain over. In this context, Maire's request to meet
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Giscard two days after the Right's victory in 1978 does 
not seem quite the dramatic event it appeared at the 
time (Hamon and Rotman, 1982: 298-311).
Recentraae thus posited the feasibility of working 
class gains without prior political change, through 
negotiating in good faith - a significant and 
controversial change in orientation compared with the 
post-1968 period, but perhaps an aspect of CFDT 
continuity, too, since the Confederation had always 
sought to get reluctant employers round the negotiating 
table (Mouriaux, 1984a).
Henceforth, union action would focus more directly 
on the workplace but there would be no integration of 
workers, and strikes to achieve demands - job creation 
via a shorter working week, better conditions, an 
extension of worker and trade union rights - would not 
be disavowed. Even limited openings from employers 
should be followed up. The Moreau Report on recentraqe 
(resyndi cali sati on has subsequently been preferred) was 
finally accepted by the Consei1 National in April 1978 
(See Syndicalisme Hebdo. No. 1703, 4th May 1978).
The directions sketched out by this report have been 
followed and the implications taken even further, 
despite a tendency to expect everything from the 
Socialist government in 1981, and nowadays it is 
debatable whether the CFDT belongs in the 
'revolutionary' camp. It is still socialist in 
orientation but its anti-capitalism is compromised in 
the eyes of both internal and external critics by its
pragmatic approach to negotiations and alliances 
(Raybould, 1985a) . Maire nowadays pleads -for 'un 
anti-capitalisme sans simolisme', arguing that the worst 
excesses of capitalism have been curbed by union action 
and the law, '1'action quotidienne de transformation'(Le 
Monde- 5th March 1986), which would appear to be a 
classic statement of reformism.
The CFDT retains an evident affinity with sections 
of the PS and broadly supported the Mauroy/Fabi us 
'modernisation' programme despite some bitterness at the 
lack of real consultation. Many ced^ti stes were 
appointed to official positions or the back-up staff of 
Mi ni stersK 1<s>> which left the Confederation open to 
criticism from its union rivals and the wider workforce 
when government policy became unpopular.
In late 1985, confirming the line implicit at the 
Bordeaux conference that summer, Maire declared that the 
Confederation would not be calling for a Left vote in 
the 1986 elections - the first time the Confederation 
had declined to make such a recommendation since 1970. 
Henceforth, recentree. the CFDT would talk to al1 
parties - there were to be no more taboos< 1'7’> .. .
In one respect, this seemed to be a reaffirmation of 
the union's right to a say in the political field but 
for many activists it was a rejection of a tradition 
stretching back to 1964 and beyond 4ia>.
From its origins, the CFTC was a christian not a 
catholic organi sati on < 1‘r> : even if it was inspired by
the Encyclical Rerum Novarum o-f 1S91 , the principles o-f 
justice and Christian charity were not interpreted in 
any dogmatic -fashion (Lefranc, 19S4: 49). Col 1 aborat i on 
was the key-word, along with the desire to see a just 
distribution o-f the pro-fits o-f labour. Class antagonism 
is seen as a -fact and deplored as such: but it is not
inherent in the system and can be eradicated through the 
correct application o-f union strength and if the moral 
principles of Christianity are. diffused throughout 
society (Reynaud, 1975a: 86-8).
The CFTC eliminated all reference to the Encyclicals 
from its statutes in 1947 but the reference to the 
'morale sociale chretienne' remains<20>. Around the same 
time, the CFTC's independence from the MRP was affirmed 
and formal links betwenn union and party severed. This, 
together with the rejection of catholic doctrine, was 
largely the work of men who were later instrumental in 
the 'deconfessionalisation' but the present day CFTC was 
nonetheless shaped by this period and the Resistance 
which preceded it (Hamon and Rotman, 19S2: 17-39).
The CFTC envisages a partnership of mutual respect 
between the owner of the means of production and the 
worker who has certain rights, notably the right to a 
just remuneration 'pour assurer la dignite de 1 'homme et 
de sa famille' (CFTC, undated: IS). CFTC documents and
discourse are sprinkled with similar references to the 
nuclear family and areas such as education and the 
welfare system are prominent among its preoccupations. 
(The Confederation was active in the successful campaign
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to head off any reorganisation of the private - mainly 
Catholic - school sector by the Socialist government in 
1933-4).
It argues for free enterprise, adding that ownership 
carries certain responsibilities — the duty to provide 
jobs and incomes, for example. The state sector should 
be limited to the provision of certain services and 
action to safeguard rights and common goods.
The CFTC chooses (naturally, -given its view of the 
potential for harmonious relationships in industry) to 
pursue the workers' interests by negotiation and 
contracts, the perfect instruments for 'la confrontation 
de points de vue differents mais non irremediablement 
contradictoires' (Landier, 1975: 71). Strikes are not
rejected but the essentially political weapon of the 
general strike is (Reynaud, 1975a: 90).
The Confederation is resolutely reformist. Accepting 
the present system and seeking only to infuse more 
justice and mutual respect, the CFTC prides itself on 
its role in negotiating agreements on training, 
pensions, the improvement of working conditions and so 
on. For the CFTC, these justify the action of those:
qui ont tenu a faire passer l'interet immediat 
des travailleurs avant les options ideologiques et 
les considerations de tactique. Les transformations 
se font en marchant, non dans 1 'attente d'une 
aggravation de la situation en vue d'hypothetiques 
bouleversements. (Landier, 1975: 74) (G)
Clearly, then, the CFTC is hostile to the class 
unionism of the CGT but it does not reject unified 
action with the latter -for 'legitimate ends' (CFTC, 
undated: 36). In this respect, it is -far more flexible 
than FO; and despite a shared reformism, relations with 
the latter are characterised by a certain formality 
because of FO's historical roots and anti-clericalism. 
Contacts with the CFDT are friendlier since the dispute 
over property and the CFTC name was settled in 1971.
CFTC doctrine has shown little change over the last 
twenty years. It has long espoused a supple form of 
planning (it first drew up a 'Plan' in 1935) and has 
been an advocate of incomes policies since 1961; since 
1971 it has called for a simultaneous moderation of 
price and income rises but holds out for free collective 
bargaining within a contractual framework (Conference 
Report, 1984: S3).
It works for a 'real community of interests' in the 
workplace and has advocated industrial relations reforms 
to this end - obligatory mediation in conflicts, more 
profit-sharing, workers on boards, to name a few (see 
Landier, 1975: 109-28). However, its reaction to the 
Auroux laws was reserved, perhaps because the CFTC is 
not well implanted in many firms and other 
Confederations stood to gain more from the greater 
resources made available under the law.
The CGC, now known officially as the Confederation 
Generale de 1 'Encadrement CGC, recruits cadres, that is,
managers, but also -foremen, technicians,
representatives, engineers and selected white collar 
workers. Like all French Con-federations, it proclaims 
its political independence: however, for the 1986
elections, it considered calling on its members to 
withdraw votes from candidates not supporting its social 
and economic positions and actively encouraged members 
to stand for seats, for any party other than the PCF, to 
ensure a voice for cadres in parliament (CGC, 1984: 29). 
Its social composition anchors it to the Right<zl>, 
though Confederal pronouncements are less dogmatic since 
Paul Marchelli took over the leadership in 1984.
Like the CFTC, it rejects class struggle and calls 
for 'solidarity' based on a humanist vision of the world 
(CGC, undated: 5). In words which echo those of the 
CFTC, it advocates reformism -
... un syndicalisme du possible, un 
syndicalisme d'efforts constants, concrets et 
obstines dans la direction souhaitable, 
infiniment plus efficace et plus ge?nerateur 
de progres que des attitudes dogmatiques 
eloignees de la realite et nourries d'une 
volonte revolutionnaire (CGC, undated: 6). (H)
Three major themes stand out among CGC 
preoccupations: the maintenance or even widening of 
salary differentials; pension arrangements and the 
social security system; the tax system (Reynaud, 1975a:
121). (Salaried managers on a high salary are hit harder 
than most and do not have the opportunities -for evasion 
open to other high earners...).
Its relations with the CFTC are cordial ('une 
organisation syndicale pleine de bon sens' - CGC, 1934: 
34) and it -finds some common ground in negotiations with 
FO while broadly rejecting its outmoded 'syndicalisme de 
feuille de paie'.
But it is ideologically hostile to the CGT (even if 
the latter comes close in its de-fence of wage 
differentials - Landier, 1931: 263) and to the CFDT, the 
latter's recent evolution not entirely dispelling 
worries associated with its 1970s gauchisme. not to 
mention its autoaestionnaire ideals and its calls for 
much flatter salary structures.
It is hostile to the attempts of the other 
Confederations to organise managers: it feels cadres
have specific problems which cannot be handled by a 
general union, a majority of whose members will 
inevitably have interests quite opposed in certain 
respects - authority and salary differentials being the 
most obvious. It was affronted by the 'representative' 
status afforded the other Confederations' cadre 
groupings by the Socialist government in 1931.
Formerly, the CGC saw itself as something of a link 
between the antagonistic worlds of the employers and 
workers. More recently, however, under Marchelli, it has 
adopted a mare strictly trade union prof i l e <=5==> . 
Benguigui and Monjardet (1934) argue that the CGC has no
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real 'project' and that it is more akin to a pressure 
group than a social movement. Nonetheless, they do note 
some evolution, the result, according to them, o-f the 
economic recession but also a -function of the internal 
heterogeneity of the Confederation. Important elements 
actually left for a time in the 1960s and 1970s because 
of the Confederation's rapport with employers and its 
conservative preoccupations: the arrival of Marchelli 
from the Metalworkers' Federation heralded a more 
rigorous defence of the cadres as workers and a more 
hostile attitude to the government.
One might add that the growth of the cadres unions 
in the other Confederations has also spurred a more 
militant attitude among CGC members at plant level (as 
with their reaction to the Creusot-Loire dismantlement 
and the problems at Technip in 19S4-5).
At its 19S4 conference, the CGC called for a 
loosening of the state hold on industry and particularly 
on the financial and banking groups: the aim ought to be 
an 'Hconomie concertee, regulee par une pianification 
souple a la franjpaise' (CGC, 1934: 15). The riqueur of
Belors was accepted but what the CGC saw as the lack of 
any coherent industrial redeployment programme was 
deplored. Given what it sees as its pivotal role in the 
workplace, the CGC was concerned about many aspects of 
the Auroux Report but the actual legislation proved more 
acceptable.
As will be outlined, the CGC embraces a form of 
'proposition force unionism' and, given its membership,
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sees itself as ideally placed to mediate between the 
economic objectives of companies and the social needs of 
the workers and the wider community.
NOTES
1. FO began to campaign hard in the education sector 
in 1983. At its 1984 conference, its leader Andre 
Bergeron stated, contrary to received opinion, that FO 
had never, tacitly or otherwise, . agreed to abstain in 
this sector.
2. With funds from the US labour movement and 
possibly the US government, as well as money from the 
French (Socialist) Labour Minister (Bergounioux, 1975: 
92; Kendall, 1975: 58: and Le Monde. 9th-12th May 1967). 
US money was still coming to FO in 1985 (Li berati o n « 
27th November 1985; International Labour Reports. 13, 
January 1986).
3. The 'transmission belt' union 'delivers' its 
members to a political party, letting political 
considerations guide industrial action.
4. The leader of the PCF cellule at Renault, Daniel 
Lacroix, was replaced on the PCF central committee by 
the leader of the CGT section in the company, Jean-Louis 
Fournier, when 'dissidents' were purged at the February 
1985 Party Conference (Le Monde. 12th February 1985).
5. Hence the resignations of Jean-Louis Moynot and 
Christiane Gilles (formerly editor of the CGT's women's 
magazine, Antoinette), from the Bureau Coofed^ral in 
late 1981. Both were members of the PCF.
6 . Semi-official talks between the CGT and PS in
1981 aimed at getting more Socialists into the union's
ruling bodies had little tangible effect. (See Adam, 
1983: 27).
7. A de -facto division of labour has been 
established with the CGT (and the CFDT in the past) 
taking action to force concessions and FQ stepping in to 
sign agreements to ensure these advances are not 
forefeited (Reynaud, 1975a: 186).
S. The general doctrine of FO is set out in a series
of articles collected in a special supplement to the 
Confederation journal, FQ Hebdo. 1608, 21st November 
1979.
However, any attempt to classify FO is fraught with 
difficulties: the various Federations have more autonomy 
than their counterparts in the other Confederations and 
different aspects of doctrine are emphasised in each 
(Adam, 1983: 11; Moss, 1984).
9. A visceral anti-communism - shared by FO's
old-style Socialists, anarcho-syndicalists and
Trotskyites as well as its Right wing - is ever-present 
and causes strains. Ironically, Bergeron's public 
disapproval of the inclusion of four PCF members in the 
first Mauroy government in 1981 was criticised by some 
FO members on the grounds that this was a strictly
political question that a trade union had no right to
intervene in.
10. And the church. FO has a strong anti-clerical 
tradition (Remond, 1985: 307-8) though it rejected
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accusations that it indulged in any 'chasse aux cures' 
at its 1934 conference (FO, 1935: 230).
11. However, Adam (1933) notes that FO activists 
became conseillers d'etat in 1979.
12. Activists from other Confederations can be 
scornful about this variety and lack of consistency. One 
described FO to me as an 'auberge espagnole'. Another 
remarked: 'Vous rencontrez tout et n'importe quoi a 
Force Ouvriere!' ('You find anything and everything in 
F O !').
13. The Farti Socialiste Unifie still exists and was 
in the 1931 government coalition. It was an important 
element in the theoretical debates surrounding Socialist 
realignment in the 1960s and 1970s.
14. Pierre Le Brun and Maurice Labi, heretics from 
the CGT and FO respectively, were also involved (Le 
Matin. 12th June 1935).
15. See also the interesting article by Pierre 
Cours-Salies in Le Matin. 12th June 1935: 'C'est dans 
les vieilles marmites qu'on fait les meilleurs debats'. 
Published during the 1935 CFDT conference, it shows the 
relevance of the questions asked at the 1964 founding of 
the CFDT to the current debate within the Confederation.
16. See Hamon and Rotman (1932: 341-6) for the 
extent of this CFDT influence. Among the better known 
names, Hubert Prevost became head of the Plan; Jeanette 
Laot joined the Presidential staff with responsibility 
for women's affairs; Michel Rolant was appointed to an 
organisation concerned with energy conservation.
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Metal war kers' leader Jacques Cherelque became special 
commissioner for Lorraine in May 1984.
17. Cf . the important CFDT report: 'Le Monde Change, 
Changeons Notre Syndicalisms' in Syndicalisms Hebdo. 
2020-3 and 2025, 7th-2Sth June and 12th July 1984.
18. This overview has given something of the 
richness of the intellectual and doctrinal debate within 
the CFTC/CFDT. Excellent accounts are given in Hamon and 
Rotman (1982) and Mouriaux (1984a). See also the other 
contributions in Kesselman and Groux (1984) and Landier 
(1981).
19. Though a CFTC document, La Morale Sociale 
Chretienne (undated: 12), claims: 'Ce sont les Chretiens
en general et les catholiques en particulier qui ont le 
plus approfondi les donnees primitives contenues ... au 
plus profond de la conscience des hommes.'
20. Inteqri stes. or fundamentalists, still push for 
a more committed Christian interpretation of unionism. 
The building trades Federation was dissolved and 
reconstituted at the Marseilles conference in 1984 
because of a dispute involving inteori stes. (See 
Li berati on. 30th November 1984).
21. Mouriaux (1984b: IS) notes that Jacques Chirac 
urged his RPR mi 1itants to be active in the CGC.
22. The old mentality was common amongst CGC 
activists I met. One remarked: 'Si je suis militant CGC, 
c'est pour vehiculer une certaine conception de 
1 'entreprise et de 1 'encadrement. Tout comme a la CGT on 




(A) '... the CGT works -for an end to capitalist
exploitation, notably by the socialisation of the means 
of production and exchange-' (CGT Rule Book).
(B) 'The two organisations have come through history 
together: both emerged from the great schism in the 
working class movement after the first world war; they 
share the same concern to give that class a unified, 
independent voice; and they draw their recruits from the 
same sections of the population. It is reductionist and 
polemical to argue that the union arm is simply a relay 
of the political avant-garde; but it is also apologetic 
and abstract to proclaim its independence without 
further commentary.' (Mouriaux, 1982: 203).
(C) 'To be sure, neither the CFDT nor the CGT are 
about to accept 'no strike' clauses in any contract; in 
fact, they state explicitly that an agreement confirms a 
particular situation and its validity disappears when 
that situation changes.' (Reynaud, 1975a: 183).
(D) '... too many of its positions are still 
expressed in a negative fashion... The constraints 
imposed by its internal diversity necessarily require a 
certain prudence.' (Bergounioux, 1982: 26).
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(E) '... they were accused of sanctioning the laws
of a system they ought to be destroying.' (Hamon and 
Rotman, 1982: 171).
(F) '... which would lead, in return, to a plurality 
of functions, the recognition by the politicians of the 
trade union as a specific agent of social 
transformation.' (Hamon and Rotman, 1982: 172).
(G) '... those who have given priority to the
immediate interests of the workers rather than 
ideological options and tactical considerations.
Transformation comes by moving forward, not by waiting 
for a situation to deteriorate into some hypothetical 
upheaval.' (Landier, 1975: 74).
(H) '... a trade unionism of the possible, of
constant, concrete, single-minded effort to move in the 
desired direction, which is infinitely more efficient 
and progressive than dogmatic attitudes with no grasp on 
reality and nourished by revolutionary ambitions.' (CGC, 
undated: 6).
3. THE FRENCH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
A central feature of the first two years of the 
Mitterrand Presidency was the passing of a series of 
laws in the field of industrial relations- The Lois 
Auroux (so designated after the name of the then Labour 
Minister) entailed the rewriting of a third of the 
labour legislation contained in the Code du Travail- In 
order to understand the aims, effects and potential long 
term impact of these laws on the place of trade unions 
in French society, it is necessary to set them in 
context. This chapter therefore describes the salient 
features of the French industrial relations system prior 
to the Auroux laws, concentrating on the attitudes of 
the 'social partners' (as the two sides of industry are 
so inappropriately called in France) to collective 
bargai ni ng.
The reference to an industrial relations 'system' 
does not imply a functionalist approach. Indeed, the 
case of France could be used to discredit the 'system' 
concept, especially when it is used to suggest a natural 
tendency to stability and order. Dunlop, who first 
theorised the idea of an industrial relations system, 
wrote (1958: 383):
An industrial relations system creates an 
ideology or a commonly shared body of ideas
and beliefs regarding the interaction and 
role of the actors which helps to bind the 
system together.
Clearly, a majority in the French labour movement 
explicity rejects any notion of sharing common beliefs 
with the employers. The revolutionary wing of French 
unionism actively combats capitalism and this is 
reflected in the confrontational way in which it uses 
industrial relations institutions.
A 'network of rules' (Dunlop, 1953) or a 'system of 
rules' (Flanders, 1965) does exist in France but it is 
inappropriate to place these at the centre of any 
industrial relations study: such an approach necessarily 
leads one to concentrate on how conflict in industry is 
managed or defused and neglects the structures of 
ownership or control which generate conflict (Hyman, 
1975: 11). This is inadequate when consensus on social
institutions is lacking and trade unions actively 
mobilise to overturn these structures of control. In 
short, it is difficult in the French context to view 
conflict as somehow useful (in that it allows 'friction' 
in the system to be located and eliminated) when that 
conflict is always a potential threat to the very 
existence of the system.
Similarly, where bargaining does not occupy the 
central place that it does in, say, the UK or US, it 
cannot be seen as the great determinant of union 
behaviour that pluralist analysts maintain (as Clegg,
1976, notes). Observers who adopt this perspective 
invariably have an a priori antipathy to the CGT because 
of its opposition to existing social structures and its 
refusal to play the game following the 'rules' of 
industrial relations. The evaluative overtones of calls 
for 'permanent bargaining' (Adam et a l , 1972) or the 
recommendation of US or German models (Landier, 1981) 
are therefore clear in France'/ more so than when 
advocated elsewhere.
Any study of the French industrial relations scene 
which sees, for example, CGT principles and doctrine as 
aberrations, and dangerous to boot (eg. Kendall, 1975) 
is, consciously or unconsciously, refusing to examine 
all the contradictions inherent in current economic 
structures. The analysis offered here follows Hyman in 
seeing the 'system' as something other than a smoothly 
functioning machine through which inevitable antagonisms 
are processed for the greater good of alls
... the notion of an industrial relations 
system ... is of analytical value only if it 
incorporates the existence of contradictorv 
processes and forces, and hence treats 
instability and stability as of equal 
significance as 'system outcomes' (Hyman,
1975: 12).
French Employers and the Unions
The previous chapter outlined the doctrine of the
trade unions; in order to understand French industrial 
relations, the nature of the employers must also be 
examined since they can be just as intransigent and 
aggressive, both verbally and physically, as the 
revolutionary unions: in certain big companies like
Citroen, Talbot and Michel in and perhaps even more so in 
small businesses, physical violence towards unionists is 
far from rare<x>. It may be argued, along with Kendall 
(1975: 75), that unyielding attitudes adopted by the 
patronat on the one hand and the CGT on the other are 
mutually reinforcing. To give one example, comites 
d 'entrenrise were effectively neutralised as bodies with 
any economic influence after 1943 because employers 
considered the CGT was attempting to use them as 'class 
struggle organisms' (Brizav, 1975: 93) or indeed as
potential soviets (Reynaud, 1975a: 240).
If it is foolhardy to generalise, one can 
nonetheless say that paternalism is widespread and the 
patron de droit divin who has never accepted a trade 
union presence in his firm is still a common figure 
among French employers. Unions were not legally entitled 
to set up branches (sections) in workplaces until 1963 
and even then many employers were still loath to accept 
the fait svndical. This attitude is not restricted to 
small enterprises: Michelin is notoriously anti-union 
and paternalist and resigned its membership of the main 
employers' body, the Conseil National du Patronat 
Fran^ais (CNPF) because it did not prevent the 1963 law 
(Brizav, 1975: 136). Such attitudes underpin a
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reluctance to engage in genuine negotiations with unions 
which destabilises industrial relations in France.
The C N P F <2> is organised around a dual structure of 
industrial branch federations and in.ter— industrial 
regional bodies, like the labour unions; but it also has 
'associate members' in the form of 'ginger groups' 
representing Christian, progressive and technocratic 
opinions, for example. Affiliation is open to all 
companies including those in the nationalised sector 
which contributed around 25 percent of CNF’F revenue 
after 1981.
The CNPF is empowered to negotiate agreements with 
the unions on any matter other than salaries. Thus, it 
has come to agreements with the Confederations covering 
pensions, unemployment benefits, redundancy procedures, 
paid holidays, etc (Martin, 1983: 112-6 and Landier,
1981: Annexe V provide lists).
Weber (1984) has argued that the CGT-CFDT 'unity in 
action' pact of January 1966 plus the shock of 1968 
forced the patronat. led by 'modernist' elements in the 
CNPF, to finally throw off its protectionist, 
paternalist skin and recover the leading industrial role 
it had ceded to the state after the Second World War. 
Maithusianism<3> and introspection gave way among the 
organised patronat to productivism and free market 
philosophy and more interest was shown in the 
institutionalisation of conflict, Weber argues. However, 
under the impact of economic crisis, the patronat
3/5
hardened its attitude towards the unions and actively 
sought ways to circumvent them (Morville, 1985; Baudouin 
and Collin, 1933).
The de-feat o-f the Right in 19S1 was an unforeseen 
setback: the employers' 'union', like .those of the 
workers, is nominally apolitical but its sympathies 
inevitably tend to the Right and the CNPF urged the 
French to vote for Giscard d'Estaing before the second 
round of the Presidential elections in May 19S1.
Yet it was soon back on the offensive, aided by the 
failure of the Socialists' initial expansionary 
policies. Under Fabius especially, the government 
appeared to be adopting the vocabulary of the patrons, 
with attempts to legislate for more flexible working 
hours and contracts and a revaluing of the 'enterprise' 
which contrasted sharply with what employers saw as the 
vendetta of the first few months.
Weber (19S4: 23) suggests that in the first period 
of the Socialist government, the 'modernists' were 
prepared to make a 'historic compromise' with the Left, 
but fiscal reforms, anti-patron rhetoric and the form 
the nationalisations took combined to scupper the 
project.
Subsequently, and especially after Yvon Gattaz 
succeeded Francois Ceyrac as 'patron des patrons', the 
CNPF leaned towards a neo— liberal approach, arguing for 
denationalisation (another incursion into the political 
arena deemed unwise by some members) and the 'motor 
role' of the private sector in industrial regeneration
rather than the technocratic state.
Two other groups speak for sections of the patronat: 
the Conf Idsrati on General e des F'etites et Movennes 
Entrenr i ses (CGPME) represents those small businessmen 
who still have day to day control of their companies. 
Firms can be members of both the CNPF and. the CGPME and 
the latter has representatives on the various committees 
of the former while still being represented in its own 
right in negotiations with the- unions. Le Syndicat 
National de la Petite et Movenne Industrie (SNPMI) 
emerged after a split within the CGPME in 1975: it is 
outspoken on behalf of "le vrai patronat de b a s e ", 
believing the CNPF to be too much under the control of 
the larger companies.
Though deemed 'representative' organisations for the 
negotiation of legally recognised collective agreements 
with the unions, the CNPF and CGPME are not necessarily 
representative of all shades of employer opinion: 
indeed, sections of the French patronat are fiercely 
independent and hostile to any form of organised 
representation - Weber's thesis attracted criticism on 
these grounds (Weber, 1984: 42-3).
The heterogeneity of the patronat does not conceal a 
widespread anti-unionism. This may be translated into 
repression, paternalism or more sophisticated direct 
appeals to the workforce or the exploitation of labour 
legislation to circumvent the unions (Morville, 1985; 
Baudouin and Collin, 1983). The end result is that
relations between employers and unions at all levels are 
tense and in the past neither side has really accepted 
the legitimacy of the other.
This ex p lains why worker representative institutions 
in France are only grudgingly accepted in the workplace, 
if at all: rather than the outcome o-f negotiations
between the two sides, these structures have invariably 
been imposed on the employer by Taw at a time when the 
balance o-f power was decisively in favour of the 
workers.
Thus, following the great strike wave of 1936, the 
formal right to belong to a union was established and 
employee representatives, delegues du personnel (DP), 
introduced. After the Second World War, with the 
employer class largely discredited, companies were 
obliged to set up workplace committees, comi tes 
d *entreori se (CE) , which gave workers limited rights in 
the economic and social life of the firm. In 1968, after 
the nationwide strikes of May and June, union branches 
(sections svndicales) were legally recognised in the 
workplace for the first time.
Each of these advances was snatched from the 
employers during periods of social unrest: thus, rather 
than representing areas of consensus within the 
workplace, they might better be seen as industrial 
vehicles for the continuation of the wider ideological 
war being waged outside. As noted above, employers have 
restricted the role of the committees due to the threat 
posed within them by the 'revolutionary' unions.
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However. confronted with the greater threat of the open 
organisation of union workplace branches, many employers 
have hastened to set up committees since 196S and chosen 
to discuss problems there rather than directly with the 
unions (Goetschy, 1935). Reynaud (1975a:. 250) suggests 
that this suits some of the unions since they are less 
implicated in any agreements finally reached.
The various institutions’ (their function, 
composition and rights) will be looked at in more detail 
when the changes made by Auroux are examined in the next 
chapter. First, the role of collective negotiations in 
France is outlined to further illustrate the fundamental 
lack of consensus.
Collective Bargaining in France
Kendall (1975: 74) argues that:
... the character of French collective 
bargaining, the nature of industrial 
relations, is backward almost beyond belief.
The social outlook of French employers, their 
unwillingness to recognise unions and bargain 
collectively, is certainly the first cause.
The failure of the unions, notably the CGT, 
to muster the forces or the will to force the 
employers to heel is certainly the second.
By 'backward', Kendall appears to mean the lack of 
legitimacy afforded to each side by the other and the
resulting -fragility of any agreements reached. The 
'problem' is that the CGT, and on occasions the CFDT, 
sees material and even structural gains within the 
present system as partly illusory since control (and the 
greater part of the benefits of that system) still 
remains with the capitalist and managerial class. Since 
they oppose the system, 'revolutionary' unionists are 
reluctant to sanction it in any 'way or accept as their 
ultimate aim changes which leave the system intact and 
the workers happier with it.
However, this position is paradoxical in that union 
action would not be sustainable for long if it was not 
seen to have some tangible impact and to convert 
positive rapports de force into gains (be they material 
or structural) some form of negotiated agreement is 
usually necessary. The CGT, and until recently the CFDT, 
have always been happiest negotiating in the heat of 
action: it is clear in these circumstances that the 
employers or the state have only made concessions 
because they have been forced to and gains here can be 
contrasted with the meagre pickings to be had from 
neQociations a froid. This attitude is held even in 
firms where the CGT is well organised, as was the case 
at the SKF factory in Ivry visited during fieldwork. One 
CGT activist was explicit:
Ici, a chaque fois qu'on a reussi a 
decrocher quelque chose, c'est sur des 
rapports de force... On n'a jamais pu avoir
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quoi que cs soit sans rapports de force - 
c'est-a-dire mobi1isation, mobilisation des 
gens avant de negocier... On n'a jamais eu 
rien d'acquis sans fa..- C'est arrive qu'on 
n'a pu mobiliser sur les mots d'ordre. Eh 
bien, quand on est arrive en reunion, le 
Directeur disait: 'Bon, voila, c'est deux
pour cent...' Pas question de^negociers pa 
s'arretait la... Des fois, il discutait 
apres, mais il avait deja dit non. (A)
On the other hand, at the equally wel1-organised 
Chapelle Darblay works near Rouen, the CGT convenor 
spoke about picking up the phone to resolve problems 
with management: but even here, the capacity to discuss 
and solve problems was not put down to any shared notion 
of legitimate grievances but to the rapports de force. 
The CGT was capable of stopping production in the unit 
and management knew it. A similar situation prevailed at 
Renault, leading some commentators to speak misleadingly 
of CGT-management 'cogestion' in the company (see, for 
instance, Le Monde. 17th October 1935).
'Agreement' is therefore a relative term in France. 
An accord. for the CGT and for many CFDT activists too, 
is never in any sense 'final' and even if it signs, the 
CGT tends to immediately raise certain points for 
renegotiation. An agreement
... is not part of the progressive
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creation of a different order of things, but 
an expression of the balance of power (Dubois 
et a l , 197S: 71).
The CFDT had a similar outlook i.n the period
following the 'unity in action' pact with the CGT 
(January 1966) until the recentraae of 1973. Thus, CFDT 
leader Edmond Mai re could write: •
Consignation ecrite des concessions 
obtenues. 1 'accord n'est jamais considere par 
1 'organisation syndicale comme la signature 
de la paix mais tout au plus comme un 
armistice toujours susceptible d'etre remis 
en cause (Maire and Julliard, 1975: 104). (B)
Recentraae adopted in 1973 (see Svndicalisme Hebdo. 
1703, 4th May 1973) heralded a fundamental shift, with 
the CFDT henceforth seeking to pursue 'realistic' (or 
rather immediately realisable) demands on the ground
through negotiations. Thus, the CFDT is now actively 
involved in trying to establish solid contractual 
relations in France based on negotiations in good faith 
on issues which will have a tangible effect for the 
workers concerned.
The Resolution Generale adopted at the CFDT's June
1935 conference in Bordeaux (see Svndicalisme Hebdo.
2065, 9th May 1935 for the text) confirmed the priority 
afforded to contracts over legislation, now considered
appropriate for fixing the framework for negotiated 
agreements, not the details of industrial life as is 
common in many respects, still. The establishment of 
sturdy negotiating structures is seen as a test of union 
efficiency (and therefore one pillar of the strategy for 
building a strong labour movement).
The contrast with the politicised slogans of the 
1970s is complete. For the Confederation now, the 
employer is no longer to be seen as the class enemy: 
rather, he has a legitimate function to perform in the 
company and between the differing 'logics' of the patron 
and the workforce, there should be 'conflictual 
cooperation'. By 1986, leader Edmond Maire was even 
questioning the anti-capitalist basis of CFDT doctrine, 
pointing out that capitalism had been forced to adapt 
under union and political pressure and trade union 
strategy had to take such advances into account. Maire's 
prescription -
Au grand reve de la rupture nous 
substituons - avec un realisme qui n'exclut 
nullement 1 'ambition - 1 'action quotidienne 
de transformation (Le Monde. March 5th 1986) (C)
- situated the CFDT squarely in the 'reformist' camp, 
'ambition' nowadays referring to gains that are possible 
within the present system.
This line is contested within the Confederation (see 
Raybould, 1985a; and the Bordeaux conference report in
Syndicalisms Hebdo, No.2071, 20th June 19S5) but the 
Resolution Generale at Bordeaux was adopted by a 67 
percent majority and the Confederation has actively set 
an example in recent negotiations (on '-flexibility' , 
retraining, etc).
At one level, this espousal o-f la politique
contractuel1e brings the CFDT closer to the three other 
're-formist' Con-f ederati ons but • its conception o-f 
bargaining still leaves it some way -from FO.
The latter, while ideologically prepared to 
negotiate in good -faith within the present system
(seeking only to remedy i mper-f ect i ons, part i cul ar 1 y
regarding the distribution o-f profits) sees any benefits 
gained as sacrosanct, to be built upon but never to be 
bargained over in subsequent negotiations. This notion 
of avantaqes acquis. or simply acquis, the idea that 
they are irreversibl e , an addition fractionnee rather 
than specific, distinct agreements (Adam et a l , 1972: 
S3) has enormous strength amongst grassroots mi 1itants 
and is a powerful barrier to the establishment of solid 
bargaining structures in France, especially at workplace 
1evel.
The failure of the 'flexibility' talks of 19S4 (to 
be examined later) illustrate the refusal to 'bargain' 
in its primary sense of making a transaction: each side 
is suspicious of the sincerity or even the capacity of 
the other to fulfil their part of any bargain and as a 
result the unions cling on dearly to the status quo, 
thereby retaining advantages won during trials of
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strength, advantages more than likely to be taken -from 
them should the rapports de -force become less 
f avourabl e.
However, the CFDT leadership is now prepared to take 
gambles during collective bargaining, making openings to 
the CNPF which it hopes could unleash a 'social 
dynamic'. For this, it is necessary to have a view of 
negotiations as 'donnant donnant-' - give and take. If 
some acQuis can be exchanged for others which better 
satisfy the needs of the workforce, then the CFDT is 
prepared to bargain:
... il ne s'agit nullement d'accepter 
n'importe quoi mais de voir si nos acquis 
n'ont pas a changer, a se developper sur de 
nouveaux terrains. (Svndicalisme Hebdo.
No.2045, 19th December 19S4). (D)
FO still tends to see acguis as the results of class
struggle and any abandonment as a betrayal of the
workers.
FO has a similar attitude (and again it is close to 
the CGT in this instance) towards labour legislation, 
including those aspects agreed in negotiations between 
employers and unions and subsequently translated into 
the legal Code by the government. The Code du Travail is 
inviolate for both FO and the CGT unless changes are 
deemed positive by them.
In contrast, the CFDT, as the thrust of the
Resolution Generals at Bordeaux made clear, nowadays 
•feels the law should be restricted to providing the
•framework -for negotiations: global legislation is
ill-adapted to the specific needs of individual 
companies and their workers and negotiated agreements
are not only more flexible but more likely to be
respected by both sides, the CFDT feels.
Serious obstacles to such an approach remain. For 
example, at workplace level, activists, even those in 
CFDT svndi cats. still retain the old attitude to 
negotiations. Respect for agreements entails some sort 
of 'policing' role for the union, which is difficult for 
a French mi 1itant to assume. The mi 1itant's link to the 
workers is such that he is obliged to take up any 
grievances and rivalry between the various svndi cats 
raises the problem of surenchere: to attract workers, 
one union might make demands so high they have little 
realistic chance of succeeding and every chance of 
provoking a dispute when hopes are dashed.
Nonetheless, at Confederation level at least, there 
does now exist a will amongst four of the the five main 
confederations to treat negotiations seriously, as 
legitimate union action likely to bring real gains.
Much therefore depends on the response of the 
patronat: as we saw above, employers have been every bit 
as intransigent as the unions in the past and only 
conceded bargaining rights with reluctance in 1936. A 
first law on collective agreements in 1919 produced 
results in most branches but fell into disuse before
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long with the hostility o-f the CGTU towards
'col 1 aboration ' and the authoritarian attitudes o-f the 
employers bearing the responsibility (Reynaud, 1975a: 
176) .
A 1950 law also had an impact only in..the short term 
but it was important in that it set up the national, 
single industry agreement as the model -for French 
negotiations. This suited both- sides - the unions 
because it meant that a maximum number o-f workers,
including those in unorganised plants, were covered, and 
the employers because minimum wages were -fixed and this 
a-f-forded some protection against the 'un-fair
competition' o-f bosses who might be able to -force down 
wages below the level o-f their rivals (Goetschy and
Martin, 19S1: 192).
National negotiations, between the Con-f ederati ons
and the CNPF directly, developed in the 1960s: these 
tend to fix general principles which are then applied at
the level of the industrial branch and, where
appropriate, the company, by further negotiations. At 
workplace level, there have been some innovatory
negotiations in the past (notably the Renault agreement 
on the fourth week of paid holidays in 1955) but until 
very recently employers were totally opposed to any 
talks at this level.
Negotiations over wages (which are still, after all, 
at the heart of most union demands and the cause of most 
strikes) therefore have traditionally had little real 
meaning in France. Minimum rates in each industry, in
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theory negotiated between union and employer 
Federations, often merely move in line with the national 
minimum wage set by the government: they then become the 
springboard for union action in individual firms to 
increase real wages even though these, ultimately, are 
often set by unilateral management decisions:
Le sens reel de la negoci-ation est 
d'alimenter une guerilla locale, beaucoup 
plus efficace qu'elle et qui interesse 
beaucoup plus directement les salaries.
(Reynaud, 1975a: 211). <E>
If one also recalls that French salaries contain a high 
proportion of long service, 'good behaviour' and 'merit' 
bonuses, determined largely by management alone, then 
the insignificance of the negotiating process becomes 
clearer still (cf. Gallie, 1978: Ch.4).
It is a complex matter trying to apportion 
'responsibility' for the relative insignificance of real 
bargaining in France. Mutually antagonistic ideologies 
and historical choices made by political actors would 
seem best to account for the low institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict and the primacy afforded to action 
over negotiation (Gallie, 1983: Chs.10 and 12). Bunel
and Saglio (1977) argue that ideology (more than any 
structural factors such as plant size or technology) 
lies behind the employers' rejection of negotiation. 
Their study found no commitment to bargaining even in
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those -firms where the 'revolutionary' unions were in a 
minority position. Only industrial action managed to get 
the employer to the negotiating table. The authors -found 
a strong desire amongst patrons to retain total control 
of their firms, even at the expense of any possible 
expansion of capacity: such a strong commitment to
personal power clearly leaves little room far any 
dilution by contractual agreement:*'
Dubois et al (197S: 72) agree, noting 'the reduced 
propensity of either side of industry to conduct 
negotiations outside actual dispute situations, at least 
at plant level': this they link to 'the absence of any 
consensus as to the ultimate aim of negotiations'. (They 
also point out a further symptom of the low 
institutionalisation of conflict - the lack of recourse 
to the extensive conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
machi nery).
In the face of this entrenched hostility of the 
employers (and given the tendency of the French state to 
involve itself directly in all aspects of labour 
relations via the Inspecteurs du Travail. the Fr-Cfets 
and legislation) it is not surprising that the French 
labour movement has traditionally aimed at pursuing 
workers' interests through strike activity aimed as much 
at the government of the day as at industry. Yet the 
CFDT has evolved, as we have seen, and the outlook for 
bargaining has changed with it.
The patronat. too, has evolved, but not in the same 
direction. Spurred on by the need to control costs more
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closely due to the economic recession, the CNPF has 
advocated much greater 'individualisation' o-f salaries, 
with wage rises linked both to the performance o-f the 
worker and the -financial health o-f the company (See Le 
Monde, 24th November 19S4: 'La nouvelle politique
salariale du CNPF), There would evidently be little 
scope here -for any union negotiations, especially given 
the general tendency o-f the CFDT- in particular to look 
-for a flattening of the wage hierarchy.
The CNPF has added its voice to those on the Right 
calling for an end to the 'monopoly' on representation 
enjoyed by the five large Confederations (plus FEN) 
which gives them certain advantages in workplace 
elections and, in allowing them to set up sections 
irrespective of their real weight in the firm, also 
means they are automatically empowered to negotiate 
agreements with the employer (Le Monde. 12th July 19S5). 
Any change in the criteria of 'representati vity' 
would doubtless leave more pliable 'negotiators' facing 
the employer (non-unionised workers, house unions, etc).
In the run-up to the 1986 elections, employer 
pressure groups became more and more insistent that, 
given the increasing diversity of firms, salaries, 
working time and whole work contracts should be fixed at 
workplace level: more often than not, these schemes 
suggest negotiators other than unions (special dellaues 
du personnel with extended powers, the comi tes 
d'entreprise. etc). The abandonment of the Code du 
Travai1. or at least much more freedom to 'negotiate'
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contracts with certain clauses departing from legal 
norms, are explicitly advocated/0 ’.
The reversal of the previous orientation is 
remarkable.
NOTES
1. A few examples at random:
In November 19S4, a Turkish CGT member was shot dead 
during an industrial dispute by a company 'bodyguard', 
perhaps with the complicity of his employer (Le Monde, 
13th November 1934) .
In February 1932, 200 armed 'mercenaries' stormed a 
cheese factory in the west of France to recover 750,000 
Camemberts in the possession of occupying workers 
(Fredet and Pingaud, 1982: 53).
Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2050, 24th January 1935, 
reported the suspended prison sentences given to seven 
foremen at Citroen (all CSL activists) for intimidation, 
GBH, racist insults and impeding union activity.
2. See Martin (1933) for the functioning of the CNPF 
and a brief outline of its history and policies. See 
also Reynaud (1975a: Chapter 2; Lefranc (1975); Weber 
(1936) and Brizay (1975).
3. Meaning here, in its economic sense, the 
restriction of output in order to support prices and the 
related restriction of imports and free trade.
4. 'Representativity', for legal purposes, has, 
since the Law of 11th February 1950, been determined by: 
membership numbers; financial health; independence (from
parties, employers and the government); 'experience'; 
and the 'patriotic attitude' demonstrated during the 
Occupation (Rivero and Savatier, 1934: 153).
5. See 'L 'entreprise au coeur du dialogue social', 
(Le Monde. 3rd April 1935) -for a discussion of some of 
these projects.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'Here, every time we've managed to get anything, 
it's because we've managed to get ourselves into a 
position o-f strength - by mobi 1 i sati on . mobilising the 
lads ahead o-f the negotiations. Without that, we'd never 
get anything... Sometimes, they don't come out, or don't 
work to rule, or whatever. So we arrive at the meeting 
and the boss says: "OK. Two percent." No question o-f
negotiating: that's as -far as it goes... Sometimes, he
discussed things after, but he'd already said no.' (CGT, 
SKF) .
<B> 'An agreement just sets down in writing the 
concessions that have been won: it is never seen by the 
trade union as a signing of the peace, but at the very 
most as a truce that is always likely to be called into 
question.' (Maire and Julliard, 1975: 104).
(C) 'In place of the great dream of a clean break 
with capitalism, we advocate - with a realism which does 
not exclude ambition - day by day transformation.'
(Edmond Maire, Le Monde. 5th March 1986).
CD) '... it is not a question o-f accepting just 
anything, but o-f seeing whether things won in the past 
need to change, or be developed in new directions.' 
(CFDT, Syndicalisms Hebdo. 2045, 19th December 1984).
(E) 'The real meaning o-f these negotiations lies in 
the substance they provide -for localised 'guerilla' 
activity which is much more effective and concerns the 
workforce a lot more directly.' (Reynaud, 1975a: 211).
4. THE AURQUX LAWS
In the aftermath of the Left victory, and in an 
attemot to forestall what it reckoned would be a 
di ri Gi ste government, the CNPF decided to revive 
negotiations, la politique contractual 1e , at national 
and industrial branch level and at the same time try to 
avoid serious discussions at workplace level, in part by 
opening up more channels of 'direct dialogue' with the 
workforce (Fredet and Pingaud, 1932: 175-7).
The CNPF's greatest fear was that the Socialists 
would want to impose the unions as 'partenaires obliges' 
in their firms - and in this they were quite correct.
The report on 'Las Droits des Travai11eu r s ' bearing 
the name of Labour Minister Jean Auroux<x> indeed saw a 
stronger union oresence in the workplace as an essential 
plank of the Socialist plan to place negotiation at the 
heart of French industrial relations, to make 
negotiating 'le mode normal de fonctionnement des 
relations sociales' (p.31).
Underlining the fact that, hitherto, negotiation had 
not been the strong point of either unions or employers, 
Auroux maintained that his proposals, if implemented, 
would herald:
... une transformation profonde et durable 
des relations industriel1es dans notre pays et 
... une veritable rupture avec le modele
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existant (p.39). (A)
In reality, the Report avocated -for the most part only 
the strengthening o-f existing rights: with the exception 
o-f the new croupes d 'exoression. it was a question of 
extending but not fundamentally reworking the role of 
existing institutions.
The Report argued that working people must be given 
the same democractic rights in -their working life that 
they had won outside the work place:
Citoyens dans la cite, les travailleurs 
doivent 1 'etre aussi dans leur entreprise 
(p . 3) .
However, this was seen not only as a matter of social 
justice ('La recherche de profits immediats a trop 
souvent ignore les interets legitimes des travai11e u r s ' 
- p.3)(C) but also one of economic efficiency: the main
asset of the developed world in the current crisis was
seen as the quality of its workforce, and for this to be
exploited to the full, there had to be an unleashing of 
energies and capabilities (p.5). The unions had fought
to maintain industry and jobs, therefore their new
rights in this field were a guarantee of France's 
economic future.
There were four main axes to the Report grouped 
around two central themes. The first theme was noted
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above: the workers must be citizens in the work place. 
This entailed: a) the re-establishment and enlargement 
o-f workers' rights and b) the 'reconstitution of the 
work place col 1ectivitv'.
The second theme was that workers must become 
'actors of change' in their company which required: c) 
an enhanced role for work place institutions and d) a 
revival of negotiations.
a) Workers' Rights. The report recommended a 
ti ghteni ng—up of controls on arbitrary employer 
sanctions and, more innovative, advocated a 'right of 
expression' for workers on their working conditions. The 
existing Health and Safety Committee and the Committee 
for the ImDrovement of Working Conditions should be 
merged and given an extended brief to study conditions, 
make prooosals and ensure legislation was resDected.
b ) The Reconstitution of the Workplace Collectivity. 
This entailed a reversal of the present trend (towards 
'un eclatement de la collectivite du travail') which was 
leading towards a dual society. Auroux was guided here 
by two principles:
i) Workers should be able to look forward to a 
contract which guaranteed their full social rights and, 
as far as possible, their continued employment.
ii) Companies should have a certain flexibility in 
their use of manpower but 'legitimate' flexibility 
meant, say, using temporary workers when vital staff
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members were absent. Temporary and contract workers were 
not to be used in permanent jobs; the contrat a duree 
i ndl?t ermi nee (the permanent job) was to be the rule and 
other types o-f contract closely regulated exceptions.
Furthermore, contract workers, temps, part-timers, 
etc, were to enjoy the same rights as other, permanent 
workers as far as possible.
c ) An Increased Role for Representative
Insti tuti ons. Auroux suggested the adaptation of 
representative institutions in smaller firms to try and 
lighten the ''threshold effect'<3>; it was accepted that 
the cost of representation in these companies was 
sometimes a burden. New institutions covering small 
firms on the same site were suggested but it was left to 
industry to make suggestions. On the other hand, 
measures were suggested to make it less easy for an 
employer to avoid holding elections for committees over 
long periods.
It was recommended that there be more union and 
worker representatives in larger firms and all 
representatives should go on economics courses paid for 
by the employer.
The CE's economic role was to be extended and its 
social role (organising canteens, outings, etc.) 
maintained;; it was to have access to a wider range of 
information and expert advice to help it assess the 
data. This, the report argued, would enable the workers 
to have a real check on what was happening in their
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company and give them some capacity to put -forward 
proposals i-f events were moving against their interests 
(p.25). Each committee was to have increased -funding 
•from the employer to enable it to function.
The Report called for new committees to be set up at 
group level where crucial decisions were often made 
without representatives having any right to question 
them.
It was to be made less easy to sack or refuse to 
reinstate workers who had some representative role 
(especially those who put their jobs on the line by 
calling for elections when no committee or deleques 
ex i sted) .
d) The Relaunch of Collective Negotiations. Auroux 
noted that millions of workers were still not covered by 
any collective agreement (a full thirty years after the 
1950 law on negotiations) or only covered by agreements 
which were out of date. He urged all means to be taken 
(including the extension of agreements by the Labour
Inspectorate to branches not covered) to ensure all
workers came under an agreement.
Conciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures 
would be more rapid and rejection of findings by either 
side would henceforth have to be accompanied by a 
motive, so that the workers could see the explanations.
The most far-reaching recommendation was for annual 
negotiations on wages and other central aspects of
working life to be made obligatory at branch and
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workolace level. Furthermore, in order to ensure the 
credibility o-f agreements at firm level, Auroux 
recommended that they should be signed by unions 
representing a certain percentage of the workforce. 
(Hitherto, a minority union could sign an.agreement and 
make it valid for all).
However s
Cette obligation de negocier n'implique 
pas 1 'obligation de conclure mais il faudra 
que les negociations soient serieuses et non 
pas formelles (p.38). (D)
If, on the employer's side, this meant that he 
should at least hear out the unions' proposals and 
claims, on their side it implied taking into account the 
economic context - hence, union representatives were to 
get all the information destined for the CE and receive 
the same economics training.
Despite the cries from the patronat. the Auroux 
report and the laws which followed do not represent any 
revolutionary break with the capitalist system and 
essential authority relationships within that system 
remained intact. Auroux's aim was to introduce an 
element of consensus into French industrial relations by 
stimulating each side of industry into taking into 
account the interests of the other, this in itself being 
seen as a factor in economic recovery:
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S'il n'est pas question de remettre en 
cause dans le secteur prive 1 'unite de 
direction et de decision dans 1 ' entreprise, il 
convient d'instituer des mecanismes qui 
rendent possible 1 'expression de toutes les 
energies et les capacites (pp.4-5). (E)
Auroux was even more explicit in the par1iamentary
debate on his proposed legislation:
Nous reconnaissons le droit et la 
responsibility d 'entreprendre, nous 
reconaissons 1 'unite de direction et la 
responsibi1ite de gestion de l'employeur. Mais 
nous disons aussi aue dans cette collectivite 
de travail, dont nous savons bien qu'y 
coexistent et qu'y coexisteront encore des 
antagonismes d'interet comme dans toute 
societe humaine, il importe aue les uns 
prennent davantage conscience de la dimension 
humaine de 1 'entreprise et les autres 
davantage conscience de sa dimension 
economique; la democratie dans 1 'entreprise 
est porteuse d'efficacite economique qui en 
absorbe rapidement les couts (Le Monde. 14th 
May 19S2). (F)
Thus. Auroux left all power of decision in the hands
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of the emplover despite the widened brief of the various 
reoresentative institutions. The employer could still 
make unilateral decisions on wages after 'seriously'
listening to union claims; he was in no way bound by the 
opinion of his CE; and his economic .power was not
affected in any way by Auroux's changes.
Kesselman (1983a: 35), in a review of the first 
phase of the PS programme, argues-that:
... the government is serving as a midwife
to ease the transition to a mode of pluralist
and corporatist regulation long prevalent 
elsewhere.
Essentially, the working class was to be harnessed to a 
project of economic 'modernisation' under the leadership 
of 'middle strata' which only sought to alter property 
relations where that was necessary for its industrial 
strategy. It was 'rationalising' rather than 
democratising industrial relations and the breadth of 
the reforms in this field could not conceal what was 
little more than an attempt at corporatist integration.
Although critics have made much of the 'turnaround' 
in government policy from June 1982, the germ of its new 
discourse was already evident in the early phase and, 
indeed, the Auroux report. The anti-employer rhetoric of 
the first few months (Fredet and Pingaud, 1982) was a 
perhaps understandable political reaction: the
Socialists nonetheless were attached to the value of
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enterprise and in seeking to introduce a form of 
'conflictual cooperation'<3> they sought above all to 
make industrial relations mechanisms function more 
smoothly: the previous model was not only socially 
divisive, it was costly when inevitable, frustrations 
failed to find an outlet and on too many occasions these 
frustrations had imperilled the state itself.
The government was later obliged, in the context of 
a longer international recession than it had reckoned on 
and a general hostility towards any coordinated 
reflation in Europe or the wider developed world, to put 
its emphasis on economic rationalisation and it then 
rapidly became clear that the Auroux legislation had 
changed little in terms of worker power or even of 
worker input. As Coriat (19S4) has suggested. if the 
lois Auroux opposed previous trends on certain points, 
they were added onto and mixed in with previous laws 
rather than substituted far them. It was therefore 
comparatively easy for the government to tinker further 
with the legislation later to achieve more 'flexibility' 
in labour practices (once its preferred path of a 
contractual agreement between the 'social partners' 
foundered).
Morville (1935) also situates the Auroux laws in the 
lineage of previous legislation (and negotiated 
agreements). For him, the transformation of the wage 
relationship is a continuous process even if it reaches 
high points at times of Left rule: adaptation was
continuous from 1963 because of the success of union
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battles, employer and government policies and the 
recessi o n .
However, Morville concurs with Savatier (1982) and 
Laroque (1984) in seeing legislation as designed 
primarily to limit the inherent inequality in the 
employer-worker relationship.
This was certainly a stated aim o-f Auroux. Yet the 
1982 laws can also be seen as an attempt to incorporate 
a union movement which has been'^particularly combative 
in the past and doctrinally hostile to any integration 
within capitalism. Constraints on the employer are part 
o-f the pay-o-f-f -for a more 'responsible' attitude from 
the unions. Furthermore, in luring the labour movement 
into reliance on the legal system to achieve its aims, 
the Auroux reforms may be seen as a further step in the 
'legalisation of the working class' (Edelman, 1978) or 
another example of:
... toute l'ambiguite des droits reconnus 
a la classe ouvriere, chaque 'acquis'
1 'enserrant un peu plus dans un filet 
legaliste qui lui est fondamentalement hostile 
et renforce globalement le systeme economique 
(Vacarie, 1982: 119-20; cf. Kourchid, 1980). (G)
The problem with this sort of analysis is that it 
tends to see union action which accepts to stay within 
the contours of legislation as futile in the long term 
and any action which tries to broaden the legislation as
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actively sanctioning the whole socio-economic system.
Objectively, the judiciary may be be hostile to the 
labour movement, as Vacarie describes, and legislation 
may serve to 'ensnare' unions: the fact that the
incoming Right wing government in 19S6 had no sweeping 
plans to repeal the Auroux laws supports the argument 
that they (and perhaps much labour legislation in 
general) pose no threat to capital.
But unions, on both the 'revolutionary' and 
'reformist' wings, have fought for help from the law to 
give them some protection against untrammelled market 
forces and arbitrary employer practices; and, for their 
part, employers have fiercely resisted such legislation. 
Thus, if legislative advance is in no way revolutionary, 
it can represent shifting 'frontiers of control' between 
labour and capital and once on the statute book, much 
depends on how the unions choose to use it and whether 
they have the strength to impose measures contested by 
the employers.
The rest of this chapter first summarises the main
points of the Auroux laws and then outlines the
attitudes of the various Confederations (and employers' 
bodies) before looking at the possible long term
implications.
The Legislation
The Report spawned four laws in 19S2 (a fifth
dealing with the democratisation of the public sector
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•followed in 1983) and a series of ordonnances dealing 
mainly with forms of work contract and working time.
The Law of August 4th 1982(4) laid down ground rules 
for companies' disciplinary procedures (rlqlement 
interieur). restricting these to questions of discipline 
and matters affecting health and safety and laying down 
obligatory steps in the event of any sanctions.
This law also introduced qroupes d'expression (GE) - 
groups of workers set up to give their opinions on the 
content and organisation of their work and how working 
conditions might be improved. The law specified that 
opinions should be expressed collectively and directly, 
that is, without the intermediary of unions, other 
representatives or management.
The law of 28th October 1982 relatfed to 
representative institutions. There were few novel 
clauses in the sections dealing with unions in the 
workplace<B> though sections, or workplace branches, 
were now legally recognised in all firms, including 
those with less that 50 workers which were excluded 
before. However, in the smaller firms, there were no 
designated delegates with special rights (though a 
deleque du personnel could function also as a union 
representative if the union so wished).
Greater time off for union business was introduced 
(paid time off was introduced for the first time in 
firms with 50 to 150 employees) and a subsequent decree
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o-f Sth June 19S3 slightly altered the number o-f 
delegates allowed in -firms with over 2000 workers.
In -firms with over 500 workers, those svndicats
which had members elected to the CE in the cadres' or
•foremen's college in addition to the manual and o-f-fice
workers' category were allowed a supplementary union 
delegate -from among the -former groups. (This aspect o-f 
the law, contested by the CGC, formed part of the 
government's policy of accepting the pluralism of 
cadres' unionism and with it the representative 
credentials of those cadres unions affiliated to worker 
Confederations).
In firms with over 2,000 workers in at least two
separate plants, a deleque central d'entreprise was 
introduced with a monthly credit of 20 hours for his 
functions. (In smaller firms a regular delegate could 
fill the function with no addition to his quota of 10 to 
20 hours off).
Secti ons affiliated to any of the five 
representative Confederations were recognised as of 
right; others had to prove their status at firm level by 
reference to the normal criteria of representativity.
Unions no longer had to collect subscriptions 
outside of working hours and away from the shop floor or 
office but the distribution of tracts and so on was 
still in theory restricted to the start or end of a 
shift. Union meetings could be held within the plant 
though out of working hours and away from the shop 
f1oor.
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Premises for the use of the unions were to be made 
available in plants of over 200 workers: in those of
over 1,000 workers, this meant one office per secti o n . 
equipped as necessary (that is, with typewriter, phone, 
furniture, etc.).
For the first time, it was legal for the delegates 
to move freely around the plant, or indeed outside, to 
do their union work, as well as stay behind after their 
shift. Unions could also now~‘ invite outsiders to 
meetings but if they were not unionists the employer's 
permission was required.
The deleaue du personnel (DP) is the elected 
representative from an office or work shop empowered to
approach the employer with individual grievances
concerning salaries, the application of laws and 
agreements, etc. He, too, was now entitled to move 
around the work place to fulfil his role.
The number of DPs (elected from among union 
candidates or, if less than 50 percent of the eligible
workers do not vote and a second round is required, from
open lists) was altered slightly and - a new feature - 
if no CE had been elected, the DPs could take on its 
functions.
The main innovation of this section was the 
introduction of deleoues de site: the departmental
labour authorities could, if a union demanded or on 
their own initiative, impose elections on a group of 
firms (individually employing less than the normal 
threshold of 11 workers for DPs) on the same site where
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more than 50 people in total were working, if 'the 
nature and importance of problems common to those -firms 
justifi ed i t '.
CEs are obligatory in firms with over 50 workers. 
(For both CE and DP elections contract, workers and 
part-timers putting in more than 20 hours per week were 
henceforth to be included ■ when working out 
' thresholds') .
Auroux significantly enlarged the economic and 
financial prerogatives of the CE though it still remains 
a consultative body only, able to proffer opinions but 
not impose decisions on the employer. The CE exists to 
ensure:
... une expression collective des 
salaries, permettant la prise en compte 
permanents de leurs interets, dans les 
decisions relatives a la gestion et a 
1 'evolution economique et financiers de 
1 'entreprise, a 1'organisation du travail et 
aux techniques de production (Code du Travail. 
Article 431.4). (H)
Thus, the CE was to examine the state of the company and 
assess this in terms of its implications for the 
workforce. The employer, who chairs the committee, was 
obliged to consult and inform it on the general health 
of the company; on any price increases; in the event of 
any reorganisation (of production, of subsidiaries,
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etc.); on new holdings or purchases of other -firms; 
before the introduction of 'important' new technology 
projects if they were likely to have any impact on 
employment, skills, salaries, conditions of employment, 
etc. (The latter was a new clause in 19S2).
The CE is consulted over any redundancy plans and 
its opinions are transmitted to the labour inspectorate 
which has to decide on the p-lan proposed. It was 
henceforth to be consulted on general employment 
conditions and in certain precise cases - for example, 
timetables and rotas — the employer cannot make changes 
against the committee's wishes.
Each new CE was to be given a document detailing the 
shareholdings in the company, its position in any group 
and its financial health; at least once a year a full 
financial report was required — Auroux specified new, 
obligatory elements such as the transfer of capital 
between firms of the same group; state or local 
authority grants; and (in larger firms) the use of 
productive capacity. Quarterly reports were also 
requi red.
Two to four members of the CE can attend board 
meetings and now they had the right to put motions 
before the board.
As foreshadowed in his report, Auroux introduced the 
requirement in larger firms for an 'economic commission' 
to be elected from within the CE, to report back to the 
CE on its analysis of documents provided by the 
employer. Each member of the CE was now to be given some
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economics training (a course lasting up to five days) by 
a reputable body which might or might not be attached to 
a union.
The CEs were previously allowed recourse to an 
expert to help them read the annual accounts: expert 
advice could now also be taken if redundancies were 
planned: if new technology was to be introduced (into
firms of over 300 workers); and ‘for other reasons, but 
then at the CE's expense.
For the first time, Auroux inserted a clause 
specifying that the employer had to provide a sum equal 
to 0.2 percent of the gross wage bill to allow the 
committee to function (to pay for staff, experts, etc), 
this sum being in addition to the money provided for 
social and cultural activities.
Each CE has between three and fifteen elected 
members (depending on the size of the company) plus one 
representative from each union section.
In firms made up of several distinct plants, there 
are comites d 'etablissements (CEts) functioning like the 
CEs above plus a comite central d'entreorise (CCE) to 
examine general economic matters applying to the whole 
firm. (The representatives on the CCE are elected by 
each CEt from within its number).
The biggest innovation of this particular law was to 
set up comites de groupe (CG) in groups whose 
headquarters were in France. Members were designated by 
unions from among and in proportion to their members on 
the CEs of the various companies. The role of the CG was
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generally limited to the receiving and dissemination o-f 
information on the financial state of the group and 
employment matters.
The law of 13th November 19S2 introduced an 
obligation on employers to negotiate annually in firms 
on real wages and working time and at branch level on 
wages (once a year) and gradings (.every five years at 
least). The legal requirement helcF for firms of any size 
where there was at least one union present.
It was possible for one or more unions which gained 
more than half the eligible votes at the last CE or DP 
election to veto an agreement which had clauses on 
salaries which went against agreements reached at a 
higher level, or clauses on other matters which departed 
from labour legislation. It should be noted that this 
fell far short of the indication in the AuroLix report 
that unions signing an agreement would have to be 
representative of a certain percentage of the workforce 
for it to be valid.
This same law made some alteration to the procedures 
available for the ending of industrial disputes. In 
particular, the Labour Minister could now institute 
mediation procedures of his own accord.
Finally, the Law of 23rd December 1982 introduced 
Comites d'hvaiene. de s&curite et des conditions de 
travai1 (CHSCT) in place of the previously separate 
Health and Safety Committees and the Committee for the
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Improvement o-f Working Conditions. They were now 
obligatory in all -firms with more than -fi-fty workers and 
if they were not set up, the DPs were empowered to carry 
on their function.
They analyse risks to safety and general working 
conditions, run regular inspections and enquiries in the 
event of accidents and can propose improvements with a 
view to the prevention of accidents. The employer may 
refuse to implement these but is obliged to give 
specific reasons. He has to consult the committee prior 
to any change in work posts, speeds, etc. and anything 
else which may have an effect on working conditions. 
Experts may be called in (at the employer's expense) to 
assess particular risks.
Members of the CHSCT are chosen by elected CE 
members and the DPs. In line with the conditions 
covering other representative functions, time spent on 
committee work is considered as working time and in 
firms with over 300 workers courses of up to five days 
are provided for members.
This law also introduced - another innovation - the 
right for an employee to alert the employer if he felt 
himself at any risk and to move away from that risk 
without permission.
Union Reaction to the Auroux Laws
All the major confederations were consulted ahead of 
the Auroux report and before the subsequent Bills were 
introduced into parliament. Each saw its influence in
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some aspects o-f Aurcu:-; 's changes. Naturally, then, each 
also was broadly -favourable to the legislation. with 
more or less serious reservations.
FO was most critical in two central areas of the 
legislation: the right of expression and the legal 
obligation to negotiate in companies.
The 'right of expression'-- it described as a 
dangerous measure<<s>>. It therefore advised its activists 
not to press for negotiations on the matter; not to sign 
agreements; to limit the scope and effectiveness of the 
groups if they were set up; and to advise workers they 
were not obliged to participate.
It had both practical and doctrinal reservations. 
Practically, employers might use the groups to justify 
then apply greater work speeds, and so on; workers might 
be penalised for comments despite the law; meetings were 
loosely structured and could degenerate, perhaps leaving 
foremen and other members of the shop floor hierarchy 
open to ridicule, or worse; and the groups might be used 
for 'political agitation' - FO claimed similar 
structures in Italy had opened the way for 'permanent 
terrorism' in factories with Red Brigade support.
To those who talked of the potential for 'worker 
control', FO retorted with its traditional line that any 
'association a la gestion' implied the integration of 
both the workers and the unions who were to negotiate 
the setting up of groups and FO did not see this as part 
of its function.
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Fundamentally, the grouos would do little more than 
pave the way -for greater exploitation, with the workers' 
complicity, FO argued. Improved productivity would end 
up as the main aim, with better conditions only arriving 
as an accessory. The groups would create- illusions o-f 
progress that would speedily degenerate into disillusion 
and thence manipulation.
Finally, FO saw the groups undermining the
*■£
representati ve unionism it is attached to: to improve
working conditions (a collective question) there were 
specific bodies (CE, CHSCT) in which the union was 
better able to defend interests and give voice to 
aspirations. Real, guaranteed improvements could be had 
only through negotiation and collective agreement (FO 
pointed to the 17th March 1975 national agreement on the 
improvement of working conditions as an example).
The C F D T <,;r> had a quite different view, in line with 
its post-recentrage policy of opening up the union to 
the workers, in order to hear what they really wanted 
rather than imposing policies on them in their name. 
Thus, it saw the right of expression as 'une chance 
exceptionnel1e ' to 'modifier les relations de travail 
dans 1 'entreprise et de transformer les conditions et le 
contenu de leur travail' (Book 3, S'exprimer dans 
1 'entreprise: 5). (I)
Rather than a threat to the union and its role, the 
CFBT saw the groups as unleashing a dynamic which would 
strengthen the collective power of the workers and their
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representative institutions:
Permettre la liberation de la parole des 
travailleurs et des travai11euses pour qu'ils 
deviennent les acteurs du cha.ngement et 
d'abord sur ce qui les touche le plus 
directement, leur travail, c'est ce que la 
CFDT a mis au coeur de sa strategie 
autogestionnaire. (Ibid). (J)
The CGT<<9> also -fully supported the right of 
expression but it clearly sought to go beyond the rather 
narrow limits imposed by the legislation and apparently 
also wanted its mi 1itants to have a more active role (as 
mi 1itants) within them.
In fact, the CGT saw the droit d'exoression as a 
droit d 'intervention in embryo. It had, since the late 
1970s, called for conseils d'atelier (and they were set 
up in state sector firms, giving workers more input into 
the running of their departments) and it urged its 
activists to move the groups in this direction, saying 
matters of work and production could not be isolated to 
workshop or even plant level - the whole running of the 
company was implicated (p.18). In short, the oroupes 
d *expressi on were:
.. un moyen nouveau d 'intervention sur le 
fonctionnement, voire la oestion meme de leur 
entreprise (p.14). (Emphasis added). (K)
workers discussing problems of their immediate tasks and 
building on this to eventually assume a role in the
running of the whole firm, the CGT clearly envisaged a 
more immediate decision-making role under union
tutelage.
The CFTC<<,'>, perhaps fearful of the sort of approach
advocated by the CGT, was in favour of the aroupes
d 'expression but cautioned that they could degenerate 
into Soviets or anarchy... In contrast to the CFDT it 
wanted a direct role for the unions and also felt that 
foremen should guide the discussions. Above all, it was 
concerned to see that the groups complemented the unions 
and were not used by management to avoid the established 
circuits of worker representation.
The CGC<xo>, while hesitant on the changes in union 
legislation, was generally in favour of the measures to 
increase worker involvement. However, it, too, was 
worried that the groups would conflict with established 
channels of communication. It was also very concerned 
that front-line managers and foremen would be attacked 
and undermined in the types of discussion envisaged 
under the law.
In that respect, it was quite close to FO whose 
brand of unionism it has come to regard as somewhat 
archaic. Yet the CGC also shared FQ's criticism of the
change to collective bargaining legislation. Both saw 
the legal requirement to negotiate in any -firm where 
there was a union secti on as likely to increase the 
inequalities between unionised and non-unionised 
sectors. Both were worried that the facility to agree 
exemptions from laws or agreements reached at a higher 
level would be exploited in poorly organised firms.
Finally, both questioned even the modified veto
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allowed under the new law. The CGC argued that it was a 
representative organisation at national level and that 
all the major Confederations should stand on the same 
footing when it came to the validity of any agreements 
they signed. Not only was a veto of any sort likely to 
block the whole field of collective negotiation, it also 
ran counter to the pluralism enshrined in French 
practice and jurisprudence: on both these counts, the 
CGC argued, Auroux was sponsoring legislation quite 
contrary to the spirit of his report and was effectively 
offering support to 'maximalist' unions at the expense 
of reformist practices which had guaranteed the workers 
at least some social progress over the years.
Both the CGC and FO felt that plant bargaining would 
undermine the relative strength the French unions could 
muster at industrial branch level where most 
negotiations took place (and branch bargaining has 
become FQ's raison d'Stre). As FO put it:
On va balkaniser la politique conventionnel1e 
e t , la divisant, ineluctablement l'affaiblir. (L)
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It was sceptical of the CFDT's enthusiasm for 
inter-company agreements, seeing the extension of branch 
agreements to non-participating firms by ministerial 
decree as a sounder way of protecting the interests of 
workers in small firms. FO was also concerned that the 
legislation might prompt more employers to set up house 
unions and negotiate worthless agreements with them. The 
CFTC shared most of these qualms though it was satisfied 
with the eventual watered down veto clause.
The CFDT took quite the opposite view. It saw the 
possibility of negotiating across a group of small firms 
as a way of getting a foothold in an area where unions 
were absent but where they needed to make an impact in 
order to survive the demise of the great manufacturing 
plants. Thus, the law of 13th November 1932 was 
described by the CFDT as:
... une loi qui favorise le renouvel1ement des 
pratiques, necessaire au renouveau du syndicalisme 
(Book 7: 5). (M)
Unions had to be imaginative and aware of constraints: 
what was feasible in large firms was not always 
advisable in smaller units.
Dans ce sens, il faudra le plus souvent 
rechercher des droits equivalents, mais pas 
necessairement identiques (Book 3: 15). (N)
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To convince employers of their interest in 
negotiating, the CFDT fell back onto the argument used 
by the state (and FO) to justify branch agreements and 
'extensions': these eliminated 'unfair competition'
which might otherwise come from employers who paid 
poverty-line wages. The CFDT argued that the 
'rigidities' of al1-embracing branch agreements could be 
avoided by engaging in discussion's covering just a few 
local units.
For the same reason, it was not opposed to plant 
agreements with clauses which modified legal 
requirements and was especially pleased that the 
obligatory aspect of the legislation would allow:
1 ' etablissement des regies particulieres 
d 'organisation du temps de travail 
correspondent aux souhaits collectifs des 
travailleurs et aux particularites des 
entreprises (Book 7: 23). (0)
(The CGC, with its 'new unionism' discourse is also 
generally aware of the need for flexibility of this 
sort: its opposition to this law should therefore be
seen in the light of what it saw as the advantages 
offered to the 'revolutionary' unions and the threat to 
its own representativity).
The CFDT and the CGT both bemoaned the lack of a 
real veto. For the CGT this was 'contempt for
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democracy': the 'veto' included in the legislation was a 
caricature - its existence actually Questioned the 
traditional principle that agreeements should not 
contain clauses less -favourable to the workers than 
those in an agreement at a higher level or legal 
requi rements.
The CFDT, as noted above, did not oppose such 
clauses but it -felt an agreement's validity needed to be 
underwritten by some test of 'Peal' representativity 
applied to the unions that signed it- This lacuna seemed
to throw it back onto the traditional method of
rejecting agreements signed by minority unions - the 
show of force:
Pour la CFDT, c'est finalement la 
capacite d'une action mobi1isatrice 
debouchant sur un accord qui reste la 
meilleure garantie contre les accords 'au 
rabais' (Book 7: 17). (P)
The CGT's concept of negotiation ('un droit acquis
par les luttes des travailleurs a cote des autres
droits') (Q) has little to do with 'give and take': it 
is about strength, the rapports de force, and all forms 
of action are legitimate in the furtherance of demands 
(CGT, undated: 89-90).
It is opposed to deroaations, or modifications, of 
branch agreements or legislation in any way which in its 
estimation makes the new clause inferior, but
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nonetheless places great stress in its recent literature 
on the negotiation o-f real wages at plant level. It 
■follows the argument in the Auroux report that the best 
plant agreements could provide targets -for branch 
negotiators, while branch agreements at least guaranteed 
certain minimum conditions in poorly organised -firms 
(p.93).
For the CGT, it is not the level o-f negotiations 
which is important but the doctrine which in-forms the 
union arguments: negotiations are conducted on a terrai n 
de classe - the employer is not a 'partner' but an 
adversary and to combat his strength a mass organisation 
has to ensure mass mobilisation.
Negotiations at any level provide an opening -for 
unions to make their mark: and, importantly, the CGT did 
not want to restrict discussions to wages and basic 
conditions. These were aspects o-f wider company policy 
and -for demands to be realised, the union needed also to 
have an input into decisions on investment, costs, work 
organisation, and so on (60-65). (The novelty o-f the CGT 
interest in such areas and the position o-f the other 
Confederations is analysed in greater detail in Chapter 
6) .
Other aspects of the strengthening of the 
representative institutions were broadly welcomed 
(though the CGC felt itself discriminated against by the 
extra cadre representative for the worker Confederations 
and by the way CCEs were elected which effectively
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excluded its members). The comites de arouoe and the 
general pattern o-f greater union access to -financial
data and expertise were applauded on all sides.
As -for lacunae, both the CGC and CFTC were
disappointed that there was no provision for workers to 
take seats on company boards (such measures were
introduced in the public sector and, it should be 
remembered, the government intended state-run firms to 
act as a model for the pr i vate sector) . The CFTC had 
also wanted an extension of profit-sharing schemes and 
measures encouraging greater recourse to the arbitration 
and mediation apparatus.
Industrial Relations after Auroux
A decentralisation of union activity has been
evident for some time in France: Auroux's measures
provided further impetus, as did the decentralisation of 
the political apparatus which devolved the control of 
local funds to elected bodies and gave unionists greater 
access to support services in their fight far jabs, plus
a role in regional planning. The revival of local
Comites d'Emploi through an agreement with the CNPF
worked in the same direction.
Including as it did a government-imposed wage freeze 
and the start of economic 'rigour', the year 1982 may 
seem an unlikely date to signal an effort to revive wage 
bargaining at branch and company level.
tt/n
However, government -figures show that 71.5 percent 
o-f those -firms required to negotiate during 19S5 did sc. 
As this was up from 43 percent in 19S3, the first full 
year after the Auroux legislation came into effect, and 
68 percent in 1984, the Labour Ministry was reasonably 
content. Nonetheless, only 3972 out of the 10,225 firms 
surveyed in 1984 actually concluded an agreement and 36 
percent of the 3457 that did not negotiate at all with 
the unions entered into some form of talks with CEs or 
DPs, presumably more tractable. The preliminary 1985 
figures showed that 5,165 agreements had been reached - 
up by about one third: but the Ministry noted a growing 
individualisation of pay awards within the overall 
agreements plus an increase in what might be labelled 
'profit-related bonuses'. (Le Monde. 28th June 1985 and 
21st June 1986).
In its recommendations to employers, the CNPF (1983) 
still gave priority to industrial branch negotiations 
(though in the first half of 1986, only 30 percent of 
branches had signed an agreement, dawn from 33 percent 
at the same stage of 1985).
CNPF policy was to follow the Auroux laws to the 
letter but the spirit is totally absent from its 
thinking. It counsels members strongly not to include 
the provisions in branch or company agreements since 
this would tend to make it harder to undo the damage 
when the laws were abrogated. Since 1983, the CNPF has 
softened its appeals for a repeal of the lois Auroux. 
but some members of the new Right wing government have
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questioned union 'monopoly' - the -facility for the main 
Confederations alone to put up candidates in the -first 
round o-f work place elections - and advocated certain 
other adjustments to union rights- By this route, the 
employers might be able to sponsor more 'responsible' 
elements (as they are wont to do in favour of FO 
sections in some cases).
It is clear that French employers show no interest 
in having strong unions, even 'responsible' ones in 
their plants. They continue to try and neutralise the 
work place as an arena of union-employer relations and 
attempt to defuse tensions by the 'social innovations' 
introduced in the 1970s (Morville, 1935).
Early appraisals of the functioning of GEs<ll> 
reveal the employers using them to legitimate past 
innovations, following the logic of Quality Circles, for 
example, by using the new groups to rally the employees 
in a way
...susceptible de faire surgir des idees 
pour ameliorer la productivity et la quality 
du travail et susceptible de detendre les 
relations sociales par une meilleure 
circulation de 1'information, un 
assouplissement des relations avec la 
maitrise et une prise en compte de la 
dimension individuelle des salaries (Linhart,
1933: 5). (R)
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The radical notions of the CFDT - workers assuming 
control o-F the organisation o-f their work as a schooling 
in autooesti on — and the militant CGT outlook - seize 
the opportunity o-f group discussion to expand the area 
o-f intervention of the workers and their’ union in the 
company - are both a long way from being realised. 
Researchers at CNAM noted the disorientation of 
activists (or outright hosti1ity.,JLn the case of FO) in 
the face of the new aroupes d"expression which were 
erected outside the traditional structures of 
representative unionism and for which management was 
much better prepared.
Although it may be too early to gauge the effects of 
measures such as the obligatory annual negotiations, the 
employers' rejection of measures which threaten their 
prerogatives in the workplace undoubtedly limit the 
chances of real change in the French industrial 
relations system and any prospect of a serious union 
role in industrial decision-making which will be crucial 
if they are to have an influence on employment issues.
Perhaps those chances disappeared as soon as Auroux 
decided against making the validity of agreements 
dependent on the true representativity of the 
signatories: such timidity may be understandable in view 
of the patronat's suspicions of anything appearing to 
strengthen the CGT but, given the transformation of the 
CFDT and Auroux's own vision as set out in the 1981 
Report, greater confidence in the negotiating apparatus 
was to have been expected and may have increased the
legitimacy ot bargaining in the eyes of both workers and 
emplovers.
Observers such as Adam et al (1972) and Gallie 
(197S) have suggested that more -frequent meetings 
between the 'social partners' could take some o-f the 
tension out o-f relations but the' ideological 
underpinning o-f both union and employer activity needs 
to change for this to happen. Obligatory meetings by 
themselves can have little effect if the will to 
negotiate 'in good faith' is absent. This is truer than 
ever today when employment is at the heart of the 
socio-economic debate yet remains firmly outside the 
negotiating arena. Some of the Confederations are trying 
to stake out a space for union action here but far from 
conceding ground, employers have succeeded in getting 
the new government to reduce even the slight 
restrictions imposed by Direction de Travail permission 
for redundancies (which CEs can attempt to influence).
Union doctrine is evolving in such a way that the 
Confederations for the most part no longer see positive 
action on industrial and economic policy as taboo. Yet 
employer opposition remains intransigent and Auroux did 
nothing to alter the unequal balance of power between 
employers and workers which might force the former to 
take more account of the collective interest of the 
latter, as expressed by the unions.
In fact, unionists' attitudes towards accepting 
responsibilities in this area are ambiguous, and union 
divisions - or the 'pluralism' underwritten by Auroux -
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were just as responsible -for halting any effective union 
offensive on jobs which. even more than on other 
matters, requires constructive, reasoned exposition 
backed up by real strength on the ground rather than 
surenchere and the potential but unpredictable threat o-f 
spontaneous rebellion.
These observations are taken -further in later 
chapters and Chapter 6 includes a look at the ways in 
which Auroux tried to encourage 'proposition -force 
unionism'. The next chapter examines the government's 
employment policies and the Con-federations' response.
NOTES
1. Page numbers in this chapter refer to the report 
listed in the bibliography under 'AUROUX, Jean (1981)'.
2. The apparent reluctance of employers to take on 
new staff if this would make the company eligible to 
have DPs, CEs, etc.
3. To use the CFDT formula.
4. French laws are traditionally referred to by the 
date on which they are promulgated. Details of the 
legislation under discussion can be found in Liaisons 
Soci ales (1984). See also Le Monde. 'Dossiers et 
Documents', 102, June 1983; and, in English, Delamotte 
(1985) and Goetschy and Rojot (1985).
5. However, foreign workers no longer need to have 
worked for five years in France before taking on a union 
post and the rule restricting foreigners to no more than 
a third of administrative posts in any svndi cat was also
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abolished. These measures, together with the elimination 
o-f the rule that elected representat i ves (DPs, CE 
members, etc) had to speak French plus the amnesty 
offered to illegal immigrants, played a part in giving 
Citroen workers, for example, the courage to organise 
after years of oppression (see Benoit, 19S2).
6. FO's analysis and critique are contained in a 
dossier, Les Lois Dites 'Auroux/. assembled by its 
Centre de Formation de Militants Syndicaux.
7. The CFDT's analysis is contained in a series of 
ten booklets under the collective title, Les Droits 
Nouveaux (undated).
S. The CGT's analysis is taken from its publication, 
Le Guide des Droits Nouveaux (undated).
9. The CFTC's presentation of the laws is contained 
in a special supplement to Svndicalisme CFTC -
Informations Confederales. 181, March 1983.
10. For the CGC's attitude to the Auroux report and
legislation, see Menin (1982) and the editions of its
journal, Cadres et MaTtrise. December 1981 and March 
1982.
11. See the reports produced by the Association de 
Recherche sur la Libre Expression des Travai11eurs. 
CNAM, Paris.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) '...a deep and lasting transformation of
industrial relations in our country and ... a real break 
with the existing model.' (Auroux, 1981: 39).
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(B) 'Citizens in the city, the workers must also be 
citizens in their workplace.' (p.3).
(C) 'The search -for quick profits has all too often 
ignored the legitimate interests of the workers.' (p.3).
(D> 'This obligation to negotiate does not imply any 
requirement to conclude an agreement but the 
negotiations must be serious and not a mere formality.' 
(p.38).
(E) 'While there is no question of compromising the 
unity of management and decision-making in the private 
sector, it is appropriate to set up structures which 
allow the expression of everyone's energy and 
capacities.' (pp.4-5).
(F) 'We recognise the right to be, and the 
responsibilities of being, an entrepreneur; we recognise 
the unity of direction and the employer's responsibility 
for management. But we also say that in the workplace 
collectivity, while there are and always will be 
differing interests as in all human society, it is 
important that the one side is more aware of the human 
dimension of the firm and the other more aware of its 
economic dimension;; workplace democracy brings with it 
economic efficiency which rapidly absorbs its costs.' 
(Le Monde. 14th May 1982).
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(G) '... the whole ambiguity of the rights conceded
to the working class, each 'victory' drawing it a little 
more into a legalistic net which is fundamentally 
hostile to it and, taken as a whole, reinforces the 
economic system.' (Vacarie, 1982: 119-20).
(H) a collective voice for the employees,
allowing their interests to be -taken permanently into 
account in all decisions concerning the management and 
economic and financial development of the firm, the
organisation of work and the techniques of production.' 
(Code du Travail. Article 431.4).
(I) '... an exceptional chance to modify workplace
relationships and transform the conditions and content 
of their work.' (CFDT, Book 3: 5).
(J) 'This is what the CFDT has put at the centre of
its strategy for 'self-managed socialism': give the
working people a voice so they become the actors of
change - and first of all in what concerns them most 
directly, their actual work.' (ibid).
(K) '... new means to intervene in the functioning,
the management even, of their company.' (CGT, undated: 
14; emphasis added).
(L) 'Negotiations are going to be balkanised and, in
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their divided -form, inevitably weakened.' (FO) .
(M) a law which -favours a renewal o-f practices
which is necessary -for the renewal o-f trade unionism. ' 
(CFDT, Book 7: 5).
(N) 'Thus, it is more often than not necessary to 
look for rights which are equivalent, not necessarily 
identical. ' (CFDT, Book S: 15).
(0) '... the establishment of specific rules
concerning the organisation of working time which 
correspond to the collective wishes of the workforce and 
the particularities of the company.' (CFDT, Book 7s 23).
(P) 'For the CFDT, at the end of the day, it is the 
capacity to mobilise for a particular agreement which is 
the best safeguard against 'cut price' deals.' (CFDT, 
Book 7: 17).
(Q) '... a right won by the workers taking action,
like all the other rights.' (CGT)
(R) '... likely to bring out ideas on improving
productivity and the quality of work, and likely to make 
workplace relations less tense by better circulation of 
information, more supple relations with supervisors and 
a recognition of an employee's individual dimension.' 
(Linhart, 1933: 5).
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5. THE CONFEDERATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY
The number one priority o-f the new Left government 
from June 19S1 was unemployment, as Prime Minister 
Pierre Maurov made clear in his keynote ‘speech to the 
National Assembly on 15th September, 1981:
L'objectif est clair: remettre la France
toute enti&re au travail- Et d'abord arreter
1 'augmentation rapide du chSmage. (A)
Many of the government's measures in the first year 
directly or indirectly addressed this priority and it is 
this aspect of policy that concerns us here rather than 
any overall appraisal of the Socialists' economic 
programme.
Much has already been written on the economic record 
of the 1981-36 government and battle-lines are already 
well-established, usually fixed along political and 
ideological lines.
The 'consensus view' of French economic policy 
during the period (as J-P. Fitoussi terms it in Machin 
and Wright, 1985) goes briefly as follows:
1) Initial policies of expansion and social 
redistribution were foolhardy and doomed from the start 
in view of the depression in the leading world 
eccnomi es.
2) The period of economic rigour from the summer of
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19S2 was a necessary correction to the first 
expansionary phase.
The results of the period as a whole are open to 
debate (witness the various contributions to Machin and 
Wright, 1985; Cobham, 1985; Kesselman 1983c) but it is 
worth underlining the fact that France never slipped
into recession (in the sense of negative growth) unlike
the UK with its markedly different policies during the 
peri od.
An academic study (cited in The Guardian. 18th
March 1986) concluded that 'the French had managed to
achieve a more satisfactory trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation'. However, the terms of this 
trade-off proved a disappointment to labour movement 
activists, particularly those who had been looking for a 
more fundamental transformation of economic policy than 
actually occurred, even during the first phase.
A common complaint of many activist from all the 
Confederations was that the government had no real 
employment policy. This seems somewhat harsh as the 
early 'social' measures (including the Auroux labour 
legislation), the economic expansion, the
nationalisations (seen as providing a laboratory for new 
industrial relations) and an industrial policy 
apparently aimed at reconquering the domestic market and 
concentrating on specific fi 1i&res*1> without abandoning 
traditional sectors such as steel and coal, were all 
concerned in different ways with the problem of 
employment.
However, from the start, and increasingly from June 
1932, the Industrial approach to the issue progressively 
gave way to an emphasis on le traitement social, which 
essentially involved adapting and cutting the labour 
force to the needs of industry rather than constructing 
an industrial policy around the problem of employment.
In retrospect, it is possible to separate out three 
strands<=> to the government's employment policy:
1) Direct lob creation. Around 240,000 jobs were 
created between 1931 and 1933, including 110,000 in the 
Civil Service, 35,000 in the health service and 65,000 
in local government with the aid of central government 
subsi di es.
2) Indirect job creation through financial and 
budgetary measures, the shorter working week, longer 
holidays, the earlier retirement age, etc.
P-A. Muet and A. Fonteneau (1933) estimated the 
effect of measures such as the raising of the minimum 
wage and benefit levels and general expansion at around 
100,000 jobs between 1931 and 1933.
P-A. Muet (in Machin and Wright, 1935: 73) observes 
that 'most specialists' reckon the fifth week's holiday 
introduced by a January 1932 decree had little impact on 
unemployment.
The same decree also brought the legal working week 
down to 39 from 40 hours, at the same time allowing a 
certain relaxation of the restrictions on working at
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weekends, night work -for women, etc.
Despite claims to the contrary by the CFDT, the 
effects of this reduction seem to have been limited: 
indeed, the government realised from the start that only 
a large drop in the working week could dent the 
unemployment figures and it therefore set a target of a 
35 hour week by 1985. This target was eventually shelved 
and attempts to revive it in mid-1984 stalled due to the 
vastly changed industrial relations climate by that 
time, with the patronat in the ascendant and the 
government beginning to respond to its calls for 
'flexibility' and the lightening of 'social' burdens.
It is hard to say what effect the 39 hour week (with 
pay left unchanged after the intervention of President 
Mitterrand and strikes in several sectors) and other 
measures such as the Auroux laws and the raising of the 
minimum wage had on company profitability though Muet 
reckons that overall (with the reduction and the new 
work patterns allowed under the decree taken into 
account) gains in productivity probably offset the 
direct costs.
The impact on employment has been measured in two 
studies: an econometric analysis estimated that 70,000
jobs were created or saved ~ 40,000 in industry, 20,000 
in the service sector and 10,000 in state firms: a study 
by INSEE based on replies from a random sample of 
employers put the figure at between 14,000 and 18,000 
jobs created in industry and commerce and, very 
tentatively, 50,000 to 100,000 in the economy as a whole
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(Mini stere des Affaires Sociales, Travail Informations ,
January - March 1984).
Neither estimate justifies the initial optimism of 
the government and the CFDT.
3) Schemes introduced to subsidise jobs, encourage 
vouth employment and take older workers out of the
labour market appear to have been more successful, at
least in bringing down the statistical level of
unemployment. Muet (1985: 80) notes that these schemes 
were continued even after the change in economic policy 
from June 1932 and 'the levelling off of unemployment 
from mid-1982 until the last part of 1983 can be largely 
imputed to t h em'<3>. He cites figures showing that the 
macro-economic effects of the schemes (on GDP. 
inflation, the balance of payments, national debt, etc) 
were smal1.
Among the more important measures were:
a) Youth employment schemes and apprenticeships 
(insertion professionnel1e ) involving around 267,000 
youngsters in 1982-3 and 236,000 in the nine months to 
March 1984.
b) Contrats de solidarite-preretraite under which 
workers over 55 retired early or worked part-time and 
state aid was given to their company to hire other 
workers if they then contracted to maintain the overall 
size of the workforce for at least a year. Such 
contracts allowed just over 170,000 new people to be 
taken on by companies during 1982-3.
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(Other state schemes, some dating -from be-fore 1931. 
made aid available -for early retirement without any 
corresponding employment commitments. As -firms began to 
shed labour more rapidly in the 19S0s, early (and 
state-subsidised) retirement became a favoured option 
and at least 432,000 people were benefitting from the 
main state scheme at the end of 1983).
c) Contrats de solidarite-duree du travai1 . If a 
company took on a worker as a result of a larger than 
legally required reduction in the working week, the 
state contracted to pay all or part of the employer's 
national insurance and related costs. In 1932, 736 
contracts covering 15,000 new recruits were signed but 
this dropped to just 277 and 3,000 respectively under 
the revised 1933 scheme.
d) State aid for those unemployed people wishing to 
start their own businesses helped 29,000 in 1931, 40,000 
in 1932 and 20,000 in the first quarter of 1933.
e) When the government decided to push ahead with 
the 'modernisation' effort in 1934, the state undertook 
to subsidise conges de conversion in particular 
industrial branches (eg. steel, shipbuilding, the car 
industry). A worker was paid a high percentage of his 
previous wage while following a retraining or skill 
conversion course.
f> In the car industry, the government provided 
financial assistance to those immigrant workers wishing 
to return home.
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In a -further effort to reduce the dole queues and 
incite employers to hire workers, the government also 
softened its line on what constituted acceptable
employment practices.
Early in 1982 it had introduced legislation
restricting recourse to various 'insecure' forms of 
contract (fixed period contracts, temporary work, etc) 
(see Chapter 8 on the 'flexibility' talks and Chapter 4 
on the Auroux report). Two years later, while refusing
to follow the CNPF in its more extreme advocacy of the
benefits of total deregulation of workplace regulations, 
the Socialist government accepted that the use of labour 
needed to be less rigidly controlled, in the process 
implicitly elbowing aside the ambition of 
'reconstituting the work place col1ectivity' so clearly 
set out in the Auroux report, placing new emphasis on 
the enterprise and even taking pains to point out the 
potential of agreements which set aside the law, as 
already allowed by the Code du Travail in certain 
circumstances. (In this it was following a change in the 
political climate which was partly the result of its own 
economic failures and the propaganda success of the 
patronat. which had quickly recovered from its initial 
shock at the 1981 election results. A SOFRES poll in Le 
Mati n of 26th February 1985 showed that the concepts of 
'competition' and 'liberalism' were judged positive by 
71 percent and 63 percent respectively).
The broad lines of the Confederations' own demands 
and proposals in the field of employment are given below
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along with their attitude to the government in this 
respect. The national flexibility negotiations are 
discussed after the concrete examples, in the case 
studies, of how union activists attempted to tackle 
employment problems in their workplace.
The French Trade Union Confederations and Employment
Lange, Ross and Vannicelli (1932: S) argue that the 
major French unions did not fundamentally change their 
framework of analysis of the world economy with the 
1970s recession; rather, they reacted to that downturn 
'on the basis of frameworks which had been developed 
prior to crisis and in other circumstances'.
As far as Confederation analvses are concerned, that 
evaluation seems accurate. However, in both the CGT and 
CFDT there have been developments in the way grassroots 
activists tackle problems and these were stimulated, if 
not initiated in the strictest sense, by the 
Confederation leaderships around the turn of the decade 
(see the next two chapters).
Lange et al only touch on these developments 
fleetingly as they chose to concentrate on the union 
leadership: besides, their study ended just as the 
political events of 1931 intervened and the new types of 
union initiatives outlined below only really began to 
flourish in the new political climate, even if the 
groundwork for the change was effected earlier.
However, at the level of the union leaderships, too 
- in the case of the CGT and CFDT, at least - there has
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been a change in the way economic problems are 
addressed. These are discussed in their own right in 
this chapter and in the case studies and -following 
chapters the extent o-f the changes and their 
significance will become clear.
The CFDT
It would seem from an examination of the 1981-6 
period that what Ross (in Lange et al) termed the 
'reformist reading of recentrage' has gained sway within 
the CFDT though its chief advocates in the ruling Bureau 
National were also the least popular with the rank and 
file (Raybould, 1985a).
It is important to note again that since its 
recentrage of 1978. the CFDT has placed great stress on 
neaotiated solutions to employment and other problems. 
The strength of mobilisation is still an important 
factor behind a successful resolution of such problems 
but nowadays the Confederation is prepared to compromise 
in order to achieve settlements applicable immediately 
rather than channel discontent towards political ends.
Various provisions of the Auroux laws, notably the 
right to company information, the annual negotiations 
and the increased means available to the representatives 
both reflected and underpinned the CFDT line. The 
Confederation published a series of booklets designed to 
show the mi 1itants how to assimilate the information 
available and then how to use it in the fight to save or 
create jobs ,
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The stress is on action at the company level, the 
'lieu principal de 1'intervention syndicale' (CFDT, 
1934: 25). But the process of information gathering and
reflection on the broader industrial questions may be 
best pursued at the level of the industrial branch and 
the CFDT therefore participates energetically in all the 
tripartite bodies dealing with such matters in France 
(notably those attached to the Rian, the national and 
regional Comites Economiaues et Sociaux and the Groupes 
de Strategies Industriel 1es set up by the Socialists). 
The Confederation also places great stress on 
territorial initiatives on industrial sites, in bassins 
d'emnloi and in the Regions. Action at this level is a 
CFDT priority in its efforts to offset the effects on 
jobs of new technology:
La CFDT agit et pese de tout son poids 
pour que des emplois alternatifs soient 
degages simultanement a 1 ' introduction des 
nouvelles technologies et aux suppressions 
d'emploi qu'elles causent. L'experience 
montre que ces solutions ne peuvent pas etre 
uniquement recherches dans 1 'entreprise 
concernee, mais dans tout le bassin d'emploi 
et par une cooperation active de toutes les 
parties prenantes. (CFDT Activites et 
Ori entati ons. published prior to the 40th 
Congress in a special edition of Svndicalisme 
Hebdo, December 1934: 13-19). (3)
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Before moving on to specific aspects of the
Confederation programme for jobs, its espousal of 'new
solidarities' should be mentioned. The CFDT has long 
sought to help the lower paid and narrow differentials. 
Now, the CFDT wants to extend its solidarity to those 
out of work and those threatened with losing their jobs. 
Some elements within the CFDT bend the notion further, 
seeing — though they take care as "a rule not to state it 
quite so explicitly - the need for 'solidarity' with 
employers since competitiveness needs to be assured in 
the market economy, especially in its present open form, 
□f the other Confederations, the CGC is closest to the 
CFDT line though it baulks at any narrowing of 
differentials that 'solidarity' might involve.
The CFDT's analysis of the crisis during the 1970s
had been two-pronged. On the one hand, the international
economy had been jolted out of the stability of the 
post-war period by the emergence of multinational 
companies and the threat to US economic domination from 
the Japanese and European countries. The oil crisis of 
1971-4 had merely exacerbated the emerging problems of 
inflation and unemployment which resulted from the 
dislocation of international trade and financial 
arrangements.
On the other hand, the CFDT argued that the position 
of France had been weakened by de Gaulle's push for 
growth which had led to balance of payments crises while
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the subsequent deflationary strategy of Prime Minister 
Barre under Giscard and the attempt to bank all on 
export performance had similarly failed. Furthermore, 
both strategies had fuelled social discontent in France 
which had also put stress on the economy.
The CFDT concluded that growth should be based on 
the internal market and not exports but beyond general 
ideas about developing industries that would reduce 
imports, the CFDT, as late as the mid-1970s, saw no 
solution to the crisis within the capitalist system: a 
totally different mode of development was required <es> .
The 1978 recentraae was not so much concerned with 
analysing the nature of the crisis as with the most 
effective form of union action to fight it and the most 
important conclusion of Moreau's report was that trade 
unionists must begin to tackle real problems in the 
workplace if they wanted to defend an increasingly 
disillusioned work force. The change in outlook this 
required is best illustrated by two quotes, separated by 
five years in time, from the CFDT official with 
responsibility for economic affairs, Michel Rolant. In a 
1975 statement cited by Lange et al (1982: 43) he
affirmed:
We do not believe that there exists a 
durable solution to this crisis within the 
confines of a capitalist society.
By 1980, he was right behind the Moreau/Maire line:
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Un type de developpement s'inflechit et 
se renverse vers le socialisme 
autogestionnaire au fil des milliers 
d ' i nf 1 echi ssements que nous sommes capables 
d'imposer par la lutte syndicale (CFDT 
Aujourd'hui, 43, May-June 19S0: S2> . (C)
Autogesti on was now seen as a process, synonymous 
with piecemeal advance coming with victories within 
capitalism rather than an alternative system which could 
only exist after capitalism was overthrown.
Of course, this view of the potential for change 
within capitalism was not uncontested though gradually a 
majority within the Confederation was won over and it is 
their programme which forms the basis of the following 
out1i ne.
The main plank of the CFDT's proposals to fight 
unemployment is a reduction in working time:
La reduction de la duree du travail 
continue, et doit continuer plus activement, 
a etre consideree comme la solution immediate 
la plus importante pour reduire le chomage.
(Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2010, 29th March 19S4). <D)
One headquarters officer in the Economics Sector 
conceded in 19S5 that the CFDT's over-reliance on this
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one aspect (especially the -failure to situate it -fully 
in the wider macroeconomic context) had been simplistic 
but a reduction in the working week remained 'le point 
de passage oblige' of any serious attempt to bring down 
unemployment. He maintained that the CFDT had been the 
first to push the shorter working week as a measure to 
fight unemployment and had strongly influenced the 
membership of the European Trade. Union Confederation - 
(ETUC) in this respect.
FO claimed, however, that the ETUC followed its 
demand of no loss of pay with the shorter working week. 
The CFDT distinguishes itself from the other 
Confederations in not automatical1v demanding
compensation for the hours not worked. After the January 
1982 ordonnance which reduced the legal working week 
from 40 to 39 hours, the CFDT earned itself the scorn of 
the rest of the labour movement in arguing this point: 
President Mitterrand eventually ruled in favour of total 
compensation after industry was hit by stoppages.
The CFDT has now moved away from a simple call for 
reduced working time; it agrees with most of the studies 
produced in this area - a reduction will only have an 
impact on employment if unit costs are held down and 
general competitiveness maintained. (See, for example, 
the November 1984 report drawn up by the Planning 
Commissariat, in Liaisons Sociales, SI 664, 19th 
November 1984).
This will often mean that timetables are rearranged 
and work organised differently to ensure production
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levels are maintained. The CFDT was therefore totally in 
•favour o-f the clause in the 19S2 ordonnance which 
allowed departures -from the strict rules governing shi-ft 
patterns and so on, by agreement with the unions.
At the Confederation's 40th Congress in June 19S5, 
Edmond Mai re was categoric in his refusal of a blanket 
reduction in the working week in his reply to the 
General Debate:
Je voudrais repondre ik ceux qui 
revendiauent les 35 heures par la loi avec 
maintien integral du pouvoir d'achat sans 
rien changer a la gestion du travail dans les 
entreprises que ce qu'ils nous proposent non 
seulement ne creerait pas d'emplois durables, 
mais aboutirait finalement a augmenter le 
chomage, car chacun le sait, bien des 
entreprises ne pourraient pas tenir le choc.
Ne jouons pas aux apprentis-sorciers avec des 
slogans dangereux. (E)
The CFDT fully supported another instrument which 
required workers to make sacrifices (or demonstrate 
their 'new-style solidarity') by accepting a temporary 
slight fall in wages in order to fund job-creating 
investments. Payments into the investment fund were for 
a fixed period, usually at an advantageous interest 
rate. Such Fonds Salariaux were set up in various 
comoanies following the law of 29th December 19S3 which
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authorised them. (See Chapters 7 and 9 -for the Renault
example).
Les fonds ainsi preleves ne sont pas une 
perte seche du pouvoir d'achat mais un 
transfert provisoire et nigocie du salaire 
direct a-fin de le faire 'travailler' pour la 
priorite d'aujourd'hui: l'emploi.
(Svndicalisme Hebdo. Special Issue - 40th 
Congress, December 19S4: IS). (F)
The Fonds Salariaux concept appears to epitomise the 
approach of the CFDT in the 19S0's. The involvement of 
the state is limited to the legislation fixing the 
framework; each scheme is negotiated at firm level and 
the use the funds are put to is made by joint 
union-management decision; the whole scheme involves a 
series of compromises — between management and union, 
and between those in work and those needing it - aimed 
at an immediate improvement of the employment situation.
The CFDT supported the sharing of work and revenues 
in other ways, too, not least in what amounted to an 
about-turn on the question of 'le travail differencie'. 
the various forms of contract, part-time and temporary 
work which, especially from the mid-1970s, have served 
to fragment the traditional nation of the work contract.
In 19S2, the CFDT and the rest of the labour 
movement inspired the series of decrees which restricted 
the employer's recourse to such 'precarious' work forms
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yet, as the CNF'F pressed the government to relax these 
regulations in the name of "flexibility', the CFDT 
appeared to acquiesce and accept the priority o-f a more 
supple labour market even at the expense of worse 
conditions for a whole swathe of the workforce.
More important, this was put over as responding to 
the new, more individualised requirements of the working 
population and the CFDT became a,prime mover behind the 
'flexibility' talks discussed below.
The CFDT does not oppose all job loss though, as 
will be made clearer in the case studies, it seeks to 
avoid 1icenciements secs (outright redundancies) and 
looks to stimulate alternati ve employment when 
restructuring or new technology displaces workers. As 
noted above, the problem is frequently addressed in 
territorial terms.
In the 1970s, the CFDT led the way in the labour 
movement's questioning of technology and the uses to 
which it was put. Its 1977 book, Les D^gats du Froores: 
Les Travailleurs Face au Changement Technique, showed 
the Confederation trying to rethink, on the basis of 
grassroots experience, the very concept of technology, 
the aims and values enshrined in its use in the work 
place. It saw an urgent need to:
...dissocier progres et avancee 
technique, de faire eclater les mythes de la 
neutralite de la technique, e t , en 
definitive, de changer les criteres qui
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regissent la notion meme d 'avancee technique 
pour en -fairs reel 1 ement un moyen de progres.
(CFDT, 1977: 10). (G)
Yet the reality of union work on new technology 
shows that it is still generally geared towards 
controlling the social effects of its application in the 
workplace, however far 'upstream' (that is, however long 
before it is actually installed) negotiations may take 
place. Thus, the clause on the introduction of new 
technology was seen as the most significant aspect of 
the 'flexibility' protocol discussed below by CFDT 
negotiators despite its rather limited scope.
This apparent reining-in of CFDT ambitions no doubt 
reflects a desire to be effective which entails certain 
compromises; it is also dictated to some extent by the 
seriousness of the employment problem which has been 
compounded by the rapid technological developments of 
the last decade. However, there has also been a marked 
doctrinal shift in the Confederation which is still the 
cause of internal unrest and has not been accepted by 
important sections of the union (Mouriaux, 1934a;; 
Raybould, 19S5a).
In the final analysis, there is little radical in 
the CFDT's proposals on transforming working 
arrangements to save jobs, nor its long-standing concern 
with improving working conditions, for example. 
Proposals in these and other areas nowadays tend to 
respect the constraints within which companies function
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under current arrangements and the need to extract a 
surplus from labour. There is no real attempt to situate 
employment at the heart of the problem and construct 
notions of industrial and social efficiency around a 
care aim of full employment. For the CFDT of the 1930s, 
the search for jobs involved the workforce moulding 
itself to the requirements of the market place: in this, 
the CFDT followed, perhaps even outpaced, the Socialist 
government and it can only be seen as a retreat from its 
questioning of the system in the aftermath of 1968 and 
the defeat of what Lange et al (1932) call the "Left 
recenterers' - those accepting to work within the system 
but concerned to push back its boundaries in the 
direction of socialism.
At national level, the Confederation played its part 
in negotiations with the employers on various matters - 
"flexibility", of course, but also the restructuring of 
the Social Security system and working time. It also 
took part in tripartite bodies such as the Plan and 
developed its own macroeconomic proposals which were put 
to Ministers but which did not form the basis of any 
demands that the Confederation tried to mobilise around.
The CFDT"s pronouncements on the economy 
occasionally irritated Socialist Ministers and attracted 
the scorn of rival Confederations, not least when, after 
a meeting with Mitterrand on 31st January 1933, Edmond 
Mai re predicted a further bout of rigueur and underlined 
the parlous state of the economy (Svndicalisme Hebdo,
5/19
1951. 10th February 1933). At that period, the CFDT 
advocated a relaunch o-f investment and it seemed to 
locate the means for this reflation in a revision o-f the 
•fiscal system, with more tax demanded -from top earners 
and the wealthy and, reversing the prevailing situation, 
more to come through direct than indirect taxation.
Getting on -for two years later, the CFDT was still 
bemoaning the lack of investment, and this despite the 
recovery in company finances Cat the expense of salaries 
and those made redundant). Again it called for a fairer 
tax treatment for wage earners and lower interest rates 
as immediate steps favourable to reflation and therefore 
jobs (CFDT, 1984b >.
On a broader scale, the CFDT called for 
European-wide initiatives on research and industrial 
cooperation and advocated closer commercial and monetary 
policies (perhaps through wider use of the integrated 
European Currency Unit) to shake off 'dollar tutelage'. 
It opposed protect!onism, arguing that it was not a 
long-term solution to problems and French industrialists 
would use such a shield simply to avoid the investment 
necessary to modernise the productive appartus.
The CFDT argued that competitiveness was not 
achieved through cost-cutting exercises: if industry was 
to be modernised, the role of the worker had to be 
transformed, too, and more responsibility passed down to 
the shop floor.
The CFDT's programme for jobs, in the context of its 
general economic proposals, is contained in an internal
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paper -from 1984, La Politique Economiaue an Questions, 
in a section entitled Gerer le Present en Freoarant 
1 "Avenir. Here, the CFDT proposes seven forms of action:
1) The creation of new activities and a stimulation 
of growth in established sectors, with industrial and 
economic policy geared explicitly towards jobs.
2) The 'modernisation of work place relations' with 
workers able to debate products, management, investment, 
training and so on.
The CFDT sought to use the crisis to gain a positive 
role for the worker in decision-making but it also 
insisted that an essential part of any strategy to move 
beyond crisis was precisely this harnessing of the 
worker's knowledge and capacity to the management 
process. (The actual mechanisms are somewhat nebulous, 
with proposals couched in terms such as: 'Une nouvelle
dvnamique reste cl enclencher, fondee sur de nouveaux 
modes de rapports sociaux et un autre type de 
developpement'>.
This proposal reflected the CFDT's long-standing 
belief that capitalism could not be reduced to an 
economic system - it was also a social system (and an 
ideology).
3) The reduction and rearrangement of working time.
4) An extended training programme, especially on the 
job training.
5) Special measures for the worst hit groups, 
notably the young and the long-term unemployed. Here, 
the CFDT conceded that fixed term contracts and other
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'precarious' work -forms could institute a dual labour 
market but it was confident this could be held in check- 
through negotiation.
6) Local initiatives, especially through revised 
comites locaux d'emploi which could assist firms in 
difficulty or take preventive action and generally 
stimulate job creation.
7) The development of 'socially useful jobs' (for 
example, home help, work in the leisure industry) to be 
funded in part through the complementary fall in demand 
for unemployment benefits.
The C6T
Superficial1y , in the period under study, the CGT 
took a similar line to the CFDT in placing great stress 
on action at ground level - 'L 'entreprise est et rests
le lieu privilegie d'ancrage des interventions et 
actions des travai11eur s ' (CGT, 1984b: 116) - and urging
its activists to make full use of the Auroux laws in 
proposing alternatives to management threats to jobs 
(Murick: 1984). However, where the CFDT sought to work 
within, if nominally against, the constraints imposed by 
the economy, the CGT actively set its store against 
economic trends and refused to compromise with current 
notions of competitiveness and sound business 
management.
For the CGT, the crisis was a crisis of the 
capitalist system. In 1985, it repeated the view of the 
41st Congress three years earlier:
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develoope dans chaque pays a partir d© ses 
bases nationales. Elle in-flue h. son tour sur 
le developpement de la crise sur chaque 
territoire national. (Le Feuole. 1192/3, 25th 
April 1935). (I)
In the 1970s it adopted a perspective close to that 
o-f the PCF, indicting the 'monopoly caoitalists' who 
used the state to shore up a rate of profit tending to 
decline and advocating their ©xpropriation through 
nationalisation. The cause of the economic problems in 
France could therefore be laid at their door and on the 
Right wing governments which supported their 
concentration on the export market and a limited number 
of domestic sectors which ultimately proved insufficient 
in the face of comoetition from foreign-owned 
multinationals. The home market had been neglected and 
when growth did increase it simply led to a sharp rise 
in imports, espciallv of household goods. (Under the 
Socialists, this caused the CGT to be sceptical about 
the fatality of 'constraints' such as the trade deficit 
which, it argued, resulted from specific policies and 
could be reversed by expansionist programmes 
concentrating on production for the domestic market).
During the 1970s, the solutions advocated by the CGT
cr /
were in the -first instance political, hence the 
mobilisation behind the Common Programme of the PS and 
PCF up until the 197S elections. After 1978, the CGT, 
not without opposition, fell in behind the PCF and its 
attacks on its erstwhile partner. Within th'e CGT, action 
was taken in opposition to closures and cut-backs 
wherever they occurred and anyone deviating from this 
line, even those within the Confederation arguing for a 
form of 'proposition force unionism', was denounced for 
'class col1aboration' (Lange et a l , 1982: Ross 1984).
Like the other Confederations, the CGT was taken 
aback by the Socialist success of May 1981. It gave a 
guarded 'soutien critique' to the new government and 
wel corned the nationalisations and early government 
measures in the field of employment. However, it grew 
increasingly uneasy with the onset of economic rigour 
from the middle of 1982 and outright hostility grew from 
the beginning of 1984 as it became clear that the
modernisation of industries such as steel and 
shipbuilding would proceed with the loss of thousands of 
jobs.
The CGT's central criticism - and the basis for its 
action an jobs - was that although there had been
political change and a programme of nationalisations, 
the way the economy and companies were being run
differed little from before 1981. The CGT thus called 
for 'new criteria of management', a concept first 
developped by Communist economists such as Paul Boccara 
and introduced into CGT literature from the beginning of
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the 1980s. Against the capitalist stress an the ratio o-f 
profits to caoital, the new -formula advanced here looked 
at the whole o-f value added to the capital utilised 
(including that which went on wages, taxes, profits, 
investment, etc) (Analyses et Documents Economicues. 
No. 3, December 1982, pp. 60-1: 'Quels Crit£?res pour une
Nouvelle Gestion?').
An essential part in increasing the ratio of value 
added is played by efforts to economise on the capital 
used by the elimination of waste. This refers to 
material waste during the production process but also 
'financial waste', by which the CGT means high interest 
rates paid on loans, dividends, 'salaries' to 
non-working relatives in a family firm and speculation, 
especially on the foreign exchange markets (Le Peuole. 
1169, 9th February 1984). If costs are to be cut, then 
the CGT proposes to start with these elements which are 
seen as a drag on the essential functions of a company - 
production and employment.
The new criteria introduce a notion of 
'profitabi1ity' widened out to include the interests of 
the collectivity, both inside and outside a particular 
enterprise: many articles stress the social aspects of 
the new criteria, their relationship to the community 
through enhanced purchasing power, job creation, social 
utility even (see, eg., Le Peuo1e « 1144, 16th-30th
November 1982).
This then becomes a basis for action, as will be 
made clear in the case studies. In fact, the clash with
c /rnr
current oracticss within industry is osrhaos stressed as 
part of the mobi 1 i si na -function o-f the union, as will be 
argued later.
The CGT gives little impression of seeking a 
compromise when it puts -forwards its prooosals and their 
content contrasts sharply with the CFDT's 
Con-f erat i on.-l evel accent ance o-f the need -for increased
suppleness in the work place.
* * £
The CGT is very wary o-f '-flexibility' and generally 
opposes any departure -from the legal provisions o-f the 
Code du Travail as 'new -forms o-f exploitation' which are 
usually designed to coerce humans to adapt to the 
dictates o-f the machine and squeeze more pro-fit out o-f 
capital investment.
It denounced the notions o-f 'partage du travail' and 
'nouvelles solidarites', arguing that few new jobs 
resulted from any supposed 'job-sharing' arrangements 
because productivity levels are usually maintained by 
increasing line speeds and other methods (Analyses et
Documents Economi aues. 10, April 1984: 12-18:
'(-'Offensive Patronale').
It argued that the CFDT line was fatalistic in that 
it accepted the crisis and sought an 'amputation' of 
wages as the best way of reducing company costs but 
maintaining the maximum number of jobs in a society 
where resources were presumed to be in finite supply. 
The growth option had been discarded and all the burdens 
fell on the work force. Implicitly - and sometimes 
explicitly — the CFDT line is seen as conniving in a
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capitalist strategy to make the workers bear the costs 
o-f structural change in the economy. (This is also the 
criticism o-f the oppositional CFDT Union R^gionale o-f 
Lower Normandy).
The CGT does join with the CFDT in seeing the 
shorter working week as one way o-f reducing the 
unemployment numbers - but only as long as it
accompanies an economic policy geared towards growth and 
jobs, and as long as pay levels are maintained,
otherwise domestic demand and therefore jobs would be
hit. It played down the actual impact o-f the 19S2
reductions arguing that jobs were only created in any 
numbers in the state sector -following specific
agreements.
As elsewhere, the CGT tried to widen out the econmic 
debate on reduced working time, arguing that it should 
not be viewed as a cost to the firm but as a benefit to 
the community, 'socialement rentable' ('socially 
profi table').
Although, alone of the large Confederations, the CGT 
refused to sign the July 19S1 agreement with the CNPF on 
working time because of the alterations to legal 
restrictions that it allowed, it was not opposed to all 
rearrangment of working hours (especially in the public 
services when the client or customer stood to benefit) 
but the workforce had to agree and would therefore 
expect some advantage from the new system. (See the 
dossier in Le Peuple. 1168, 26th January 1984;; 1 e
Peuple. 1178, 30th August 1984: 16-18: and Analyses et
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Documents Economiaues. 4, February 19S3: 4-8).
The CGT's analysis o-f the unemployment crisis in 
French industry (CGT, 1984b) locates the root cause in 
the centralisation of capital, the concentration of 
industry in the hands of large groups and the need for 
these groups to dispose of large amounts of liquidity 
for the investment required to maintain profit levels in 
the face of fierce competition. Profits need to be 
realised ever more quickly to allow this rotation of 
capital and financial criteria thus come to dominate 
industrial decision-making even more than in the past. 
Medium-term ventures are handicapped and money is 
increasingly put to speculative financial use causing 
investment funds to dry up.
A second cause of the crisis was the decision by the 
large groups to concentrate on segments of markets - 
international markets - and invest abroad in commercial 
or, increasingly, manufacturing ventures. Domestic 
investments in 'condemned' sectors were abandoned and 
even relatively modern sites closed down. The coherence 
of French industrial structures has thus been sacrificed 
by French-based transnational operators and import 
penetration facilitated by joint ventures with foreign 
groups.
The French state backed up the large groups in this 
strategy by providing a massive infusion of funds to aid 
redeployment and soak up the social costs involved.
The national interests, particularly those of French 
workers, were neglected in all this. Even those
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remaining in jobs had suffered deskilling as automation 
was introduced with the sole aim of forcing down labour 
costs and the employers staged an assault on established 
condi ti ons.
The CGT saw no way in which such a strategy could 
solve unemployment and (like the CFDT) painted ta the 
failure to invest even when profits picked up in 19S3 as 
evidence. This was all the more "Scandalous for the CGT 
since profits had risen due to the suppression of jobs 
and the holding down of salaries. not through any real 
increase in added value.
The CGT thus called for a new form of growth which 
integrated economic and social goals. This, it said, 
would require worker intervention in management and the 
recovery of national control of industry (which did not 
exclude international agreements on cooperation). The 
vehicle for both these aims was nationalisation - though 
the way in which the state companies were run, the 
failure to alter the predominance of financial criteria, 
brought the wrath of the Confederation down on the 
government, especially when these groups began to lay 
off staff like any other enterprise after the reversal 
in government economic priorities from 19S2-3.
The union interest in questions of management was 
not seen as a completely new departure. After all, 
demands relating to training, working conditions, even 
on wages all restricted management's options in some 
way. However, the gravity of the present crisis
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nec555i tatsd a mors direct intsrvsnti on bv the wcrkErs 
in order to impose decisions in their interests:
, les snjeux industrials d ' aujourd'hui,
1 'ampleur de la casse industrielle e-f feet use 
au nom des criteres de cette gestion 
capitalists, exigent que les travailleurs 
interviennent a tous les nivea’ux et a toutes 
les Stapes des processus decisionels aui , 
dans 1 'entrsprise, definissent strategie et 
object!fs generaux de production et 
transforment ceux-ci en modalites concretes 
d'obtention de resultats, c 'est-a-dire en 
mise en oeuvre effective des productions, en 
volume et contenu d'emplois. (CGT, l?S4b:
112). (J)
Like the CFDT, the CGT also underlined the 
importance of union intervention at the national level, 
too, in the various organisms of the Plan, for example. 
It placed more stress than the CFDT on worker action to 
influence the contrats de plan agreed between the state 
and the nationalised companies: as will be seen in the 
case studies, CGT svndicats and Federations were active 
in trying to forge production agreements between state 
firms and other enterprises as the basis for French 
control of certain sectors of strategic interest.
The national interest was a prime concern of the CGT 
since it considered that only if Francs had control over
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provide a solution to unemolovment»
Thus, it was, in sharp contrast to both the CFDT and 
FO, highly suspicious of any coordination of strategies 
by EEC countries or, worse, any programme imposed from 
Brussels which necessarily relegated specific French 
interests. (The EEC was written off as being under 
German domination and broadly subservient to US and 
Japanese interests).
Its prooosals invariably stressed the ideas of 
national industrial coherence (a 1 caique de filiire) and 
the priority' of winning back the home market by French 
enterprises which would mean more jobs and which also 
entailed higher wages to orovide demand.
Thus. the Document d 'Orientation for its 42nd 
Congress in 19S5 listed the CGT demands on employment 
under four main headings:
1) Higher salaries to boost consumption in the 
domestic market - as well as for social justice.
2) The creation of new jobs for these same economic 
and social reasons; and the new jobs should be secure, 
with a high skill content. The CGT saw no contradiction 
between the call for more jobs and its support for new 
technology, since this led to the shedding of labour 
only because of the priorities of the system into which 
it was currently being introduced.
3) State firms should lead the way in reversing the 
decline of French industry, in particular through 
research initiatives and cooperation with smaller firms
at home rather than link-ups with -foreion groups-
4) A true modernisation o-f industry which linked 
economic and social aims — not the 'modernisations 
pretextes' or 'restructurations alibi' (Le Feuple. 1169, 
9th February 1984) which were simply an excuse for
sackings and closing down -financially ' unpro-f i tabl e ' but 
industrially sound units.
The means for all this were at.hand:
II s'agit ... de prelever sur les 
fortunes, de frapper les vrais privileges. (K)
But it was also necessary to get at the roots of the 
problem - the financial waste inherent in management 
practices governed by capitalist criteria.
Public funds, for example. should be granted to
companies only if certain commitments on job creation, 
training and modernisation were made - and the workforce 
should have some check that they were kept. The same 
conditions ought also to be attached to loans from state 
banks.
Force Quvriere
Alain Bergounioux, one of the few academics whose 
interest in FO stretches back beyond its recent
electoral successes, outlines what he describes as FO's 
'strategy for the crisis' in Kesselman and Groux (19S4).
This 'strategy' concentrates almost exclusively on 
defending purchasing power and safeguarding social
security and other benefits (la protection socials). To 
this and. FO aims everywhere to pursue negotiations and 
come to agreements, even if only minimal advances are on 
offer: the Confederal leadership engages in highly
public visits to the Elysee Palace and Ministries to 
exert pressure concerning planned government measures or 
the opening of negotiations; and, finally, FQ members 
are active in the management of the bodies which run the 
French social security system.
Reading this list of priorities, one is immediately 
struck by the fact that there are no economic or 
industrial prescriptions for tackling the jobs crisis: 
this is really a programme of union action which aims no 
higher than limiting the effects of the crisis on those 
still in work and those on the dole.
The CGT and, especially, the CFDT have given much 
thought to forms of union action - but action aimed at 
influencing economic and industrial decisions as much as 
the defence of immediate interests. The difference 
between FO and its main rivals, of course, is that the 
former has no pro jet de societes the trade union should 
not take industrial action which is aimed at the 
political arena and, at the risk of losing the 
independence vital for its primary role of defending 
workers' interests, it should leave decision-making with 
the employers and politicians.
There is perhaps a thin line between action to 
pressurise the decision makers to move in a certain 
direction and the method recently adopted by the CFDT
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and CGT of mobilising behind alternative solutions, but 
FQ doctrine rules out the latter process - or has done 
until recently. In April 1986, FG put certain proposals 
to the government relating to unemployment and these 
were detailed enough for Le Monde's commentator to note 
that it was "presque un 'plan' complet de lutte contre 
le chomage" and to talk of "ce changement strategique" 
(Le Monde. 4th and 5th April 1936)'.
The proposals were mainly to do with fiscal changes 
and training programmes - fairly safe areas to wander 
into in any first attempt at 'proposition force 
unionism' - and perhaps more of a tactical move to 
reonen FO's traditionally good relations with Right wing 
governments ahead of any move in this direction by the 
CFDT, but developments in the near future will obviously 
be of interest.
For the time being, however, FO's approach to 
economic and industrial matters still seems to be 
epitomised by the simple, repeated, almost platitudinous 
contributione of Andre Bergeron, calling for reflation 
through higher wages and warning of serious social 
unrest if he is not heeded (See the frequent leaders by 
Bergeron in FO Hebdo).
FO leaders do not enjoy the extensive research and 
back-up staff available to their counterparts in the CGT 
and CFDT and its analyses of the economic situation are 
consequently less developed.
According to Bergounioux (1984), it accepts that the 
crisis is structural and stability can only be
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re—established through international cocnsration, though 
it also contends that positive results would ensue -from 
domestic re-flation geared towards job creation.
FO opposes protectionism on the grounds that this 
would cause retaliation which would hit jobs in export 
industries but, with the C G T , it is hostile to the 
CFDT's concept o-f job (and income) sharing and argues 
•for maintained purchasing power ^nd -full compensation 
•for any reduced working week. Anything else, at a time 
when workers were already having trouble making ends
meet, was unrealistic and union leaders who expected
workers to accept it were indulging in fantasy (FO 
Hebdo, 1674, 17th June 1931).
FO did not see the shorter working week as an
effective economic answer to unemployment: firms needed 
to remain competitive and acted within a market
environment, therefore commitments on jobs linked to
purely social measures were always likely to be
uncertain. For F O , then, a reduction in working time
would only have an impact on employment levels in a
context of growth generated by competitive companies. 
(Report to 15th Congress, 1934, p.269).
Against the CFDT, FO argued that the crisis was not 
one of over—production as four— fifths of the world
currently lived in need (FO Hebdo. 1737, 19th January
1933): a call for growth was not therefore inflationary 
and there was not some finite demand for labour which 
consequently had to be redistributed in new forms
throughout the work force. For FO, the shorter working
er / ~r er
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week was a straight demand -far better conditions, as 
many sneakers at its 1984 Congress made clear, though it 
accepted that its introduction needed to be coordinated 
on a European scale if French productivity was not to be 
put at a disadvantage (FO Hebdo, 1673, 10th June 1981).
This insistence on growth rather than work sharing 
as the solution to unemployment clearly put FO in the 
same economic camn as the CGT, despite the essentially 
political disagreement on the virtues of European 
ref1ati on.
The European theme is very strong — Bergeron has 
called, for example. for conventions collectives 
Eurooeennes. European collective bargaining (FO Hebdo. 
1677, 8th July 1981) and on occasions he seems to 
advocate a form of political integration via a 'United 
Nations of Europe' (eg, FO Hebdo. No.1824, 23rd January 
1985) or at the very least mors commercial and 
industrial integration. (Joint statements along these 
lines were issued by the CFTC, CGC and FO in 1981 and 
1982).
On the specific matter of employment, the 15th 
Congress passed a motion which argued that the various 
measures taken by the government (see the section on 1e 
traitement social du chomaae) had done all they were 
likely to do in denting the unemployment figures and 
that a true programme of job creation was now required, 
through the fallowing measures:
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1) Re-flat ion and investment based on an industrial 
strategy worked out at a European level. coordinated 
with the OECD and developing countries.
2) Increased wages to support domestic demand.
3) A shorter working week, by negotiation and with 
no loss o-f pay.
4) A programme o-f job creation in the public sector 
to improve the quality o-f services and satisfy needs.
Like all the other Confederations, FO called for an 
expansion in government training schemes, especially for 
the young, but it wanted to ensure that there would be 
real job opportunities at the end of them.
The CGC and CFTC
The remaining two Confederations, the CGC and the 
CFTC, are as limited in their resources (and therefore 
their research and publications) as FO.
The CGC's views on the way out of crisis bring it 
fairly close to the 'modernists' in the CFDT, both 
sharing a concern with the entreprise and arguing for 
strong contractual relations between employers and trade 
unions, though the CGC goes further than most in the 
CFDT with its support for a form of binding 
contractualism (CGC, 1983: 44).
In line with all the Confederations except the CGT, 
it is resolutely against protectionism, which fails to 
address the problem of the failure to modernise and is 
counter-productive in an open world economy.
Like the CFDT, the CGC sees the need for workers to
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be given more responsibility and a greater role in day 
to day work decisions if an organisation is to be 
-flexible and capable o-f responding quickly to changes in 
the business environment. This would satis-fy the double 
aim o-f increasing worker satis-faction and making jobs 
more secure.
The CGC shares with the CFTC the demand that workers
should be represented on company boards, the conseils de
survei 11 ance. to keep a close eye on affairs and have
some say in the definition of industrial strategy,1 "
though powers of decision should remain with line
management. For the CGC, the only way out of crisis is 
through concertati o n .
On the specific matter of employment, the CGC was as 
concerned as the rest that New Technology should be
introduced in a way which did not deskill the majority 
of workers. However, it felt that in the medium term it 
would be a net creator of jobs with a high skill 
content and therefore its introduction should be
carefully prepared but never impeded.
It urged priority treatment for those groups most 
affected by unemployment including: an effort to attract 
the young to industry, in part through revised curricula 
in schools and a renewal of the apprenticeship system; 
equal treatment for women in the labour market (which 
required a change in mentalities as much as the law); a 
restriction on the redundancy of those aged 45 years and 
over who might have particular difficulty in finding a 
new position, or even a system obliging companies to
■_i /  o o
employ a certain quota o-f oeople in this age groan.
On the question of temps choisi. the CGC was if 
anything even mare radical than the CFDT, arguing that 
work was no longer central to life styles even if it 
remained the main source of income for most people. It 
argued for the greater acceptance of differentiated 
working patterns and of career planning which, for 
example, would allow those who did not go into higher 
education after school to have the same opportunity at a 
later stage in life, perhaps with the option of 
returning to the same employer and even a paid 
contingent of weeks, months or years which might be 
dedicated to educational improvement.
It wanted to see an extension of voluntary work 
which, in its view, provided employment for those with 
alternative resources and added to services without 
impinging upon the paid sector.
It was a logical next step to move that the wage be 
dissociated from the effort expended, to widen out the 
whole concept of remuneration to take into account 
individual contributions such as personal effort and 
responsibility but also social utility. On the other 
hand, the CGC argued against any ceiling on salaries and 
especially the CFDT's formula placing it at six times 
the minimum wage level, rejecting any 'moral' arguments 
for such an arbitrary range.
In an interview in Le Monde (21st September 19S4), 
CGC leader Paul Marchelli offered an adapted version of 
'new-style solidarity' when he said that modernisation
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could in vo I vs a n93r—term fall in livino stsndsrds for 
al 1 - that is. even those on SMIC (the legal minimum) if 
society wanted to avoid the problem o-f a disillusioned 
and demoralised cadres grouo...
The CGC was keen on improved training in the 
workplace and, departing -from the CFDT here, advocated 
in place of a shorter working week
... 45 heures payees 40,  ^ condition qus
ces 45 heures comportent au moins 10 heures 
de formation. (CGC, 26th Congress, reported 
in Liaisons Sociales. Document W207,
12th June 1984). <L>
The Confederation disagreed strongly with government 
economic policy during the first three years of the 
Mitterrand presidency and took to the streets on several
occasions to protest growing state control in general
and the post-1981 nationalisations in particular.
Its macro-economic position was quite close to that 
of the CFTC which, at its 42nd Congress in November 1984 
(see Liaisons Sociales. Document W213, 9th January 1985) 
denounced the nationalisations as dictated solely by 
ideology and disastrous in terms of the cost which was 
not even redeemed by success on the employment front.
Like the CGC, it wanted a disengagement of the state 
from its overbearing industrial presence. (Its 
conference slogan was 'Entreprendre Pour L ' Homme"...).
While dismissing the shorter working week as a
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miracle cure -for unemployment. the CFTC saw it as 
'inevitable', given the development of technology, but 
wanted agreements at company level which contained 
guarantees on purchasing power.
The CFTC was totally in favour of the modernisation 
effort but conceded that it would entail a net reduction 
in jobs and it therefore called for reflation through 
higher wages and increased domestic demand as a 
stimulant to job creation. It wanted aid for small 
businesses and a programme of public works which would, 
as a priority, find employment for those 'ne disposant 
pas toujours des capacites necsssaires pour s'adapter 
aux technologies avancees'.
The Employment Issue and French Industrial Relations
Sabine Erb^s-Seguin (1934), following here some of 
the 'Regulation' theorists such as Robert Boyer, has
suggested that in the foreseeable future the new 
neaoci able. the central issue around which industrial 
relations will be conducted, will be employment. The
interest of the flexibility negotiations and of the
Confederations' action and programmes for jabs therefore 
goes much deeper than the actual contents the way in 
which the unions address this issue is a pointer to how 
the movement will evolve in the future and what barriers 
might stand in the way.
In fact, it is not only the evolution of the labour 
movement which is of interest: as outlined earlier, the 
patronat has long moved out of its protectionist,
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malthusianist tarper of old and has stsadily edged 
towards a form of economic liberalism which includes 
throwing off what is seen as the heavy hand of the state 
in its dealings with employees.
In particular, the patronat now seems to encourage 
firm level negotiations rather than the branch level 
talks it once preferred. However, this does not mean 
that it is no longer concerned t;o keep the unions well 
away from centres of decision: in stark opposition to
Auroux's notion of a strong, responsible labour movement 
able to negotiate in good faith with the employers, the 
French patronat seems to be seeking ever more refined 
ways of evading the unions, hence the proliferation of 
schemes relating to agreements with 'elected 
representatives', 'negotiated deregulation',
individualised contracts, and so on during the latter 
phase of the Socialist government. (See, for example, Le 
Monde. 3rd April 1985).
Of course, the employer cannot evade the union 
inter1ocuteur indefinitely, especially given the Auroux 
obligation to negotiate once a year on wages and 
conditions. But there is no obligation to conclude an 
agreement and early results were not encouraging (Le 
Monde. 28th June 1985). What is more, activists 
frequently noted that their employer was slow or even 
totally apposed to giving them all the information they 
were legally entitled to and which was necessary for any 
reasoned appraisal of a company's situation.
The good faith of the employers' side was clearly
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open to question early in 1985 when the CNPF seemed to. 
if not sabotage, at least show no real interest in an 
attempt to negotiate a retraining scheme -for the 
unemployed (Le Monde, 26th June 19S5). The strategy then 
appeared to be to wait for the inevitable Right wing 
victory in the March 19S6 elections and rely on the new 
government to sweep away ' restrictive' legislation: 
entrepreneurial freedom would ,then rapidly allow 
solution of the employment problem.
Yet the good faith of sections of the labour 
movement might be just as open to question as the 
discussion of the flexibility talks and case studies 
wi 11 reveal.
It is the intentions of the CGT which are most in 
question: yet the attitudes of FO and the CFDT also 
present barriers to any development of bargaining in the 
present context. FO is reluctant to venture out of the 
field of salaries and immediate conditions; more, it 
clings on to acquis. sharing with the CGT the notion 
that hard-won advances are not to be bargained away and 
that progress does not allow such give and take: both 
these attitudes militate against any effective approach 
to the question of unemployment.
The problem inside the CFDT is different: a
significant number of its mi 1itants are still suspicious 
of neaociations a froid. all the more so when its chief 
advocates seem prepared to jettison significant elements 
of the programme which has made the Confederation a 
radical socialist force since the late 1960s.
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Notwithstanding the majorities achieved by the CFDT 
leadership at the 1932 and 1935 conferences -for their 
'rscsntred' strategy, the unease o-f CFDT activists, the 
conservatism o-f FO, the maximalism of the CGT and, 
indeed, the anti-unionism of the employers- all mean that 
the transition to an industrial relations system 
reolving around negotiation is still some way off in 
France.
Furthermore, although some observers posited the 
emergence of a new 'reformist' bloc during the 1931-36 
period, and particularly during the flexibility talks 
when the CFDT, FQ, CFTC and CGC frequently held separate 
caucus meetings, such a thesis needs to be treated with 
caution. Already, in this present chapter, differing 
attitudes on the way to tackle unemployment have been 
uncovered: the divergences should become clearer after
discussion of the case studies and the way in which the 
Confederations evolved towards a form of 'proposition 
force unionism'.
NOTES
1) A fi1iere is a chain of activities from the 
extraction of materials to the sale of a product.
2) For a comprehensive list of the various measures 
taken by the government, see Economie et Statistiaue. 
166, May 1934: 35-3. Estimates on job numbers in this 
section are generally taken from this source.
3) It should also be noted that changes in the way 
the social security system was operated took 100,000
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ceoa 1 e off the bsne-fits reoister between 1982 and 1983.
4) For example, L ' Act 1 on Economioue dans
1 'Entrenrise (1983) and Emcloi: Mode d'Emoloi (1984).
5) See Lange et al (1982) -far union analyses in the 
post-war period; and 'Vers un autre type de
developpement'. CFDT Aujourd'hui. 30, March-April 1978; 
72-87.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'The objective is clear: to put France back to 
work. And in the -first instance halt the rapid increase 
in unemployment. ' (Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, 15th 
September 1981).
(B) 'The CFDT puts all its weight behind initiatives 
to create alternative jobs when new technology is 
introduced, with the job losses that causes. Experience
shows that the search -for solutions cannot be limited to
the company concerned - it has to cover the whole
'travel to work area' and must involve the active 
cooperation o-f everyone concerned. ' (CFDT, Svndical isme 
Hebdo. December 1984: 18-19).
(C) 'A type o-f development is overturned, moved in a 
di-f-ferent direction towards self-managed socialism with 
each of the thousands of changes of course we are able 
to impose through our trade union activity.' (CFDT 
Aujourd'hui. 43, Mav-June 1980: 82).
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( D )  The shortiEr w0 rkino w e e k  conti nuss> and must 
CDntinue more actively to be considered the most 
important immediate solution to unemployment. ' 
(Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2010, 2?th March 19S4).
(E) 'I would like to say to those who demand the 35 
hour week by law with salaries fully maintained and 
nothing changed in the organisation of work that what 
they are proposing not only wouldn't create durable jobs 
but would eventually end up by increasing unemployment, 
because everyone of you knows, a lot of firms just
couldn't survive the shock. Let's not play at being the 
sorcerer's aoprentice with dangerous slogans.' (Edmond 
Maire, CFDT Congress, June 1935).
(F) 'The funds thus levied do not entail the
complete loss of part of the salary: this is a
provisional, negotiated transfer of the direct salary in 
order to make it 'work' for the current priority: jobs. '
(Svndicalisme Hebdo. December 1934: IS).
(G) '... 'decouple' the notions of 'progress' and
'technical advance', explode the myth of the neutrality 
of technology and change the criteria which govern the 
very notion of technical advance in order to really make 
it a means of progress. ' (CFDT, 1977: 10).
(H) ' A  new dynamic remains to be set in motion,
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based on new modes o-f social relations and another type
o-f development. ' (CFDT, 1984b).
(I) 'The crisis across the capitalist world is in 
•fact the product o-f the crisis developing in each 
country from its national base. It influences, in turn, 
the way the crisis develops in each country.' (Le 
Peuole. 1192/3, 25th April 1985).,’
(J) 'The importance of what is at stake in industry 
today, the scale of the industrial hooliganism done in 
the name of the criteria of this capitalist management, 
require that the workers intervene at all levels and all 
stages of the decision-making process which, in the 
company, define the strategy and general objectives of 
production and transform these into concrete ways of 
obtaining results - that is, in the effective operation 
of production and in the volume and content of jobs. ' 
(CGT, 1984b: 112).
(K> 'It is a matter of levying taxes on wealth, 
hitting the real privileges.' (CGT, Document 
d 'Orientation. 42nd Congress).
(L) '... 45 hours paid as if they were 40 — as long
as they include at least 10 hours of training. ' (CGC, 
26th Congress) .
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6. THE EMERGENCE OF 'PROPOSITION FORCE UNIONISM'
The French labour movement as described in the 
previous chapters has traditionally been, in its 
majority, 'revolutionary' or 'maximalist' in that it has 
seen solid gains -for the workers as only really possible 
after a socialist transformation of society. Even the 
largest 'reformist' union is doctrinally anti-capitalist 
and sees it as an act of trade union purity to refuse 
any implication in decision-making, preferring to act as 
a counterweight to employers and, as necessary,
governments.
On the face of it, then, France would not seem to be 
fertile ground for the emergence of any 'proposition 
force unionism' - meaning the use of union power to
influence the resolution of industrial problems in a 
positive manner through the elaboration of 'alternative 
solutions' or 'counter-plans' which are negotiable 
within the current system but still point in the
direction of social transformation (Lange et a l , 1932: 
61) .
However, in this chapter, it will be argued that 
such an evolution has taken place in France even if
progress to date is cautious, faltering and beset with 
contradictions. Indeed, the move towards practices 
closer in touch with the day to day concerns of the work 
force was probably necessary to avoid the 
marginalisation of traditional combative, or
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contestatai re . unionism in France and the factors 
behind this development are outlined.
The next chapter will look at concrete efforts by 
grassroots activists to influence developments in their 
companies when job losses have been threatened.
Most attention is focused on the CGT and the CFDTz 
these are the unions which have pushed reflection 
furthest and since they tend to be the best represented 
in most sectors (with over 60 percent of the total of 
sections svndicales in industrial concerns<1>), their 
policies are of most interest in this field.
The Changing Industrial Relations Environment
It is possible to isolate a series of factors in the 
economic. industrial, social and political fields which 
contributed, in varying proportions, to the 
self-analysis of both the CGT and CFDT.
Foremost amongst these was the failure of the Left 
to win the par1iamentary elections of 197S and, 
paradoxical1v , the arrival of a Left government in 19S1. 
However, the rise in unemployment due to the recession, 
the restructuring of industry and the pace of 
technological change provided an eminently practical 
reason for these two Confederations to reassess their 
attitude to problems in capitalist firms while one 
aspect of French employers' response to the crisis - a 
whole panoply of initiatives aimed at making the 
workforce more productive while locking them into an 
'enterprise culture' - spurred an examination by the
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u . n  i  o n s  o - f  c h a n a e s  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  a t t  i  t  t i d e s  o - f  t h e  w o r k e r s  
w h i c h  t h e v  h a d  h i t h e r t o  n e o l e c t e d .
There is a growing body of academic opinion in 
France which sees the current problems of French 
industry as a reflection of social as well as economic 
stresses. The crisis in the mode of capital accumulation 
is also the crisis of the wage-labour relationship, 
the rapport saiarial. defined as
... 1 'ensemble des conditions qui regissent
1 'usage et la reproduction de la force de 
travail. Ce terme recouvre ainsi 
1'organisation du proces de travail, le 
type de polarisation des qualifications, le 
degre de mobilite de la force de travail, 
enfin 1es determinants de la formation et de 
1'uti1isation du revenu saiarial direct, mais 
aussi les elements collectifs contribuant au 
salaire indirect (Boyer, 19S4a: 29)<3>. (A)
Boyer argues that the limits of the 'fordist' 
organisation of industry have been reached: it can no
longer ensure the rate of profit prevailing in the 1950s 
and 1960s. In part, this is due to the struggles of 
workers against conditions in industry, conditions they 
are no longer prepared to accept in return for monetary 
compensation. Legislation, the 'social wage' and the 
opening-up of the French economy to international 
markets have further increased the pressure on profits.
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This type o-f analysis seems to be accepted to a 
certain extent by the CFDT leadership and. acknowledging
i-f not welcoming the current situaion, it seeks to 
influence the establishment o-f a new rapport saiarial 
by. -for example, negotiating revised contracts which 
take economic constraints into account, arguing -for 
reduced but more -flexible working hours and moving 
towards some -form o-f union check on the use o-f 
investment -funds at both company and regional level.
The CGT has largely adhered to a more orthodox 
Keynesian reading o-f the crisis, calling -for re-flation, 
a certain amount o-f protecti oni s m , the de-fence o-f 
purchasing power to provide outlets for goods and 
services, and so an.
The differences in outlook noted in the previous 
chapter on the Confederations' programmes for jobs 
should be kept in mind here as the economic analyses 
provide a framework for the theoretical thinking of each 
Confederation on what is possible within the current 
economic system and therefore the feasibility of 
'counter— plans' based on labour movement priorities.
The rise in unemployment from around 1974 led to a 
rise in the proportion of disputes relating to job 
loss<3> and a change in the nature of some demands (on 
work time, for example, moving from a concern with 
longer holidays and a shorter working week for their 
own sake to action against short time working and then 
to proposals for reduced hours as part of a programme to
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a b s o r b  r s d u n d s n c i s s )  .  ( S e e  C s s s s s u s .  1 9 8 0 :  C h  1 )  .
T b s  s t r a t s a y  o f  b o t h  t h e  C F D T  a n d  t h e  C G T  d L i r i n c  t h e  
early years o-f the crisis was. of course, overwhelmingly 
political: the focus was on national issues likely to 
embarrass the government and the unions staged one day 
strikes and protest demonstrations to point to the need 
for a change in the 197S elections. Yet this form of 
action promised little in the .short term to those 
workers whose firms were going to the wall and 
increasingly they sought to preserve their jobs by 
defensive action, sometimes accompanied by efforts to 
prove the viability of the company. Essentially, this 
was
une reponse locale et pragmatique a la 
conjunction d'une situation de crise et d'une 
incapacits du syndicalisms considers au 
niveau de sa totalite a y faire face (Huiban,
1981: 40). (B)
The failure of the Union de la Gauche drove home the 
point for unionists in both the CFDT and the CGT and the 
attenti sme of the period was denounced as the CFDT 
embarked on a major overhauil of its strategy from 
1977-78. Rgcentraoe specifically entailed a greater 
concern with the preoccupations of the grassroots and 
action in the workplace (Svndicalisme Hebdo. 1703, 4th 
May 1978).
Some CGT leaders were arguing along the same lines.
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Jean-Loui s Moynot (1982), while maintaining that 
political change was still vital, asserted that until it 
came the labour movement had to -face up to the crisis 
and propose concrete, negotiable alternatives to the 
anti-working class policies o-f the employers. Like the 
CFDT, he saw the need -for greater worker participation 
in the -formulation o-f policy and union li-fe in general.
When the CGT opened up its press to an unprecedented 
membership debate on its policy and strategy in the
run-up to the 1978 Conference it was clear that many 
activists also felt the union should look more closely 
at what the workers wanted and not take their opinions 
for granted. In his speech to the Grenoble Conference, 
General Secretary Georges S-Cguy echoed the criticisms,
broaching subjects such as work organisation and
deskilling, calling for union initiatives in these
'qualitative' areas and even conceding the lack of union 
independence in the pre—electoral period (Ross, 1984).
hoynot argued (1982: 58) that the CGT had
traditional1y been loath to stray far from demands on 
wages and immediate working conditions:
Implicitement ou explicitement, l'idee la 
plus repandue dans la CGT est que s'occuper de 
questions economiques en systeme capitalists 
procede de la col 1aboration de classes. (C)
Thus, there had previously been little concern with 
questions of work organisation and technology
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beyond the effects that these had on remuneration, 
health and safety. Movnot - and Edmond Mai re for the 
CFDT, too (for example, in the May 1980 report 
reproduced in Landier, 1981: Annexe II) - found this all
i
the more deplorable because employers had stepped in to 
exploit the unions' hesitations and directly address the 
workers' desires for more autonomy and self-expression 
in their work.
It is clear that, in this respect at least, one can 
talk of a conscious management strategy aimed at 
achieving higher productivity through more flexible use 
of labour and. indeed, meeting certain individual 
demands, in the short term at least. Borzeix (1980) has 
captured well the embarrassment of union activists, 
caught between what they perceived as class 
col1aboration on one side and the interest of workers on 
the other (see also Morville, 1985; and the Dourdan 
seminars published in 1978 and 1982).
The May 1968 events had demonstrated that the young 
in particular were seeking more from work than wages to 
satisfy basic needs: old values relating to occupational 
skills and collective, class concerns were giving way to 
more individualised desires for self-fulfilment, perhaps 
even vague notions of 'control', and contestation was 
more likely to be found now over issues such as the 
environment, the 'quality of life', women's issues, than 
in class confrontation located in industry (Touraine et 
a l , 1984; Segrestin et a l , 1981). Though the CFDT had
adopted the qualitative demands of May 1968 as its own,
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it had been sidetracked by the el sc tor al i sm of the 
1974-7S period: meanwhile, Moynot (1979) argued that the 
CGT had failed to address issues of concern to what he 
termed the 'mouvement social reel ' because its culture 
did not allow it to conceive of genuine social advance 
within current political and economic structures.
All these factors pushed the CpT and the CFDT into a 
period of introspection which focused essentially on the 
boundaries of 'class' union action under capitalism.'
The debate was at once between the CFDT and CGT and 
within each Confederation (with contributions from the 
'reformists' who largely, however, remained faithful to 
their previous line). It became more urgent from May 
1931 when the labour movement had to decide how far it 
would go in assisting the PS-PCF government in its 
efforts to stave off recession, particularly when the 
economic and industrial problems refused to respond to 
the mid-1932 change in political direction.
It is clear from the research undertaken that there 
has been a change of attitude in both the CFDT and CGT 
as regards their implication in many areas of economic 
life. The change as far as the CGT and certain elements 
of the CFDT are concerned may only be at the level of 
discourse though that itself may reflect the real 
obstacles to positive working class initiatives in an 
economy still dominated by the search for profits and 
capital accumulation. The evolution in attitude is 
outlined here and concrete examples of the desire to
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influence pci icy are outlined in the next two chapters 
before an assessment of the significance of this 
development is attempted.
The Doctrinal Debate
There has been a continuous debate within the CFDT 
since its foundation on the strategy for social and 
political change which revolves ground the relationship 
between short and long-term aims, the play-off between 
'current demands' and ideological purity. While still 
the CFTC, the Confederation at first sought cooperation 
with employers who shared its Christian outlook but, as 
outlined above, from 1945 in particular there was a 
steady evolution towards a form of unionism based more 
on economic and political analysis than moral principle.
In the document on 'democratic planning' adopted by 
the 1959 Conference there is an emphasis on the need for 
activists to be trained to formulate policies on wages, 
working conditions and economic and financial matters 
but at the same time it is asserted that any ambitions 
in the field of planning would be misplaced under the 
current system:
... croire que cela est realisable sans 
transformation politique veritable, c'est 
rever! (CFDT, 1971: 91). (D)
The resolution adopted at the Conference is unmistakably 
anti-capitalist: it calls for nationalisation of the
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banking system, the 'public control' ot investments and 
an economy based on the satisfaction of needs. And yet 
there is also a section dealing with power sharing in 
which the CFTC demands that the union
doit etre mis en possibilite resile 
d'exercer son controls et sa participation 
a la gestion.
Cel a suppose notamment, dans 1'immediat. 
la reconnaissance du delegue syndical 
d'entreprise et les moyens d'action 
necessaires... (CFDT, 1971: 94. Emphasis 
added: some immediate prospects for change 
are clearly envisaged). (E)
In the discussion which follows the presentation of 
these documents, a lively argument ensues between those 
who see democratic planning as a step on the way to 
socialism and those who refuse any integration of the 
workers into the decision-making system of companies 
prior to revolutionary change or, at the very least, 
before the nationalisation of their firms in a mixed 
economy.
At its 1970 Conference, no doubt influenced by the 
potentialities revealed by May 1963, the CFDT formally 
embraced socialism and its position on immediate demands 
had hardened. It called for autooestion: the social
ownership of the means of production and exchange: and 
democratic planning. But now it is explicitv stated
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that :
Css trois elements indissociables et 
complementaires ne peuvent etre realises que 
dans Line societe social iste (CFDT, 1971':
131). (F)
'Partial conquests' o-f an exemplary nature are desirable 
only within the perspective of 'intermediary objectives' 
- that is, medium-term goals which develop class 
consciousness and prepare the conditions for socialist 
transf ormat i on . But any form of cooest i on is excluded 
since it involves unions sanctioning decisions made in 
reality by the capitalist power. Union demands are
alternati ves to capitalist choices and negotiations do
not imply bargaining over issues that are non-negotiable 
but rather
... Lin moyen parmi d'autres de 
concretiser un rapport de forces ne de
1 'action... loin de conforter la societe
capitaliste, (la negociation) doit 
contribuer a desequi1ibrer le systeme et 
ouvrir la possibilite d'une nouvelle avancee 
vers une societe socialiste et democrat!que 
(CFDT, 1971: 137). (G)
It was this perspective, with its emphasis on the 
need for political change, that led the CFDT into its
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programme of joint action with the CGT (stimulated in 
part bv active socialists within the CFDT who sought a 
closer gathering o-f -forces on the Left after
Mitterrand's narrow -failure to become President in 
1974).
Given the different 'currents' within the CFDT, it 
is perhaps not totally accurate to present the
predominance of electoral objectives in the mid-1970s 
as an aberration in CFDT history (as some of the
post-recentrace leadership has argued). However, the 
CFDT has always sought an indeoendent political voice 
for itself and, in this, distinguishes itself sharply 
from the CGT which it sees as totally dominated by the 
political objectives of the Communist Party. For the 
CFDT, its rival's reliance on the party political sphere 
gave it a stati st perspective on planning, totally at 
odds with the CFDT's calls for autogestion. democracy 
and planning from the base upwards (Maire, 1971).
In fact, the CGT does see the trade unions as having 
a role in defining the means to achieve socialism, even 
if the 'essential responsibilities' lie with the parties 
on the left (Krasucki, 1972). The CGT was not all that 
far from the CFDT in the early 1970s in seeing little 
scope for progress under the 'monopoly capitalists and 
their government': and any victories achieved by the 
workers were important above all for their contribution 
to the rapports de force on which depended the prospects 
for real change, that is, change in the political and 
economic systems.
6/12
w s ~  m o r e  d i  s a a r e e m e n t  o n  the c o n t e n t  o f  s n v  
•future s a d  aliens. The CGT araued tor nationalised 
industries run by rsorssentatives of the workers, 
government and consumers: Krasucki (1972) ridiculed the 
CFDT' s vision o-f 'worker sel f—management' in the massive 
industrial concerns of the modern economy. The CFDT, in 
return, argued that problems to do with alienation and 
relations with management would .not disappear simply 
with a  change in property ownership.
The Arrival of the Left Government
The political events of May-June 1981 seemed to ooen 
up new oossibi 1 ities for the unions to influence 
i n d u s t r i a l  policy and both the CFDT and CGT appeared 
r e a d y  to make the most of an unexpected opportunity. 
Thus, Henri Krasucki, at the October 1981 Comi 14 
Confederal National, presented the CGT as an ally and 
partner of the new government, ambitious but aware of 
realities, 'des inter1ocuteurs loyaux, constructifs, 
sans complaisance' (Le Petiole, 1117, lst-15th October 
1981) .
The CFDT was highly enthusiastic over the potential 
for change and, as it gained a foothold in many 
ministerial teams, it felt its voice would be heeded by 
the government. The lack of reserve of the CFDT might 
seem surprising in view of the recentraae described 
above. However, the Federation officials cited by Huiban 
(1981) situate the origins of their reflection on 
industrial and economic problems in the perspective of a
Lef t vi ctorv in 1973 (and w i d e s d r ea d nati onal i sati ons) 
When the Left failed, the CFDT leadership, for all the 
reasons cited above, pushed ahead with its thinking. In 
particular, it began to realise that defensive action, 
sometimes coupled with negotiations -on redundancy 
packages, would not suffice in the context of a 
prolonged, structural crisis of the type that the 
post-1974 recession was now seen to be:
Si les travail leurs restent prat i qu.ement 
absents des processus d'evolution de 
I 'entreori se et des decisions oui sont crises 
sans agir ni proooser d'alternatives aux 
choix patronauM, le syndicat ne pourra 
ensuite oue corrioer dans is detail leurs 
effets les plus nefastes (Svndicalisme Hebdo.
No.1720, 31st August 1973). (H)
Moynot and a few others in the CGT were arguing the 
same two points: the union must be preoared to argue and
act positively whatever the political context; and to 
properly look after the workers' interests it needed to 
begin negotiating upstream of measures affecting the 
personnel, on industrial and economic policies. Moynot 
recognised this to be a break with French labour 
tradition but saw the old attitude as something of a 
false alternative:
... ou bien se limiter aux seulss
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revendications socialss et laisser au;: 
patrons st au penvoir politique la 
responsabi1ite complete de leur gestion, ou 
bien se fier a la vertu d'un programme 
economi qua pour resoudre comme par miracle 
les problernes qu'on ne pourvient pas a 
resoudre par la lutte revendicative (1979:
47). (I)
Given the extent of the crisis, Moynot argued, it 
was suicidal to limit action to salaries, working
conditions and defensive fights for jobs. Capitalist
policies on investment and products were ruinous for the 
workers, therefore it was vital for them to intervene.
This line was repulsed by the majority at the time,
according to Ross (1984; and in Lange et a l , 1982) for
reasons related to the political strategy of the PCF 
(the CGT's positive proposals on steel industry 
restructuring being abandoned in favour of anti-Davignon 
activity to aid the PCF in the 1979 elections to the EEC 
Assembly) but no doubt also because (as Moynot admitted) 
it was a shock to CGT culture, much too close to 
col 1aboration and integration for mi 1itants schooled in 
'class unionism'.
One CGT official I spoke to in 1985 was still 
bemoaning the lack of mobilisation by the workers behind 
such 'counter-plans', blaming that on the residue of an 
anarcho-syndicalist tradition which labelled any role in 
management this side of the revolution as class
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collaboration. Ha- concsdsd that, most plana were largely 
the work of full-time officials at the level of the 
industrial Federations and Confederation headquarters 
'oft on a le temps de les iladorer'.
It should be noted that this culture is not unique 
to CGT activists. A CFDT official told me mi 1itants were 
'unprepared' for the new role but that the Auroux laws 
were helping to focus minds on industrial and economic 
spheres. Some CFDT bodies are openly hostile, the 
Hacuitex Federation<‘*> placing more hope in political 
change and national mass action to preserve jobs (see 
its 'counter-text' to the 1935 Conference Resolution 
Generale in Svndicalisme Hebdo, 2065, 9th May 19S5). The 
'oppositional' Union Regionals of Lower Normandy has 
denounced the Confederation's 'nec-Iiberal ' solutions to 
the crisis and deplores the abandonment of defensive 
action at all levels, even if it accepts the need for 
the unions to elaborate their own proposals in the 
economic field. (See its 19S4 Report: 'Aujourd'hui, quel
svndicalisme pour quelle societe?'). Like Hacuitex and 
the CGT, it argues for the state sector to set an 
example in terms of job maintenance in particular 
(Svndicalisme Hebdo, 2016, 10th May 19S4).
In the wake of the controversial Confederation 
report 'Le Monde Change. Chanpeons Notre Svndicalisme ' . 
the Finance Federation denounced the deviation of 
Confederation aims, 'le parti-pris d 'instal1 ation dans 
le capitalisme', with strikes and other forms of 
industrial action downgraded to 'un derapage de la
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nsgociation, voire une -forme r ingarde d'expression des 
m£?contents ' (Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2016. 10th May 1934). 
(J) .
FG, of course, has made it an article of faith not 
to seek any intervention in the running of companies or 
the economy. As a union 'counterweight', it attempts to 
limit the effects of industrial restructuring by 
negotiating redundancy terms (with action undertaken 
where success seems likely or cut-backs unjustified), 
pushing retraining schemes and taking an active role in 
the social security system and so on. A union, it feels, 
has no vocation to manage and therefore it looks for no 
responsibiIity in decision-making which might blur its 
identity and compromise its ability to defend the 
workers' interests (limited to wages, immediate
conditions and jab security, as far as possible).
Management decisions must take into account broader
interests which the union is not there to defend:
autogestion is denounced for the attempt to reconcile 
the unreconci1able. (See the 15th Conference Report, 
19S4, especially the section on 'L'action ^conomique de 
la Confederation', pp.233-350).
There may be moves towards a more positive attitude 
on these industrial questions by the FO's cadres union 
(Le Monde, 31st May 1935) but all the F0 activists I 
spoke to in the course of fieldwork shared the notion 
that this defence of immediate interests was the only 
legitimate area for trade union action in the work 
place. One official at Renault remarked:
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La rols du syndicalisms eat de sentir ce 
qui peut etre sauve, mini miser la crise et 
avoir des garanties dans la mesure des 
possibilities. (K)
For the election of unionists to the board of 
nationalised companies in 1984,. FO stressed its members 
sought no policy-making role and would seek election 
only to further demands at this new. higher level of 
representation. All its candidates in each firm 
presented an identical 'manifesto' of 'orooosi ti ons 
soci ales' relating to conditions of employment, with no 
industrial, financial or management content.
Bergounicux (1975) notes F O 's selective reading of 
the Amiens Charter (especially the omission of the 
notion of the svndi cat as the future 'groupement de 
production et de repartition') and the loss of that part 
of the inter-war CGT tradition from which FO emerged 
which emphasised the role of the union in national 
planning and workers' control in the factory. In seeking 
to distinguish itself from what it saw as the 
PCF-dominated CGT, FO stressed its non-alignment and a 
notion of 'pure' unionism which excluded any activity 
beyond the most basic defensive and revendicatif (at 
least in the workplace, FO being a champion of the 
workers' role in the management of the Social Security 
system). '
Bergounioux writes of FO after the schism:
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Sa nouvelle position, minoritairs. °n 
butts au:: critiques d'ideologies rivales,
1 'amsna a -fairs des choix, en construisant 
peu a peu un systems doctrinal autour de la 
notion d'indepsndance et en rejetant ce qui 
avait ete une des virtualit^s du controls 
ouvrier dans la CGT de Jouhau:-:- la capacite 
gestionnaire du svndicalisme dans 
1'entreprise, pour maintenir le syndicat dans 
une -fonction de controle au sens stricte du 
terme (Ssrgounioux, 1982:69). (L>
The CGC, while not neglecting the defensive and 
bargaining functions of the trade union, recognises the 
need to be constructive and offer proposals on
industrial and economic matters. (CGC, 1983). However, 
for some activists there may be a a contradiction
between this union role and the criticism of management 
it implies, one noting:
On (le syndicat CGC) fait confiance non 
seulement a la Direction mais a tout 
1 'encadrement qui fait les enquetes de 
marche, qui est competent (CGC, Renault). (M)
However, others had a conception of the CGC
occupying the middle ground and adjudicating in a sense 
between managment and workers, reconciling .1 'economioue
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La CGC, compte tanu des membres qui son t 
renresentes au sain de cette organisation 
svndicale, 1 'sncadrement. etait la mieux 
places pour oretendre a oroposer un plan qui 
soit acceptable st qui soit serieux (CGC,
Chapelle Darblay). (N)
CGC mi 1i tants alone were considered to have the 
comoetence to propose alternatives on the technical 
side:
Les cadres ont une position privilegiee 
pour ae-finir une politique coherente 
d'adaptation sur de nouveaux produits et avec 
de nouveaux materials (CGC, Chanel 1e Darblay). (0)
Unions and flanaaroent Practices.
As noted earlier, the FO view on management was 
until recently largely shared by those unions claiming a 
class basis -for their policies, Borzeix (19S4: 225)
cites a CGT activist during a union day school as 
sayi ng:
La production, c'est 1 'a-ffaire des 
patrons; 1 'organisation du travai1, c'est 
pas notre ravon, (P)
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a  v i e w  s h e  n o t e s  w a s  w i d e l y  s h a r e d
Mauriaux (19S2 164-6) cautions aaainst
over-si moli f i cati on there was mass action aoainst
Taylorism in the early years o-f this century and the
Organ i sat i on ' in the inter-war years. But nonetheless, 
denunciation - and this was the position until the last 
decade - was not accompanied by-any great re-flection on
al ternat i ves.
Yet, starting with the revolt by manual workers (OS) 
in the 1968-75 period, the COT and CFDT did begin to pay 
more attention to work organisation, no longer decrying 
merely the 'capitalist usage' o-f technology but its very 
conception, and no longer accenting any consequences o-f 
new technology as inevitable or, indeed, necessary in 
terms of the develooment o-f the productive -forces but 
beginning to reflect more deeply on determin i st beliefs. 
When new technology and 'industrial restruoturing' began 
to mean heavy job loss, the need for doctrinal revision 
became all the more urgent.
The OS disputes and employer initiatives to 
'humanise' work (by job enrichment, semi-autonomous work 
teams, etc) finally prompted the CGT and CFDT to 
question their attitudes on work organisation and the 
desirability of changing it within capitalism. Yet both 
Borzeix (1980) and Groux (1984) contend that the 
discourse of Federation and Confederation officials had 
little impact on work olace secti ons and in no sense 
could ons talk of any union 'strategy' on work
CGTU continued denounce Sci enti f i c Wor k
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organisation which was translated into action.
Where the Federations spoke o-f work organi sati o n , 
the workplace representatives concerned themselves more 
pragmati cal 1 y with the traditional problem o-f 
condi ti ons. For Borzei:-:, this was partly a question o-f 
union culture: addressing the question of work
organisation inevitably leads to investment, markets, 
industrial strategy, matters -that unionists were 
inclined to steer clear of for fear of 'class 
col 1aboration' and which therefore they had little or no 
expertise in.
The contribution of the CGT to the first Dourdan 
seminar on the division of labour argued that any 
significant change in work content and 'the place of men 
in the firm' necessari1y implied the questioning of the 
private ownership of the means of production. But 
already, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, some 
CGT officers were arguing that the unions needed to 
intervene in this and other areas if they were to have 
any success in defending the workers at a time of 
profound structural crisis.
Borzeix's research was carried out in 1977-79, just 
as the debate inside (and between) the various 
Confederations on these matters got underway. By the 
time I did my fieldwork, in 19S4-5, the 'lag' between 
grassroots and officials was much less pronounced: many 
activists in both the CGT and CFDT had assimilated their 
Confederation's line and saw it as vital to fallow 
'management' issues and influence them whenever
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possible. In no way was this seen as 'taboo' -for trade 
unionists and none admitted to havinn any reserve,tions• 
on the grounds o-f class col 1 aboration , -for example - 
though this is still the reaction o-f the majority o-f FO 
activists (see the 15th Congress Comets rendu 
stenoaraphioue des d^bats. 1984, especially p.193 and 
the section on 'new technologies and restructuring ' , 
pp.300-304).
The -following comments -from £ST and CFDT mi 1 i tants 
were typical:
II y a toujours su des contre- 
prooositions -faites... II -faut pas se 
contenter de dire 'non, pas d'accord'
(CGT, SKF). (Q >
Ca me gene pas de fairs une proposition 
a  partir du moment o l i  c'est pour crier un 
emploi ou maintenir un emploi. Qu'est-ce 
qui est contradictoire la—dedans?
(CFDT, Kodak) (R)
On fait des propositions, on aide, si 
vous voulez, avec la connaissance qu'on a de 
l'entreprise et des problemes, avec des 
besoins qui s'expriment. (CGT, Kodak). (S)
The content of such proposals and the extent to 
which they signify a real transformation in union
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□ s'- =* c f i c He? t a ckled in the succeeding chsntsrs. But the 
change in discourse is significant and reflects the 
barrage o-f union literature inciting activists 
particularly after the chance o-f government in 1981 to 
exert a check, a control e . on all aspects o-f company 
business using the Auroux laws (which were, o-f course, 
to a large extent moulded by long-standing union 
demands) .
One CGT activist did not see May 19S1 as introducing 
an altogether radical change in union attitude: rather, 
it allowed the maturing o-f a line o-f re-flection begun 
some time before but which political conditions had not 
allowed fully to develop:
On a voulu jouer un role different, 
construct i f - qu'on ne refusait pas avant, 
d ' ai11eurs... (CGT, Chapelle Darblay). (T)
Subsequent experience may have led to a revised view 
of possibilities by CGT activists but it is important to 
stress here the significance of the political context 
for the CGT and, indeed, for the CFDT which, for all its 
recentraoe, was no less enthusiastic at the prospects 
opened up in May 1981. (Compare the headline in CFDT 
Magazine. 50, May 1981: 'Deux Millions d'Emplois, C'est
Possi ble! ' ).
Jean Brun <B> , in L 'intervention des Travailleurs sur 
le Terrain de la Gestion (Le Feupls, 1151, 1st—31st 
March 1983) equates this 'combat de gestion' with the
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' combs t  d s  cls s s s  ' * H0 555srts that i n t e r e s t  in company 
management grew under Giscard. when the unions attempted 
to halt the 'casss industriel 1e '. For 3run, a new, more 
positive approach is now possible (and i ndi soensatola: 
defensive struggles alone are no longer sufficient) and 
activists are accepting this line 'after a period of 
adaptation (The changed climate within nationalised
industries in particular is noted by Le MaTtre and 
Verwaeke, 1934).
There is thus a new interest in productive 
potential: products and their markets: the tranfer of 
materials between companies - their pricing and 
quality: research policy: training schemes: investments:
and the means of realising more, and more highly 
skilled, jobs. It is clear that action and proposals are 
motivated mainly by the fight to save jobs and - 
reflecting a preoccupation which became evident in the 
1970s (Casassus, 1930) - create jobs, especially in the 
enlarged state sector.
Gerard Alezard of the CGT's Bureau Confederal agrees 
that the
combat pour la gestion est aujourd'hui 
precisement au coeur de la lutte de classe 
(Le Peuols. 1144, 16th~30th November 1932). (U)
The CGT advocates 'new criteria of management' which 
attempt to redefine profitability in a collective 
context, not setting it un as the motor element in the
y
value added/capital utilised relationship but affording 
the surplus needed -for -further investment the same 
status as, say, salaries, taxes, rates, national
insurance contributions and so on. It thus asks: what is 
'profitable' for purchasing power and employment in a 
locality, for the satisfaction of social needs, for 
winning back the home market..? (See also Analyses et 
Documents Economiques. 3, December 19S2, pp.60-1: 'Quels
criteres pour une nouvelle gestion?').
For the CGT, the problem of economic constraints is
a problem of the capitalist system: it argues, first,
that if employment is situated at the heart of
management objectives, then the financial costs of 
redundancy, early retirement, the closure of 
industrially sound units and worker unrest (which often
total more than actual investment in production) can be 
avoided and resources better utilised (Analyses et
Documents Economiaues. 13, December 19S4, pp.26-9: 'Pour
une autre logique de gestion'); and secondly that waste 
inherent in the system must be eliminated as a priority 
- material waste but also the financial 'waste'
attributed to the repayment of high interest loans; to
the payment of dividends and 'salaries' to non-working 
relatives in family firms; and speculation, especially 
on the foreign exchanges (Le Peuple. 1169, 9th February 
1984).
It is important to note that action at firm level
(and the dossier in Le Petiole, 1170, 22nd February 1984
stresses that 'tout se joue' at this level) is not seen
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i n  i s o l a t i o n :  t h e  CGT a d v o c a t e s  a  ' n e w  f o r m  of growth'
a n d  e a c h  i n i t i a t i v e  o p . n e w  c r i t e r i a ,  w i t h i n  a. f i r m  
c o n  t  r i b  L i t  e s  t o  t h i s .
The mare traditional action (on wages, aimed at the
company, branch and state) is seen as necessary for
general reflation and complementary to the intervention
in management.
The CFDT is reproached by the CGT for abandoning
bread and butter issues in order to seek a compromise 
with the p a t r o n a t  over employment (see, for example, 
CGT, 1984a: 126-7): the onus for moving beyond the
recession is out on the workers who must share the 
present ' p o o l ' of employment and a fixed wage mass. For 
the CGT, the CFDT, while claiming to want a 
non— c a p i t a l i s t  solution to the crisis. nonetheless 
accepts the international crisis as a fact that it is
pointless f i g h t i n g  against (by, for example, worker
initiatives to get their companies to 'Buy French' in 
order to reconquer the home market with the help of the 
enforced reduction of 'excessive imports' (CGT, 1984b:
120) .
As noted above, this analysis of the CFDT's position 
is shared b y  some CFDT bodies, notably the Uni on 
Reoi onale of Lower Normandy.
In fact, the CFDT of the 1980s is noticeably more 
pragmatic than the CGT and encourages its members to 
make proposals on the basis of the market situation of 
each firm:
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Pour Is CFDT, il no S3.ur3it v avoir do 
reponse uni forme pour rspondre a la diversite 
des aspirations et situations (Clause 420, 
Resolution General*, 1985 Conference, in 
Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2065, 9th May 1985). (V)
It has sought to be recognised by employers as a
force de propositions et done comme un 
inter1ocuteur porteu^ d'une conception des 
interets de 1 'entrgprisg. (Clause 452,
Resolution Generals. 1985 Conference: 
emphasis added). (W)
The notion of 'conf1ictual cooperation' between employer 
and union in the workplace caused heated debate at the 
April 1984 Conseil National (Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2016, 
10th May 1984) and at the 1985 Conference the idea of 
the enterprise as 'un lieu d u  s'affrontent des logiques 
differentes. du s 'exnri me.nt des interets souvent
ccntradictoires' (Clause 410) was accepted in the face 
of an amendment calling it 'un lieu ou s'affrontent des 
divergences d'interet' (Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2071, 20th 
June 1985).
As with the CGT. the number ons priority is jobs and 
the CFDT acts to impose this priority at company and
other levels. However. the traditional. full—time.
permanent iob is no lonoer the solitary model:
L 'existence de deux millions et demi de 
ch0meurs, 1'impossibi1ite de retrouver les 
conditions de plein emoloi tell es au'elles 
existaient dans la peri ode anterieure de 
croi ssance, 1 'aspiration des individus et 
des groupes a une meilleure maitrise de leur 
temps, nous amenent a definir une conception 
nouvelle et diversifie de 1'emploi (Clause 
120, Resolution Generale, 1935 Conference: 
emphasis added). (X)
Many CFDT aims seem little different from those of 
the CGT (jobs with a higher skill content. modified 
staff-management relations in the workplace. etc) and 
both talk of 'centre—propositions' but differences 
appear in practice. as an examination of the case 
studies will make clear. Nowadays the CFDT tries to 
ensure that its proposals are concrete and neaoti able 
and actively seeks to engage employers in 'good faith' 
bargaining: the CGT, by the tone of its discourse as 
well as by the actions it undertakes, still treats its 
proposals as a list of demands to be imposed by force, 
negotiations merely confirming the subsequent rapports 
de force.
Certain CFDT Federations and Regional Unions have 
little faith in the employers' willinpness to negotiate 
on anything, let alone industrial policy, and call for
national mobilisation around unifvino issues and 
1eoisi ati ve guarantees to defend workers' interests.
The ' -Fundamental i st ' critics see the Conf ederat i on 
leadership taking a pragmatic path which necessarily 
relegates central principles such as autoaestion , 
democratic planning and social ownership o-f industry to 
mere statements o-f intent. Another body o-f critics 
accepts the need -for a re-evaluation o-f doctrine and 
policies aimed both at building the union's strength and 
saving jobs, but the present strategy is not seen to 
have had great success and there is concern that the 
■failure to support defensive action has impaired the 
CFDT's credibility.
The 'new solidarities' that Mai re has called -for (Le 
Monde. 2nd and 3rd November 1984), seem to put the onus 
on the workers to accent less secure jobs and no 
increase in cav rather than on the employers to halt the 
trend to prBcari sati on.
The debate at the 1985 Conference ended with the 
chemical workers' Federation and some imoortant Regional 
Unions (such as Rhone-Al pes) -falling in behind Maire 
(Raybould, 1985a) but, nonetheless, a third o-f the 
delegates' votes went against the leadership (and in
e-f-fect to the 'counter-text' o-f Hacuitex despite it
being widely seen as inadequate and -following a 
political rather than a trade union line).
While the idea o-f co-oesti on is still anathema to
the vast majority o-f French union activists (which, as
will become clear, introduces some ambiguity into the 
n o t i o n  o-f ' counter—qrooosal s ' w i t h  c o n t r a d i  ct i o n s  
accentuated bv the o e r i o d  o-f Le-^ -t G o v e r n m e n t )  . the n e e d
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•for the unions to influence industrial policy in a 
positive way is accepted by most in the CFDT.
The debate is multi-layered, but one important 
divide is between those who see influence as being most 
effective at the national political and economic level 
and those who see developments in the workplace as vital 
both for the union's standing with the workers and to 
ensure policies are adapted to specific situations; in 
the latter group there is a further debate between those 
who talk of the firm as being an area of 'conflictual 
co-operation' and those, faithful to class unionism, who 
go no further than 'conflictual co—existence'.
But outri oht opposition to 'proposition force 
unionism' still has a voice inside the Confederation.
Huiban (IFSI) aroues that such opposition is 
primarily political and reflects the conscious adoption 
of a 'maximalist' unionism which has political aims 
rather than the objective severity of conditions in a 
particular branch. Thus, the CGT and Hacuitex are 
practically written off by him for failing to see that 
in the current crisis unions can only survive and 
employment can only be maintained if unions accept the 
constraints of the economy (which are not simply a 
political . problem) and mobilise to enforce negotiations 
on their own positive solutions pointing to a different 
form of development.
Hacuitex General Secretary Leon Dion is quoted as 
saviHQ (in Apr!1 1FS1)i
II y a une limite que (Hacuitex) ne veut 
pas franchir car on pense a u 'on doit -faire 
la demonstration des contradictions du 
systems lui-meme, et ou'on n'a pas a rentrer 
dans ses regies du jeu (Huiban, 1981: 115). (Y)
This was still the Hacuitex line in 1985 at the Bordeaux 
Conference:
La Conf ederati on accepte trop facilement 
le langage patronal . En -fait, el 1 e a 
abandonne sa strategic d'action contre le 
regime capitalists et fluctue... II taut 
1 utter contre les 1icenciements, les heures 
supp1ementaires. it faut mettre la priorite 
sur les bas salaires. Mais, surtout, il -faut 
remettre en cause le systeme capitalists et 
mobiliser les travailleurs sur la perspective 
d 'un socialisms autogestionnaire (Resume des 
inter vant ions des dsleoues. no.30)« (Z)
Yet Frsdo Krumnow, -formerly leader o-f Hacuitex and 
focal point of the (non-aauchiste) Left in the CFDT, has 
smohasised that this stance was not primarily dictated 
by ideological factors but by the sheer frustration at 
never getting employers to negotiate an 'economic 
agreement' despite a rising tide of closures and 
redundancies in the s e c t o r  from as ear)v as 1952. Any 
reduction of employer prerogatives - and any definition
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o-f ' count er-ol an s ' must entail this - is not negotiable 
within the current system (CFDT, 1971: 168-9).
This is at the heart o-f the debate in France: how 
much is possible through trade union action given 
current economic and political arrangements? In Britain, 
commentators generally argue that, while plans must be 
•fought -for immediately and can thereby contribute to 
both political change and the necessary transformation 
o-f the labour movement, political support at the 
national level especially is vital -for a successful
realisation of their content (Benyon and Wainwright,
1979; Cooley and Wainwright, 1981; Wainwright and 
Elliott, 1982: Palmer, 1986).
Even in Britain, with its reformist trade union 
movement, fears of j. ncorporat i on and complicity in 
capitalist structures lead to wariness in this field 
(See the titles listed above plus Samuel, 1985). In
France, such fears are elevated into doctrine by FO: 
they do not deter the CGC nor the CFTC - the latter 
actively advocates co-management, both call for workers 
to have seats on the boards of all companies and neither 
are averse to making positive contributions to 
management problems in those companies where they have a 
Dr0E0nC!0«
Types of Union Initiative
An attempt to draw up a typology
interventions in thr s field has been made
of union 
by Huitoan
initiatives durinn the 1973—80 oeriod. He distinoLiishes 
two -forms: the contre —plan e co no miaue (CPE) remains
close to the classic mode of French union action - 
productivist, statist, keynesian in inspiration and 
pitched at the macroeconomic level as much as the 
ostensible target, the firm or branch. It involves an 
effort to
adjoindre une argumentation economioue a 
un mode d'action classique, polemique et 
revendicatif. L'objet demeure la satisfaction 
de revendications sociales d'une part, le 
oositionnement par rapport au systems 
politique d'autre part (Huiban, 19Sir 4) (AA)
Huiban's second category, the contre-oroposi11 on 
i ndust r i el 3. e (CPI) is more radically innovative: this is 
an autonomous union initiative aimed at achieving 
significant alterations in industrial aims and 
incremental advances in worker control within the 
present system - changing this system as it proceeds.
(La CPI) c o n s t  i t  u e ,  en  r e a c t i o n  a  Line 
o r i e n t a t i o n  ou a u n e  s i t u a t i o n  o r e e x i s t a n t e , 
l a  mi s e  en  a v a n t  d ' o b j e c t i f s  e t  d e  mo v e n s  
a l t e r n a t i f s .  l i e s  au o r o d u i t ,  d s p u i s  l e s  
c o n d i t i o n s  de  s a  f a b r i c a t i o n  ( l i e u  d e  
o r o d L i c t  i on . Choi  r d ' i n v e s t i  ^ s e m e n t s  e t  de1 1 a 
t e c h n o l o g i e ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n  d e  l a  p r o d u c t i o n )
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jusqu'a la prise en comote de sa 
commercialisation, en liaison avec une 
re-flexion sur sa finalite (Ibid: 4-5). (BE)
This categorisation works best (on Huiban's data) at 
the branch level (steel, cars, aeronautics and 
textiles/clothing are those studied): here the broad
lines o-f what might be termed a strategy are evident. At 
the -firm level, practices are divergent, less coherent 
within the same Con-f ederat i on and therefore less easy to 
■force into analytical categories. The CPI label is here 
attached to initiatives which have little in common with 
the radical approach given the same label at branch 
1evel.
He divides his fortv -firm-level cases into:
i) cooperatives - these emerge out of firms that 
have been badly run but nonetheless have active markets 
and which are viable given external finance:
ii) the CPI - but here he means little more than 
attempts at a feasibility study, intended to show that a 
firm is viable and"therefore aimed at the authorities or 
any likely buyer. No real change in structure, products 
or work organisation is proposed;
iii) the  ^CP I d^entreorise alternative* seriouslv 
questions products and production and (usually with 
Federation support) often tries to situate the firm*s 
recovery in a wider branch context. As in the second 
~.a-hesq orv■> a buver is souoht but the union tries at the 
same time to institute n s- w *orin5 of w o r k o^osni sati on
and management practices.
Even this last category, however, is seen as a moven 
de lutte as much as an objective in itself: the
principal aim is to reconstitute the conditions under 
which unions can pursue their traditional -functions.
This will be recalled later in the analysis o-f the cases 
studied -for this piece o-f research, for mi 1 i tants 
sometimes cited this as the main reason for drawing up 
even the more ambitious plans and this calls into
question some of the more lofty ambitions attributed to
'proposition force unionism'.
The use of the CPI term at the level of the firm is 
confusing and undermines the force of the distinction
which seemed to have some vaiibitv at branch level. 
Moreover, Huiban is too quick to equate the CPI with the 
CFDT (for whom he now works) and the CPE with the CGT. 
More important, my own research shows that the thinking 
of both Confederations has evolved during the 1980s.
Under the Left government, branch studies have been 
made by the unions and 'plans' sometimes drawn up but 
most emphasis has'been put on lower-level activity and 
the use of the new means provided by the Auroux laws to 
advance proposals in plants, companies and groups. 
While the .Confederations push certain oriorities and 
these are more or less assimilated by the grassroots, it 
is less easy to force the plethora of initiatives into a 
restricted number of categories, as the CFDT concedes, 
with its acceptance of the 'diversity of aspirations and 
situations ' noted above.
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The sinceritv of the different initiatives can onlv 
be deduced from the statements of the activists 
involved, but the results of their actions can be used, 
alongside the evaluation of these results by the workers 
themselves, to assess the significance of the proposals 
both in terms of the evolution of French trade unionism 
and of their success in the field of employment.
This analysis will be attempted after the examples 
of industrial proposals by svndi cats and an example of 
concrete action at national level (the 1984 
■'flexibility' negotiations). The present section is 
concluded with a rapid examination of how the Auroux 
laws assisted the development of union initiatives in 
the workplace.
Auroux's Con tr i but i c-n to 'Preposition Force Unionism'
Jean Auroux's labour laws aimed to strengthen the 
rights of workers and unions in the workplace to enable 
them to become 'actors of change' within industry. The 
legislation was not revolutionary: in particular, oowers 
of decision in all but very minor matters were left with 
the employer. On the other hand, the unions were given 
access to a wider range of information on the general 
health of their company and the right to be consulted on 
a variety of matters.
Auroux wanted the unions to be better able to make 
counter—proposals if they deemed them necessary to the 
workers' interests.
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In tarn, there was an explicit desire that employers 
— presumably through the recommendations of the workers' 
representatives — would integrate social considerations 
more closely into their industrial policies (Auroux, 
1981; Liaisons Sociaies, 1984).
The new legislation has been fully described above. 
The measures which were particularly helpful to the 
unions in this field involved those which should have 
made available a wide range of industrial, financial and 
technological information and the means to examine it in 
greater detail through the use of experts and special 
commissions set up within the CE. All CE members were to 
receive some form of economics training to assist them 
in their function.
Similar facilities were made available to the CHSCT 
to enable detailed examination of any projected changes 
in the production process involving the organisation of 
work, products and conditions in general.
The Auroux report suggested giving the CE the right 
to question the company chief and put motions to the 
board if certain indicators suggested the company might 
be in difficulties. The actual Auroux laws contained no 
such clause but later bankruptcy legislation gave the CE 
the right to be warned of problems by official auditors 
and opened up the possibility for it to intervene in 
advance of the serious problems that contre—pians are 
normally designed to counter and put the interests of 
the employees at the centre of any rescue package.
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The thrust of the C G T s  advice to its activists was 
to seize on what it saw as the spirit of the legislation 
and advance demands, pushing the workers' interests at 
all levels and in all institutions. Thus, even though 
the CGs were formally set up solely for the imparting of 
information, the CGT urged its members to respond to the 
data received with their opinions and proposals on 
changes (CGT, undated: 57). Similarly, in the GEs, set 
up according to the law to allow discussion of immediate 
working conditions and how they might be improved, the 
CGT advocated widening the debate to cover intervention 
in general management, calling upon its members to act 
so that workers had
... vraiment le droit d 'intervenir sur 
tout ce qui a trait au travail, a la 
production, a la gestion non seulement de leur 
unit£ de travail, mais de tout 
1 ‘etablissement, voire de 1'entreprise dans 
la mesure ou la plupart de leur5 probl^mes 
ne peuvent etre isoles de la marche generale 
(CGT, undated: 18). (CC)
Similarly, the CGT saw the annual right to 
negotiations on wages and working schedules as an 
inroad, first, into an area often characterised by 
unilateral decision but also into the whole field of 
personnel management which inevitably led to wider
discussions since it was
... etroitement imbrique dans la gestion 
de lentreprise et ne peut itre traite sans 
q u e n t r e  dans la negociation tout ce qui a 
trait a la vie de 1 ‘entreprise: la production 
...les couts de la production ... les 
investissements, les marches (CGT, 
undated: 60) (DD)
Competitivity entailed the examination of use of 
capacity, investments and financial costs as well as 
wage costs; and the company could not be seen in 
isolation, either: what management said it could afford 
on wages had to be balanced against what society, the 
national community needed:
... en bref, on mettra en avant de 
nouveaux criteres de gestion (CGT, undated:
65). (EE)
In every type of forum, then, there is the same concern 
to alter the criteria governing industrial development 
under capitalism. It is implicit — and the CGT is at 
pains on several occasions to underline the class nature 
of its unionism — that these recommendations will be 
fought by employers and are therefore in a general sense 
incompatible with prevailing arrangements in industry.
The CFDT's guide to the laws sticks more closely to
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the provisions enshrined in the legislation, calling on 
its members to fully utilise the possibilities of 
negotiation and discussion to unleash a 'dynamic' that 
will transform both industrial relations and the 
relationship of union to worker. Whereas the CGT 
advocates general means to secure greater intervention 
in company management, the CFDT is more pragmatic, 
looking to anchor the union more closely to the 
workplace and transforming society from there — which is 
seen as both more democratic and more likely to provide 
the suppleness required by individual firms in a mixed 
economy.
On the annual negotiations, for example, it welcomes 
the possibility of departing from branch agreements to 
raise lower wages while containing company costs within 
a fixed overall increase in the wage bill. On working 
time, too, the possibility of adjusting legal 
arrangements (as supported by the Confederation in the 
July 1981 agreement with the CNPF and the 1984 
flexibility' talks) is seen as answering both the 
wishes of the workers and the specific needs of each 
company (CFDT, undated: Eook Seven, p.23). (The CGT and 
FO - and to a lesser extent the CFTC - are hostile to 
any loosening of the legislation in this field).
In its reading of the new laws, the CFDT seems to 
follow closely the designs of Auroux as set out in the 
initial report: the increased means and new rights are 
to be used to make reasoned contributions to the way 
companies are run, based on the immediate and longer
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term interests of the workers.
The results of this approach will be examined in 
-full a-fter the case studies, but it is perhaps 
appropriate to note here that -few if any employers show 
any inclination to negotiate on industrial strategy with 
the trade unions- Even as regards the letter of the law, 
activists complained that information vital to a proper 
understanding was denied them and it was difficult to 
tell when an employer was lying by omission. In line 
with the CNPF's recommendations (CNPF, 1983), employers 
did as much as they needed to stay within the law, 
taking care not to set unnecessary precedents or 
enshrine in plant agreements the intrusive aspects of 
laws which the employers hoped would be abrogated or 
diluted by the next government.
Auroux left economic power in the hands of the 
employers or the top management in state firms who have 
continued, especially from 19S2—3, to be guided by 
financial as much as industrial criteria. Under these 
conditions, any counter-plan or alternative industrial 
proposals which have jobs at their heart are always 
going to run up against the logic of capital 
accumulation: if Auroux provided the means to allow 
unions to present a case in the interests of their 
members, he did not alter power relations and the 
dynamic willed by the CFDT in particular failed to 
materialise. A senior CNPF official told me he 
considered the CFDT 'daring' for its Jresponsabi1ite de 
caractere economique' and it has presented some
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well-argued cases at company level — but individual 
employers have refused to contemplate negotiations on 
this terrain.
NOTES
1. 1981 figures: see Liaisons Sociales. N28/5470,
4th April 1984.
2= See also the other works by Boyer listed in the 
Bibliography plus Coriat (1984 and 1979).
3. The percentage of localised disputes with 
employment as the central issue rose from 10 pet in 1977 
to 29 pet in 1983 (Liaisons Sociales. T1247, 7th June 
1984).
4. Hacuitex is the CFDT's clothing and textile 
workers' Federation.
5. Of the C G T 's Institut 'Entreprise et Politique 
Industriel1e '. a consultancy firm based at its Montreui1 
headquarters.
TRANSLATED QUOTES
(A) '... all the conditions governing the use and 
reproduction of the labour force. This term therefore 
covers the organisation of the labour process; the way 
skills are graded; the degree of labour force mobility; 
what determines the make-up of direct income from wages 
and how it is used; and also the collective elements 
which go towards the indirect wage.' (Boyer, 1984a: 29).
(B) ... a localised, pragmatic response to an
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economic crisis combined with the -failure o-f trade 
unionism, as then constituted, to tackle it.' (Huiban, 
1981: 40).
(C) 'Whether explicitly or not, the idea most common 
in the CGT is that getting involved in economic 
questions in the capitalist system means class 
collaboration.' (Moynot, 1982: 58).
<D) '... anyone who thinks that that is feasible
without real political transformation is dreaming!'
(CFDT, 1971: 91).
(E) '... must really be in a position to check on
and participate in management.
That supposes in particular, and urgently, the
recognition of the shop steward and the necessary means
of action.' (CFDT, 1971: 94).
(F) ‘These three connected and complementary
elements can only be realised in a socialist society.' 
(CFDT, 1971: 131). .
(G> '... one of several ways of giving substance to
the strength of the workers relative to management after 
industrial action... Far from fortifying capitalist 
society, negotiations must play a part in destabilising 
the system and opening up the possibility of a new 
advance towards a democratic, socialist society.' (CFDT,
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1971: 137).
(H) rIf the workers remain all but absent from the 
firm's decision-making processes and its development, 
without acting or offering alternatives to the 
employers' choices, all the union will be left with is 
the job of alleviating the worst effects of limited 
aspects of policies.' (Syndicalisme Hebdo. 1720, 31st 
August 1978).
(I) '...either limit yourself to simple demands to
do with pay and conditions and leave complete
responsibility for management in the hands of the bosses 
and government; or put your trust in the virtues of an 
economic programme to solve, as if by magic, all the 
problems you can't solve through industrial action.' 
(Moynot, 1979, 47).
(J) '... the clear decision to implicate the union
in capitalism' (with strikes and other forms of
industrial action downgraded to) 'a sort of last resort 
if negotiations falter, worse, an old-fashioned form of 
expression typical of the never satisfied.' 
(Syndicalisme Hebdo. 2016, 10th May 1984).
(K) The role of trade unionism is to sense what can 
be saved, minimise the effects of recession and, as far 
as possible, arrange safeguards.‘ (FQ, Renault).
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(L) Its new position as a minority grouping exposed 
to the criticisms of rival ideologies led it to make 
specific choices, gradually constructing a doctrinal 
system around the notion of independence, jettisoning on 
the way something that went without saying in Jouhaux's 
CGT with its workers' control — the capacity of the 
union to run the firm — in order to restrict the union 
to a control function, in the sense of checki n q « and no 
more-' (Bergounioux, 1982: 69).
(M) 'Our CGC branch has confidence not only in top 
management but in all the white collar staff who do the 
market surveys - they're competent people.' (CGC, 
Renault).
(N) 'The CGC, given the make-up of this particular 
union, that is, the managers and professional staff 
within it, was in the best position to hope to put 
together a plan that would be both acceptable and 
serious.' (CGC, Chapelle Barbiay).
(□) ‘The managerial staff is in a privileged 
position when it comes to defining a coherent policy for 
moving into new products and materials.' (CGC, Chapelle 
Darblay>.
(P) Production is the bosses' business; work 
organisation has got nothing to do with us. (Borzeix, 
19B4: 225).
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(Q) 'We've always made proposals... You can't just 
say: 'No, we don't agree.' (CGT, SKF).
(R) 'I'm not embarrassed about making proposals when 
it's with a view to creating or saving a job. Where's 
the contradiction there?' (CFDT, Kodak).
(S) 'We make proposals, we help out, if you like,
with our knowledge of the firm and its problems, with 
the needs which are being expressed.' (CGT, Kodak).
<T) 'We wanted to play a different, more
constructive role — one that we wouldn't have rejected 
before, by the w a y . ' (CGT, Chapelle Darblay).
(U) ... the struggle over management today is right
at the heart of the class struggle.' (Le Feuple. 1144,
16th-30th November 1982).
(V) For the CFDT, there can't be any uniform
response to the great diversity of aspirations and
situations.' (Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2065, 9th May 1985).
(W) '... a force capable of making proposals and
thus able to bring to discussions its conception of the 
interests of the company. ' (Ibid: emphasis added).
(X) ’The existence of two and a half million
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unemployed, the impossibility of petting back to full 
employment as It existed in the previous period of 
growth, the aspiration of individuals aand groups to a 
better organisation of their time — all this leads us to 
define a new, more diversified conception of employment 
(Ibid: emphasis added).
(Y) 'There's a limit that Hacuitex won't cross 
because we think that you have to show up the 
contradictions inherent in the system, not follow its 
rules. * (Huiban, 19B1: 115).
(Z) 'The Confederation is too quick to accept the 
employers' language. In fact, it has abandoned its 
strategy of action against the capitalist regime and is 
indecisive... We must fight redundancies and overtime 
and give priority to the low paid. But above all, we 
must take issue with the capitalist system and mobilise 
the workers behind self—managed socialism.' (Delegates' 
speeches, No. 30, CFDT Conference 1985).
(AA> '... add on some economic arguments to the 
classic, polemical mode of action which used to be about 
simply making demands. The object remains, on the one 
hand, the satisfaction of these demands, and on the 
other, the taking up of a position in the political 
field.* (Huiban, 1981: 4).
(BB) '(The CPI) involves — in reaction to a
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pre-existing line Dr situation — the advancing of 
alternative objectives and means linked to the product, 
going from the conditions of its production (place, 
organisation, choice of investments and technology) 
right up to its marketing, together with some reflection 
as to its usefulness.' (Huiban, 1981: 4—5).
(CO '... really have the right to intervene on 
everything touching on work, production, the management 
not only of their department but of the whole plant, or 
company even, since most of their problems cannot be 
isolated from the general state of the firm.' (CGT, 
undated: 18).
(DD> ’... one aspect, linked to all the others, of 
management, one that cannot be dealt with properly 
unless the negotiations cover everything to do with the 
life of the company: production, production costs,
investments, markets.' (Ibid, 60).
(EE) ... in short, we will put forward new criteria 
of management. ' (Ib-id, 65).
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7. STUDIES OF UNION WORKPLACE INITIATIVES
In the previous chapter, the evolution of trade 
union thought on industrial strategy and the attitude of 
trade unionists vis-a-vis the practice of management was 
outlined. It was noted that the new vocabulary and the 
innovative demarche of proposing 'alternative solutions' 
had been adopted by activists at the grassroots, even if 
certain elements resisted the trend.
This chapter sets out the response of trade 
unionists to management proposals on job reductions or 
closures in four troubled firms. Data from these cases 
will be supplemented by reports of others compiled from 
the union press and studies by French researchers. An 
evaluation of the efficacity of this form of action will 
be made and its significance assessed in terms of the 
likely future role and behaviour of trade unions.
The four cases I studied at first hand were chosen 
because, at each, trade unionists had reflected on 
management proposals, offered alternatives and sought to 
negotiate on thesjs. These cases do not form a 
‘representative sample' in any statistical sense but 
they are indicative of a trend which has characterised 
French trade union behaviour over the last few years — 
and particularly since 1981 - and an attempt is made
here to locate more clearly the essential features of 
this trend.
The case of Renault involves discussion of a
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management—proposed redundancy scheme which was
ultimately rejected. This failure throws light on 
certain contradictions in the 'proposition force' 
discourse and, like the failure of the 'flexibility' 
negotiations related in Chapter 8, highlights the 
difficulties faced by unions, especially revolutionary' 
unions, in developing strategies to counter mass 
unemployment which must also answer the needs of their 
actual membership.
In each of the four cases, the background to the 
company's problems is sketched, along with management's 
proposals; the response of the union sections present is 
then outlined, followed by subsequent developments in 
the dispute.
Notes and translated quotations appear at the end of 
each case study.
I) KODAK-PATHE
Vincennes, south east of Paris, has been at the 
heart of the French film and photographic industry since 
1907 when the Path6 firm built its 'cite du film' there 
to produce film for the cinema, and then for photography 
and X—Rays- Since 1927 the firm has been a 99-9 percent 
subsidiary of the world's leading film manufacturer, 
Eastman Kodak- A research centre sited at Vincennes by 
Pathe in 1920 developed a series of profitable lines for 
the Kodak group which also has factories at 
Chalon—sur—Saone and Sevran plus smaller processing 
plants and distribution units in several other French 
towns-
At its height, the Vincennes site employed around 
3,700 people and even at the start of the 1980s, 3,000 
different products were being made there- Yet, from
1974, the Eastman Kodak company had begun a thorough 
reorganisation of its European activities under what was 
known as the Product Interchange Programme (PIP)- The 
overall aim was to bring down costs by the
rationalisation of production: this involved bringing
the national units under the control of a European
headquarters (based in London); concentrating production 
so that each line would only be made in one plant; 
removing 'low—volume' products to the US; and closing 
less profitable plants- From 1979, with Japanese 
competition growing and the staple photographic products
market in only slight increase, a further 
rationalisation programme was put into effect, the 
integrated European company coming under even more 
direct control from the US.
It is clear from the business press that Kodak was 
complacent right through till the mid-1970s, relying on 
its traditional chemical based photographic products to 
generate profits and neglecting innovations, notably 
video, apparently because of high start-up costs. As the 
competition moved ahead, Kodak tried to catch up, not by 
developing its own research but by buying up other firms 
active in the new fields or entering into marketing 
deals with rivals (Financial Times, January 1st 1984; 
Fortune. August 22nd 1983).
The 1979 plan involved the closure of the Vincennes 
site in 1991-2, its activities being taken over for the 
most part by the Chalon works, Kodak Ltd in the UK and 
Eastman Kodak in the US.
The Union Analysis
The C F D T 419 section followed its Confederation's 
line in seeking a shorter working week as the first 
response to the company's 'overmanning' claims but 
alongside this it called for a halt to the run-down in 
productions the Vincennes factory was a profitable 
concern with high performance machinery and ending 
research and manufacturing there made no sense.
Environmental factors cited by the company were not 
an issue for the CFD'I . Noise and effluence levels had
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been found acceptable by local authorities and the 
problems associated with chemical and other inflammable 
materials had proved slight- While conceding that there 
was no space at Vincennes to transform and automate the 
coating tracks to bring them up to the speeds capable at 
Chalon, both the CGT and CFDT painted out that 
management had closed off this option by selling land 
adjacent to the site- Furthermore, the possibility of 
making more sophisticated, high value added products on 
the existing equipment remained- Audio tape had once 
been produced at Vincennes and research into other 
magnetic tapes, including video, had been halted despite 
the promising outlook.
Under the company's plan, most research on new 
products would be lost to the US and the new Research 
and Development facilities at Chalon would concentrate 
only on the enhancement of current products or parts of 
research projects farmed out from the US. Crucially, the 
CGT and CFDT claimed, products would no longer be taken 
from the research stage through to production by any 
national unit outside the US.
Even more so than with the production transfers, the 
CFDT argued that there were no 'technological 
imperatives' behind these moves. The logic was that of a 
multinational company restructuring for mainly financial 
reasons:
En fait, il s'agit pour la Direction,
sous couvert du transfert de fabrications a
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Chalon et suivant en cela les directions 
de 1 Eastman Kodak, de specialiser encore 
plus Kodak—Rathe dans la fabrication de 
quelques produits a technologie ancienne- La 
poursuite de cette politique am^nera petit a 
petit un 'sous-developpement' technique, 
scientifique et technologique qui conduira 
ineluctablement a transformer Kodak—Rathe en 
une societe de distribution de produits 
fabriques par 1 'Eastman Kodak. (CFDT Kodak 
Vincennes, Radiographie d'une Restructuration 
August 1902). (A)
Even in the immediate future, the unions argued, the 
concentration on a limited number of products would 
leave Kodak-Rathe more vulnerable at a time of 
recession. And with the production of triacetate, the 
base for many sorts of films, and other basic materials 
concentrated in the US, other national units would be at 
the mercy of Eastman Kodak's transfer pricing policy.
The CGT section. in a leaflet circulated at a Rress 
Conference on 2 7 t h . October 1982, pointed out that all 
this was contrary to the policies of the liauroy 
government on industrial and technical renewal, 
reconquering the home market', restoring the balance of 
payments and bringing down unemployment.
Employment at Kodak Vincennes
Under the RIP and the 1979 restructuring plans,
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employment at Vincennes dropped -from 2,940 in 1975 to
2,410 in 1980, 2,300 in 1983 and stood at around 1,500 
when I -first visited the site early in 1985.
From 1975, Kodak-Rathe mainly hired workers on fixed 
term contracts and brought in sub—contractors to fill 
maintenance and even some production posts. Various 
early retirement schemes saw 254 people leave Vincennes 
between 1979 and 1982 (out of a total of 451 for the 
Kodak—Rathe group).
When the Mauroy government tightened up the
conditions under which companies might employ workers on 
short term contracts, Kodak—Rathe decided to accelerate 
the run-down of Vincennes, bringing forward the closure 
date to 1987. In 1982 it announced that 1,500 new jobs 
were to be created at Chalon, a thousand of these to be 
filled by employees tranferring from Vincennes.
However, this still left around 1,400 of the 1982
work force unaccounted for and a management survey
showed that only 20 percent of staff were willing or 
able to move, 56 percent declining for personal reasons 
such as the employment of a spouse.
The Union Response
Three unions have sections at Kodak Vincennes: the 
CFDT, the CGT and FD. The CGT and CFDT adopted similar 
analyses and were prepared throughout to work together 
to keep the site open. FD, on the other hand, put most 
effort into trying to negotiate a 'social plan', as 
required by the 1969 and 1974 national agreements on
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procedures when a company plans large scale 
r e d u n d a n c i e s * This involved searching -for alternative 
jobs -for those to be displaced, top-ups' -for those 
accepting jobs with lower salaries, early retirement 
schemes, etc. It also accepted management proposals to 
set up companies, staffed by those made redundant, to 
service the Kodak group (by distributing copiers or 
handling publicity, for example). The other sections saw 
this as 'delayed redundancy', since the companies had 
only short term contracts and were therefore high-risk 
ventures.
FO broadly accepted the company's view of its 
economic constraints' which dictated the closure of 
Vincennes and sought to limit the effects by negotiating 
social measures':
Plus nous serons nombreux a vouloir 
negocier un veritable plan social, qui 
eviterait les 1icenciements, et a obtenir 
les ameliorations importantes pour ceux 
d'entre nous qui iront travailler a Chalon, 
mieux notre rale de syndicaliste aura ete 
accompli. (FO notice, April 1984). (B>
In this, the FO secti on was faithful to the style of 
unionism traditional to its Confederation. In 
interviews, FO activists maintained that they had 
managed to improve the conditions under which workers 
would move to Chalon as well as the provisions made for
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those left behind: the company's industrial strategy was 
something it had neither the means to criticise nor the 
inclination to intrude u p o n C3>.
The CGT and CFDT felt quite differently: they, too, 
were working in the best interests of the Kodak workers 
but their arguments were also bolstered by references to 
the wider community and indeed the nation.
□n estime que Force Ouvriere, ils sont 
tous pour gerer la fermeture, avec des solutions 
sociales, et cetera- Nous, on dit que cette 
solution-1a est tres mauvaise parce qu'on ne 
peut pas gerer la fermeture d *une entreprise 
alors que globalement les difficultes 
s 'accroissent. (CGT, Kodak). (C)
Thus, over and above the cost to the region (Val de 
Marne was already suffering a haemorrhage of industrial 
jobs) there was a cost to the national economy involved 
in the loss of production to another country, not to 
mention the lass of research potential, skills and 'un 
savoir-faire commun cumule au fil des annees', to cite a 
CGT tract.
There is an obvious clash here between the financial 
and strategic logic of a transnational company and the 
logic of union demands which rest on employment and 
conditions within a national context. This aspect will 
be tackled when discussing the Kodak workers' 
international action but first the proposals of the CGT
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and CFDT have to be examined.
As outlined above, the analyses of these two 
sections were broadly similar: the same can be said
about their demands and they coordinated their approach 
on this issue.
In an August 1979 tract the CFDT called for:
i) a shorter working week as the first response to 
any 'overmanning' which might result from automation;
ii) the return of the manufacture of 'low volume 
products' such as black and white film which Eastman 
Kodak had transferred to the US (and which had in fact 
accounted for 15—20 percent of total production at 
Vincennes);
iii) the continued production of the triacetate base 
for films, central to the Vincennes site (Kodak-Fathe 
was the only producer of this base in the group outside 
the US);
iv) the introduction of new products such as video 
and computer tape.
The same points were developed by the CGT and its 
cadre arm, UGICT,,,and the call for the manufacture of 
video tape was to remain at the heart of the joint 
offensive even as more products were withdrawn from the 
Vincennes range and the number of workers scaled down.
The video tape proposals were not simply plucked out 
of the air with the 1980s ’video bo o m ’ in mind. The 
Vincennes research centre had worked on magnetic tape 
since the 1950s (it was the only Eastman Kodak arm to do
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so until 1978) and had worked on video tape -from 1977 
until 1982 when Kodak—Rathe halted the small scale 
production which had already got under way (Lebrun,
1983: 103). The CGT argued that there would be no
problem selling the tapes in a booming French market and 
noted that, in 1982, Kodak—Rathe already had potential
export orders -for the year of 2.5 to three million tapes
worth 110 million francs from Philips, Grundig and BBH 
of Switzerland and these export openings still existed. 
A French market for around four million blank tapes 
existed in 1981 and this had risen to 11.96 million in 
1983.
The reasons behind the decision to halt video tape 
manufacture at Vincennes are not clear: Lebrun suggests 
that the company was looking towards the closure of the 
site and the start-up of any new production was not 
desirable. Certainly, it is clear from the business 
press that a conservative senior management failed to 
see the impact video would have in the 1980s and by the 
time it grasped this, the most cost effective way of 
gaining a slice of the market was buying in the material 
from the Japanese .and marketing it under the Kodak 
brand. In January 1984 Kodak announced it was to sell a 
lightweight video camera/recorder manufactured by 
Matsushita which would use a tape made by TDK (Financial 
Times. January 5th 1984).
The CGT took the video plan a stage further 
following the nationalisations put into effect by the 
Mauroy government in 1981. In its press conference of
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October 27th 1982, it advocated a link-up with Rh&ne 
Poulenc, later adding Thomson-Brandt to the project, to 
ensure a wholly French video industry: Rhone Poulenc
would supply the terphane or mylar base -for the tape 
which would then be coated and -finished at Vincennes. 
Some investment would be required since the finishing 
machinery was only capable of turning out 50,000 tapes a 
month, but the other productive equipment upstream of 
the finishing process had a capacity of 300,000 tapes. 
The CGT did not consider this investment any problem for 
Kodak—Pathe:
La preuve: il parle d'investir un 
milliard de francs en cinq ans, dont une 
bonne partie pour liquider 1 'usine de 
Vincennes (deux millions de francs, par an, 
rien que pour demonter le materiel!) (CGT 
Dossier, June 10th 1983). (D)
For the CGT and the CFDT, the introduction of video 
tape manufacture would ensure the profitability of the 
Vincennes site and, provided further justification for
keeping the highly regarded research facilities intact. 
The CGT estimated that 200 jobs would be created by the 
launch of the new line and the remaining jobs at
Vincennes would also be safeguarded.
By September 19B4<^ > , it was talking of 300-400 new 
jobs, a production run of 10 to 15 million tapes per
year and 200 million francs investment. In this
document, the CGT pointed out that Rhone Poulenc already 
made the base for the tape: it had a deal with the
Japanese Tyobo company under which the latter produced 
the finished video cassettes. The CGT therefore argued 
for 'une co-operation Franco—Franjpai se ', better for 
employment, the trade balance, national independence and 
therefore economic and social advance. Collaboration 
with Thomson—Brandt, which produces video recorders and 
was to launch a new camera with incorporated play—back 
features in late 1984, would ensure a fully competitive 
French presence in this market.
Finally, the CGT, in April 1983, also proposed the 
full production of movie film at Vincennes — at that 
time, only coating was being done there. This would 
allow the machinery for making the triacetate base to be 
fully utilised once mare.
Union Action
The CGT and CFDT predictably got a frosty reception 
from management with their proposals. In fact, it soon 
became clear to them that Kodak—Pathe management had no 
real power of decision in the matter and that they had 
to approach Kodak's European management based in London. 
Yet the company refused to acknowledge the existence of 
this tier of management and simply referred the union 
back to local management.
The activists at Vincennes then decided to gather 
information on the effects of Eastman-Kodak's 
restructuring on the other national units in Europe. The
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Departmental council of Val—de—Marne contacted the
Greater London Council, itself concerned at threats to 
Kodak Ltd's Harrow plant, and they helped to bring 
together unionists from both sites in Paris in June
1983- At this meeting, the Standing Conference of Kodak
European Trade Unions was set ups at subsequent 
meetings, representatives from Italy were present and 
interest was shown by Belgian and Irish Kodak workers. 
However, the German unionists from IGMetall were
reluctant to participate because of the presence of the 
CGT: branded as communist, the CGT is still kept out of
the European Trade Union Confederation and ostracised by 
the American and German unions in particular.
FO unionists attended a London, November 1983, 
meeting as observers but dropped out subsequently, in 
part because of FO's commitment to ICEF, the 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General 
Workers Unions. This body has organised a World Council 
of Kodak Workers and a similar forum exists under the 
aegis of FISTAV, the International Federation of Unions 
Df Audiovisual Workers.
Why the need for a third international body of Kodak 
workers? One CFDT activist said she was all for 
international bodies that did something — but the ICEF 
body had not met for years and was ineffective. The 
FISTAV body was unknown to the activists I spoke to.
The new Standing Conference was obviously closer to 
the grassroots and aimed at promoting various 
international initiatives with a view to creating the
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conditions' under which Eastman Kodak would be obliged 
to negotiate on technical change, restructuring and 
employment and give the European companies a -fair share 
of new developments.
The main initiatives appear to have involved signing 
petitions and presenting them to national managements 
(January 1984); a meeting with members of the European 
Parliament (also Janurary 1984); and putting a common 
list of questions to national managements at the end of 
1984 on future markets, investments and restructuring, 
new processes, employment, and the procedures governing 
internal price fixing.
The Kodak—Pathe management refused to provide any of 
this information on the grounds that it was 'strategic'. 
It should be noted that information of the type sought 
should be given as a matter of routine to CEs under the 
Auroux 1egisiation<=>. The CFDT activists in particular 
bemoaned the lack of precision in the laws in defining 
exactly what the employer was obliged to reveal and the 
failure of management to comply even when it seemed 
relatively straightforward. Above all, important 
decisions concerning employment were invariably taken 
(presumably, here, by bodies senior to Kodak—Pathe 
management) without the obligatory prior consultation of 
the CE.
(On the other hand, both the CGT and CFDT agreed 
that the extra resources given to the CE under Auroux 
had, by going towards phone and travel costs, been vital 
in the effort to forge contacts abroad).
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Although the main goal was to -force Kodak-Pathe to 
keep alive the production and research -functions of 
Vincennes, an immediate aim in 1981 was to get 
management and government representatives around the 
table to discuss the situation- However, neither the 
Ministries of Industry, Research, Culture and 
Communications nor the Planning authorities would 
intervene on the grounds that Kodak was not seeking 
public money; it was investing in Chalon; and (at that 
stage) it was not making people redundant.
Both the CGT and CFDT sections were therefore fairly 
cynical about the effects of the political chanoement 
and tended to play down any idea that they may have had 
high hopes of a different response from the Ministries:
On pensait bien sur ces questions-la, 
meme en 1981. que ^a serait en fonction du 
rapport de forces- D'ailleurs, la preuve 
depuis quatre ans... (CGT, Kodak-Pathe) (E)
Notre position — Section Syndicale CFDT — 
a toujours ete a dire: C'est pas parce que la 
Gauche arrive au pouvoir que tous les 
problernes sont regies, et qu'il faudra 
toujours pouvoir mobiliser, parce que le 
patronat sera toujours le patronat, le 
gouvernement sera toujours le gouvernement, 
meme si c'est de gauche, et c'est aux gens de
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mobiliser pour essayer d'avoir quelque chose.
On n'a jamais reve par rapport a 1 'arrivee de 
la Gauche! (CFDT, Kodak-Path£>. (F>
Such protestations are not surprising. The real 
lesson to be drawn is, first, that despite the
discouraging response of the Ministries, the unionists 
at Kodak-Pathe persisted with their attempt to have a 
say in the industrial future of their company. Thus, if 
the arrival of the Left government nurtured the movement 
of trade unionists towards the idea of 'counter­
proposals' and an incursion onto 'management terrain', 
that orientation appears to have outlasted the period 
during which the climate seemed most favourable for it.
Secondly, despite the current leanings of the CFDT 
leadership towards a contractual policy which would have 
such matters as one of the elements, there was little 
feeling here that industrial strategy or any aspect of 
1 'economique as opposed to the traditional union sphere 
of le social was in any real sense negotiable, let „alone 
a likely area of consensus. Only industrial muscle was 
liable to alter management's decision.
The activists' scepticism was underpinned by 
suspicions that a deal had been struck between the 
company and the government. For a start, Pierre Joxe, a 
Socialist Minister, was depute for the Chalon area where 
jobs were being created. And a member of the cabinet of 
the first post— 1981 Industry Minister went on to become 
head of Rhone Poulenc. CFDT activists suspected a deal
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whereby Kodak allowed Rhone Poulenc to establish itself 
in the video tape market unhindered by competition from 
Kodak—Pathe if the latter was given a free hand in its 
restructuring...
Thus, underlying attitudes amongst these activists 
at least were unaltered by the events of 1981 and the 
adoption of a new demarche, a new way of proceeding, did 
not signify any fundamental change in their vision of 
thi ngs:
... on se fait pas d'illusions. On sait 
aujourdhui q u ‘on n'a pas change 
fondamentalement de regime, de systfeme 
social, politique... Done les choses 
continuent comme avant. On se fait pas 
d Jillusions sur ce q u 'on pourrait nous donner 
a nous mais on sait qu'il faudra 1 'arracher 
(CGT, Kodak-Pathe). (G)
The international link-up was not seen by these 
activists as likely to force a change of direction on 
management. Rather-, it allowed an exchange of ideas and 
information to provide a clearer picture of global 
Eastman Kodak strategy.
Les reunions qu'il y a avec les Anglais, 
c'est bien, parce que pa permet d'avoir des 
informations. Mais pour faire reculer la 
Direction, seule la mobilisation du personnel
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petit compter, il faut etre realiste. Et on 
n e s t  pas parvenu a ce stade-la. (CFDT,
Kodak-Pathe). (H)
In -fact, the whole notion o-f trying to maintain 
national production quotas through internati onal 
co-operation is ambiguous and may limit the 
possibilities o-f united action. In this particular case, 
co—operation was made possible by the perception that 
the US mother company was seeking control of all the 
best products and research at the expense of its 
European subsidiaries and restricting the autonomy of 
the latter to that end. A kind of European consciousness 
was therefore able to emerge in the face of 'American 
aggressi on *:
II y a des produits qu'on fait depuis 
tres longtemps et qu'on est en mesure de 
faire, d u n e  tres bonne qualite. II n'y a 
pas de raison qu'on ne les fasse pas... Les 
Anglais reconnaissent £a. (CGT, Kodak-Pathe). (I)
Again, we see the refusal of the company's logic and 
an attempt almost to petrify a given international 
division of labour since the proposed restructuring 
refused to take into account national industrial and 
social factors. Both sections shared this rejection of 
the company logic and used quite similar vocabulary 
('refus de gachis', 'sabotage') more often found in the
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CGT than the CFDT press. On the shorter working week, 
too, the CFDT mi 1itants here were closer to the CGT line 
than their own Confederation's, arguing that no pay cut 
was justified because of the productivity gains made 
through new technology and because consumption had to be 
maintained to preserve jobs.
However, there were some differences of approach. In 
particular, the CFDT activists did not lay the same 
stress as the CGT on the Kodak—Rh6ne Poulenc—Thomson 
Brandt link-up, one going so far as to describe the CGT 
enthusiasm as having a ‘caractere publicitaire'.
As in other cases, the CGT, while making alternative 
proposals for the company concerned, widened the focus, 
citing factors in the national economy and the need for 
a national audiovisual industry strategy. Casassus, in 
Casassus et al (1985) refers to this as a 'strategie 
d'amplification' and contrasts it with FO's 'strategie
pragmatique' and the CFDT's 'strategie
d'exteriorisation '. However, here at least, the CFDT 
section concentrated mainly on the workers at Vincennes 
and the fate of the plant itself.
Its members freely - or gladly — described
themselves as 'dissidents' within the CFDT though 
without apparently subscribing to the oppositional line 
of Hacuitex or Lower Normandy. Nor, like the Poissy 
Talbot CFDT section which came out against all 
redundancies during the 1983-B4 dispute, was it led by 
any Trotskyite group. Rather, it was an 'autonomous' 
group of individuals who had been attracted to the CFDT
in the past because of its democratic and radical nature 
but who now, somewhat disillusioned, preferred to put 
more effort into strictly local union and social matters 
and had virtually withdrawn from Confederation life.
The point is, again, that despite their opposition 
to the CFDT leadership on such issues as full
compensation for the shorter working week and economic 
policy, they nonetheless felt that the only credible way 
to fight for jobs in their workplace was by
demonstrating to management — and workers - that
alternatives to closure did exist and that Eastman 
Kodak's decisions were not governed by any superior 
logic passed down from on high. There were other choices 
and a union needed to demonstrate this by setting out 
its own proposals and combatting the plans of management 
not only at a rhetorical level but by reference to 
concrete data and analysis.
The CGT section worked closely with its Chemical 
Workers Federation and with UGICT, the CGT's cadres 
union. In fact, while addressing the problems of 
Vincennes, the CGT approach did seem to fit a 'pro
forma' pattern, especially as regards the rather 
nationalistic discourse of the proposed
' franco-franpise' link-up with two state firms which we 
will see repeated elsewhere. The activists here also 
followed the Confederation line in seeing the post— 1981 
nationalisations as flawed because the criteria 
governing their goals and functioning had not been 
altered - a sign of a shift in CGT thinking perhaps in
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the light of experience: nationalisation is necessary to 
alter a company's role but not sufficient- 'New criteria 
of management' are also required and if the activists I 
spoke to did not use that label, it was clear they had 
assimilated the voluminous Confederation literature on 
the matter and had applied it in their firm.
In spite of all their efforts, the run-down at 
Vincennes continued and the mobilisation of the 
workforce was weak. The implications of this will be 
discussed in the conclusion of this chapter and in 
Chapter 9. We move now to another Val-de-Marne plant 
where alternatives were suggested, again unsuccessfully, 
by unionists in their opposition to closure plans.
NOTES
1. The details of the secti o n 's proposals and 
actions are taken from interviews, in-house union 
documents and the national union press.
2. Renegotiation of the main points of these 
agreements was one of the CNPF demands during the 
'flexibility' negotiations discussed in Chapter B.
3. CGT and CFDT activists described FO as a 
'syndicat de la direction'. The Secretary of the FO 
section was apparently an RPR member of the Vincennes 
council, which had not opposed the disengagement of 
Kodak from the town, but at least one of the FO 
mi 1itants I spoke to was a Socialist.
4. In 'La CGT propose une co—operation ... pour la
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fabrication francaisg de la video'.
5. The Vredling proposals will presumably require 
the same sort of information to be given to employees 
should they ever be ratified in some form by the 
European Commissioners and Parliament.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'Under the cover of a transfer of manufacturing 
to Chalon, and following the instructions of Eastman 
Kodak, management is trying to specialise Kodak-Pathe 
even further in the production of a few old technology 
goods- If this policy continues, it will gradually lead 
to a technical, scientific and technological 
'under—development’ which will inexorably transform 
Kodak-Pathe into a firm which merely distributes 
products made by Eastman Kodak-' (CFDT, August 1982).
(B) 'The more of us there are who want to negotiate 
a real social plan which avoids redundancies and wins 
improvements for those wanting to move to Chalon, the
better trade unionists we will be-' (FO notice, April
1984).
(C) 'We feel that the people in FO just want to see 
an orderly closure, with social solutions and so on- We, 
on the other hand, say that type of solution is very bad
— you can't play a part in the closure of a firm when
problems are growing in firms all around y o u - ' (CGT, 
Kodak).
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(D) rThe proof: they talk of investing a billion 
francs over five years, a large portion of that being 
earmarked for the elimination of the Vincennes factory 
(two million francs a year just to dismantle the 
machines!).' (CGT dossier, June 1985).
(E) 'As far as that goes, we thought, even in 1981. 
that it would all be down to the actual strength of each 
side, management and workers. And we've been proved 
right over four years.' (CGT, Kodak).
(F) 'Our position, as a union branch, has always 
been this: just because you've got a Left government, it 
doesn't mean problems are immediately solved. You still 
have to be able to mobilise, because the bosses will 
always be the bosses, the government will always be the 
government, even if it's on the Left, and people have to 
mobilise if they want something. We never had any dreams 
as far as the Left government was concerned! * (CFDT, 
Kodak).
(G) '...we're not under any illusions. We know now
that we haven't fundamentally changed the regime, the 
social and political system... So things go on as 
before. We've got no illusions about what we might get — 
but we do know we'll have to fight for i t . ' (CGT, 
Kodak).
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(H) 'The meetings we've been having with the English 
are good, because they allow us to exchange information. 
But to make management back down, only the mobilisation 
o-f the workforce counts, you've got to be realistic- And 
we've not managed i t . ' (CFDT, Kodak).
(I) There are some products we've been making for 
years and we're still capable o-f* making them, to a very 
high standard. There's no reason why we shouldn't... The 
English recognise that.' (CGT, Kodak).
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ill) SKF
The SKF plant in Ivry used to be something of a CGT 
stronghold: of the 615 workers employed there when a
closure decision was announced in 1983, around 30 
percent were CGT' members and its candidates palled 
around 80 percent in workplace elections. (FO had had a 
presence at the plant and the CFDT was there right until 
an occupation was begun by the CGT in November 1983).
S K F 41 * is a Swedish—based company specialising in 
ball bearings, but also producing steel, machine tools, 
car and plane parts, etc. A bearings company which had 
existed in Ivry from 1904 merged with SKF in 1920.
In the early 1970s, the Ivry plant had employed 
around 2,000 people on three sites: within the SKF group 
it specialised in the research and initial development 
of bearings manufacture- It produced mainly small runs, 
large batch production having been progressively taken 
over by other SKF factories at Fontenay and St. Cyr.
The SKF group had embarked upon a European wide 
restructuring because of over-capacity, in large part 
due to the recession in the car industry (its major 
customer in France was Peugeot) and cheap imports from 
Japan, China and the Comecon countries. (SKF was a prime 
mover behind the EEC anti-dumping agreement with the 
USSR, Poland and Roumania in 1981 which, however, had 
little real effect). Extraordinary costs of 274 million 
kronur were incurred in 1983 due to the restructuring
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which affected in particular the French, Italian and 
German companies in the group (Annual Report, 1983). The 
express aim was to 'concentrate the resources of each 
individual company in order to improve their competitive 
posi tion '.
After forecasting stagnant markets for 1983, SKF 
finally decided to close the Ivry plant, intending to 
transfer its functions to its 'two other factories in 
France. Ivry was chosen, the company said, because of 
its high costs, including rates; the upkeep of an ageing 
site; the high wage bill due to the number of employees 
with long service and the 'hausse reguliere et 
importante des coats salariaux et avantages sociaux 
divers'; and excessive absenteeism. It was initially 
proposed to transfer 98 employees out of the 616 to the 
other factories and another 160 posts might eventually 
be created there as a result of work sharing (through 
state—subsidised contrats de solidarite) and a shorter 
working week.
The CGT Response
The CGT immediately commissioned a report from the 
SOGEX research bureau, paid for partly out of CE funds.
On the industrial analysis, its report acknowledged 
the problems with imports and the difficulties in the 
car industry but nonetheless advanced the hypothesis of 
a two percent growth in the bearings market for 1984. 
This was described as a 'natural' growth rate but was in 
fact dependent on the reversal of the imparts trend
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noted above, a restriction on Japanese car imports into 
the EEC, an upturn (‘tant attendue') in the world 
economy and a -franc devaluation. In addition, the report 
painted out, i-f SKF managed to recover one percent of 
the home market - which SDGEX reckoned was -feasible — it 
would increase its sales by 4.24 percent.
If the French operations contributed only 13 percent 
of SKF sales in Europe, down from IB percent in 1973, 
this was not so much due to the high costs of French 
operations as the restructuring undertaken by SKF. The 
CGT therefore attached little credence to SKF's promise 
that it would maintain its overall levels of production 
in France on its two remaining sites.
The Union Proposals
□n the basis of this report, the CGT put forward 
alternative proposals for the Ivry site. The 
argumentation on the potential market and the other 
external economic factors seems to have been taken 
directly from the SOGEX report. Proposals on the 
manufacturing processes were also made and mi 1itants 
said these were the result of discussions with the 
workforce but in fact the suggestions appear to differ 
little from the arrangements existing in 1983.
There was no attempt to suggest new products here - 
difficult given the highly specialised but limited 
nature of the Ivry production range.
The CGT therefore concentrated on the financial and 
personnel aspects of the planned closure and attempted
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to rebut SKF's arguments. Crucially, its proposals 
turned around the 200 million francs the mother company 
was to inject into SKF—CAM (the French arm of the group) 
which included 165 millions earmarked for the Ivry 
closure, 15 million of that for 'voluntary' redundancy 
payments. This the CGT proposed to use to reduce the 
debt of SKF-CAM and finance investment to improve 
productivity, the need for which was fully accepted. A 
further 200 million franc soft loan would be sought from 
the government, as envisaged in SKF's own plans.
If Ivry was then kept open, over 150 million francs 
would be saved on the closure costs: given a
hypothetical four percent growth in SKF's market share 
and an inflation rate of eight percent, SKF-CAM would be 
producing profits again by 1986, the CGT said. And where 
SKF's plans involved a total projected loss of 182 
million francs in 1983-85, the CGT plan foresaw a loss 
of just 119 million francs — with Ivry still producing.
According to the CGT, the problem of excess capacity 
was only partly due to imparts from the countries listed 
above: there was also a problem with imports from within 
the SKF group, particularly in the range produced at 
Ivry. (Lorry—loads of such bearings from Italy were 
'confiscated' and used as proof by SKF workers in one of 
the many wel1—publicised events staged to keep the 
dispute in the public eye). Therefore, the CGT said, 
there was a need for the bearings in France and these 
should be produced at Ivry.
For the CGT, the use to which SKF intended to put
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the funds represented ' un enorme gaspillage technique et 
humain'. Furthermore, the real social cost of the 495 
redundancies eventually announced in September 1983 was 
put much higher than the company's estimate, the CGT 
claiming that it costs the community 70*000 francs per 
year in benefits, lost output, taxes and so on for each 
unemployed person. For the CGT, SKF was disregarding its 
responsibilities to the community:
... Nous sommes en un temps ou les 
decisions des societes ne doivent plus 
relever de 1 arbitraire. Ni meme des seuls 
criteres de rentabilite. L'utiiite sociale et 
les cauts saciaux doivent etre pris en 
consideration. (Annexe 2 of the Propositions 
pamphlet). (A)
One of the activists interviewed was particularly 
indignant at the 'problem' of the higher wage bill due 
to the proportion of workers with long service. Not only 
was this a reflection of SKF's refusal to recruit over 
the years, it was also the callous attitude of a company 
that had taken the best years of a worker's life and was 
preparing now to throw him onto the scrapheap along with 
all his skills and experience.
It was misleading to compare Ivry and the other two 
sites in other ways, too. For a start, they were covered 
by different agreements and wages were invariably higher 
in Paris; in addition, the Ivry workers were well
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organised and in the vanguard of all industrial action 
within SKF-CAM — there was a month-long occupation in 
March 1982, one of the rash of disputes in France at 
that time over the way in which the fifth week's holiday 
was introduced.
This, of course, would provide any company with an 
excellent reason to shut that particular plant: the 'red 
belt' of Paris is littered with . the hulks of factories 
whose owners have found cheaper and more pliable labour 
available in the provinces. The CGT activists here would 
not even countenance a discussion on the economic and 
management sense of such a move: for them it was
' scandal eux ' , 'pas normal', immoral in some sense<:2> .
Furthermore, the factories in the provinces were 
more modern and handled large batch production 
itranferred in part from Ivry) which meant lower costs. 
Investment in Ivry had been low. Thirteen flexible 
manufacturing units had been ordered and would have 
increased Ivry's productivey rate enormously but only 
five were ever put into use. (I was shown some still in 
their boxes in the occupied factory in April 1985 — the 
one trump card the occupiers held).
The lack of investment had also meant deteriorating 
working conditions, a major factor behind the 
absenteeism — and a high accident rate which the 
company made less noise about, the CGT noted. It also 
hit the quality of production: in fact, even parts known 
to be faulty were sent out to customers, the union 
claimed. Finally there was very little investment in
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training — and most of that went to the cadres.
SKF Ivry had employed 2,250 workers in 1962: now 
there were 615. SKF had actively run down the site and 
was using the results of its own actions to justify 
closure! Again, this was scandalous for the CGT 
activists. They conceded that the site was now too large 
and proposed to sell part of the land for redevelopment 
by other industrialists. But they maintained that Ivry 
was still viable. In particular, it had a research and 
testing centre in which 75 percent of the bearings used 
in French cars had been developed: since several
experienced technicians were unwilling to transfer from 
the Paris region and some of the equipment was difficult 
to move, closure would mean the loss of '1'acquis d'un 
demi—siecie d experience .
To redress the imbalance in the workforce, the CGT
proposed contrats de solidarite, contrats de
pre-retraite and contrats formation which, in various 
state—assisted ways, allowed the older, experienced 
workers to pass on their 'savoir- faire' while gradually 
scaling down their own working time and then going into 
early retirement. (SKF had sought state aid but for 
early retirement only as part of its closure package).
Productivity could be raised by the 'repatriation' 
of lines transferred elsewhere within the group, in 
France or beyond. But the CGT argued that any 
measurement of productivity had to take into account the 
research and development function of Ivry which meant 
that it undertook ‘difficult‘ runs, more costly than
standard batch production.
The CGT proposals included investment in new 
machinery and training: in each department, the
proposals entailed maintained or increased production 
levels and staffing levels at least as high as before 
the closure. An end to strict demarcation between grades 
was acceptable if workers were given the proper training 
and grading, activists said. Under the heading of 'work 
organisation;, the union made limited suggestions along 
the lines of workers having the right to intervene in 
the production process with modifications and proposals 
on conditions and productivity. (The closure plans had 
meant that the Auroux laws were never really applied at 
Ivry).
Finally, the CGT called for a shorter working week 
to create new jobs and an increase in wages to motivate 
the workers and, on a wider scale, stimulate the 
economy.
Union Action
Predictably, SKF rejected the proposals which the 
CGT subsequently took to local, departmental and 
national authorities. To prevent the transfer of 
machinery as the closure date approached, CGT members 
occupied the Ivry factory in November 1983. The 
occupation was to continue for 18 months and various 
stunts kept the dispute in the public eye. Seventy local 
organisations and the Communist-led council supported 
the workforce and chartered a plane to fly a delegation
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to Gothenburg in Sweden to attempt to talk to SKF group 
leadership and also to discuss their case with local 
unionists- The latter initiative does not seem to have 
had any tangible result.
When I visited Ivry in April 1985 there were no more 
than sixty workers still involved with the occupation. 
They had survived that long mainly due to the assistance 
o-f the council.
Ivry is a Communist stronghold: in the 1983 council 
elections, the F'CF—led Left list got 77 percent of the 
vote. The SKF plant there was a CGT bastion. Both these 
factors probably played a part in SKF's decision to 
close this plant rather than one of the two outside the 
Paris conurbation. That decision may, then, have been 
broadly political though a heavy rates bill no doubt 
contributed, too. For the council, the closure of SKF 
meant the annual loss of nine million francs in rates 
and related charges (Ivry Ma Ville. No.113, May 1983). A 
further 1,500 jobs were under threat in the town at the 
time of the SKF closure.
The chances of the remaining sixty salvaging
anything from the occupation by April 1985 were remote. 
The CGT had progressively scaled down its proposals as 
the available workforce shrank and at various points 
during the dispute alternative projects for the site 
were discussed by SKF, union and council officials but 
no agreement was ever reached. (One scheme involving a 
laboratory for rubber research and certain services of 
the SITA and Total groups would have created around 200
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jabs).
By 1985 it was clear that the symbolic and political 
aspects of the dispute were o-f more importance than any 
industrial plan. This does not seem to have been the 
case at the start. The local activists put a great deal 
o-f effort into drawing up their initial proposals and 
the CGT's Metalworkers Federation was also intent on 
making its opinions felt as to the need for a strong 
French bearings industry<;s> .
Yet, despite the dwindling band of occupiers, the 
CGT press and the PCF daily, L 'Humanite. continued to 
publicise the dispute. Mobilisation elsewhere was slow 
and this lengthy occupation (in the town where Thorez 
was for many years depute) was seized upon as a vivid 
symbol of the workers' right to employment.
Finally, on May 28th 1985, fully 18 months after the 
tribunal d'instance had ordered the evacuation of the 
piant, 240 riot police moved in, easily overcoming the
two or three people who had spent the night there.
Throughout the day, skirmishes took place in the streets
surrounding the factory.
The reaction of the CGT and PCF was interesting
and provides an instructive comparison with attitudes 
expressed earlier in the dispute. Thus, in the April 
1984 issue of Ivry Ma Vi lie. Patrick Qinard (SKF worker 
and PCF Councillor) had stated:
Toutes les etudes concluent sur les 
possibi1ites, la viabilite des solutions
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proposes par la CGT- II s'agit bien pour la 
SKF d ‘une voionte politique de casser 1'usine 
d'lvry qui s'inscrit dans la demarche de 
sabotage economique du patronat et de la 
droite de desindustrialiser la region 
parisienne. (B)
Dn the expulsion of the SKF, occupiers, however, it 
was the government that was deemed the guilty party. 
Jean—Pierre Page of the Union Departementale declared:
En agressant les travailleurs de la SKF, 
le gouvernement, le chef de 1 'Etat lui-meme, 
renouent avec les pratiques anti-ouvri^res 
des precedents gouvernements socialistes.
(L 'Humanite. May 29th, 1985). (C)
The CGT magazine, La Vie Ouvriere. (2127, 3rd-9th June 
1985) squarely situated the government in the same camp 
as the patronat in an article detailing examples of 
employer aggression against unionists.
The tendency to attack the government for the 
shake-out in industry had begun well before the 
Communist Party declined to sit in the Fabius government 
in the middle of 1984 but the volume was increased after 
that, causing some disquiet among the Socialists in the 
CGT.
What happened next at Ivry underlined the symbolic 
aspect of the dispute. I he company had already evacuated
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some o-f its machinery when, in the early hoars of June 
5th, a 'commando' group broke into the works and in the 
resulting bloody battle scores were injured. The next 
day, L 'Humanite had pictures covering its front page and 
the editorial likened the events to 1947 when the 
Socialist Jules Moch sent tanks into the mining areas.
That comparison is illuminating on two counts.
First, it draws a parallel with' a previous period of 
open hostility between the Socialists and Communists 
when the CGT abruptly dropped its post-war exhortations 
to the workers to toil to rebuild the economy and began 
to mobilise behind calls to improve wages. A similar 
slide from soutien critique to outright opposition had 
also occurred now. Of course, in both cases, the CGT 
could point to real grievances to support its change of 
attitude but the ultimate futility of the SKF episode 
suggests that this fight at least was more about party 
politics than industry.
This leads on to the second point: the strike wave
of 1947 was perhaps a failure but it was a mass
phenomenon: the SKF battle, for all the column inches it 
generated, was a one-off affair and should be set 
against the signal failure of the CGT to truly mobilise 
the workers against job losses in much more serious 
cases — Renault, for example. Rather than a sign of its 
virility, the SKF episode might better be portrayed as a 
symbol of the CGT's decline over the thirty years since 
the Moch intervention.
What is more — and this serves to underline both the
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above points — the June 5th raid was apparently 
organised by the PCF and for the most part involved its 
members and employees from the Communist Councils in the 
region- Of the 68 people arrested in Ivry that day, only 
one was an SKF worker (Le Monde, June 7th 19B5)- Even 
Henri Krasucki was not let into the secret until late on 
June 4th and Andre Sainjon, General Secretary of the 
CGT's Metalworkers Federation^ was kept in total 
ignorance (Le Nouvel Qbservateur, 1075, 14th-20th June
1985). Both these men are leading Communists and so, at 
a different political level, the SKF battle can also be 
seen as an episode in the fractional battle between 
those Communists in the CGT seeking to bring their union 
solidly out against the Socialist government (and 
therefore on the side of the PCF) and the more cautious 
PCF members who recognised the threat that this posed to 
unity within the Confederation.
'Incomprehension Mutuelle'
All this has taken us some way from the notion of 
'alternative plans': in this case, as the local svndicat 
came up against a management determined to push ahead 
with its own plan, workers drifted away from the plant 
to other jobs or the resignation of the dole queue and 
the dispute was kept alive as a symbolic reminder of the 
failings of the Socialist government in the fields of 
industry and employment. Symbolic, too, perhaps, of the 
passing of the type of industrial unit from which the 
CGT drew its strength and which has suffered
7/38
inordinately during the present crisis.
As at Kodak, the union was faced with a 
transnational company with the financial resources to 
implement its restructuring despite the irritation of 
machinery being impounded by the workers over a long 
period. Ultimately, whatever means a union has access to 
and whatever rights the law gives it, the impact of 
workers: plans will always depend on the willingness of
employers and managers to discuss them. Even under a 
Left government, and even in nationalised firms, as we 
will see in the case of Renault, company leaders are 
still hostile to any worker input in an area seen as 
their prerogative.
The SKF plan did have merits — the concern with the 
local economy, the desire to see skills passed on to the 
next generation, the dismay at the waste of human, 
material and technical resources — but, as with Kodak, 
the union logic ran counter to the logic of SKF, notably 
over the question of finance.
SKF was quite prepared to transfer 200 million 
francs to close Ivry, to reduce what it saw — from the 
point of view of its group operations - as excess 
production in France and close a law performance unit. 
The CGT, on the other hand, wanted to use that money to 
invest in Ivry, subsidise the losses in the short term 
and invest with a view to achieving medium and long-term 
profitability. As elsewhere, the union tried to argue 
for cross-subsidisation and the inclusion of social 
criteria in determining the uses to which capital is
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put: the financial constraints felt by the SKF group are
largely ignored.
The market forecast of each side is a case study in 
the use of statistics — the CGT using fairly optimistic 
figures from the Chamber of Commerce and Employers' 
organisations at precise moments in time, SKF using zero 
growth forecasts to justify its closure decision to the 
labour authorities but noticeably more bullish not long 
after the redundancies had been given the go-ahead.
As in other cases, the CGT criticised management for
seeing the downturn in its markets and its market share 
as fact, fatalites. and therefore irreversible. It
countered by urging SKF to seek out new markets — TGV
trains, aeronautics, new models of car, and so on — in 
the general belief that growth can be stimulated given 
the right political will, therefore there is no 
justification in closing down plants which have working 
equipment, which only need investment and the 
elimination of 'unfair competition' to make them viable.
However, irrespective of the market, the financial 
element alone was enough to sink the CGT plan under the 
current economic system. SKF-CAM management described 
the proposals as requiring a miracle' and in capitalist 
terms the CGT is indeed asking for a 'gift' of 200 
million francs from SKF, free finance. It is clear from 
the minutes of the CE meeting of October 12th 1983 that 
on this issue there was a real dialogue de sourds. 'un 
constat d 'incomprehension mutuelle' as those minutes put 
it.
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This important -financial aspect resurfaces in the 
following case which also involved the lengthy 
occupation of a factory by the CGT.
NOTES
1. Information is drawn from interviews with union 
activists and a member of the town's Service des 
Activites Economiques: and the pamphlet Propositions du 
Syndicat CGT pour le maintien et le developpement de 
1'etablissement SKF Ivry. which includes excerpts from 
the company's own plan and the SOGEX report.
2. A genuine scandal broke out when the workers 
occupied the factory and found files on their political 
views and personal lives. According to one older 
mi 1itant. this touched a particularly raw nerve as the 
company had denounced trade union activists to the 
Germans during the Second World War.
3. CGT—FGM: Points de repere et Elements de
propositions pour assurer une relance et un
developpement du secteur fran^ais du roulement. 
(Roneotyped document, October 1983).
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'We live in an age when decisions in society 
should no longer be made arbitrarily. Nor on the basis 
of profitability alone. Social usefulness and social 
costs must be taken into consideration.' (Annexe 2 of 
the Propositions pamphlet).
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(B) All the studies agree on the possibilities 
opened up, the viability of the solutions proposed by 
the CGT. With SKF, there is a political motive for 
smashing the Ivry factory which fits in with the 
strategy of economic sabotage of the bosses and the 
Right, and the deindustrialisation of the Paris region.' 
(Ivry Ha Ville. April 19S4).
(C> 'By attacking the workers of SKF, the government 
and the Head of State himself are adopting the 
anti—working class practices of previous Socialist
governments. ' (L 'Humanite. May 29th 1985).
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illI; CHAPELLE DARBLAY
I he paper-making company of Chapelle Darblay went 
into receivership in December 1980. Since at the time it 
produced around 80 percent of all paper made in France 
(covering around 42 percent of the country‘s needs) and 
employed some 2,360 people in the two of its plants 
situated in the Rouen region, it attracted a great deal 
of publicity.
In 1980, the group was jointly owned by a public 
industrial finance body, the Institut Pour le 
Developpement Industriel (IDI), and the private bank 
Paribas*1'. The company had grown in the 1960s and 1970s 
after a series of mergers pushed through with the aim, 
firstly, of establishing a paper manufacturer large 
enough to compete with the North American and European 
giants; and, secondly, to provide Chapelle Darblay with 
its own distribution units and some capacity for 
supplying the raw materials it needed.
However, 30 percent of raw materials were still 
imported (and paid for in dollars) and energy costs in 
the industry were high. Furthermore, it was a capital 
intensive industry: by the end of the 1970s investment 
had been squeezed (a CGT activist claimed that the 
Darblay family which had controlled the group till the 
mid-1970s had invested elsewhere for a quicker return on 
capital — in the toy industry, for example - and 
machinery in the Rouen plants was largely outdated).
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Ironically, investment of 114 million francs in 
1978—9, mostly in a completely new paper—making machine 
(taking up the whole of a 2-1/2 acre factory) probably 
pushed the company over the brink as it coincided with a 
serious increase in production and material costs (fuel, 
for example, rose by 106 percent with the second 'oil 
shock ) which were already high, especially in 
comparison with Canadian competitors. The company also 
had to face an unexpected downturn in the market for 
lightweight coated paper, used for magazines and certain 
books (though its major product was newsprint).
For a long time, problems had been masked to some 
extent by the existence of an effective state subsidy 
for paper<3). However, after making a modest profit of 
27.1 million francs (out of a turnover of 1.7 billion) 
in 1979, the company called in the receiver in December 
1980, burdened by debts of 1.1 billion francs.
Under French law, the company was allowed to carry 
on producing while the various legal and state 
authorities sought to come up with a plan for finance. 
Since French operators were unwilling to invest in 
Chapelle Darblay, the Industry Ministry called upon the 
Dutch paper company, Parenco, which had recently pushed 
through its own modernisation, to draw up and oversee a 
recovery plan.
This first Parenco plan in early 1983 aimed, over 
five years, to restore Chapelle Darblay to international 
competitiveness in the newsprint market that it was 
henceforth to concentrate upon, to the exclusion of
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other products. It entailed making greater use of French 
resources, with investments in equipment more suitable 
for French timber and machinery for recycling paper. A 
move to thermo—chemical (rather than mechanical) 
paper-making would commence with the commissioning of a 
brand new machine. Total investment in 1983 would amount 
to 1.2 billion francs, most of that coming from the 
state.
When the plan was put forward, there were 2,031 
employees left in the Rouen plants: around 1,450 would 
lose their jobs under the plan, 600 immediately and the 
rest in 1987-8. All that was proposed for these were 
vague retraining schemes.
fhe Union Response
Three sections (CGT, CFDT, CGC) existed in each of 
the Chapelle Darblay plants at St. Etienne-du-Rouvray 
and Grand Couronne, with the CGT particularly strong in 
the former: it had 75 percent of the vote in the 
workers' college and 40 percent among the foremen and 
cadres (where it was up against a combined CFDT-CGC 
ticket) in the 1985 DP elections.
The CFDT commissioned a report by the TEN research 
bureau in March 1982. The report stressed the need to 
bring down costs into line with competitors: it found
that the development of the company was dependent on 
newsprint production, other products having little 
realistic chance of expanding sales though their
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continued production was deemed necessary to maintain 
the maximum number of jobs- A radical transformation' 
in working practices was also necessary to provide 
suppleness in labour management.
The CFDT Union Reoianaie. which took the lead in the 
CFDT response and somewhat eclipsed the role o-f the 
local sections - drew on these -findings for its own 
proposals- It was particularly concerned with the impact 
of any large-scale job lasses on' the local economy and 
had strongly opposed the indifference of the pre— 1981 
government.
So, while Parenco's plan would keep alive the
traditonal paper— making industry in the Rouen area, the 
CFDT deplored both the job losses per se and the failure 
of the plan to address the needs of those displaced. On
the industrial side, it questioned the abandonment of
all products other than newsprint and the lack of will 
to go for a greater share of the home market, which it 
felt was feasible with the proper investment.
The CFDT's proposals, however, seem to accept the
Parenco plan as the best option available and complement 
rather than oppose its central features. In particular, 
Chapelle Darblay itself does not occupy the central 
place that it has in the CST's proposals and the 
emphasis is put on local and regional development to 
build on the solid base of a slimmed—down and profitable 
paper business.
Thus, the CFDT suggested the setting up of an 
industrial mission', with representatives of unions,
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employers, local and national authorities. The mission 
would have funds (presumably from the local authorities 
and government) to encourage and co—ordinate new 
investment in the Rouen area, particularly in sectors 
related to paper — the exploitation of- local timber 
resources, the collection of paper to recycle, 
businesses to take up the production of types of paper 
abandoned by Parenco — but also small engineering 
businesses to work on aspects of the modernisation of 
old enterprises and ventures in which the skills of 
those who lost their jobs at Chapelle Darblay could be 
put to use.
Since the government was putting up most of the 
funding for the restructuring of Chapelle Darblay 
anyway, the CFDT argued that social costs should be 
integrated within the financial and industrial project 
of Parenco. It demanded that there should be no 
redundancies without, first, a 'massive' reduction in 
the working week and then the offer of alternative 
employment to all those still surplus to requirements.
Overall, the sectoral and craft emphasis of the 
CGT's stance is displaced here by an emphasis on the 
local economy. This no doubt reflects the fact that the 
CFDT's proposals, while naturally receiving some input 
from its sections in the plants, were largely drawn up 
by its regional body in Rouen. However, the programme 
was not accepted by all the CFDT members at Chapelle 
Darblay, some siding with the CGT, at least until the 
latter's decision to stage an occupation.
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In particular, some CFDT members -found themselves 
unable to accept their Union Reqicnales analysis that 
protectionism in the paper industry, as well as allowing 
the sector to grow and provide above average wages and 
conditions, had also sowed the seeds of its failure to 
be competitive on the international market and therefore 
had to be dispensed with.
It was much easier for the grassroots activists to 
identify with the CGT's demands, with their emphasis on 
the maintenance of conditions won through years of 
struggle and the continuation of protectionist policies 
until the national industry was nurtured back to health.
The CGT line, familiar from the other cases already 
discussed, was that the Parenco plan was based on a 
short—term view of profitability which, in reducing 
output and employment rather than tackling the problem 
of imparts, destroyed a sound industrial unit. Again, 
the CGT emphasised the national and social implications 
of the local problem, demanding:
...nouveaux criteres de gestion qui lient 
etroitement objectifs de relance economique 
et progres social. (Oswald Calvetti of the 
Commission Executive at a press conference on 
Chapelle Darblay, 30th June 1983). (A)
So, while on the one hand the CGT's proposals were 
more clearly centred on the maintenance of Chapelle 
Darblay as an industrial entity than those of the CFDT,
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there was also a national line at reasoning not taken up 
by the CFDT literature or activists (though, o-f course, 
it shared the latter's concern for the regional impact 
of the proposed job losses). Thus, the CGT highlighted 
the effect on the trade balance of running down 
production in an essential material and the need for a 
certain national independence in the supply of paper, 
vital for education, culture and information.
The CGT entitled its proposals for Chapelle Darblay 
'Un Plan Franco—Fran^ais Pour Chapelle Darblay'. It was 
drawn up by the CGT sections. cadres from within the 
company and elsewhere in the industry, and a research 
group, GERENCE (Groupe d'Etude et de Recherche dans 
1 Elaboration de Nouveaux Criteres d'Efficacite).
The stated aim was to provide investment capital to 
increase production and cover national needs as far as 
possible, safeguarding the maximum number of jobs in the 
process- This was seen as essentially a matter of 
political will:
Les moyens peuvent etre degages, le 
cout social de la casse de Chapelle Darblay 
exprime en valeur represente plus que les 
sommes nfscessaires a investir pour 
rentabiliser les productions qui seraient 
abandonnees par la mise en oeuvre du Plan 
Parenco. (Presentation Generale du Plan 
Franco—Francai s).
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The funds wasted on social security, 'top—up' 
payments -for those transferring to external, lower-paid 
jobs and various 'retraining' schemes, plus the state 
aid to the local councils affected by loss of rate 
income and so on, ought to be used to subsidise 
production and jobs, the CGT implied: this would avoid 
not only the damage to the trade figures but also the 
ravages inflicted on the social fabric of the region.
For the CGT, French groups had refused to undertake 
any joint venture with Chapelle Darblay out of a barely 
concealed desire to see it fail, for commercial reasons 
(they wanted to take over the non—newsprint products) 
but also for political reasons:
...mettre bas un bastion de la gauche, 
une entreprise phare dans la profession et la 
region au vue (sic) des conquetes sociales 
obtenues par la lutte des travailleurs avec 
leurs puissants syndicats CGT- (Presentation 
Generate du Plan Franco—Franipais) .
The subsequent choice of Parenco reflected the 
government's acceptance of the role of Brussels in 
carving out a European restructuring of the paper 
industry according to CGT activists.
In contrast, the CGT's plan involved calling upon 
the help of an important French paper company, Cellulose 
du Pin, a unit of the nationalised Saint Gobain company: 
in fact, since 1980 the CGT had been demanding the
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nationaiisation of Chapelle Darblay itself. Its calls 
gat louder as the company kept going with public funds 
and as it became clear that Parenco would only be 
bringing expertise, not its own funds, into the 
restructuring operation.
The CGT's industrial proposals recognised the need 
to reduce costs (one CGT activist here offered the 
comment that there was indeed a role for competition in 
stimulating production and responding to needs - a 
perspective rare in the CGT, all the more so in a 
protected industry) but reckoned this could be done by 
the introduction of new machinery and a cheaper supply 
of raw materials.
Like the CFDT, the CGT proposed adaptations to use 
recycled paper and timber from the region. Again like 
the CFDT, it queried the strategy of producing only 
newsprint which was likely to leave the company highly 
vulnerable to any market downturn and furthermore argued 
for increased production to bring economies of scale. 
(The TEN report made the same point).
Unlike the CFDT, the CGT wanted the production of 
other types of paper to be retained within Chapelle 
Darblay to achieve similar savings on costs. Both unions 
looked at the European market in paper for magazines, 
books and other printed material but whereas the CGT saw 
potential for development (there was apparently no 
question of protectionism here!), the CFDT reckoned that 
production of only some of these different types of 
paper might be increased and it was pessimistic about
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Chapelle Darblay's chances of increasing its market 
share given the stiff competition.
The CGT's plan retained all the 'positive' 
investments detailed in the Parenco plan (that is, those 
which went into modernising machinery for 
thermo—chemical production, creating a capacity for 
recycling paper, and so on) and added suggestions for 
other improvements to machinery, costed at 420 million 
francs. Total investment needed: 1.6 billion francs...
fhe CGT argued for the continuation of production on 
both sites and the CFDT tended to agree that running 
down Grand Couronne prior to the start of production on 
a new machine at St. Etienne which was scheduled to take 
over its capacity was a strategic error which would 
alienate customers and see skilled workers drift away 
even before their projected redundancy dates. 
Investments at Grand Couronne would cost less than 
closure and the CGT said it could be run profitably with 
the non—newsprint products.
On the other hand, the CGT plan made no mention at 
all of the size of the workforce: the presentation of
the plan talks only of a 'satisfactory resolution’ to 
the problem, 'unlike in the Parenco plan'. Subsequent 
events were to show that the CGT rejected all the 
redundancies — and this aspect of production costs was 
totally absent in its proposals.
The CGC at Chapelle Darblay also came up with 
proposals although the members I interviewed at the St.
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Etienne plant were unable, or unwilling, to show me a 
copy. They insisted that their proposals -formed the 
basis of the CGT Plan Franco—Francais though the'/ also 
included -figures on manning levels. They had taken the 
line that their proposals would carry more weight with 
the Industry Minister and the workforce i-f presented 
through the CGT. (For their part, CGT activists 
acknowledged the help of Chapelle Darblay cadres but not 
of CGC members, as such).
The CGC accepted the need for the first wave of 
redundancies proposed by Parenco but, like the other 
sections. rejected the later job losses as unnecessary 
since there were markets for the high value added 
products to be abandoned along with the Grand Couronne 
si te.
The Fight Against the First Parenco Plan
The Parenco plan was presented in May 19B3 and 
immediately the CGT and CFDT began to lobby the 
government against the massive job losses. In July, the 
Industry Ministry agreed to fund an 'industrial mission' 
as demanded by the CFDT, with the brief of stimulating 
local investment to provide jobs for those to be made 
redundant. In addition, the Ministry agreed to look at a 
proposal that Chapelle Darblay continue production of 
non—newsprint paper for a time, as long as the market 
and profitability did not deteriorate.
The CFDT and CGC broadly accepted this approach but 
the CGT demanded more than promises and 'studies': it
wanted guarantees -for the Grand Couronne site and the 
workers who were to lose their jobs- And it was still
arguing tor a French solution, all the more so since
Parenco had now been taken over by the German firm,
Haindl, which was unenthusiastic about the whole scheme.
Consequently, the Former head of Parenco, the Canadian 
John Kila, was put in charge of the restructuring in a 
personal capacity and a lucrative contract for technical 
assistance was given to Parenco.
Kila brought just one million francs of new capital 
to the business - a figure matched by both Paribas and 
IDI but, due to a complicated structure involving layers 
of holding companies, Kila actually had a 51 percent 
stake in the new Chapelle Darblay company <L fExpress. 
3rd February 1984; and Chapelle Darblay documentation).
Three local councils (all PCF-led), which stood to 
lose rate income and faced the burden of supporting the 
unemployed workers, backed the CGT stand, as did 18,255 
of the local population in a local referendum. (A 
similar test of opinion — which stood little chance of 
failing, given the self—selection of those likely to 
vote - was also staged by the SKF workers in Ivry).
At the beginning of September 1983, the CGT occupied 
the two factories of Grand Couronne and St. 
Etienne—du-Rouvray. The management had decided to halt 
production to reorganise shifts and equipment: the CGT 
subsequently restarted the machinery with the help of 
retired technicians and perhaps even some cadres from 
outside the company (Vie Quvriere. 2037, 12th— 18th
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September 1983; Le Monde, 4th-5tn September 1983). 
Production continued sporadically during the occupation 
despite a tire and an accident (caused by incompetence 
according to CGC activists, sabotage after an 'open day'
according to the CGT).
The other unions were apparently kept out by the CGT 
though they both disagreed with the occupation anyway. 
On 17th October, a group of armed men (including, 
according to CGT activists, paiice in civilian clothing 
and CGC mi 1itants and possibly led by a foreman who was 
in the Front National) drove the CGT out of Grand 
Couronne but a similar attack at the St. Etienne site 
was repulsed.
The negotiations which eventually ended the dispute 
saw many amendments to the Parenco plan and the 
realisation of demands made primarily by the CGT - 
though activists from the other unions insisted that the 
Labour Ministry was moving towards these demands even
before the occupation.
It was agreed that Grand Couronne was to be kept 
open and its equipment modernised and the range of 
coated paper that Parenco had intended to abandon was 
kept in production: this meant a reprieve for 400
workers. The workers were paid 50 percent of the salary 
they would have received but for the 98 day strike and 
occupation.
The final plan, accepted by the CGT, would still 
leave only 930 workers on the two sites by the end of 
the phased restructuring out of 2,040 at the start of
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1983 and 1,400 betore the occupation. The CGT line — no 
redundancies, nationalisation and total French control - 
was thus unsuccessful.
However, 400 jobs were retained within Chapelle 
Darblay, jobs that the CFDT and CGC were prepared to see 
lost, even if the CFDT was pressing strongly for state 
aid to promote industrial regeneration with a view to 
creating replacement jobs.
The crucial decision to retain production of paper 
other than newsprint made sense in terms of the spread 
of products needed for viability and the available 
markets — that is, on criteria acceptable to the 
capitalists who would run the business. For the cynics, 
the original Parenco decision to jettison this part of 
Chapelle Darblay's business was dictated by its 
aspirations to gain a greater slice of the European 
market for its own factories. All the sections at 
Chapelle Darblay queried that part of the plan but it 
seems clear that only the C G T 's action ensured that it 
was overturned.
The cost of the rescue package - some 3.2 billion 
francs spread over five years — caused dissent among 
ministers and raised eyebrows in banking circles where 
it was thought unlikely that the company would be 
producing a big enough surplus to pay back any of the 
money as planned after five years. As an indication of 
the scale of this subsidy, it was ten times greater than 
the sum set aside in 1984 for the redevelopment of 
mining areas (L 'Express. 3rd February 1984); and
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Chapelle Darblay looked set to eat up all the -funds 
earmarked by the government in 1984 and 1985 -for the 
timber and allied industries of la filiere bois (Le 
Monde. 16th-17th October 1984).
The EEC was also alarmed at the subsidy and the new 
President of the Commission, Jacques Delors (who, 
ironically, had, as French Finance Minister, apposed the 
decision to shore up Chapelle .Darblay) broached the 
subject with French officials early in 1985 ( Le Monde. 
15th January 1985). Rival French manufacturers were also 
worried about their ability to compete given the scale 
of investment finance provided by the government for the 
Rouen plants.
CGT activists argued that their relative success at 
Chapelle Darblay proved there was a positive way out of 
the economic crisis, involving investment to save jobs, 
maintaining production and taking pressure off the trade 
balance rather than spending money to wind down 
industrial units that were still technically sound.
All the sections argued against a reliance on 
newsprint alone yet it was not the force of argument 
that ensured a thorough revision of the original plan: 
the reasons must be sought elsewhere, in political 
contingencies and plain industrial muscle.
First, Laurent Fabius, then Industry Minister and 
later Prime Minister, was a depute for the Rouen area 
and had called for government aid to ensure the survival 
of Chapelle Darblay while in opposition: it would have
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been highly embarrassing to take a different line when 
he was in a position to allocate the necessary financial 
resources and the CGT made sure his previous demands 
were kept in the public mind by poster campaigns and so 
on.
Secondly, other local political figures and bodies — 
notably the local Communist-led councils, but also 
politicians and newspapers on the Right, mindful of the 
employment problems in Rouen and seizing the chance to 
increase the government's discomfort — lobbied strongly 
to keep Chapelle Darblay going and were less concerned 
than commentators in Paris about the cost of the
exercise.
Third, Chapelle Darblay was a CGT bastion, a company 
heavily unionised by craft workers whose skills would 
not easily find employment outside. Enough of these 
workers, including apparently some members of the CFDT, 
felt they had little to lose by embarking upon a tough,
lengthy dispute.
CGC activists at the company espoused the theory 
that the dispute was really no more than a preliminary 
test of strength between the government and the PCF and
'son bras s^culier qui est la CGT' ahead of the
large-scale job reductions that were already in the 
pipe—line in mining, steel, shipbuilding and the car 
industry. For them, the CGT action simply succeeded in 
pushing the cost of the rescue package way beyond the 
realms of the acceptable.
That analysis fails to address the question of the
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products and jobs saved as a direct result of the
occupation. It is also rather contemptuous of the
motivations of craftsmen seeing their jobs disappear and 
their skills becoming redundant, with little chance of 
finding alternatives as the rest of manufacturing 
industry contracts.
Yet it is difficult to see the events at Chapelle
Darblay as significant in the development of any new
trade union perspective on employment. As will be argued 
at length later, while the discourse of the CGT departed 
from the traditional pattern, the change was one of form 
rather than substance and the made of union action was 
quite traditional.
On the other hand, the CFDT's approach was radical 
for a trade union in that the workplace in difficulty 
was not situated at the centre of its thinking on how to 
tackle job loss: yet with the CFDT, too, there was a
certain disjunction between proposals and action, some 
members resorting to defensive tactics even as the 
positive proposals seemed to be bearing fruit (with the 
"industrial mission'). An approach which offers hope of 
possible jobs elsewhere is not necessarily enough to win 
over a workforce used to above average wages and 
conditions: such corporatisme was denounced on other 
occasions by Edmond Maire and his colleagues at CFDT 
headquarters but it is nonetheless just as much a 
reality as the economic conditions which the CFDT 
nationally is attempting to come to terms with.
The CGT cannot be said to have won the dispute. The
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workforce was stiii scheduled to be reduced by 50 
percent and there was no real integration of social, 
technical and industrial considerations in the -final 
plan.
Ultimately, -for all the talk of 'new criteria', what 
seems to have happened here is that the government was 
forced to hand over a direct and substantial subsidy and 
the heavily revised Parenco plan judiciously altered its 
stance on what was feasible in market terms. The outcome 
is in no way indicative of any new pattern of company 
management and the unions did not win any rights in the 
running of the company. The agreement the CGT signed at 
the end of the occupation deals almost exclusively with 
personnel matters and the unions are invited only to 
comment on how the industrial plan set out by Parenco 
can efficiently be put into effect (Releve d'Accord. 4th 
December 1983).
Despite the recourse to experts and bureaux 
d 'etudes, all the proposals and analyses, the unions 
were still denied any role in the definition of 
industrial aims and arrangements, as the CFDT itself 
complained in a letter to the Socialist Party leader, 
Lionel Jospin, in the summer of 1983:
Est-il imaginable ... de vouloir 
cautionner les travailleurs et leurs 
organisations dans la seule discussion des 
‘plans sociaux', resultat de decisions 
economiques dont ils ont ete totalement
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exclus, decisions marquees par la logique
patronale? (Letter cited in the newspaper,
Paris-Normandie Rouen. 2nd—3rd July 1983). (C)
NOTES
1. Paribas was nationalised by the Socialist 
government before being floated off into the private 
sector again by the Chirac government in 1987.
2. A state body regulated distribution and ensured 
that a purchaser paid the same for French paper as he 
would for an imported line. This situation dated from 
the post-war years and was a reaction to German control 
of newsprint — and therefore of information to some 
extent — during the Occupation. This emotional reference 
was used by the CGT and PCF in their argument for French 
control of Chapelle Darblay.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) '...new management criteria which closely link 
the aims of economic recovery and social progress.' 
(Oswald Calvetti, CGT officer)-
(B) '...to beat down a bastion of the Left, a key 
firm in the trade because of the conditions won by the 
action of the workers, with their powerful CGT 
branches. ' (Plan Franco-franjpais) .
(C) 'Do you really want to allow the workers and 
their unions a say only in the 'social plans', the end
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result o-f economic decisions from which they have been 
totally excluded, decisions marked by the employers' 
logic?' (CFDT letter in Paris-Normandie Rouen).
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(IV) RENAULT
Treatment Qf the Renault case differs somewhat from 
the format established with the three other companies. 
Proposals from the unions are considered though often 
they are at a level of generality relating to the car 
industry as a whole. Much of the discussion here relates 
to an innovatory redundancy/retraining scheme which was 
finally not accepted by the principal unions.
The Renault case is important for at least four 
reasons. First, Renault remains the symbol of French 
state involvement in industry. The car firm was 
confiscated from its founder, Louis Renault, after he 
was accused of collaborating with the Germans during the 
last war: subsequently, it epitomised the mass
consumption, high growth society which developed in the 
1950s and 1960s.
Secondly, the restructuring of the car industry was 
important for a whale series of branches - steel, 
electronics, robotics and so on. The Dupuis report to 
the Conseil Economique et Social was categorical:
L'avenir industriel de la France passe 
par la modernisation de son industrie 
automobile (Liaisons Sociales V400, 23rd 
August 19S4). (A)
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Beyond this industrial importance, the Regie Renault 
was also something of a laboratory tor workplace 
relations, leading the way on salaries, pensions, 
sickness paty and limited exercises in shopfloor 
discussion groups.
Finally, Renault was also the centre o-f CGT 
strength<1>, leading some commentators to talk of 
co-qestion <Le Monde. 17th October 1985) though it is 
perhaps more accurate to say tfiat management tended to 
sound out the CGT on a great many matters going beyond 
the strictly social' and, because of its strength, had 
to take into account the likely CGT reaction to any 
decision.
However, the CGT position of strength and 
management's practice of consultation were both coming 
under pressure in the 1980s. Already, in the 1970s, 
strikes by production line workers over working 
conditions signalled that the traditional pay-off of 
high salaries and good service conditions was no longer 
enough. As the recession and intense competition began 
to hit the European car producers, the French unions, as 
elsewhere, began to demand a greater say in the 
company's industrial policies which were of such 
importance to the continued employment of their members.
The French Car Industry in the 1980s
Once the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s were 
over, the international car firms found themselves 
fighting fiercely to retain their market share,
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particularly in the -face of cheaper Japanese imports. 
Though records were still being set for production, 
exports and French registrations as late as 1977, 
problems were clearly emerging in the middle of that 
decade, as Peugeot, with the assistance of a massive 
state loan, bought control of Citroen from Michelin in 
1974—76. In 1970, Peugeot also took over the European 
factories of Chrysler, renaming them 'Talbot'.
The idea had been to bank on size to facilitate 
production of a wider range of models for the 
international market. However, as the international
economy remained depressed, and as Japanese production 
methods and technology kept their productivity well
ahead of their competitors, Peugeot and Renault (but
also Fiat, the American producers and British Leyland, 
too) got into serious financial difficulties.
The problem was not only one of Japanese imports: in
fact, these are restricted to three per cent of the
French market. Renault and the Peugeot group, PSA, were 
also faced with a relatively saturated market: 72 per
cent of households owned a car and in any recession such 
a market of renewal is highly vulnerable.
In 1983, PSA ran up losses of 2.6 billion francs. In 
1984, Renault's deficit was a massive 12.5 billion 
francs. Management response was to accept the downturn 
in market share (in Renault's case, dawn to 31.8 per 
cent of the French market in the first eight months of 
1984 from 40 per cent in 1980-82, according to the 
Financial Times of 22nd August 1984), cut back staff and
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embark on an extensive restructuring.
Elsewhere, 1984 began with pitched battles at the 
Talbot plant at Poissy between strikers (mostly o-f 
African stock) and non—strikers after PSA announced 
there were to be 1,950 redundancies.
During the 1960s, the French car firms had filled 
their production posts with immigrants, often recruited 
directly from their native villges with the assistance 
of their own government and the French authorities. At 
Renault, in 1984, 58 per cent of manual workers at the 
Billancourt works were immigrants, as were 46 per cent 
at FI ins. Renault, it seems, made some effort to provide 
these workers with basic literacy but this was the 
exception amongst the car firms. Everywhere, their 
training and skills were rudimentary.
Poissy demonstrated that the situation in the car 
industry was explosive but change was being forced on 
the companies. The government stepped in, entrusting a 
report on the industry and how its restructuring should 
be handled to Francois Dalle, head of the Oreal 
cosmetics group.
The Dalle Report(2)
Though reasonably optimistic about the European 
market, forecasting growth of between one and two per 
cent until the year 2000, Dalle forecast further falls 
in the coverage of the market by French producers with 
the resultant under—use of capacity further weakening 
their relatively poor productivity rates. Having had to
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borrow heavily to survive and invest, both Renault and 
PSA found themselves with annual debt servicing costs 
amounting to four per cent of their turnover compared 
with two per cent for their main rivals: the capacity to 
invest in much needed new technology was therefore 
impaired.
Taking as an indicator of productivity the ratio of 
output to workers, Dalle argued that job reductions were 
inevitable if the necessary productivity gains of seven 
per cent per annum were to be achieved. In September 
1984, when the report was drawn up, 16,000 car industry 
jobs were already earmarked to go: Dalle said 54,000 
more would need to go by the end of 1988 (out of a 
French workforce of 230,000 in car assembly) and 
possibly more if sales deteriorated further.
Dalle proposed a series of measures to reduce the 
workforce: earlier retirement; perhaps a shorter working 
week if the related salary issues could be resolved 
adequately; aide a la reinsertion (that is, training and 
financial assistance for those immigrant workers who 
chose to return to their native lands); and retraining, 
with Dalle advocating state funding for a scheme whereby 
a worker undergoing training received 70 per cent of his 
former salary and remained attached to the company which 
subsequently assisted him in his search for employment.
These 'social' measures were at the heart of Dalle's 
short-term strategy for turning the car industry round: 
the main problem, the report implied, was overmanning.
Other measures advocated by Dalle included price
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deregulation and measures to assist the dealer networks. 
Although he was probably only following a trend already 
under way, Dalle recommended Japanese systems of work 
organisation, involving smaller production units with 
workers in charge of their own quality control, lower 
stock levels to cut down on space and costs, and so on. 
The need for a better educated work force more able to 
respond to changes in technology was stressed though 
Dalle tended to play down the importance of technology 
in the Japanese success story.
Finally, noting the tense industrial relations 
climate in the car firms, Dalle acknowledged that some 
form of consensus over the restructuring was vital and 
the social measures had to be discussed with the unions. 
But the ending of Taylorism (and, presumably, Fordism) 
also meant that the workforce might have to cede some of 
its avantaaes acouis. Dalle said. It was left unclear 
whether he meant wages or general conditions but 
implicit in the report was the need for flexibility in 
the management of both resources and personnel.
The Union Reaction to Dalle
The C G T <3> saw the Dalle report as a public 
relations exercise designed to demonstrate the need for 
the 6,000 job losses being sought by Citroen and the 
15,000 that were in the air at Renault around the time 
the report was leaked to the press in August 1984.
Above all, the CGT rejected the idea of job 
reductions as a miracle cure and the 'fatalism' of the
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report- There was no strategy for reconquering the home 
market and nothing about the heavy cost of Renault's 
programme of worldwide investments, which the CGT 
fiercely opposed-
lhe C F D T <'*> also suspected that Dalle had been 
leaked to get the overmanning' notion firmly planted in 
the public consciousness but it broadly accepted Dalle's 
analysis of developments in the car industry and the 
belief that a 'gigantesque' effort of adaptation was 
required on the part of the workforce now that the 
Fordist production system had been found wanting.
There was disagreement on three points:
i) The emphasis on the problems of the constructors. 
The CFDT was concerned about the uneven quality of the 
suppliers and noted that many were in a precarious 
position as the car firms had used their position as 
monopoly buyers to keep down component prices. (This had 
been part of S K F 's problem).
ii) Interestingly, the CFDT was against state 
subsidies being used to solve the problems of redundancy 
and indebtedness. It argued that the French already paid 
out enough in the various taxes on car purchases, petrol 
and so on and it backed the idea of prets particioatifs 
(loans paid back out of profits).
iii) Dalle had been rather too dismissive of the 
shorter working week and job sharing as a way of 
resolving the problem of surplus staff. While the CFDT 
went along with his estimate of the job reductions
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necessary, it would only accept 'social packages' which 
concentrated on retraining and which left no—one in the 
dole queues.
Both FO and the CGC also sought negotiations on 
social measures to avoid any outright redundancies 
(1icenciements secs). The CGC had long been concerned 
about the state of the car industry<a> and agreed with 
the need for the job reductions' advocated by Dalle. 
However, like the CFDT, it wanted negotiations at branch 
level and the extension of any schemes to the commercial 
networks and the small suppliers.
It had three major criticisms of Dalle:
i) The first concerned fiscal policy — always a 
major CGC concern. It argued that the lightening of the 
burden of VAT, petroleum duty, road tax and so on would 
stimulate the market — an aspect of the problem totally 
neglected by Dalle.
ii) There was little real comment on industrial 
strategy in the report, particularly the relationship 
with suppliers, but also the benefits to be had from a 
revival of cooperation between Peugeot and Renault. (The 
CGC saw mutual advantages to be had in the fields of 
research, the evaluation of rivals' vehicles and 
purchasing policy, for example).
iii) The CGC complained that Dalle was too ready to 
accept the Japanese model of production and workplace 
relations when in fact the French way of doing things 
was essentially sound.
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FO was also sceptical about the feasibility of the 
Japanese system in France and it condemned the supply 
side' emphasis of the report t,b) . It noted that, in 
Japan, productivity gains were achieved through growth 
not cutbacks. It was astonished at the proposal to raise 
prices by three per cent given the growing penetration 
of the French market by foreign companies. Like the 
CGC, it wanted a reduction in the taxes associated with 
motoring (in particular, the 33 'per cent VAT on new 
cars).
The notion of sureffecti fs was questioned to some 
extent: FO saw the problem as in large part due to the 
economic recession and was therefore reluctant to accept 
any hard figures. In any case, like the other unions, it 
demanded that 1icenciements secs be avoided and wanted 
retraining and in-house re-employment to be the aim of 
any negotiations.
Union Proposals for Renault and the Car Industry
Following its general policy, FO offered a basic 
analysis of Renault's problems (flawed new model 
programme, high interest rates, inability to meet much 
of its investment funding from its own resources due to 
stagnant markets) but did not offer alternatives, making 
only a series of demands to do with the workforce. Its 
statement to the important May 1985 CCE meeting was 
specific on this point, and a classic summary of FO 
doctrine:
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Force Ouvriere a tout jours attirme qu'il 
n'etait pas dans sa vocation de gerer ies 
entreprises et d'inflechir les choix 
industriels, -financiers et commerciaux pour 
lesquels les Directions ont competence et 
responsabilite. (B)
It wanted negotiations around three demands! no 
outright redundancies; a big reduction in the working 
week with no loss o-f pay (though it recognised that the 
transformation and modernisation o-f the production 
process would have priority); a new agreement on 
short-time working which was increasingly prevalent.
Underlying these demands were -fairly orthodox 
Keynesian assumptions about purchasing power needing to 
be maintained to keep up consumption. In contrast to the 
other unions, FO ottered little analysis ot the 
structural nature ot the company's problems.
Among the activists I spoke to, there seemed to be 
an air ot resignation, at least as tar as the 
compression ot the worktorce was concerned. FO demands 
were minimal in the sense that the only outcome excluded 
was actual redundancy ('Aucun membre du personnel ne 
doit pointer a 1'ANPE') and the role ot the union was to 
limit the nefarious aspects at the restructuring under 
way.
FO a constate que, s'il y a des 
surettectits, il taut trouver des compromis..
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On est oblige de subir (la nouvelle 
technolagie). Si les gens ne 1 acceptent pas, 
les voisins vont le -faire, ils arriveront a 
avoir des prix beaucoup plus privilegies que 
nous. (FO, Renault).
Although their analysis of the industrial situation 
had been pushed further, CGC activists I spoke to were 
similarly resigned to the impending shake—out at 
Renault, particularly after the failure of the 'social 
plan' and the arrival of the new Managing Director, 
Georges Besse<7> (as outlined in the next section). If 
some still hoped to avoid redundancies by patching 
together an agreement on retraining and early 
retirement, at least one was prepared to accept that the 
company's existence was in peril (or would have been, 
had it been a private sector company) and the unions 
might have to swallow unpalatable remedies:
Dans la limite, un elu CGC, dans 
n'importe quelle instance, ne s'opposerait 
pas aux 1icenciements s'il estime que c'est 
absolument necessaire pour que 1 'entreprise 
survive. (CGC, Renault).
The CGC appeared to support the strategy of Georges 
Besse as it began to unfold over the first few months of 
1985. (The main thrust seemed to be a withdrawal into 
car manufacturing proper, with Renault's presence in
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other sectors scaled down or diluted by cooperative 
deals).
Ihe most prickly aspect of Renault strategy (because 
the CGT laid the blame for the losses and job reductions 
at its door) was the mondialisation of production — 
Renault's implantation as a manufacturer in other 
countries. The purchase of American Motors had been 
costly and it was making heavy'* losses in 1984—5 <s>; 
similarly, a new Mexican plant was facing serious 
difficulties around the time the job losses were being 
discussed in France.
The CGC supported the move into these countries and, 
indeed, saw them as vital for employment in France since 
French plants supplied parts, spares, expertise and so 
on. Abandoning the Mexican and US investments would 
recoup precisely nothing.
On the other hand, the CGC did feel the company 
ought to adapt its range more for each national market 
and it wanted a more adventurous export policy (one 
activist citing the neglect of the South African and 
Australian markets).
The CFDT also went along with the mondialisation 
policy, one of its leaders at Renault arguing that 60 
per cent of its output was sold or produced elsewhere 
and it was 'utopian' to think that could continue if 
Renault pulled out of certain countries.
The CGT, however, denounced what it described as a 
policy of ‘tout a 1 'etranger‘, its pamphlets and
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spokesmen constantly juxtaposing the 'gout-fre financier 
nord-americain and the scaling-down of investment 
projects at home. The CGT claimed that the US and 
Mexican operations were responsible -for a large slice of 
the 12-5 billion francs deficit recorded in 1984. They 
were particularly incensed that each year 300,000 
Renault vehicles produced abroad were reimported for 
sale on the French market.
CGT activists were at pains'to point out they were 
not totally against foreign production but the balance 
had gone awry and it was madness to weaken the national 
centre of the group. If the argument was raised that 
markets would be closed to the company if it did not 
invest in certain countries, the CGT declared that 
cooperative deals and planned production would be more 
to the advantage of the respective workforces and that 
such deals could be readily had with Third World and 
East European countries. (It fought hard against the 
decision to end the consultancy and engineering 
arrangements with the Russian firm Moskvitch in 1985).
A conference of European Renault workers in May 
1984, organised by the CG under CGT aegis (of the other 
French svndicats. only the CGC participated), resolved 
that the company should not build any new works that 
would be in competition with existing establishments.
There was a common desire to see new technology
introduced to improve skills, products and employment:
and a shorter working week with no loss of pay, indeed
an increase in purchasing power.
7/75
Again we see here the desire to -fix a kind of 
mini mum level of employment and production below which a 
company should not be allowed to fall, regardless of 
markets and other strategic considerations. The CGT 
secretary of the CG argued that Renault should use 
French parts produced by French workers even when others 
were clearly cheaper: France could not possibly supply 
more cheaply than some countries with 'underpaid 
labour', he said, but that was rib reason to shun French 
goods- It did not follow that 'cheapest' was best, for 
the workforce, the country or even the company- In 
short:
II faut passer au—dela de la rentabilite. (E)
As elsewhere, the CGT looked into 'cooperations 
franco-francaises'- particularly planning deals between 
Renault and suppliers or companies which might have 
something to offer in the technological field, such as 
CGE and Matra-
Activists denounced the preoccupation of the 
management (and the government) with financial criteria 
which dictated the closing down of capacity in France, 
often to the benefit of plants in other countries- The 
CGT claimed that Renault in France was operating at only 
70 per cent of capacity against 80 per cent at its 
Spanish, Portuguese and Belgian sites (Le Monde. 29th 
May 1985) and, in August 1985, CGT commandos' fought a 
running battle with riot police in an attempt to stop
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machinery being taken -from the Douai plant in northern 
France to a Spanish factory.
The CGT argued that, of the 12.5 billion francs 
lasses in 1985, 4.5 billion was the provision for
closure and redundancy—related costs; four billion was 
for interest and loan repayments; and the remainder was 
attributable to the 'non—qualite de la production'.
The CGT went on to demand that the 4.5 billions 
should be used to invest in salaries and increased 
production with the aim of gaining 40 per cent of the 
French car market and 50 per cent of the lorry trade 
(against levels at the time of 30 and 31 per cent 
respectively).
The debt burden should be lightened by a reduction 
in interest rate5<9>:
Les banques, en particulier celles qui 
sont nationalisees, n'ont pas a realiser des 
profits speculatifs sur les prets qu'elles 
consentent a notre entreprise. (CGT tract,
May 1985).
The state and the financial and insurance groups under 
its control had to be induced' to invest in the company 
(or reinvest the proceeds from car insurance sales, as 
the CGT put it).
More constructively, the CGT demanded the 
introduction of a 'livret-eparane auto' — a savings 
scheme with preferential interest rates designed for the
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-future car buyer. In common with the other unions, the 
CGI wanted to see VAf and petrol taxes reduced (but it 
also suggested a special tax on cars above llcv).
The costs incurred through poor quality parts and 
rushed workmanship could be reduced through training and 
investment in new equipment and integrating the 
manufacture of parts within the Renault group and French 
industry in general.
The CGT also called (naturally) for the company to 
help stimulate the market by paying higher wages, to the 
low paid in particular. (It argued that salaries could 
not be the cause of Renault's problems since the wage 
bill had dropped from 25 per cent of turnover in 1980 to 
20 per cent five years later).
The CGT said that its proposals were the result of 
discussions in the workshops and offices of each plant. 
However, the air of generality of these 'proposals' - 
really little more than a list of demands and arguments 
on the financial plane — suggest that they were more the 
work of officials. The presentation of the Analyses 
booklet to the press and indeed the contents show that 
the CGT was pitching its solutions at the industrial 
branch level and it strongly urged a renewal of the 
cooperation between Renault and Peugeot which had lapsed 
in the 1970s.
The CGT press (see especially the feature in La Vie 
Quvri ere. 2118, 1st April 1985) concentrated
predominantly on the financial and commercial aspects of
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the Renault affair. As regards the concrete conditions 
and organisation of production on the ground, the CGT 
offered only general analyses rather than proposals for 
change — arguments about quality, for example: 
retouches- or last minute 'rectifications', occupied 10 
per cent of the work force at Douai and cost six per 
cent of the g r o u p Js turnover, or one third of the 1984 
loss, according to the company's own figures, the CGT 
said- This situation could be remedied by an improvement 
in working conditions, slower assembly line speeds, more 
training and more workers.
From which point, the CGT argued that the problem at 
Renault was not sureffectifs but sous-effectifs.
Given the complexity and importance of the problem 
(the car industry provided work for 800,000 in all), the 
other unions also tended to situate their arguments at 
the branch level and many of the proposals fell within 
the political sphere — tax changes being the obvious 
ex amp1e .
However, the CFDT also stated that it would be 
making proposals in all the plants, at all levels 
though, judging from the examples given in its press, 
much depended on the energy of each section and the 
proposals' were of uneven quality.
Like the CGT — though it recognised the seriousness 
of the financial problems — it was unhappy that 
financial criteria overshadowed all else: in particular, 
it saw no good reason for certain of the closures
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announced by management and the ending of investment in 
such products of the future as ceramics and liquid 
crystal.
□ne example (in Syndicalisms Hebdo, 2065, 9th May 
1985) involved the scaling down of investment at the 
Maubeuge body works and the transfer of new models to 
Belgium. The CFDT agreed that on financial grounds, 
rationalisation was 'irrefutable' but industrially the 
plan was incoherent. Not only was investment maintained 
in the downstream' assembly department but Maubeuge, a 
plant capable of adapting rapidly to changes in design 
and specification, was located in an area where the 
plastics industry was strong and it was therefore 
ideally placed to research and produce the lightweight 
materials of the future.
The CFDT also rejected the fatalistic acceptance of 
Renault's reduced market share in France and, with the 
assistance of its consumers' association, ASSECQ, put 
forward proposals on making the commercial network more 
receptive to customers' needs. Many of the suggestions 
revolved around the idea of making after— sales service, 
repairs and the supply of parts more reliable and 
speedy. If a car needed repairs while still under 
guarantee, the CFDT suggested that the customer should 
have the use of a second-hand car while his own was off 
the road.
It also wanted the dealer networks to be able to 
supply 'customised' models to clients. The slogan used 
to put all this over was ' le client Roi and to show
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this was not mere rhetoric the CFDT urged negotiations 
between the unions, the company and consumer 
associations. (See FGMM-CFDT, Bulletin du Militant, 284, 
Apri1 1985).
On the question of manning, the CFDT, as noted 
above, put the stress on retraining with an early start 
to on-the—job training so that skills would keep pace 
with changes in technology. It also advocated, of 
course, a much reduced working 'week but, unlike the 
other syndicats. and in line with its national policy, 
it was prepared to accept regressive compensation - that 
is, more compensation for those at the bottom end of the 
pay scale.
One final indicator of the attitude of the unions 
towards the restructuring effort came with their 
reaction to the introduction of fonds salariaux: these 
are funds established by contributions from the workers' 
wage packets and destined, usually, for investments 
which are likely to create jobs. Two such funds were set 
up by Renault after the law of 29th December 1983 which 
authorised them. (See Liaisons Sociales C3 107, 14th 
February 1985; and Le Monde. 8th February 1985).
The first concerned the plant at Maubeuge already 
mentioned above: from November 1984, 87 per cent of the 
workforce voluntarily agreed to pay, each month for two 
years, either one per cent or 0.5 per cent of their wage 
into a special fund which would then be used for 
training. This use was suggested by the CFDT, the
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majority union at Maubeuge.
Ihe money was blocked for up to five years and 
repaid at a maximum of 10 per cent, with tax advantages.
A second agreement was reached in February 1985 for 
the whole of Renault. In this case, an obligatory 
one-off levy of 0.2 per cent was made on each wage 
packet, the company adding from its own funds twice the 
amount collected. Workers were able to make additional 
voluntary payments and the money-'was to be repayable at 
an advantageous interest rate after five years. It was 
to be used for direct job—related investment in the 
group.
Interestingly, the obligatory levy was to be offset 
by a bonus payment to each workers the idea seemed to 
be, then, to 'symbolically associate each worker with 
the company', as Le Monde of 8th February 1985 put it.
Perhaps for this reason both FO and the CGT were 
hostile to the scheme and with wages already hit in 
1984, neither union was favourable to the idea of a 
further fall in take—home pay, though the issue of the 
special bonus was sidestepped (L'Humanite. 7th February 
1985; FO Hebdo. 1825, 30th January 1985).
On the other hand, the CFDT, CGC and C F T C <10> were 
all enthusiastic - perhaps another small sign of the 
'realignment' on the French labour scene, with the 
pragmatists lining up against the archeos, the defenders 
of avantaqes acquis and unbending tradition.
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The haiiurs ot the Renault 'Social Plan' Talks
At the end of September 1984, a strike broke out at 
the Renault plant in Le Mans, spreading rapidly to the 
other major sites. The spark for the Le Mans walk—out 
was the news that workers would be obliged to take a 
week of their holiday between December 24th 1984 and 
January 1st 1985 in order, management said, to reduce 
the risk of short-time working latter in 1985.
Vet, underlying the discontent was uncertainty over 
employment at Renault. The Dalle report had been given a 
great deal of media publicity and rumours abounded that 
up to 15,000 jobs were to disappear in Renault, perhaps 
as many as 1,000 of them from Le Mans.
The CGT immediately supported the strikers and was 
joined by the CFDT, FQ and even some CGC activists 
(despite a denunciation of the dispute by CGC leader 
Paul Marchel1i ). However, it soon became clear, as the 
CGT sought to extend the strike to other Renault plants 
(and beyond), that it was aiming not only at management 
strategy for turning Renault round but the whole 
'modernisation' effort of the government and the 
consequent job loss in heavy manufacturing industry. 
(See, for example, Le Monde. 2nd October 1984: 'La CGT
defie le pouvoir').
Just as the strike appeared to be fading (management 
had offered a bonus, a small cost of living increase and 
the possibility of a revision, by local agreement, in 
the end—year holiday arrangements), Renault came up with
a radical scheme -for soaking up the overmanning in the 
company.
As originally outlined to the unions (Le Monde. 4th
October 1984), the plan was a means o-f substantially
reducing the company payroll without making anyone
redundant: better, workers would be offered the chance
%
of retraining for the car industry jobs of the future 
and Renault committed itself to finding new jobs, inside 
or outside the company, for any workers displaced.
In return, the company needed a more mobile
workforce — in occupational and geographical terms — and 
a recognition by the unions that productivity gains of 
seven per cent per annum were needed to catch up with 
the competition.
White collar and blue collar supervisory grades
would not be exempt from the pruning process: more than 
half the 15,300 projected job losses would come from
these groups (Liberation, 28th September 1984).
During subsequent negotiations, management said it 
would not formally open talks on a shorter working week 
though it was open to any ‘job and revenue sharing' 
proposals (Le Monde. 18th October 1984).
The draft agreement was ready at the beginning of 
December and is worth examining in some detail.
The first phase involved inviting candidates from 
throughout the group for early retirement and
compensated voluntary redundancy, with immigrants 
choosing to return 'home' receiving a minimum 120,000
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francs to cover relocation and retraining (aide a la 
reinsertion). Workers who remained could then move to 
fill a post which the company wanted to retain but which 
was now vacant.
In the second phase, each plant management would 
decide on the positions that were to disappear, the 
workers affected in each category and those the company 
proposed should be retrained or redeployed. (No—one over 
the age of 48 would be listed without his agreement and 
criteria such as seniority and family commitments would 
be taken into account). Each of these workers would then 
be offered a choice of alternative positions and 
training on full pay.
In the third phase, a revised and definitive list of 
excess' workers wouid be drawn ups if they now accepted 
a job offered to them, they entered the same procedure 
(mobility and retraining) as before. Those who, in the 
meantime had found a post outside the company would 
leave with a minimum redundancy payment of 50,000 
francs.
To those still unaccounted for, the company offered 
'training leave' (conges de conversion) of six months at 
70 per cent of salary with a choice of three jobs, 
inside or outside the group, at the end of it (and a 
bonus payment).
A joint union—management body was to be formed to 
oversee this whole procedure and it would try to find an 
'individual solution' for any worker who refused all the 
above options. Only if this, too, failed would
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redundancy proper be considered.
The disputes at Talbot and Citroen had led the 
government to set up the Centre de Formation 
Technoloqique Tor the retraining of car workers but the 
Renault plan, with the guarantees oT alternative 
employment for those displaced, was a radical 
innovation.
Unlike Kodak, for example, and even the industrial 
mission set up after the Chapelle Darblay dispute, 
Renault committed itself to finding secure jobs for 
those who could not be placed within the group. The 
agreement stipulated that these external positions would 
be paid at the standard rates for the branch and, 
furthermore, if a worker was made redundant from his new 
company, he would have a priority claim to any vacancies 
at Renault within the following twelve months.
The terms of this agreement were certainly 
unparalleled in France during the period under study, 
yet ultimately they were rejected by both the CGT and 
the CFDT.
A CGT official at Renault argued that at the end of 
the training process, a worker could still find himself 
'sans garantie de reintegration', yet, as the draft plan 
suggests, this would only be so in extreme cases.
The CGT's main reason for rejecting the accord lay 
beyond its details, in the failure to hold any talks 
with the unions on industrial strategy. For the CGT, if 
the strateqie de declin was not reversed, if the company 
did not commit itself to winning back lost market share
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in France and in Europe, then any 'social' plan would be 
inadequate as redundancies were bound to occur.
CGT activists also argued that many small firms were 
dependent on Renault orders: if Renault cut back, these
firms would also have to retrench. Where then would 
Renault workers be able to find employment?
(This refusal of Renault strategy as essentially 
deflationary was also the line of the PCF: through its 
economist, Philippe Herzog - and' its important cellule
in the company - it devoted a lot of time to Renault in
1984-5, advocating the creation of 25,000 jobs, mainly 
to improve the quality of cars at the factory gates but 
also for the launch of a new 'popular' model for which 
it saw a promising market).
In a nutshell, the CGT argument rejected the
'complacent acceptance of a reduced home market (one 
activist stated that the only real problem was 
austerity in Europe' — that is, it was all the fault of 
political choices made by the European governments) and 
called for increased production with a new emphasis on 
quality and reliability to win back market share.
Therefore, a priori. it was against any agreement 
which was based on the premise that overall employment
in Renault had to fall.
On the other hand, activists were not opposed to the
idea of mobility, as long as this was strictly
voluntary, and the retraining of the manual work force 
in the skills of the future was something the
Confederation as a whole was clamouring for.
Nonetheless, the CGT rejected the plan and activists 
stood by this decision even when it appeared to have 
contributed to the arrival of Georges Besse and looked, 
at best, a tactical error.
The other Confederations are consistent in their 
reading of political motivations into CGT actions but, 
in this case at least, there appears to be some 
justification. CFDT leaders at Renault contended that 
the PCF, having left the government coalition during the 
summer months, was steadily increasing its criticism of 
Socialist policies, painting a black picture of the 
state of manufacturing industry and the divisions being 
introduced into society. Signing the Renault accord 
would have contradicted this line at a time when the PCF 
and the CGT nationally were attempting to mobilise 
against government policy.
Furthermore, the CGT was at this time fiercely
attacking the patronat (and the other Confederations) 
over the flexibility talks: the issue there was also job 
security and the defence of traditional conditions and 
past acqui s . To be consistent, the CGT also had to come 
out against the loss of thousands of well paid and
hitherto secure jobs in what was its 'fortress' at
Renault.
The rejection of the social plan highlights an 
ambiguity in the CBT's new attitude to questions of 
management and industrial strategy. In refusing to be 
limited to immediate personnel issues, the CGT is 
pushing its right to be involved in broader matters
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which, in the final analysis, are determinants of 
employment.
But here, its reluctance to talk unless industrial 
policy was on the agenda proved counter-productive: its 
unwillingness to compromise with management — accept the 
guarantees enshrined in the social plan even if excluded 
from the industrial debate — seems to reflect a refusal 
to compromise with the capitalist system at large.
Previously, that refusal was epitomised by the 
politicisation of discontent, the amplification' of 
grievances onto a national, political stage. In the 
19SOs that strategy was no longer operationable: 
political change had taken place and even if the new 
government did not have the shape the CGT leadership 
would have liked, it had to be wary of contesting it, at 
least initially; furthermore, workers and activists were 
facing growing problems in the workplace and wanted 
action on the ground, immediate response to 
difficulties, not one-day protest strikes and the 
promise of better times when a 'sound' government was in 
pi ace.
In effect, the CGT's response was not to shelve its 
maximalism but to translate it into demands at the level 
of the firm and the industrial branch, demands which 
looked to be addressing concrete situations but which 
nonetheless were essentially transformative, needing 
systemic change rather than piecemeal concessions by 
management if they were to be met.
Equally illuminating was the split between CFDT
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activists and their leadership at both company and 
Federation level. For the accord was finally turned down 
by the CFDT, the principal reason given by the activists 
being the lack of any commitment on a shorter working 
week beyond the promise of talks in each plant. A 
reduction in the working week is, of course, a major 
plank in the employment policy of the Confederation but 
the pragmatism which it nowadays encourages in its 
activists was evidently lacking here.
CFDT leaders at Renault (one of whom described the 
accord as 'le plus positif, le plus originel de la 
France sur le plan social') also noted that their 
activists had underestimated the financial problems of 
the company, partly due to the reassuring noises made by 
management right up to the summer of 1984, partly due to 
their lack of training in economics.
Analysis of the leaflets distributed by the CFDT at 
Billancourt from December through the early months of 
1985 show that the CFDT grassroots held similar 
reservations to the CGT on several points: the suspicion 
that some workers would be coerced into 'volunteering' 
for redundancy or mobility; retraining seen, especially 
in the latter stage of the procedure, as '1'antichambre 
du depart de 1 'entreprise sous la contrainte'; the 
likelihood of redundancies despite the accord if the 
still mysterious recovery plan proved inadequate.
After a shake-up at the head of the car division in 
early 1984 and the subsequent postponement of the 
industrial plan, the CFDT, despite rejecting CGT
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proposals as fantasy and describing its calls for action 
as dictated by political considerations, came even 
closer to the CGT view:
II n'est pas possible de parler effectif, 
si 1 on ne connaTt pas le plan de 
redressement industriel de la Regie.. . (et) si 
la direction ne s'explique pas sur les moyens 
qu'elle entend mettre en oeuvre pour 
redresser la situation commercials (CFDT 
Renault, Notre Lutte, 973, 13th December 1984. (G)
Local activists also seemed to concentrate more on 
the 'conjunctural', that is, short—term economic reasons 
behind Renault's problems than the leadership with its 
stress on the structural changes in the market and car 
industry employment.
The decision of the activists (by a 55 per cent 
majority) to reject the Social Plan was slammed by their 
Federation which had viewed the Renault plan as a point 
of reference for other groups of workers in the car and 
engineering industry. What is more, it felt that the 
svndicat had squandered an opportunity to break the hold 
the CGT had on Renault management, of farcing managers 
to consult all the svndi cats, not just the CGT (FGliM 
Info, No.l, January 1985).
A similar division occurred within FO, with the 
Federation in favour of signing an the basis that there
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were serious guarantees -for the workforce and nothing 
better was achievable but some activists preferring the 
safety of the provisions in the Code du Travail and 
previous national agreements, even if the accord looked 
more favourable. The position was rather reversed with 
the CGC: local activists and leadership signed the
agreement against the wishes of the Confederation, which 
was worried that CGT influence on the joint bodies 
overseeing the scheme (fComites de Salut Public'!) would 
be to the disadvantage of its own membership.
As it happened, management decided to withdraw the 
offer after the rejection by the CGT and CFDT, before FO 
had reached a final decision. One FO activist (in favour 
of signing) felt that the agreement could still have 
worked with just the signatures of FO, the CGC and the 
CSL, especially as the CFDT svndicat was under pressure 
from the Federation to reverse its decision. He felt 
that management may have hastily withdrawn it due to 
second thoughts about the cost: it was, he said,
‘tellement magnifique que c'etait surement intenable'.
Perhaps the government, too, had a rethink. It was 
vital to avoid a damaging disupte in Renault but it was 
just as important to avoid giving such conspicuous 
privileges to a relatively small group of workers: 
already, Ministers had been at pains to point out there 
was no modele Renault that might be extended to all 
redundant workers (Le Monde. 9th October 1984).
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After the -failure of the talks, Renault went ahead 
anyway with some of the provisions though now there was 
no union check on progress (other than the statutory 
consultation with the CE, etc) through the joint bodies.
In the wake of the failure — perhaps a direct result 
of it — Bernard Hanon was replaced at the head of 
Renault by Georges Besse, who had pulled the chemicals 
and aluminium firm PUK into the black, partly through 
extensive job reductions (achieved without
redundancies).
Hanon was seen by some commenators as being the 
victim of the need to reconcile the unreconcilable: turn 
Renault around financially and commercially without 
provoking shock waves on the industrial relations front 
in a CGT bastion.
However, the Renault affair can more justifiably be 
seen as another demonstration of the CGT's fading 
influence. It sank the 'Social Plan' but it was unable 
to stem the flow of voluntary redundancies, early 
retirements and other job losses during 19B5 - none of 
them part of any formally announced redundancy package. 
Neither was it able to mobilise the workforce against 
management policy: the decision to hold a journee
d 'action on the politically significant date of May 10th 
1985 (four years after Mitterrand's presidential 
victory) was a signal failure.
Again, the mighty Renault svndicat was reduced to 
guerrilla action, supported by comrades in the SNCF and 
elsewhere, to attempt to stop machinery being tranferred
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from Francs to Spain and make a stand against the 
mondialisation strategy. As at SKF, this seemed merely 
to highlight its lack of real power, achieving little 
and alienating the workers whose basic insecurity 
remained.
NOTES
1. All the other Confederations were present in 
Renault - the CFDT was in -fact* the largest union at 
FI ins. However, the CGT had nearly hal-f the total number 
o-f votes cast in the ‘employee directors' election in 
1984 and was in a massive majority at the Billancourt 
plant I visited.
2. Details taken -from Liaisons Sociales. V403, 24th 
October 1984.
3. Details gathered from interviews with activists, 
union leaflets, press reports and the CGT Metalworkers' 
Federation <FGM> booklet, Analyses et Propositions pour 
1'Industrie Automobile. (1985).
4. Details gathered from interviews, union leaflets, 
and the national and union press.
5. See the pamphlet, Non a la crise de 1'automobile. 
prepared by the CGC Metalworkers' Federation in October 
1980. Comments on Dalle taken from interviews and the 
document, Positions CFE—CGC concernant le orojet de 
rapport sur l'industrie automobile franpaise. 8th 
November 1984.
6. Details from interviews and the analysis in FO 
Hebdo, 1816, 7th November 1984.
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7. Georges Besse had performed a similar 
rationalisation at PUK and was called in when Bernard 
Hanon was sacked after the failure of the 'social plan' 
negotiations.
Besse was gunned down in a Paris street at the end 
of 1986, apparently by members of the extreme Left 
group, Action Directe-
8- Renault finally sold out Chrysler in March 
1987.
9- Michelin had received such a loan at 4— 1/2 pet 
shortly before.
10. The CFTC had long advocated a similar scheme — 
the Livret d'Eoarane d 'Entreprise; see page 59 of the 
Report presented to its 42nd Congress, Marseilles, 
November—December 1984.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'The industrial future of France is tied in with 
the modernisation of its motor industry.' (Dupuis 
Report).
(B> 'FO has always maintained that it was not its 
vocation to manage firms and divert the industrial, 
financial and commercial decisions for which management 
has the competence and responsibility.' (FO, May 1985).
(C) 'FO has concluded that if there is overmanning, 
compromises must be found... We are obliged to put up 
with (new technology). If the blokes don't accept it,
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the people next door are going to do it and they'll end 
up with much mare competitive prices than us- (FO, 
Renault).
(D) 'Within reason, a CGC rep, in any capacity, 
would not oppose redundancies it he reckons they are 
absolutely necessary -for the company to survive- ' (CGC, 
Renault)-
■'v
(E) 'We have to look Further than mere 
profitability-' (CGT, Renault).
(F) 'The banks, particularly the nationalised ones, 
shouldn't be making speculative profits on the loans 
they give our company. ' (CGT, May 1985).
(G) 'It's impossible to talk about manning if you 
don't know the company's industrial recovery plan... 
(and) if management doesn't explain what means it 
intends to use to turn around the commercial situation.' 
(CFDT, Renault, 13th December 1984).
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(V) CONCLUSION
The sort of union action investigated above would 
not have taken place in France -fifteen years ago, -for 
the reasons, mainly political and ideological, outlined 
in the previous chapters. Before attempting to draw out 
the significance of this development, it is useful to 
highlight the main themes which emerge from the cases 
discussed and others taken from a review of the union 
press in the post— 1981 period.
'Economic Nationalism'
In each of the cases, there was a strong emphasis 
placed by most of the activists on French production and 
employment levels. If the CGI was most vociferous in its 
pro-French demands, activists in other Confederations 
were also concerned about the state of national industry 
- naturally, since their members are French and the 
workforce, for the most part, seeks to find employment 
within the nation's boundaries.
There was some awareness amongst the mi 1i tants that 
perhaps a European approach was needed to tackle certain 
problems though this limited recognition of shared 
international interests was rejected by the CGT.
For the CGT, the EEC is run for the benefit of the 
large multinationals and is no more than a tool of US 
imperialism (Analyses et Documents Economigues. No. 9, 
February 1984. Special issue on Europe). It refuses any
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rationalisation' plans emanating -from Brussels (on 
steel, paper, etc) and any corporate strategy which 
entails a reduction in French industrial capacity to the 
benefit of another country.
In the cases studied here, it is necessary to 
distinguish between two different problems: with Kodak 
and SKF, plant closures were the result of strategic 
choices made by group management — located, in this
•’V
instance, overseas, though the same problem would apply 
if the company were French.
The CGT maintained that the problems at Renault were 
also caused by management's decision to
'internationalise' its productive capacity which reduced 
the levels of investment in France. However, Renault 
also had to contend with massive losses as a group, as 
did Chapelle Darblay.
In both circumstances, however, the CGT refused to 
accept the choices made by management (or the 
government) since, in hitting French capacity, they were 
deemed against the interests of French workers. 
Employment in France (and the French trade balance, 
though this only because of the related direct effect on 
employment levels) was therefore the major priority of 
the CGT and all other considerations were secondary, 
including the financial problems of these companies, 
dismissed as 'problems of capitalism': such difficulties 
evaporated in the CGT plans, with finance to be had, as 
if by magic, from the groups concerned, or, as actually 
happened in the case of Chapelle Darblay, from central
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government.
Ironically, the CGT was the keenest of all the 
Confederations to sponsor contact with foreign workers 
in the various transnational groups. The aim appeared to 
be to gain agreement on ratios of production as they 
existed prior to group restructuring — to 'petrify' 
these quotas for ever more. Unless, one might surmise, 
the French units increased production which necessitated 
taking on more staff...
In several of the examples cited in a UGICT 
seminar41’ , production of materials or manufactures was 
retrieved from other countries to the benefit of French 
order books. There was no questioning of what this might 
mean for Italian workers, or South Korean workers, or 
American workers. The CGT calls for 'selective import 
controls' as necessary to protect weakened or fledgeling 
French producers: the question of their impact on
companies elsewhere is answered by vague suggestions 
that 'cooperation must replace competition' though how 
this will tackle the problem of finite or declining 
markets is evaded.
Perhaps that is not seen as a problem by the CGT: it 
remains 'productivist', meaning the continuous growth of 
industry and manufacturing is seen as a goal of 
developed societies and there is relatively little 
questioning, certainly in comparison with the CFDT, of 
what is actually produced (though more nowadays on how 
it is produced). The CGT states simply that there is a 
crying need for more hospitals, more bottom of the range
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cars, more coal, and the economics of this production 
are not really treated with any more attention than in 
the days when Bsnoit Frachon told the 30th Congress in 
1955:
Je ne sais pas combien couterait aux 
capitalistes la realisation des propositions 
contenues dans notre programme et je vous 
avoue que je ne m'en soucie pas beaucoup.
(Cited in Mouriaux, 1982: 182). (ft)
One CGT mi 1itant at SKF contended:
On a toujours fait des propositions - 
maintenant c'est chiffre, c'est plus s^rieux. (B)
However, one can only be suspicious of the reasoning 
behind certain figures — though, on the other hand, the 
presentation of company accounts and a fortiori the 
financial arguments made by companies for shutting 
certain plants often seem designed to prove that no 
'science' of economics exists.
Certainly, the CGT — and the other Confederations, 
too - had some success with public opinion when the 
narrow financial concerns of companies were contrasted 
with local needs and, if it concerned an international 
restructuring, national interests.
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The Increasing Concern with Local Specificities
This concern with local issues, the specificities of 
each company's situation, has been one of the 
distinguishing features of the 'proposition force' 
unionism which has developed in France- Though there was 
still a tendency to call for government action 
(reflation, protectionism, and so on), even the CGT 
activists in the firms visited had seen the need to 
research their company's operations and markets and make 
out a case for their proposals on the basis of their 
findings.
The tendency was even more clear-cut in the case of 
CFDT activists, partly as a result of the strategic 
choice made by their Confederation to concentrate on the 
concrete concerns of the workforce. In all cases, the 
provisions of the Auroux legislation encouraged the 
trend-
But there has also been some attempt to apprehend 
the wider local and regional problems associated with 
job loss. In fact, the CFDT has on occasions shifted the 
whole centre of its approach from the company initially 
concerned to the locality affected <=i> : this was the case 
in Rouen during the Chapelle Darblay dispute and in 
Lorraine where the steel industry's decline was halted 
only temporarily by the arrival of the Socialist 
government. In this latter case, the new approach of the 
union movement was epitomised by the (controversial) 
appointment of Jacques Chereque, CFDT number two and a
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-former Metalworkers leader, as Commissaire with the 
brie-f o-f stimulating reindustrialisation in Lorraine.
This shift of focus away from the national stage 
predated the arrival of Mitterrand (see Tozzi, 1982, for 
one reading of the influence of regionalism on the 
French labour movement) but was nurtured by the 
Socialists' decentralisation policy which gave more 
economic power to regional assemblies as well as by the 
revival of the comites locaux d'emploi (CLE), one 
positive result of the 'flexibility' negotiations.
These CLEs may help in overcoming one problem the 
unions have faced in their efforts at regional levels 
with whom should they be negotiating? There is perhaps 
no set prescription here, but the revived com!tes, made 
up of representatives of the unions, employers and local 
councils, are clearly appropriate vehicles for the 
airing of proposals.
The industrial mission set up at Rouen is a good 
example of another body set up with union, employer and 
political represenation, this time with a more specific 
brief than the C L E 's and with funding to research 
projects and coordinate investment plans.
The CFDT was the moving force behind the Rouen 
initiative and in another case, in Aquitaine, it played 
a formative role in setting up the innovative 
Association pour le developpement de 1 'eparqne et son 
investissement en Region Aquitaine. This tripartite body 
(local authorities, employers' organisations and all the 
other Confederations eventually took part) managed a
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savings -fund, 20 per cent of which could be invested in 
regional development and job—creating initiatives, the 
rest, by law, having to go into shares.
Such Funds Communs de Placement a Risques, endorsed 
by the CFDT and CGC in particular, are a clear example 
of the French unions' increasing willingness to make 
positive proposals at local and regional level, where in 
the past they might have only waged defensive battles, 
more often than not seeking political solutions and 
putting their energies into 'days of action' in Paris to 
press home their point.
The 'localisation' of union activity that this 
involves has surely been one of the more significant 
developments in French trade unionism since 1968 and one 
which seems likely to continue, given the uneven nature 
of job loss and the diversity of regional situations 
with which the unions will continue to be confronted.
Working Time*3 *
Surprisingly, only in the Renault case did the issue 
of working time have much prominence. Though all the 
Confederations want to see a reduction, the problems at 
the firms I visited were so grave that activists were 
obliged to come up with much more far—reaching proposals 
if they were to entertain any hopes of saving jobs.
Besides, the CGT and FO tend to see reduced working 
time as a straight demand aimed at improving the quality 
of working life: they are reluctant to accept changes in 
working patterns, which might have the apposite effect,
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and have denounced the CFDT for being prepared to 
bargain over variations to rotas and shifts in order to 
save jobs.
The example of the CGT syndi cat at 
Dassault—Bordeaux, which proposed the elimination of 
overtime to allow 200 workers to be taken on (La Vie 
Quvriere« 2109, 28th January 1985) stands out precisely
because the weekly Panorama des luttes is studded with 
reports of occupations and strikes over little mare than 
straight demands, labelled 'proposals', for jobs to be 
maintained.
The CFDT press, on the other hand, is full of 
examples of svndicats putting forward negotiable 
packages to offset or limit the extent of proposed job 
cuts, more often than not involving reduced working time 
with rearranged rotas and a different work organisation 
to allow machines to turn for longer. Crucially, the 
CFDT does not automatically demand full compensation for 
the hours not worked: both FO and the CGT demand that 
salaries be maintained in all cases.
The CFDT agreed with most of the studies produced in 
this field*'*’: reduced working time only has an impact 
on employment if unit costs are held down and production 
levels maintained. Thus, it emphasised the need for 
decentralised talks (as apposed to a national agreement 
or government edict) on the hours and organisation of 
work. (See especially Syndicalisme Hebdo. 2041, 22nd 
November 1984; and 1938, 11th November 1982).
This, of course, was the view of the CFDT leadership
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at Renault but there it was rejected by the activists 
who sought an immediate cut as the only way of tackling 
the employment problem brought about by (and both 
leadership and grassroots used the same term) excess 
hours worked'. Similarly, the CFDT activists at Kodak 
were against the idea of non—compensation far any 
reduction in hours, feeling that new technology was a 
net destroyer of jobs and therefore a shorter working 
week was vital to soak up some of the resultant 
'over-manning'.
All the same, ambitious examples of reduced working 
time or work sharing appeared regularly in the CFDT 
press:
i> New Technology and a fall in demand for car 
components threated 12S jobs at Lif-Hutchinson before 
the CFDT negotiated a deal under which 256 of the female 
production workers agreed to work 19.5 hours per week 
for 80 per cent of their salary, with a return to 
full-time work if orders picked up (Svndicalisme Hebdo, 
2010, 29th March 1984).
ii) At Arthur—Martin at Revin, 217 proposed job 
losses were reduced to 72 by cutting the working week to 
37 hours with only 90 per cent compensation. (Yet 
activists saw this as evidence that proposals such as 
the shorter working week, work sharing and early 
retirement were not a panacea for job loss, presumably 
because jobs and purchasing power would still be taken 
out of the economy as a result of such deals 
(Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2040, 15th November 1984).
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iii> A particularly interesting initiative came from 
the CFDT ; s electrical industry Federation, It argued 
that a reduction in the working week to 35 hours could 
create 6,000 jobs: funding would come, in equal amounts, 
from the government (called upon to subsidise jobs 
rather than pay dole), the utility company (from 
productivity gains) and the work force, if they opted 
not to take full compensation for the shorter working 
week (Syndicalisme Hebdo, 2036, 18th October 1984)- 
Attempts were made to publicise the plan through fetes 
and other forms of non—industrial action during 1984 and 
1985 but they made little impression on the authorities.
Contrast the types of initiative sponsored in the 
name of 'solidarity' by the CGT. In addition to the 
’franco-fran^ais ventures recorded in the case studies, 
the following examples, taken from the Liaisons Sociales 
report of the UGICT seminar mentioned above (Document 
R621 of 27th July 1983), give an idea of the CGT line: 
thus, a group of hospital workers told how they got 
their managers to buy Renault rather than Italian 
vehicles; and workers at the Dunkirk shipyards managed 
to force a rethink on an order for a container vessel 
which had looked like going to Sweden or South Korea but 
was finally given to a state company; the same workers 
then initiated studies with activists in local firms on 
the possibility of supplying fittings previously only 
available from abroad.
The CGT refuses to be constrained by what others 
present as objective' market factors: it seeks to alter
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the shape of the market environment and enlarge the 
possibilities for French companies, with the terms and 
conditions of the workforce remaining a fixed factor. 
The CFDT, on the other hand, frequently tries to seek 
an accomodation with the market which may require some 
sacrifice on the part of those in employment in order to 
help those who are, or might soon be, without it.
FO, for its part, pushed the shorter working week, 
especially through the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), partly as a job-creating measure 
but also, as several speakers at its 1984 Congress 
pointed out, simply as a long-standing demand to improve 
conditions for those in employment (FO, 1985: 285—295). 
Its activists invariably followed the Confederation line 
that a cut in hours without full compensation was 
self-defeating since it would cut salaries, consumption 
and therefore jobs — a position identical to that of the 
CGT.
The CGC was reticent on this point: it disliked the 
CFDT formula (full compensation only for those on the 
lowest salaries) because it sought to maintain 
differentials but, on the other hand, it was trying to 
cultivate a modernist and non-dogmatic image. On the 
whole, CGC activists placed more stress on retraining 
and aspects of flexibility other than work time.
New Criteria and Market Forces
A central issue in all the case studies was the very 
criteria which companies used to justify their
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restructuring plans. Inevitably, given the nature of 
capitalist companies which need to produce a surplus 
from their trading activities, these were predominantly 
financial, supported by data of an industrial and 
commercial nature. It is interesting, then, that the CGT 
usually based its counter-attack on the nature of these 
criteria whereas the CFDT, while professing a desire to 
move beyond the confines of capitalist structures, 
nonetheless accepted the reality of the economic 
constraints companies were working under and sought to 
find alternative solutions taking these into account. 
This 'realism was summed up by a national official:
II s'agit pas de tromper les 
travai11eurs. Si elle (1 entreprise) est 
viable, elle est viable dans le cadre actuel. (C)
□f course, this 'realism' often caused dissent at 
local level, some workers refusing to see why they 
should be the scapegoats for managerial errors or suffer 
— even in the name of 'new solidarity' — the effects of 
economic contingencies and the chance workings of market 
forces. Thus, the local CFDT leadership met resistance 
to its proposals from its own members at Chapelle 
Darblay while Renault members incurred the wrath of 
their Metalworkers Federation by rejecting the proposed 
'social plan' which might have set a precedent for the 
whole industry.
The CFDT section at Kodak was scathing about its
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Confederation 75 'realism'
Pour nous, ce n est pas le syndicalisme­
ll y a a la fois une perte d'emplois et une 
perte du pauvoir d achat- pa reduit le rfille 
du syndicalisme a neant. (D)
FO re-fused to be drawn into the debate about 
criteria or alternatives: it never questioned managerial 
competence (nous, on n ‘a pas d'elements pour juger' - 
FO, Renault) unless there were obvious irreguiarities 
and, more than the two other leading Confederations, it 
usually followed rather than initiated action by the 
Workforce-
Accepting to work within the market economy yet 
still concerned to change the rules under which this 
economy evolved, the CFDT had to demonstrate that its 
plans were viable- Often, an infusion of investment 
funds is required — and here, too, the CFDT has 
demonstrated its belief that the union can make solid 
improvements in the workers' interests now, under the 
capitalist system, and not only in some hypothetical, 
more politically congenial future. Hence its promotion 
of the industrial mission at Rouen, its support for 
fonds salariaux at Renault and elsewhere and its 
initiative in Aquitaine mentioned above. Svndicalisme 
Hebdo (No. 2035, 11th October 19S4, p.5) was not 
understating the significance of the latter when it 
described it as:
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...Lin jaion de plus vers 1 'elaboration de 
reponses nouveiles aux defis de la crise. Une 
de ces initiatives qui entrainent le 
mouvement syndical dans une veritable 
revolution culturelle en l'obligeant a sortir 
d'un rftle purement d^fensif. (E)
By its action to move savings in a direction that 
conventional fund managers might not normally take, the 
CFDT would argue that here was an example of working 
within capitalism while positively changing its
orientations, moving them in a direction more favourable
to labour.
Opponents of this general line (the CGT but also 
internal dissidents) might perhaps criticise the CFDT 
with the standard argument against reformism: it merely 
perpetuates the system, leaving the same people in real 
control, under the guise of 'softening it up'.
The gap between a 'reformist' and a 'revolutionary' 
stance is never clear cut, however, and sometimes the 
CGT argues that it, too, is gradually taking over areas
previously under the control of capital, though it still
seems to situate this in the context of an on—going 
attempt to overthrow the system:
S'il y a crise du modele capitaliste, 
crise de la logique capitaliste, cela 
implique pour le syndicat des responsabi1ites
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nouvelles. II s'agit en queique sorts - et 
c'est le sens de 1 'action que mine la CGT - 
de s'approprier petit a petit des terrains 
qui etaient jusqu'a present des terrains 
reserves au patronat. Ce sont les terrains de 
la gestion, de 1 entreprise, des choix de 
production, de la gestion de 1 'economie, des 
finalites de la production (CRMSI, 19S4: 76). (F)
The CGT proposals in the case studies and elsewhere 
were often couched in terms critical of the system as a 
whole — of the cutbacks decided on purely financial 
grounds which cannot be justified in terms of needs, of 
the waste - financial, technical, human — inherent in a 
system driven by the search for profit.
Its proposals, therefore, involve not so much a
package aimed at aiding the recovery of a firm in
difficulty as an indictment of the system which got the 
workers into such a situation. The details of its plans
are often directly opposed to the programme advocated by
management whereas the CFDT takes the environment into 
account and seeks to inflect rather than 'derail ' 
conventional initiatives. Perhaps the most telling 
distinction between the two approaches is that CFDT 
plans are usually negotiable under the current rules of 
the game: CGT proposals may be coherent in their own
terms but more often than not they are difficult to 
negotiate around and frequently this is due to the 
financial element.
7/111
SKF, -for example, was called upon to use significant 
amounts of group investment money, destined to
rationalise (that is, pare back) French operations, to 
actually build up French productive capacity and 
reprieve the Ivry site. At the UGICT conference referred 
to earlier, there was a similar plan which required an
infusion of funds into a chlorine company, Jarrie, by
F'UK which part-owned it; at Kodak, too, the plans put 
forward by the CGT and CFDT involved the use of
investment funds in ways directly opposed to those laid 
down in company strategies, although here both svndi cats 
had coherent industrial proposals which they claimed 
were profitable.
That statement gives rise to two reflections which 
will need to be taken further in the concluding remarks: 
first, as with the criticism of CFDT ventures in general
that was noted above, if the criteria for the success or
'realism' of union proposals are the capitalist ones of 
profitability, how radical is this type of union 
approach and how far can such initiatives be said to 
carry within them the seeds of a new order? The
suspicion remains that the CFDT is downgrading its 
ambitions to the extent that most of its 'industrial' 
proposals are now little more than innovations in the 
restricted field of personnel policy, the major policy 
decisions still remaining with the managers.
Secondly, if even the ostensibly profitable
suggestions are rebuffed by companies (the example of 
the Lucas plan in the UK is instructive here), how
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successful are more radical proposals, those seeking to 
transform capitalist structures, likely to be, this side 
of a revolutionary situation?
Although often backed up with expert analysis of a 
company's operations, the C G T 's proposals tend to be 
more simplistic, more direct than the CFDT's. If a whole 
group is in difficulty (Creusot-Loire, the steel groups, 
Technip), then direct state subsidy is demanded- The 
total volume of funding that might be required under 
such circumstances is barely considereds at the limit, 
the CGT will argue that enough money is being wasted on 
'speculationr and dividend payments to the rich to fund 
industrial modernisation and retraining without the need 
for cutbacks in employment (see, for example, just about 
every editorial by Gerard Alezard in the CGT's quarterly 
Analyses et Documents Economiques).
The contribution of CGT Commission Executive member 
Oswald Calvetti to a June 30th 1983 press conference on 
Chapelle Darblay (contained in the CGT dossier on the 
Plan Franco-franpais) is a striking example of this
approach which moves in a seamless way from global
economic statistics to proposals on specific firms. 
Thus, beginning with the revelation that only 54 per 
cent of profits were (directly) reinvested in industry 
in 1982, Calvetti moves on to argue that money certainly 
exists to revive industry and link economic and social 
progress and that if the notion of profitability for its 
own pockets advocated by the patronat is disavowed, then
the CGT's aim of investing for jobs will be seen as both
feasible and sound.
Eventually, Chapelle Darblay was saved by a massive 
infusion of government funding. At a financial level, 
disregarding for a moment the argument that paper is a 
strategic commodity, necessary for education, 
communication and so on and therefore vital for national 
independence, it is hard not to see this as a classic 
case of a government forced into, the heavy subsidisation 
of a 'lame duck' under strong union and regional 
pressure <=s> .
Given the level of funding allowed here, the notion 
of competitiveness seems completely absent (as rival 
French producers and Brussels complained) and one 
activist at Chapelle Darblay said the outcome 
demonstrated that 'une autre lecture de la crise' was 
possible. However, upon investigation, that outcome 
looks to have been more the result of political 
contingencies and unusually strong rapports de force 
than any new consensus or even any new approach to the 
problem of industrial restructuring and, these 
conditions rarely being met elsewhere, Chapelle Darblay 
can hardly be set up as a counter-model.
CGT activists believed they were being positive and 
realistic in their proposals and it is difficult to 
dispute the sincerity of their intentions although the 
comments of some suggested they were aware their 
proposals were unlikely to be realised even under a Left 
government:
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On sait tr^s bien, on ss fait pas 
d illusions. On salt aujourd'hui q u 'on n a 
pas change fondamentalement de regime, de 
systems social, politique- Done les chases 
continuent comme avant. On se fait pas 
d ‘illusions sur ce qu'on pourrait nous donner 
a nous mais on sait qu'il faudra 1 'arracher 
(CGT, Kodak). <G>
The resignation of this activist helps explain one 
feature of practically all the CGT 'Plans' I came
across. Even if a unit or perhaps the whole plant of a 
transnational group was indisputably loss-making, the 
plans still called for cross—subsidies within a group.
Of course, there is a problem with transfer pricing and 
other practices which make it difficult to know just 
what part of an industrial group is making a profit or a 
loss: the point is that, for the CGT, there is always 
money available. Its proposals often go way beyond the 
criticism of such 'sharp practices' and, especially in 
their presentation if not in the talks which may come
about, put the blame on the very principles of the
capitalist system - production for profit, the payment 
of dividends, the need for companies to make operating 
surpluses - in such a way as to make them very difficult 
to bargain over.
This is made very clear in the vocabulary of CGT 
activists and pamphlets where the financial arguments 
share an undertone of moral outrage.
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As a result, one might say that even if the CGT has 
begun to address questions o-f industry and finance in 
the current system, it does not always address them in 
an 4operationable4 way: it seems that its plans are 
meant not to be bargained over so much as to mobilise 
the workforce. Underlying each is an anti—capitalist 
critique which may be couched in economic terms but 
which, for all that, in present circumstances, has a 
largely political and doctrinal function.
The Patronat and Union Proposals
A central test of the CFD T 's post-1978 line was 
whether the employers would respond positively, whether 
its 'realistic' unionism would be met by a willingness 
to allow the unions a say in how their members 1ived 
their working lives. This, of course, was encouraged by 
Jean Auroux's ideas on "citizenship4 at work in the 
industrial relations legislation largely inspired by the 
trade unions.
However, the organised patronat seems to have 
responded to the CFDT recentraqe and the Auroux laws 
only by accentuating the previous policy of 
individualising workplace relations, with the union role 
kept to a minimum. Certainly, for all the efforts of 
syndicats. Federations and other union bodies, there has 
been no opening-up of industrial strategy to the unions, 
either in private or public sector companies.
□f the companies I studied, SKF and Kodak bluntly 
refused any discussion of their industrial strategy;
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Chapelle Darblay invited comments on the second recovery 
plan after industrial action had scuppered the first but 
still no real policy-making role for the unions; and 
Renault offered the unions an important role in its 
personnel policy but drew the line on any involvement in 
formulating industrial strategy on which long-term job 
prospects hinged.
Activists have not given up in the face of such 
refusals: they have continued their attempt to chip away 
at 'management prerogative'.
But the unions' failure could have wide—reaching 
implications. In the short-term, they fail to stem the 
tide of job losses and continue to lose members: indeed,
they may have exacerbated this process by alienating 
those workers at the grassroots who were concerned, 
naturally enough, only with their own livelihood and 
backed more orthodox union demands and action. In the 
longer term, the union's failure to impose their own 
reading of the crisis leaves the way clear for 
employers, and governments, to impose their solutions 
which, in terms of the quantity and quality of jobs 
available, may not be in the interests of the nation's 
workforce.
Economic Imperatives and Social Needs
This leads to a more serious question about 
'proposition force' unionism in general: just how far is 
it possible to truly integrate social, industrial and 
financial considerations?
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The Socialists clearly decided that it was not 
passible when giving the go-ahead for the 
'modernisation' of traditional industries such as 
shipbuilding from early 1984. The undivided aim became 
financial soundness and the employment problem was
tackled as an ancillary matter. It may" be that the
French socialist government was more humane and more 
concerned about the impact of mass unemployment than
governments in some other countries but its treatment of 
the problem was highly orthodox, from its early effort 
at job creation in the state sector to its support for 
the return home of immigrant workers.
Durand (in Casassus et a l , 1984) argues that
'social' considerations were integrated into the first 
Steel Plan drawn up by the Socialists in 1982. Yet this 
was a wholly neqati ve integration in that the 
authorities were concerned mainly to defuse in advance 
the violence always likely to well up in the militant 
regions such as Lorraine. As at Chapelle Darblay, job 
numbers were merely juggled to take into account the 
rapports de force. The plans were then deemed feasible 
on capitalist criteria, with massive initial subsidies, 
and the jobs 'reprieved' did not reflect any changed 
view on, for example, what efficiency meant.
One official of UGICT, the CGT cadres arm, told me 
she wanted her members to be 'associes a la conception 
(de la nouvelle technologie), maltriser les processus 
des son Elaboration', not simply 'gerer ce qui est mis 
en pi ace '. (H).
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Yet there was no real debate on the conception of 
technology - putting human skills, capacities and needs 
at the heart of the problem and designing technology 
around that - during this period. In fact, the unions 
were probably even lagging behind the position reached 
by the CFDT in the late 1970s, epitomised by its 
arguments in Les D£gats du Progress les travailleurs 
face au changement technigue (1977>-
In the same way, the view of the CGT (at Renault and 
SKF) that more workers should be hired and the accent 
put on quality ran counter to the cost-cutting logic of 
the companies, even though better quality was also 
stated to be a company aim.
There was little, if anything, from any of the 
unions on new products or 'socially useful production' 
which might not only soak up unemployment but also 
prepare the ground for the new type of development that 
both the CGT and CFDT loudly, but vaguely, call for. 
What is more, as one commentator has noted, the notion 
of 'social need' as expressed by unions can be rather 
artificial, constructed sometimes only to support 
employment proposals (Alain Lipietz in CRMSI, 1984: 72).
To sum up, the CFDT seemed to pitch its proposals on 
fairly traditional capitalist terrain, at least as 
regards its industrial content, while seeking a more 
acceptable social package which essentially only pushes 
back the limits of unbridled capitalism a bit further 
than they have already gone under pressure from unions
7/119
and progressive governments over the last century.
The CG i , on the other hand, was perhaps more intent 
on transforming the bases under which companies operate 
and thereby putting workers at the heart of industrial 
development, but it had little chance of succeeding 
under current socio-economic arrangements and that was 
probably understood by its leadership.
These observations will be enlarged in the 
penultimate chapter which sums up the changes and 
continuities in French trade unionism in the 1980s. 
Before that, there is a discussion of the important 
'flexibility' negotiations which took place at the end 
of 1984 between the leaders of the employers' and 
workers Confederations and in which some of the themes 
which emerged from the case studies were given an airing 
on a national stage.
NOTES
1. Reported in Liaisons Sociales. Document R621, 
27th July 1983.
2. The CFDT (and the other Confederations, too) use 
the concept of the bassin. which might be translated as 
the 'travel to work area'. (See, for example, Pierre 
Heritier, CFDT national officer in charge of economic 
policy, in Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2000, 19th January 1984).
3. See Autrand (1987) for a study of union strategy- 
on working time.
4. See the studies of INSEE and the Ministere des
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Affaires Sociaies, as reported in Liaisons Sociales. 
R637, 26th September 19S4.
5- The subsidy was ended by the new Right-wing 
government in 1986 and denounced as a misuse of public 
funds- (Le Monde, 3rd June 1986).
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'I don't know how much the proposals in our 
programme would cost the capitalists and I have to admit 
I'm not that bothered. ' (Mouriaux, 1982: 182).
<B) 'We've always put forward proposals but now 
there's figures and things, it's more serious.' <CGT, 
SKF) .
(C) 'It's no good trying to deceive the workers. If 
a firm is viable, it's viable within the current 
system.’ (CFDT national officer).
(D) 'For us, it's not trade unionism. You've got a 
loss of jobs and a loss of purchasing power. That 
reduces the role of the union to zero.' (CFDT Kodak).
(E) '... another landmark on the way to defining new 
answers to the recession. One of those initiatives which 
lead the union movement into a true cultural revolution, 
making it move beyond a purely defensive role.' 
(Svndicalisme Hebdo. 2035, 11th October 1984).
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(F) 'If there's a crisis of the capitalist model, of 
capitalist logic, that implies new responsibilities for 
the union- In a way, it is a question of - and this is 
the direction the CGT is moving in — gradually taking 
over areas which up till now were the preserve of the 
bosses- These are the fields of management, the company, 
decisions on production, the management of the economy, 
the aims of production.' (CGT, in CRMSI, 1984: 76).
<G) 'We know all that, we're not under any 
illusions- We know now that we haven't fundamentally 
changed the regime, the social and political system.-- 
So things go on as before. We've got no illusions about 
what we might get — but we do know that we'll have to 
fight for it. ' (CGT, Kodak).
(H) '...associated with the conception (of new
technology), in charge of the procedure of elaborating 
it, not simply "managing what has been installed".' 
(UGICT official).
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8. THE NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON FLEXIBILITY
As unemployment kept on rising, moving through two 
million in 1982, and the long-awaited recovery in the US 
and other western economies -failed to materialise, the 
Left government in France was forced into a series of 
retreats.
The decision to concentrate on restoring the 
financial health of the nationalised industries was the 
most visible sign of the change of tack, not least 
because it threatened to add directly to the numbers out 
of work. Yet the about-turn on conditions of employment 
— the abandonment of Auroux‘s vision of ‘reconstituting 
the workplace community' - was perhaps more symbolic of 
the change of direction, epitomising the transformation 
of the Socialist Party into something more akin to a 
typical European Social Democratic grouping, 
concentrating on the socially equitable management of 
the economy rather than its transformation <A>.
In the process, the question of manpower flexibility 
split the labour movement, dividing those who rejected 
any loosening of legal safeguards from those who were 
prepared to risk some concessions in the belief that 
this would aid the development of social dialogue, 
paving the way for a wider spread of employment 
opportunities and perhaps giving the unions more 
credibility in this field.
By 1983, the Employers were putting pressure — both
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publicly and more discreetly through renewed informal 
contacts - on the government to adapt the employment 
legislation and ordonnances introduced during its first 
year in office. (The CNPF had probably realised that 
its early onslaught on Auraux. had been 
counter-productive, especially when the new laws failed 
to fetter French managers in the way the employers'
organisations had hyperbolical!'/ predicted) .
At the same time, the unions were calling for talks 
on new technology and working hours. The employers would 
only agree to negotiate if their own demands were also 
put on the agenda.
fhe government preferred to see areas of agreement 
actively drawn up by the social partners rather than 
court further unpopularity from one side or the other by 
imposing fresh legislation and so the flexibility
negotiations - aimed at revising a centre-piece of its 
early reforms - went ahead with its blessing.
The talks began in May 1984 but most of the 
significant action occurred in the last quarter of that 
year amidst great media interest. A 'protocol' finally 
emerged in the early hours of Sunday 16th December. (The 
protocol is reproduced in Droit Social. 2, 1985).
The Flexibility' Protocpl
The protocol began with a preamble in which the
parties asserted their common will to safeguard jobs,
described as one of their priorities. Agreement between 
employers and workers organisations was seen as the
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best way of responding to problems thrown up by 
technologicai change, international competition and the 
economic recession.
Section One dealt with the introduction of new 
technology, providing for negotiations in.the industrial 
branches and in firms to discuss the likely impact on 
jobs, skills, salaries, conditions and training 
requirements. Henceforth, a plan d'adaptation would be 
negotiated 'upstream' of the plan social which is 
required under the terms of the 1969 national agreement 
on job security and subsequent legislation in the event 
of planned redundancies.
Section Two related to working time - in particular 
the possibility of more flexible rotas and the further 
extension of exemptions from legal restrictions already 
allowed by the Code du Travail under certain 
circumstances. The issue of working hours calculated on 
an annual basis was specifically mentioned. No new 
reduction in work time was explicitly envisaged: indeed, 
the final clause of this section stressed the need to 
master costs and highlighted the danger of any reduction 
eating up productivity gains which might be better 
allocated to investment or used to hold down prices.
Section Three dealt with alterations to the 
procedures employers had to follow in making 
redundancies. It represented a compromise between 
existing delays and the employers' call for outright 
elimination of the Labour Inspectors' approval though 
the employers' position was reaffirmed in an extract
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-from the minutes of the negotiations which was appended 
to the -final Protocol.
The need for a plan social would have been
restricted under the agreement to those firms where more
than ten redundancies were announced in any thirty—day 
period, though any plan would now have to explore the 
possibility of reducing job loss through a reduction in 
working hours and external as well as internal 
transfers.
Section Four would have introduced delays before the 
election of workplace representatives when legal 
thresholds were reached, restricted the categories of 
workers taken into account for the calculations and
limited the number of meetings. One clause indicated
that negotiations might be possible on adapting 
representation in smaller firms - a very tentative 
acknowledgement of the CFDT's support for deleoues
i nter—entrepri se or commi ssi ons_______paritaires
professi onnel1es.
This section also adapted the conditions of payment 
of certain para-fiscal contributions relating to public 
transport and so on.
Section Five would have expanded the range of cases 
in which temporary and contract workers could be 
employed and the passible length of their employment. 
(The Socialists had introduced restrictions in this area 
in February and March 19S2 in order to prevent abuses 
they saw as leading to a growing precarisatian. or 
destabilisation, of employment conditions. The
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□rdonnanties of the period strengthened t.he rights of 
temporary and part—time workers).
It is immediately clear that this list reflected the 
agenda of the employers" side in the negotiations and 
was a de facto acceptance that a major bar to 
recruitment was the rigidity of labour law — the costs 
inflicted on the employer by the requirement to have 
worker representatives with paid time off once a certain 
total of employees was reached, the inability to make 
redundancies when required, the restrictions on the 
hiring of short term labour, and so on.
During the negotiations the CNPF introduced, with 
something of a fanfare, the idea of emplois nouveaux a 
contraintes al1eqees (ENCA): in return for the
elimination of the Labour Inspectorate's approval of 
redundancies and the non—inclusion of new recruits into 
"threshold" calculations, the CNPF said it could 
guarantee the creation of 471,000 new jobs (Le Monde, 
5th July 1984). This claim convinced few and fed 
suspicions that the CNPF was more concerned with scoring 
ideological paints than easing unemployment. The 
proposal was eventually shelved, in the form that it was 
initially presented, but the final protocol was very 
much in the same spirit.
This aggressive CNPF stance was perhaps the 
principal reason why the CST, throughout the period of 
negotiation, showed itself hostile to the venture. In
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its conception of union—empioyer relations, the union 
makes demands of the employer. Here, the reverse was 
happening: the employers were setting out their own 
revendications and, what is more, these entailed the 
abandonment of many of the protections.. and guarantees 
won by the workers over the preceding fifty years.
Like the CNPF, the CGT saw the protocol as an 
indivisible whole and was therefore ill-disposed to 
highlight particular sections which might seem 
favourable to the workers. Thus, negotiations ahead of 
the introduction of new technology did not impress the 
CGT because the flexibility in the use of labour that 
the employers wanted to accompany the new techniques was 
already won in the remaining clauses.
For the CGT, the only novelty in the current crisis 
is that technology is evolving more rapidly than ever 
before; there has been a qualitative leap with 
information technology and microelectronics, which 
necessitates a quicker return on investments, a greater 
facility to adapt working time (and working lives) to 
machines and the ability to shed 'excess' staff as 
financial requirements dictate.
The CGT was not opposed to change, even less to the 
introduction of new techniques, but it saw in the 
employers' offensive a mystification of technalogical 
advance: it regarded this as a social process and the
benefits therefore ought to devolve to society as a 
whole, with the aim of providing stable, interesting, 
skilled jobs for all and using technology to fulfil
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social need. This would only be possible if the workers 
had some control over both the use and the concepti on of 
technology: the Protocol only envisaged negotiations 
over its consequences (conditions, training and so on) 
after it had been developed according to capitalist 
requirements.
The CGT sought here, as elsewhere, to link economic 
efficiency and social progress. Its own concept of
'flexibility' involved mobility between classifications 
and even between firms but with a guarantee of 
employment for each worker. (The C G T 's own proposals, 
not discussed as such, are contained in Le Peuple. 1182, 
15th November 1984). In fact, clause 3.1.1 of the 
Protocol moved in this direction with the requirement
that employers canvass for replacement jobs in other
firms in their 'social plans' ahead of redundancies,
while clause 1.1 stated firmly:
Tous les efforts doivent tendre a ce que 
les mutations technolagiques ne soient pas 
seulement subies mais constituent un des 
elements du progres social. (A)
The absence of any concrete advances in the Protocol 
obviously led the CGT to be suspicious of such pious 
pronouncements, but even more crucially, it deplored the 
whole idea of negotiating over avantaqes acquis, gains 
won in the past which were not to be bargained over, 
whatever the changed circumstances.
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In this respect, it took a quite different tack to 
that of the CFDT for whom the form of the negotiations 
was as important — and as welcome — as the actual 
content of the Protocol and whose Bureau National 
initially recommended signature. As noted in Chapter 
Three, it has banked a great deal on negotiating 
concrete advances for the workers and has been prepared 
in recent years to accept some 'give and take' 
(donnant-donnant). Much has hinged on the response of 
the employers and a national protocol signed by the 
CNPF, CGPME and four of the five major Confedertions 
would, in its view, have breathed fresh life into the 
bargaining process, especially in the area of working 
time which is so central to the CFDT's programme for 
jobs and for better conditions.
Furthermore, the CFDT was prepared to take a gamble 
(the word pari was used by an official) on the Protocol 
leading to employment opportunities, through a 'social 
dynamic' unleashed by the negotiations as much as by any 
single mechanism such as the shorter working week. The 
premise of the Confederation leadership is that 'la pire 
des precarites', the worst labour market position by 
far, is being in the dole queue. Some of the leaders go 
even further, arguing that people nowadays actively seek 
variable working patterns and may even choose to work, 
say, for just eight or nine months in a year. From here, 
the acceptance of looser legislation covering temporary 
and contract work is not so shocking.
Another positive aspect for the CFDT was the
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passible inroad allowed into representation in the 
smaller firms which currently consititute a desert far 
all the Confederations.
The projected discussions over new technology were 
also seen as positive, as was the requirement to look at 
a reduction in working time and external job 
opportuneties ahead of any redundancies- Against this, 
the clause referring to the need' to master costs in the 
section on working time, even if it was an improvement 
on the initial CNPF wording, would surely have had a 
blocking effect in plant level talks.
Force Quvriere, like the CFDT, was looking for a 
relaunch of collective negotiations to emerge from these 
discussions. A majority of the FO negotiators was also 
in favour of signing until it became clear that a 
sizeable number of FO mi 1itants and Federations were 
opposed.
The main objection was the assault on legislative 
safegaurds and the broader questioning of acquis which 
FD is as reluctant to bargain over as the CGT:
Cela touche au code du travail. Nos 
militants n 'en veulent pas. C*est 
theologique. Je ne peux pas passer par—dessus 
la tete des militants. Nous sommes une 
organisation democratique. (Andre Bergeron in 
Le Monde. 22nd December 1984). (B)
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Recalling his words to the November 1984 Conference, 
Bergeron wrote in FQJjsbda, No. 1822, 9th January 1985:
... si nous etions ouverts a certaines 
'mises a jour', nous n'entendions pas pour 
autant laisser passer par—dessus bord la 
reglementation du travail- (C)
That Conference was fresh in the mi 1itants' minds 
and it is surprising that signing was even considered 
given some of the statements made there. Bergeron 
himself had complained that the employers were 'mounting 
an assault on social conquests' and in the important 
Resolution Sociale. FO denounced 'les projets du 
patronat qui visent a liberer les empioyeurs de toutes 
contraintes legales ou conventionneiles relatives £ la 
faculte d 'embaucher ou de iicencier '. (D)
As regards the fifth section of the protocol 
relating to contract, temporary and part-time work, the 
Conference could not have been more explicit:
A ce sujet, la CGT-FO considlre que les 
dispositions legales et reglementaires 
existantes constituent, pour les salaries, 
une protection minimale qui ne saurait etre 
remise en question. (Resolution Sociale). (E)
Enormous deference is shown to Andr^ Bergeron by FO 
mi 1itants yet even he — and he apparently favoured
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signature despite the self — congratulatory tones of his 
FQ Hebdo piece of 9th January 1935 after the 
Confederation eventually refused — was unable to 
reconcile the mood of the November conference, quite in 
tune with FO culture, with the content of the December 
protocol.
If FO was favourable to the negotiations over the 
introduction of new technology, most other aspects of 
the protocol troubled it, not least the clause relating 
to the annualisation of working time, described by one 
official in an interview as 'une idee extr^mement 
dangereuse': the idea of getting workers to work longer
when production (or the weather, or whatever) required 
and less during slacker periods, perhaps by enforced
holidays, was disruptive both of workers' lives and of
established agreements and therefore unacceptable on 
both counts.
As for the 'threshold effect', the same official was 
in tune with many other unionists and external observers 
in his opinion that this posed only a 'psychological' 
block on employers who were thinking of hiring workers, 
not any substantial financial handicap. (An IN3EE study 
cited in Le Monde of 5th March 1985 appears to bear this 
out) .
The CFTC was just as hesitant as FO about signing 
even though its chief negotiator maintained in an 
interview that the Code du Travail was rigid and some
loosening of restrictions, on contract work, for
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instance, would have been acceptable.
However, it was not prepared to see the 'precarious' 
work -form become the norm, as it was in some branches, 
such as commerce, and it was worried that the Protocol 
allowed widespread exemptions from legal provisions in 
workplace agreements in a way previously only possible 
through branch agreements (see clause 2.3). The CFTC, 
like FO in particular, is wary of innovatory deals at 
workplace level, preferring negotiations in the 
industrial branches where the unions have a more solid 
presence and structure.
Finally, the CFTC, because of its confessional 
doctrine, was concerned at certain provisions of the 
work time section, particularly the prospect of Sunday 
working becoming commonplace and of the special 
conditions attached to female employment being 
discarded.
The CSC was the only one of the Confederations which 
said it would sign the protocol. One official opined 
that workers needed to adapt to new market conditions 
and that the Auroux legislation exacerbated the rigidity 
in the French labour market which was due in large 
measure to the legal framework.
In fact, certain clauses of the protocol were highly 
advantageous to the CGC's constituency. Clause 1.6, for 
instance, stressed the central position of the 
encadrement in the introduction of new technology, while 
the annualisation of work time would have been
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attractive to a category not paid tor overtime yet
generally working longer hoars than the average employee 
(Eroux, 1983: 42—4).
The CGC activists I met were happy with their
Confederation's decision; some were enthusiastic about
the whole concept of flexibility:
C ' est notre temps qui veut jza, il faut 
adapter. (CGC, Chapelle Darblay). (F>
The Rejection of the Protocol
It was clear well before the negotiations ended that 
the CGT would not be signing under any circumstances and 
it managed to mobilise its mi 1itants with more success 
than in most other campaigns of the post— 1981 period. 
This certainly played a part in the subsequent negative 
decisions of the CFDT and FO - not only the thrust of 
the CGT argument but the realisation that any success at 
firm levei in particular would have to be won in the 
face of CGT opposition. In this light, the relatively 
positive aspects of the protocol looked even more slight 
to many activists.
However, there were more fundamental reasons for the 
opposition within FO and the CFDT and it is necessary to 
stress these since they impinge on the capacity for 
change within each Confederation and have a bearing on 
the likely course of French industrial relations in the 
future.
Both FO and the CFDT still espouse a class analysis
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of society. Even i-f both nowadays place an emphasis on 
negotiation, the dominant ideology among mi 1itants still 
sees conditions of employment as resting on victories 
snatched by the labour movement from hostile employers 
and to be built upon, not used as bargaining fodder. The 
defence of avantages acouis is sacred in FO and the CGT 
and that attitude is also common at grassroots level in 
the CFDT.
Leading lights in the CFDT (including their main 
negotiators in these talks, Jean Kaspar and Jean—Paul 
Jacquier) would call this attitude 'archaic' and
i
implicitly accept the CNPF analysis on the 'rigidities' 
of French labour law. The thrust of their approach is to 
bargain away some of these 'outmoded' restrictions 
against a stronger union input (especially in smaller 
firms) into industrial life, attracting members to the 
union by offering them immediate advantages which in 
turn increases the union's capacity to win further 
advantages.
The worry of many activists (and shared by outside 
observers such as Rene Mouriaux in Intersocial« No. 110, 
February 1985) was that the unions favourable to signing 
seemed to be acquiescing to the CNPF's definition of 
economic and social realities. The final protocol thus 
seemed to enshrine a reading of the employment problem 
which suggested that unemployment could be largely 
attributed to constraints imposed by social legislators 
on the entrepreneur. Even if certain of the 
Confederations — the CFDT, CFTC and CGC — conceded that
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this was partly true, their overall analysis pointed to 
the need for economic reflation and greater investment
to bring down unemployment, yet there was no Quid pro
quo in the D e c e t f i b a r  16th document, nothing positive -for 
the mi 1itants to seize on. Above all, once the CNPF's 
whimsical -figure of 471,000 new jobs had been 
discredited, there was neither any real commitment nor 
any serious estimate of the likely effect of the 
measures on employment.
As a result, this gave the initiative to those 
inside each Confederation who were unconvinced of the 
employers' good faith (such as the FO official who 
described flexibility to me as 1 Line vaste entreprise 
ideologique du patronat).
Furthermore^-- and this was even more serious fpr
the CFDI ~ activists that I interviewed from all the
Confederations appeared sceptical about the notion that
the way out of the crisis lay in sharing out the work
ie f/vthat current]y exists. Edmond Maire's concept of 'new 
solidarities (see Le Monde, 2nd and 3rd November 1984) 
has proved unattractive to a workforce seeking more, not 
less, job security, and the idea;that to have a job and 
a steady income is somehow a privilege is badly received 
by the a v e r a g e  member- — not 1 east when it comes from a 
uni on 1eader...
So, finally, a majority of union activists decided 
that the Protocol set out a very unequal bargain and, 
only too aware of the traditional anti—unionism of the
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patronat« many were convinced that such innovations as 
the plans d 'adaptation' would mean little in an actual 
redundancy situation.
But the issues which were at the heart of these 
negotiations will not disappear simply because the 
agreement was not formalised. It is clear that the 
concept of 'employment' is changing rapidly and 
employers feel confident enough — especially after the 
change of government — to push ahead with their 
experiments with or without the approval of the 
Confederations.
The activists I met were generally aware of the need 
for more flexibility in production — but at the same 
time they demanded more control over new forms of work 
organisation, better retraining and, above all, a 
certain stability of employment within the new framework 
of flexibility, be it within the firm, the group or even 
a geographical area.
Yet even when guarantees of this order were on offer 
at Renault, sections of the labour movement rejected 
them as insufficient, not fully allaying the fears of 
the existing workforce. The flexibilty agreement was 
hardly in the same category, all the concessions seeming 
to come from the workers' side, but, together, these two 
cases illustrate the problems confronting union leaders 
who are trying to come to terms with a new economic 
environment while retaining the support of members, 
without neglecting the needs of the wider workforce, 
including those currently unemployed.
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French unions have moved a long way in the last 
decade but old attitudes, conditioned by many more 
decades of employer hostility and the consequent need 
for binding legislation, are hard to break down — and
the patronat has not always acted in a way likely to
encourage the process.
NOTES ^
1. The transformation was formalised after the 
defeat in the 1986 elections. (See, for example, The 
Guardi a n , 22nd April 1986; and Le Monde, 27—8th April 
1986).
2. During fieldwork, I was able to interview members 
of all the Confederal teams for these negotiations, 
including the leaders in the case of the CFDT (Jean
Kaspar) and the CFTC (Jean Gruat).
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'Every effort should be made to ensure that
technological change is not simply 'put up with' but 
that it actively constitutes one of the elements of 
social progress.' (Flexibility Protocol).
(B) 'That affects industrial relations law. Our 
people don't want anything to do with that. That's what 
we stand for. I can't do something over the heads of our 
active members. We're a democratic organisation. ' 
(Bergeron).
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(C) '...if we were open to certain 'clarifications'T 
we didn't intend throwing overboard workplace 
legislation.' (Bergeron).
(D) '... those employer schemes which-aim at -freeing 
management -from any legal or negotiated limits to their 
ability to hire and -fire. ' (Resolution Sociale. FQ 
Conference).
(E) 'As regards this, FO considers that the existing 
legal provisions constitute, for the workers, a basic 
minimum protection that should not be questioned.' 
(Ibid) .
(F) 'You have to move with the times, you must 
adapt.' (CGC, Chapelle Darblay).
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9. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN FRENCH TRADE UNIONISM
Although May 13th 19S1 was a major date in political 
history, it would be misleading to see it as pivotal in 
terms of French trade unionism- Other dates or periods 
may have more justifiable claim: the mid 1970s, for
example, when the rising number'of company failures and 
redundancies first obliged unionists to look seriously 
at questions of management and finance; 197S and the 
'Steel Plans' prepared by the CST and CFDT; the 
unravelling of the Union de la Gauche from 1977 and the 
consequent political debacle of 1978 when hopes of a
Left government foundered after disputes over the Common 
Programme; and, not least, the recentraqe of the CFDT in 
1977-8 which spelt the end of any 'unity in action' with 
the CGT and opened the way for a serious 'proposition 
force unionism' as well as the revival of contractual 
relations with the employers' Confederations and a 
possible rapprochement with the reformist trade unions.
However, the period from May 1981 to March 1986
allowed certain lines of union thought or action to 
develop and consolidate, while at the same time laying 
bare the ambiguities in the programmes of the CFDT and 
CGT in particular- The most significant of these 
developments are discussed here.
Trade Unions and Company Management
The mast important development was a growing
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interest in the running of firms and the proposals 
regularly made in this area by all of the Confederations 
except FO. During the 1981—6 period, most union activity 
seemed to centre on the level of the establishment or 
the company and, perhaps because mobilisation was so 
weak, the unions generally refrained from advancing 
broader industrial branch level plans.
Here at least the change of government was of 
obvious importance. Under the Auroux legislation, 
mi 1itants were given greater access to company 
information and more paid time-off and resources to 
exploit it. Furthermore, in the early months anyway, 
they were hopeful of getting a sympathetic reception if 
they took their proposals to any of the Ministries where 
unionists had been taken on as advisers and officials, 
while the whole climate of opinion was receptive to new 
initiatives on employment.
The CGT and CFDT are present in more firms than the 
other Confederations and they were therefore most 
involved in the new development, though with significant 
differences.
One such difference involved the perspectives each 
Confederation saw opening up as a result of their 
interventions. This distinction was not clear cut among 
the activists who tended to have limited ambitions:
Le seui interet dans notre histoire, 
c est de trouver du travail... C est pas la
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co—gsstioni Si 1 'on avait voulu la gestion de 
1 'entrepriss, on aurait fait tin SCOF‘<;L> des 
le depart. (CGT, SKF). (A)
Notre objective est a dire: il y a un 
certain nombre de fabrications qui sont 
abandonnees et un certain nombre d'autres 
qui dans un avenir a court ou moyen terme 
est encore rentable. Les Americains nous les 
ont retirees (et) il faut essayer de creer 
des activitees nouveiles... C'est uniquement 
dans cette objective-ia - pas du tout une 
histoire de co—gestion. (CFDT, Kodak). (B)
However, the difference was marked among officials 
of the two Confederations. The CFDT was eager to be 
recognised as an interlocuteur valable of the employers 
and sought to find areas of negotiation and structures 
which would give it a permanent means of influencing 
management. I he content and process of making proposals 
was a step to this goal.
CGT officials, on the other hand, were aiming 
explicitly at reining back the power of employers and 
imposing new guidelines on them. The idea that employers 
might be brought to the negotiating table to bargain 
away their prerogatives seemed ridiculous to the CGT and 
their proposals were often aimed at the government (a 
call for intervention and funding) as much as at the 
employer.
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The CFDT was much more prepared to bargain and
compromise, accepting, Tar example, less rigid rotas if 
there was a reduction in time worked. It accepted the 
need to act within economic constraints though it still 
claimed to want to change the nature of these
constraints: it tried to persuade employers, for
example, that training ought to be treated as a long
term investment not as a cost to be lumped in with taxes 
and other para—fiscal contributions.
Confederation officials asserted that the 
autogestionnaire ideals which had guided their theory 
and practice during the 1970s were not up to tackling 
the immediate social and economic problems of the 1980s 
and had therefore been 'put into cold storage'. 
Objectively, this put the CFDT in the reformist' camp, 
as officials admitted (while still claiming that the 
CFDT's vision of society was transformative) and its 
evolution ruled out any revival of the 'unity in action' 
which had been so strong a feature of union advance from 
the mid-1960s (Dubois, 1984).
Although the concrete proposals made by a CGT 
svndicat may not always differ greatly from those of 
their CFDT colleagues, the CGT seems to exhibit a 
refusal to compromise which inevitably means that its 
plans are only likely to be influential after a 
confrontation (as at Chapelle Darblay). It rejects the 
constraints imposed by the capitalist economy (above 
all, it rejects the concept of ‘overmanning') and many 
of the features of its new criteria of management' are
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therefore impractical this side of a fundamental change 
in the political and economic system.
Like the CFDT, it may try to show that certain 
changes could be profitable in the longer term, but it 
also juxtaposes what is 'profitable' for society as a 
whole with what is profitable on a balance sheet. Thus, 
its proposals centring around ' f ranco—f rancpais' 
contracts between companies are justified on social as 
well as economic grounds (they 'provide jobs for French 
workers as well as help the trade balance). At the same 
time, the CGT can partly deflect criticism that it is 
unrealistically trying to set up 'islands of socialism 
in a capitalist sea by arguing that contracts between 
the state sector and smaller private firms can lay the 
basis for an economy based on cooperation not 
competition.
However, all the case—study evidence presented here, 
together with the public statements of its leaders and 
press, suggest that the CGT has not yet abandoned 
maximalism: it is still geared towards the overthrow of
cpai tali sm.
What is fascinating is that this maximalism has been 
expressed, in the 1980s, in a quite novel form, for 
essentially political reasons. From 1981, any CGT 
mobilisation explicitly aimed at political change (which 
from 1977—7B had most clearly meant support for the F'CF) 
was naturally halted; and even when illusions evaporated 
from mid— 1982, slogans for political change would have 
been unlikely to rally either those who supported the
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Socialists or those demoralised by the whole political 
process. Hence, the emphasis was switched to economic 
policy - calls -for Keynesian reflation and protectionism 
at the national level and, more importantly, 'new 
criteria' at firm level. These criteria may appear 
closer to the realities of the workplace - and almost 
certainly they would be to the advantage of the workers 
— but in reality the CGT is making demands on companies 
which are not feasible in the current system. Its plans 
have a mobilising function rather than a practical one 
and, as in the past, their success in raising class 
consciousness is just as important as any actual 
achievement in defending jobs: thus, short-term and
medium-term aims come together, though the political 
strategy frequently undermines the immediate effort of 
defending jobs because of the unchanged reluctance to 
compromise and bargain in the sense that it might be 
understood in the UK, far example.
In short, the demands for 'new criteria of 
management' reflect the transposition onto a formally 
economic plane of maximalist demands that are, for the 
time being, untenable in the political sphere.
Evidence that the situation in each company is not 
the most important consideration far CGT activists is 
found in the similarity of form taken by CGT proposals — 
retraining, reduced hours with no loss of pay, deals 
with French clients and suppliers, no job loss — as well 
as the similarity of action - referenda of the workforce 
and wider community, publicity stunts, questions asked
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by sympathisers in the National Assembly - and the 
vocabulary in which they are expressed. A pattern seems 
to emerge of worker discontent being translated into 
propositions which fit a certain prescribed CGT pattern 
and which, in the final analysis, seem to have a 
mobilising and ideological function rather than any 
realistic chance of influencing decisions or being
negotiated over.
If the line adopted by the CGT may superficiaily 
appear to follow that advocated by Jean—Louis Moynot 
(1982 and 1979), the fact that Moynot was squeezed out 
of the Bureau Confederal for his troubles serves to
underline the above analysis: Moynot called for
negotiations in good faith and (after 1981) for a 
unified approach by the Confederations in conjunction 
with the Socialist—1ed government (Le Monde. 6th 
December 1983) but CGT tactics precluded both these 
policies. The CGT refuses the idea of making concessions 
on workplace practices in order to gain incremental 
increases in power and revised advantages relating to 
employment conditions: Moynot's resignation from the
Bureau Confederal stands as a symbol of the strategic 
continuity of CGT policy despite a real change in 
tactics.
After the change of government in 1986, this became 
clearer. Although it still put forward its own proposals 
when closures were threatened, reasoned 'counter—p l ans' 
seemed less central to CGT action and there even seemed 
to be a throwback to the oppositionist rhetoric which,
under the Socialists, tended to have a more positive 
veneer, at least.
Thus, in the first post-election CCN meeting, Louis 
Viannet, a PCF hard-liner, presented the report and 
stated in particular:
Pour la CGT, discussion et negociation ne 
peuvent avoir de sens et surtout de portie 
que conpjes comme un moment de 1 'action, de 
mobilisation (Le Monde, 26th April 1986). <C)
This refusal of dialogue outside of conflict contrasts 
with the approaches to management and Ministers which 
were standard during the first years of the Left 
government. Furthermore, Viannet was explicitly 
rejecting the recent more positive line when he called 
on the activists to:
... reconquerir, au sens le plus noble du 
terme, la fonction revendicative comme raison 
d'etre fondamentale de 1 'organisation 
syndicale. (D)
The change in attitude was clear at least from the 
SKF episode: similar violent, high profile action has
been taken subsequently by Renault workers who, along 
with sympathisers, fought a running battle throughout 
France to stop machinery being tranferred to a Renault 
factory in Spain and by Normed shipbuilding workers
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thrsatened with redundancy who cut railway lines to 
publicise their fight.
The aim is two—fold: to distinguish the combative
CGT from the other 'collaborationist' unions, including 
the CFDT, and to highlight the rejection of 'capitalist 
solutions' to the crisis.
This recent development lends support to the 
analysis above, that the CGT's move onto management 
terrain signalled only a tactica'l change determined by 
the political events of 1981 and not a major strategic 
overhaul to compare with the CFDT's recentrage.
The Rejection of Responsibility
However, there exists a contradiction within the 
concept of proposition force unionism' even as it is 
practised by the CFDT. This contradiction — the refusal 
of any responsi bi1i tv for the management of companies — 
can be traced back to an anarcho—syndicalist refusal of 
capitalist structures and is fully assumed by FO, but it 
sits uneasily beside demands for a say in industrial and 
financial decisions42’.
As a description of this attitude, Adam et al's 
image remains pertinent despite the vastly different 
context and changed tactics:
On tire sur le pianiste jusqu'a ce q u 'i1 
joue juste, mais on ne le remplace pas. (Adam 
et a l , 1972: 77-8). (E)
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The underlying tear is of being integrated into the 
capitalist system, or of simply being seen to accept the 
(capitalist) rules of the game. If some of the more 
ultra' of the CFDT modernists no longer see that as a 
constraint, their poor showing in the elections to the 
C F D T *s ruling bodies in June 1985 was evidence that the 
grassroots did not sanction this line (Raybould, 1985a) 
and meetings of the policy-making Conseil Confederal 
Nati onal see constant friction between competing 
viewpoints, notably those who would like to see the CFDT 
evolve into a kind of 'modernist' FO, a contract signer 
not frightened of taking gambles with acquis, and those 
who accept the need to update the programme of the 1970s 
but want to retain a radical, socialist perspective. On 
industrial matters, the latter group decries the 
modernists for, in its view, practically condemning some 
older sectors of the economy in advance, and almost in 
their entirety; while politically, the ambition only to 
correct the worst features of capitalism merely 
buttresses the system. The fiercest critics of the 
leadership line (in particular, the UR of Lower 
Normandy) find the Confederation guilty of 'neo-liberal 
deviancy' for accepting the employers' economic 
solutions under the guise of responding to a perceived 
shift in the aspirations of the working population.
At the June 1985 Conference, a form of 'progressive 
pragmatism' seemed to emerge (Raybould, 1985a) but 
concrete differences over values and aims inevitably 
persist and even what is labelled 'primary
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anti-capitaiism (strong enough to preclude any 
compromise) remains in pockets.
However, the rejection of responsibility seems to be 
shared to a greater or lesser extent by all sides. In an 
interview, a Confederation official in the Economics 
Department accepted that this attitude had historical 
roots and noted that the present period was 'une phase 
ambigue qui ne peut pas durer;. In this transitional 
phase, the unions demand a say in determining strategy 
but want no part in the day to day running (la gestion 
Quotidienne) of the firm which would compromise their 
defensive function. In the near term, then, the CFDT 
demanded information and real consultation which might 
involve the discussion of its own proposals.
This leaves obscure the precise conditions under 
which the svndi cat would be able to reconcile 
participation in management and the defense of the work 
force. FO argues that the two roles are antinomic: the 
hesitancy of the CFDT when confronted with the problem 
may help to explain the workforce's inability to grasp 
its line on occasions and the relative success of FO's 
straightfarward defense of immediate interests.
The CGT's position is also clear and again 
reinforces the interpretation of its intentions offered 
above: both mi 1itants and officials state that they seek 
workers' control but that this is impossible under the 
present system. One official, who regretted the lack of 
interest shown by some mi 1itants in management matters, 
was nonetheless adamant that 'le syndicat n'a pas pour
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vocation de gersr' (F) and that that was the
responsibility of the patron alone.
This official argued that the union existed to 
defend the workers; to do this, it now felt it had to 
intervene in company management but that did not entail 
any responsibility for a company's performance. 
Presumably that still held even if the employer actually 
acted on union proposals.
Essentially, for this CGT official:
Le patron reste maTtre des decisions de 
gestion, mais pas des choix de criteres de 
gestion. (G)
That is, management should retain managerial control but 
only within an overall strategy which is influenced by 
the union and which is therefore an expression of the 
rapports de force.
The view that unions could not be fully implicated 
in day to day decision making in the capitalist firm was 
shared by all the CGT activists I met:
On ne prend pas de decisions. On fait 
des propositions, on aide, si vous voulez, 
avec la connaissance qu'on a de 1 entreprise, 
et des problemes... Les problemes individuels 
sont en rapport avec les problemes de 
1 'entreprise. Mais on ne se place pas sur le 
plan politique dans le sens ou on ne prend
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pas de decisions. On n 'a pas de 
responsabilite dans ies decisions. (CGT,
Kodak). (H)
The replies of both officials and grassroots 
activists in both the formerly revolutionary' 
Confederations were frequently evasive or elliptical on 
this point. Although they were getting involved and saw 
the need to do so, they found it' hard to reconcile this 
with anti-capitalist dogma.
At this theoretical level, then, there seems to be 
something of an objective overlap between the position 
of the CGT and that of the CFDT though the formula of 
'conflictual co—operation' espoused by some in the 
latter Confederation would be unacceptable to the CGT.
There was nonetheless a real difference when it came 
to translating the evolving doctrine into concrete 
action. The CFDT now argues that socialism is not for 
tomorrow: given that premise, a socialist trade unionist 
has to question what his role should be: Act with a view 
to preparing the ground for 'realr socialism? Or accept 
the reality of certain political and economic 
constraints and try to influence crucial decisions being 
taken now in a socialist direction?
The CGT has chosen the first route, the CFDT the 
second, which is littered with traps the Confederation 
has not yet found a way round — not least, how to 
reconcile reformist action and "revolutionary’ rhetoric 
and doctrine.
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The Changing Nature of Employment
A central test Tor the CFDT will be whether it 
actually succeeds in its stated aim of changing the 
nature o-f work and employment ('Changer l'Emploi') 
without changing power relations within society.
One theme of both the cases and the national debate 
over flexibility concerned the type of job the unions 
ought to be fighting for. The siame debate is taking 
place in Britain and other industrialised countries as 
the relative importance of the service sector, female 
employment, part—time work, contract work and so on 
grows.
The CGT begins each fight on the basis of no job 
loss, no surrender of acquis; in each firm studied, CGT 
activists noted that their workforce enjoyed better than 
average conditions due to battles fought in the past and 
in each there was at least the suspicion, sometimes 
clear evidence, that closures or the shedding of labour 
was partly designed to hit the power of the unions.
The best of the social plans on offer — at Renault — 
offered retraining and, in the first stages, continued 
employment within the group: this was rejected by the 
CGT, possibly far political reasons, but also because 
even here it felt the new jobs would not be secure 
unless accompanied by an industrial strategy which 
reflected its own reflationary priorities.
At Kodak, the alternative jobs on offer were 
rejected by the CGT and CFDT for similar reasons and the
9/14
CGT took the same line at Chapelle Darblay and SKF. FO, 
on the other hand, generally restricted its brief to the 
immediate situation and, once it had negotiated the best 
social deal possible, did not seem to reflect on the 
longer—term implications.
The CGC activists encountered were more varied in 
their opinions: at Chapelle Darblay, though, the view 
prevailed that a worker, given the proper training which 
was his due, ought to be able to 'fend for himself in the 
labour market.
The CFDT and CGT were also insistent on the need for 
retraining but tended to demand guaranteed jobs at the 
end, otherwise the courses represented little more than 
stages—parkinq, 'antechambers to the dole office' and
therefore no real solution to the employment problem.
FO, picking up on Dalle's prescriptions for the car 
industry, said it wanted the 'jobs for life' of Japanese 
car workers (Le Monde- 3rd November 1984). Ironically, 
FO would probably find it easier than the other 
Confederations to live with a dual labour market along 
Japanese lines, with a secure core and a 'periphery' of 
highly insecure posts in small component and service 
companies, because of its single-minded attachment to 
the defence of acquis where it is implanted and its lack 
of any 'social project'.
It lambasts the CFDT for its 'trendy' preoccupations 
and its neglect of the bread and butter issues — pay and 
basic conditions- Here it is joined by the CGT but other 
commentators, too (for example, Rene Mouriaux in
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Intersocial. 110, February 1985; and various
contributors to the non-aligned grassroots magazine, 
Resister) have argued that the CFDT has been too quick 
to accomodate economic trends and the priorities of the 
patronat which both follow and underpin them rather than 
argue for working class solutions.
For the moment, the Confederation's pragmatism seems 
to have the upper hand on the radicalism and managment 
seems to be gaining the flexibility it needs without any 
quid pro quo in terms of greater worker control of his 
environment and work organisation, more input into 
policy, consultation, and so on.
New Solidarities and Old Divisions
The uneven nature of the compromise was what 
eventually caused activists to reject the flexibility 
protocol of December 1984 (Raybould, 1985b; Mauriaux, 
1985). The debate then, and indeed for much of the 
1980s, has centred on the notion of solidarity.
The CGT tends to use the term in a fairly orthodox 
way, meaning workers coming together to save jobs and 
safeguard conditions, both locally and within 
industries. However, as the case studies and other 
examples demonstrate, the form of solidarity action 
proposed by the CGT has widened to include, for example, 
the presentation of industrial plans grouping products 
from separate firms. Solidarity now has a more positive 
sense, meaning more than the old-style street 
demonstration and contributions to fighting funds.
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For the CFDT leadership, the term solidarity implies 
responsible onion action to help those who do not have a 
job — and even a highly precarious situation is 
preferable to the despair of the dole queue. As one 
national officer stated to me:
La pire des precarites, c'est le chomage. (I)
Coupled with an acceptance of fihancial constraints and 
market place realities', this has led to activists 
having to accept the need on occasions for job cuts or 
reduced hours with no compensation to keep a company 
afloat while at the same time calling for aid for 
retraining and alternative opportunities in the same 
region. This was the stance of the CFDT Union Locale in 
Rouen during the Chapelie Darblay dispute though it 
failed to convince all its own members at the works, 
those called upon to forefeit their own jobs in the name 
of financial redressment.
Elsewhere, CFDT leader Edmond Maire misread the mood 
of his own members in the civil service when, in the 
name of his nouvelles solidarites. he refused to back 
their strike over pay in March 1984. He later denied 
calling them 'privileged' but he was adamant that those 
in secure, relatively well-paid jobs had to accept 
certain sacrifices to help the less fortunate.
In the private sector, too, the CFDT line on pay and 
work—sharing caused problems for activists - witness 
this comment from an IBM worker after the CFDT lost
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ground in BF‘ elections:
II est di-f-ficile de parler du partage du 
travail et de la priorite aux bas salaires 
dans une usine ou le salaire moyen avoisine 
13,000 francs par mois... (Syndicalisme 
Hebdo, 2003, February 9th 1984). (J)
Clearly, there is a certain"contradiction between, 
on the one hand, accepting constraints and ordering 
priorities within them and, on the other, fulfilling the 
expectations and attending to the elementary interests 
of workers (and members)-
The irony is that sacrifice on the part of the 
membership necessarily has to come at a time which would 
anyway be difficult. The aenerosite of the CFDT is then 
immediately under pressure. As one CFDT official 
remarked:
La valeur de solidarite dans un temps de 
crise est une valeur qui n'est plus au 
premier rang. (K>
F0, focussing entirely on basic conditions, has 
reaped dividends by its refusal to get involved in the 
search for new solutions to the problems of 
unemployment. The CGT, meanwhile, has made demands and 
'proposals' but has lacked both credibility and the 
muscle which might give them some chance of being
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implemented.
The Confsdsrations have a massive task ahead of them 
in seeking to change the terms of the economic debate. 
While survey evidence (e.g. Alternatives Economiques, 
June 1984) suggests that the French are not wholly 
convinced by the liberal remedies advocated by the
Right, the policies tried by the PS/PCF government and 
supported with more or less enthusiasm by the main 
Confederations were discredited by the turn of economic 
events in 1982—83.
The CGT continues to call for reflation, 
protectionism and nationalisation. In fact, current
developments in the major Western economies, especially 
the USA (where protection is back on the political
agenda and there is pressure for
international1y—coordinated reflation) suggest that some 
form of counter—cyclical government measures are now
back in vogue. However, such macroeconomic measures are, 
of themselves, unlikely to solve an unemployment problem 
which is structural.
More radical steps are needed at local level and 
these almost certainly involve flexibility in working 
and remuneration arrangements. The CFDT has grasped this 
but, despite the scattered successes reported in its own 
press, the problem remains of coming up with formulae 
which cannot be seized upon as capitulation to the 
employers. Given the present low level of mobilisation 
and the hostility of the CGT and FO, that is difficult.
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And then there is always the intractable problem of 
the attitude of the employers, little inclined to
trade-offs with the unions, especially when they have 
the upper hand, as at present.
An Ever More Divided Movement
One important reason for the employers' dominance is 
the continuing weakness and division of the labour 
movement<3). The period of Socialist government saw no 
increase in the unions' collective capacity to mobilise: 
on the contrary, the gap between the CGT and CFDT 
widened over a series of issues — compensation for
reduced working time, alterations to legal regulations
at local level, Afghanistan, and so on.
It was difficult enough trying to mobilise each 
svndicat behind quantitative demands: when the demands
are qualitative, structured plans or proposals, the 
points of disagreement invariably multiply.
The problem used to be described as one of 
surenchere — Confederations or svndicats putting ever 
higher figures on demands to 'outbid' rivals for the 
workers' approval. The ground has shifted somewhat over 
the last few years, four of the five main Confederations 
backing contractual policies and making more negotiable 
demands. However, divisions are all the deeper over the 
more complex issues and only in one of the case studies 
(Kodak) did two svndi cats line up behind similar 
proposals: ironically, this involved the CGT and a CFDT
svndi cat which freely voiced its opposition to many of
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its Con+ederation'5 recent stands. Even here there were 
undercurrents of suspicion about each other s actions. 
Elsewhere, as at Chapelle Darblay, open disagreement 
could spill over into violence.
At national level, the situation was no better. The 
Italian trade unions demonstrated in the 1970s how 
industrial muscle could be effectively used to alter the 
shape of economic development, by, for example, getting 
the state to sponsor investment in regions which might 
otherwise be neglected (Lange et al , 1982). The French 
Confederations were too divided and too weak to achieve 
anything on that scale.
The press was quick to point to the emergence of a 
new 'reformist bloc during the flexibility talks and as 
the CFDT helped oust the CST from control of some 
important CEs. However, these were no more than ad hoc 
alliances between the CFDT, CFTC, CGC and FO: divisions 
over doctrine remain wide and these are regularly 
translated into policy differences (over such 
fundamental concerns as pay, the code du travai1 and, of 
course, the separation of the roles of union and 
management). The CFDT, like the CGT, still claims to 
have a transformative vision of the union role (see the 
interview with Edmond Maire, Le Monde. 22nd May 1986) 
and its exploration of new avenues has occasionally 
irritated the reformists: a more pragmatic approach
still leaves wide differences of opinion as to the 
nature of current problems and how to tackle them, let 
alone ultimate aims.
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Within this divided movement, the C G T 's decline is 
clear and, though it is still the best implanted o-f ail 
the Confederations and retains a certain 'spoiling 
capacity', the days when its mots d 'ordre exerted a wide 
influence over French workers are gone- This may already 
have been the case during the 1970s but it was disguised 
by the appeal that, together, the CGT and CFDT held 
during the productive if precarious periods of 'unity in 
action' (Dubois, 1984). Now, with the CFDT moving in a 
different, sometimes quite opposite, direction, the CGT 
seems marginalised on the union left.
The CGT—PCF Connection
Tactics which were largely determined by PCF 
politics during the late 1970s and into the period of 
Socialist government are partly responsible for this 
marginalisation (Ross, 1982), along with the archaic 
tones of its rejection of the Socialists' modernisation 
projects and economic rigour.
Some of its criticism of the government's about—turn 
had a certain validity within the terms of its own 
analysis, notably that the 'constraints' evoked by the 
government were the result of the previous government's 
policies on opening up the French economy, lack of 
investment and the priority given to exports, and were 
therefore reversible (CGT, 1984a: 44—53).
However, any action that might have been expected on 
the basis of this analysis was constrained by two 
factors: first, the PCF, which shared a similar
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analysis, was in the government -for three years until 
July 1984 and therefore obliged to respect certain rules 
concerning collective responsibi1ity. Though some
observers reckoned it might 'use' the CGT to show
opposition to some government measures, the
Confederation generally maintained a low profile until 
early 1984, especially as far as national action was 
concerned. Besides - and this is the second point — 
despite growing unease on the Left and in trade union 
circles, the CGT had little success in actually 
mobilising against the government when it did try.
Its efforts, especially during the run-up to the 
1986 election, had the effect of stirring up discontent 
inside the Confederation because of the apparent party 
political content of the move (Le Monde. 27th February 
1986; and 30th November 1985 for the opposition of 
Socialist ceqetistes to the tone of the CGT's 42nd 
Conference).
The unusual stirrings within the CGT were fuelled by 
arguments between Communists in the Confederation's 
ruling bodies. These came to the surface during the 
PCF's Central Committee meeting in May 1985 when, 
amongst others, Louis Viannet, sometimes seen as the CGT 
number two, openly criticised Henri Krasucki for the 
failure to contest Socialist policies and lay the blame 
for the workers' problems on the Socialist Party in 
government.
Krasucki was obliged to point out the difficulties 
in mobilising and the non-aligned status of the CGT (Le
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Monde« 23rd and 24th May 1985; Le Matin, 23rd May 1985). 
The latter point was emphasised in the initial document 
d 'orientation prepared -for the 42nd Conference and while 1 
some commentators readily interpreted it as the CGT 
fending off in advance any criticism of a pre-electoral 
onslaught on the Socialists (cf. Le Monde, 11th April 
19S5), Krasucki was evidently concerned to maintain a 
certain cohesion within the CGT. Its numerical decline 
would only be exacerbated if Socialists and others who 
preferred the Left government to the Right were further 
alienated.
Practically all the key CGT posts at Regional and 
Federation level are held by PCF members who are 
wel1 —positioned to influence action and decision-making 
within the Confederation. However, it is simplistic to 
assume that the PCF—CGT link is consistent in its 
functioning and that the flow of demands is ail one-way. 
Indeed, it may well have been the growing discontent 
within CGT ranks which persuaded the Party leadership 
not to participate in the Fabius government. 
Furthermore, the Party leadership has had to contend 
with growing unease over recent strategy and a small 
group of 'renovators' has attempted to open up internal 
debate. This echoed a similar debate within the CGT 
though that was stifled with the accession of Krasucki 
to the leadership and the squeezing out of 'proposition 
force' advocates such as Moynot (see, eg, Harmel 19S2: 
112-4) .
The decline of the PCF as an electoral and political
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force might in theory have allowed the CGT more space to 
develop a more independent, industrially-based line of 
action but in practice the Party has redoubled its 
efforts to push the union into an explicitly 
anti-Socialist direction, hence the statement at the 
CGT's April 1936 CCN to the effect that the Socialists 
had prepared the ground for the economic policies of the
Right (Le iionde. 26th April 1986).
In the near term, given the hostile political 
climate, the current PCF isolationism and the continuing 
pressures on industry to reduce costs through lay-offs, 
it is hard to see the CGT adopting anything but a 
negative stance even if it continues to make 'proposals' 
in some form.
However, these proposals can only succeed, when they 
succeed at all, almost in spite of themselves. Given
current notions of profits, 'sound management' and
labour usage, CGT proposals would invariably push up 
costs on the negative side of a balance sheet and 
therefore do not even begin to address the problems as 
seen from the employer's viewpoint.
This is not to argue that the CGT cannot justify 
concentrating on alternative priorities — the regional 
effects of job loss, the waste of human lives through 
idleness, the way workers bear the brunt of any company 
failure but rarely enjoy the full fruits of success: 
simply, CGT demands, flying as they do in the face of 
current business logic, are unrealisable and the manner 
in which it seeks to achieve them under the current
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system, positive in appearance, conceals an ideological 
and mobilising intent as much as any immediate hope of 
influencing management. The demarche has changed but not 
the underlying hostility to the capitalist system which 
brooks no c o m p r o m i s e -
In this light, even its exhortations to its 
activists to fully utilise the new rights contained in 
the Auroux legislation look like an attempt to push the 
system beyond its limits in order to force 
confrontation. Ultimately, the CGT falls down through 
its lack of any 'intermediate strategy ' , its failure to 
demonstrate to workers that action can both satisfy 
immediate demands and further long-term ambitions.
So the CGT shares little common ground with any of 
the other Confederations at present and is likely to 
pursue its aims by attempting to mobilise at national 
level: in 1985-7 it attempted this increasingly, over
the introduction of new regulations on work time and 
'flexibility', trade union rights and so on. This is 
something of a return to the pattern which prevailed 
until the late 1970s: the big difference now is that the 
CGT, isolated, no longer seems to have the troops to 
make it count.
The divisions in the labour movement figure as a 
major factor behind the unions' failure to influence 
employment policy in the 1980s. A period of relative 
rapprochement on the political Left was not the signal 
for trade union unification that it was at the time of
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the Popular Front: indeed, the industrial relations
re-forms o-f the Socialists did nothing to encourage this, 
the institutionalisation o-f union 'pluralism' being 
explicitly encouraged- Auroux made this clear when 
deciding not to make agreements dependent on being 
signed by majority unions:
... le piuralisme syndical est une realite de 
la societe franjiaise a laquelle nous tenons.
(National Assembly speech cited in Liaisons 
Sociaies. 1984: 165). (L)
Even with the arrival in top positions of activists 
who did not live through the events leading to the 
post-war schism, FO and the CGT seem unreconci1 able. The 
key, of course, is the PCF influence on CGT activity 
which is likely to remain important.
The CGT and CFDT are poles apart and the latter no 
longer sees the former as a privileged partner. The CGT 
prefers to make advances to CFDT mi 1itants and syndicats 
rather than the Confederation and in recent months has 
made similar overtures to FO activists when, 
interestingly, the cleavage between the two union 
'families' — the CGT and FQ on the one side and the CFDT 
and CFTC on the other — has reappeared, notably over the 
sanctity of acouis<a> (Raybould, 1985b).
The CFTC and CGC generally sit on the periphery of 
the triangular struggle, each with its distinctive 
i denti ty.
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Even the idea of one democratic Left union to stand 
up to the CGT which inspired CFTC/CFDT activists to seek 
a rapprochement with FO in the 1960s (Hano.n and Rotman, 
1932: 139; Descamps, 1971) is no longer on the agenda.
And FEN, which often played the role of 'middleman' in 
the past in order to mount unified demonstrations, now 
seems to want to set up in competition to the 
Confederations, having suffered attacks on its 
constituency from FO and then the CGT.
A vicious circle emerges: the unions are losing
members because they are unable to halt factory closures 
or change government policies because of their 
divisions; with their membership in decline, the fight 
for recruits gets tougher and divisions widen... None of 
the Confederations seems to be having much success in 
attracting 'new' workers (those in service industries, 
on contracts, temps, and so on) though the CGT recruited 
large numbers of immigrants in the car industry in the 
aftermath of the Left's 1981 victory.
A large part of the problem lies in the unions' 
inability to replace declining emotional attachments to 
the svndicat by other 'incentives' to membership, to use 
the vocabulary of Lange et al (1982). French unions have 
relied in the past on 'identity incentives' (political, 
often, based on principles and rights) and these are 
still the guiding light of many mi 1i tants. Such 
incentives are no longer sufficient, and the young in 
particular have turned increasingly to single issue 
campaigns outside the workplace as more relevant to
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society's problems and more personally satisfying. The 
CFDT has resolved to attract members by offering various 
services (insurance, leisure facilities, etc) but this 
is another issue which makes waves within an 
organisation which attracted members in the past on the 
basis of its political programme and democracy.
For some, an interest in providing services to the 
work group and concentrating on. its immediate interests 
sails too close to corporati s m e <<a>> . a pejorative term in 
the French labour tradition in which class action has 
been the beacon.
Negotiations in the work place have not taken off 
and so have not proved to be the rallying point for new 
members that some of the Confederations expected.
Another vicious circle is therefore unbroken: the
svndicat is too weak to impose itself as inter1ocuteur; 
the worker sees no advantage in joining so the union 
remains weak...
The Patronat and Trade Union 'Propositionsr
The attitude of employers and managers towards trade 
unions in general has been an important factor in the 
development of the latter: Gallie (1983) argues that the 
radical nature of the French labour movement is due in 
large part to the policies of repression and exclusion 
adopted by the political and industrial elites,
especially in the aftermath of World War One. That 
repressive tradition lingers on (see Ch. 3) though a 
more subtle form of 'human relations' manipulation and
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direct employer-employee communication is the current 
mode (see Horviiie, 19S5)-
The patronat has rejected the ethos which guided the 
Aurcux report, the idea that the unions should be 
strengthened and induced to bargain in good faith with a 
more open management. According to the activists in the 
case studies, information has been handed over 
grudgingly or not at all and decisions relating to 
employment and other matters in which Auroux envisaged a 
role for union proposals are still being taken 
uni laterally.
This kind of attitude did not surprise the activists 
I met: for the CGT members in particular, the patronat
was only acting in its class interests in refusing 
proposals designed to benefit the workers and the 
communi ty.
The same went for bargaining in general:
Avec les negociations obligatoires sur 
les salaires, on y va, on n'obtient pas. On 
n ’obtient rien si on n'a pas de rapports de 
force. Ca, c'est la reaiite de la lutte de 
classe. II n'y a rien a ajouter. (CGT, Kodak) (M)
The CFDT's disappointment must have been more 
bitter. It had held secret meetings with the CNPF at the 
time of its recentraoe in order to seek out areas where 
the 'social partners’ might fruitfully engage in 
negotiations, yet subsequent evidence seems to show a
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decline in negotiation at national level CMouriaux, 
1984b)» Activity at branch level stagnated after the 
initial impetus provided by fiuroux and negotiations in 
firms have in the majority of cases had little tangible 
effect (Le Monde. 28th June 1985).
The employers scrambled to hold talks on reduced 
working time in July 1981 in an attempt to pre-empt 
legislative change but they have subsequently refused to 
concede any further generalised reduction. The 
flexibility Protocol of December 1984 was seen by many 
activists as little more than a charter for 
dereguiation, an employer di ktat, and was therefore 
rejected; in the Hay 1985 talks on training and 
employment opportunities for those made redundant
(cpntrats formation reclassement), the employers
appeared to be going through the motions of negotiating, 
their minds fixed an the post-election political agenda.
Still, in their analysis of local initiatives, CFDT
officials would go no further than criticising some 
unreceptive employers; and when verifiable economic 
factors convinced them that job losses were unavoidable, 
they were prepared to negotiate a 'social plan' as long 
as redeployment and retraining formed an important part. 
The CGT would only accept such a retreat after a defeat 
in action and, as at Renault, would not even draw the 
line at scuppering a highly advantageous redeployment 
plan if it felt that proper consideration had not been 
given to industrial alternatives.
Overall, the evidence from the case studies and
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press reports shows that the unions failed to influence 
the industrial choices of the employers and government 
except in those rare cases where mobilisation and 
traditional displays of industrial muscle forced a 
rethink.
It is fairly obvious — but nonetheless important to 
underline — that jobs and employment are central in any 
union proposals. Employers may not enjoy having to lay 
people off, or being unable to take on new workers, yet 
the fact remains that their priorities lie elsewhere. 
The need to rein in costs, either because of competition 
or declining markets, invariably focusses on labour 
which has to be directly cut or otherwise made more 
productive. Against this, the unions are seeking to 
improve or defend conditions, beginning with the very 
fact of employment.
The nationalisations of 1981—82 may have muddied the 
notion of 'property rights': for ail that, no right to 
work exists under capitalism or in the mixed economy, 
'democratic socialism' of Mitterrand. As a result, under 
the present system, any notion of planning for jobs, and 
by extension any counter-plan' which has jobs at its 
centre, is utopian (cf. Casassus, 1979 and 1980).
Despite PS policy prior to 1981 (and despite CGT 
pressure), the Auroux laws gave no right of veto to CEs 
in any crucial areas, including redundancies.
In the end, the terms of the economic debate were 
left largely unchanged after five years of Socialist 
government and an intensive union attempt to see social
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con si dsrat. i ons given more prominence in industrial
deci si ons-making«
The Treatment o-f Redundancies
One major qualification of the above statement 
concerns the treatment of redundancies. Already, as a 
result of a 1969 agreement, any employer wishing to make 
workers redundant had to satisfy the labour inspector 
that no other solution was possible and draw up a
social plan' with a view to aiding those no longer
needed- In practice, a refusal from the labour 
authorities was hardly ever forthcoming but, especially 
if there was a union presence in a company, some form of 
assistance going beyond statutory redundancy pay was 
made by the employer.
This procedure has hardened during the 1980s and, 
often with a government subsidy, various measures are
taken to help the redundant workers find alternative
employment. This was the case in three of the companies 
studied.
This is undeniably an advance but it has to be set 
in perspective. First, this elimination of the 
licenciement sec, or outright redundancy, is only a 
feature of the larger, better organised firms: workers 
in the mass of small and medium sized businesses which 
are not unionised get their statutory rights at best. 
The CFDT in particular is acutely aware of this and has 
sought to remedy the situation by getting recognition 
for inter—enterprise delegates or even joint
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union-empioyer bodies (in return -for higher thresholds 
for representatives in smaller workplaces) in a given 
area.
Secondly, the union role here is usually restricted 
to social (or personnel) matters: nothing much has
changed, then, since 1977-8 when the CGT and CFDT first 
began seriously to address industrial problems during 
the steel crisis but ended up with nothing more than an 
elaborate redundancy scheme. Despite the effort put into 
research and lobbying on industrial strategy, the unions 
have had little impact, either in the nationalised 
companies or the private sector.
Finally, even the improvements in 'social plans' 
have come about generally as a result of union muscle — 
riots in Lorraine over the steei cut-backs, pitched 
battles at F'oissy over the Talbot redundancies, the 
occupation at Chapelle Darblay.
It is tempting to conclude from this third point 
that no new area of consensus has opened up in French 
industrial relations despite the structural reforms of 
the Socialists and the initiatives of the CFDT.
However, one development, already mentioned in the 
Renault study, suggests that the terms of the 
relationship may be changing: fonds salariaux, though 
still not widespread, seem to epitomise the type of 
approach sought by the CFDT as a way out of the present 
crisis — negotiations close to the workers, joint union 
and management decisions on the uses to which the funds 
are put, solidarity for those out of work as workers
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cede part of their salary as a short—term loan to
finance job-creating investments.
It is too soon to say if these schemes will spread 
or be extended but those that e>iist have been welcomed
by the CGC and CFTC, as well as the CFDT, with FO
reserved and only the CGT completely hostile. As with 
other developments, much depends on how far the
employers are prepared to open up. decision—making to the 
unions and the chances of that happening still seem 
sii ght.
Differentiated Levels of Union Intervention
The 'fonds saiariaux' schemes are one example of the 
development during this period of different levels of 
union intervention, both within and beyond the workplace 
and, alongside this, new forms of worker representation.
Some of the latter are directly sponsored by the 
employers: quality circles, of course, which have
blossomed despite the parallel establishment of qroupes 
d expression, often barely distinguishable in practice; 
and the more individualised forms of representation 
advocated by various employer pressure groups (Le Monde. 
3rd May 19Q5) which do not seem widespread, as yet.
Other new institutions were set up by Auroux, as 
detailed in Chapter 4 — comites de oroupe. economic and 
technological committees within the CE and worker 
representatives on the boards of nationalised companies. 
The latter still seem to be searching for a role but the 
other bodies were valuable as sources of information.
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The delagues de site introduced by Auroux do not 
appear to have taken off though there has been no 
thorough research in this field.
Overall, the Confederations were keen that their 
activists seize the opportunities opened up by the new 
laws for gathering information and putting the union 
point of view but mi 1itants were often sceptical about 
their real impact and aware of .the drawbacks: one CFDT 
activist described the legislation as 'lourde et 
inefficace' and, while recognising the need for new 
union initiatives in the field of industrial strategy, 
bemoaned the generally futile hours spent trying to 
persuade civil servants to intervene or at least 
consider union proposals.
An impression gained from fieldwork was that 
activists were burdened down with work — a not uncommon 
position for rank and file union activists in any 
country but exacerbated here by the demands made of the 
mi 1itant by the new emphasis on knowing the enterprise 
and industry, and by the multiplicity of institutional 
roles to be filled by a restricted number of people. CGT 
and CFDT officials acknowledged the problem, adding that 
the capacity to utilise the new laws fully would only 
come with experience and training, a necessarily slow 
learning process.
Although the CFDT in particular set out as one part 
of its unionisation strategy to involve ordinary members 
more closely in the wor^k of the svndi cat alongside the 
committed mi 1i tants, the Auroux laws could conceivably
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have the opposite effect: union ' speci al i sts ' could
develop at syndicat level in the fields of economic 
policy, equal oportunities or legislation, for example. 
The practice of 'pooling' delegates' paid hours off so 
that one or two people could devote themselves full time 
to union business (which appears to be common in the CGT 
in particular) can, of course, exaggerate any divide 
between the super—deleques and the rest.
Growing Union Intervention Outside the Firm
Another interesting development over the last few 
years is the increase in positive union intervention 
beyond the work place and the development of structures 
to this end. French Confederations have always had a 
dual structure built on industrial branch and 
geographical lines, and, typically, the local, 
departmental and regional bodies occupy themselves with 
coordination, the development of svndi cats and 
representing the Confederation in local bodies 
(Houri aux, 1982: 19).
The recent period has seen these bodies initiating 
action as the run-down of traditional industry has 
depressed specific areas and towns — the best example in 
the case studies was the sponsoring of the 'Industrial 
Mission' by the CFDT in Rouen.
The CFDT was enthusiastic over the revival of 
comites locaux d'emploi (CLEs) (an early and, as it 
turned out, isolated success of the flexibility talks) 
and their tripartite membership (unions, employers,
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local authorities). The committees were set up to study 
the local economy, suggest courses o-f action likely to 
save or create jobs and aid certain ventures o-f an
exemplary nature (CFDT Aujourd'hui, No.60, March 1983; 
CFDT Magazine. No.92, March 1985), The CGT alone refused 
to sign the agreement on the CLEs, noting they had not
done much for employment in the past and calling for
them to have a veto over redundancies (Le Monde, 4th 
July 1984).
However, as the unions have, by themselves, been 
singularly unsuccessful in influencing employers'
decisions, the alliances made possible by such 
territorial action could pay dividends — on both the
indicators mentioned above, unionisation and power to
influence events.
Tozzi (1982) suggests that the modern 'single issue' 
movements (he concentrates on the ecologists, feminists 
and regionalists) could help regenerate trade unionism 
as long as the Confederations resisted the temptation to 
integrate and ultimately smother them. Leaving aside the 
need for feminists to tackle the inbred sexism of trade 
unions, an obvious point of contact between the 'old' 
and 'new' social movements would be over the desire to 
save jobs on the one side and the parallel concern for 
local communities on the others certainly, with the 
devolved powers of regional assemblies and the 
tripartite CLE's, there would seem to be scape far 
common cause between unionists and regionalists.
ft different venture worth noting was the effort made
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by the CFDT Union Reqionale o-f Lower Normandy to 
organise temporary workers in Caen into a col 1 ecti-f 
d interimaires, an attempt which -foundered on the lack 
of enthusiasm of the industrial svndi cats in the town 
for any tripartite (UR, Federation, col1ecti f ) organism 
and the lack of Confederation support (Baudouin and 
Col1 in , 19S3).
All the Confederations were stung into paying more 
attention to their unemployed workers’ unions in the 
face of an autonomous grouping which had some success in 
the first half of 1985.
The CFDT was the most active in searching for new 
structures outside the workplace bath to respond to the 
problems of unemployment (as in its initiative on a 
regional, tripartite fund to channel savings into 
industry in Aquitaine, for example) and in order to 
represent those in employment more efficiently. During 
the flexibility talks, it suggested deleoues 
inter-entreprises as a way of increasing union influence 
in small businesses, suggesting as a quid pro quo a 
raising of thresholds for other workplace bodies in 
those areas where local representatives were accepted 
(Le Monde. 9th— 10th September 1984).
All this was part of the CFDT's 'new solidarities' 
strategy and fits in with its broad view of the crisis 
as being social as much as economic in its implications. 
It is therefore concerned to advance proposals beyond 
the usual confines of trade union activity yet without 
passing in the first instance through political
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channel 5.
It is less rigid than the CGT in its appraisal o-f 
how industry has to evolve to remain competitive (within 
a market economy) and because o-f this places the
emphasis on local schemes to replace jobs which are 
redundant: the CGT invariably re-fuses to accept the
disappearance o-f any post though the CGT mi 1 itants in 
the case studies often used local considerations in 
their arguments. FD chooses -to remain within the
workplace, to negotiate on social measures as a rule.
Given the geographical structures o-f all the French 
Con-fedorations and the fact that industrial decline has 
an exaggerated effect on some regions and towns, this 
trend towards local union action outside the workplace 
must be significant. However, once again, divisions and 
differences of approach at this level are even more of a 
drawback than with traditional forms of action inside a 
single firm where at least there is a community of 
interests among those employed. Furthermore, as one CFDT 
official remarked to me in 1986, the arrival of a new 
government whose culture is not at all compatible with 
this sort of decentralised initiative or tripartite 
structure may signal a drying up of funds and a 
withdrawal of employer interest even in those areas 
where advances have been made.
Nonetheless, as matters stand, the
'territorialisationr of union initiatives confirms the 
tendency indicated by the interest in management
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matters: anion action on jobs is no longer restricted to 
defensive struggles and appeals to the state for 
subsidies.
The various forms of initiative from investment 
funds to 'alternative plans represent a qualitative 
change in union action since the early 1970s, 
consolidated under the period of Left government, and in 
broad terms indicate a move away from the strict defense 
of employment towards the creation or transformation of 
jobs.
It is the CFDT which is most implicated here and the 
extent to which the trend continues depends on the 
political choices made by the other leading 
Confederations, FO and the CGT, and whether they are 
prepared to compromise their doctrine to improve their 
prospects of influencing employment - the CGT by being 
prepared to act within capitalism, FO by ackowledging 
that defense frequently requires a positive contribution 
in areas hitherto considered off-limits for the union.
The International Context
The 'localisation' of union activity clearly 
reflects the diversity of conditions which are affected 
by regional and sectoral factors. Yet, since the early 
1970s, there has been a massive internationalisation of 
capital flows and with it a tendency for transnational 
operators to increasingly shift productive capacity from 
one country to another, in search of more promising 
markets, more pliant labour, tax concessions and so on.
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In each of the case studies and in the 
Confederations' economic programmes, the internationai 
context o-f union action raised certain ambiguities. Here 
again, the CST stood alone in seeing the viability of 
national solutions to macroeconomic problems and 
refusing what it considered international solutions 
imposed on French enterprises by foreign groups or 
international agencies.
The other Confederations, while concerned that 
France should not abandon all independence and voicing 
concern for national interests, nonetheless subscribed 
to the view that a durable solution to the crisis 
necessarily involved coordination at the European level, 
on industrial, social, financial and political issues.
At the local level, in the heat of the battle to 
save jobs, matters could look a little different. 
European rationalisation (of steel, coal, paper) or the 
approach of a foreign group was usually perceived as a 
threat and there was a natural reluctance on the part of 
workers who had enjoyed well-paid jobs in what had been 
seen as core industrial concerns to accept they had to 
move on — which could involve both occupational and 
domestic upheaval — in the interests of some scheme 
worked out a long way away by people whose livelihoods 
would be little affected by it.
The activists had generally looked to workers abroad 
for information and, on occasion, with a view to 
formulating common lines of action, though these rarely 
came to much. Thus, the prospects for success at local
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ievei were more important for the majority o-f the 
mi 1itants than any hopes they placed on international 
action: even those activists who had worked hard to 
forge international links were not expecting an equal 
return for their efforts in the fight for jobs:
Les reunions q u 'i1 y a avec les Anglais, 
c'est bien, parce que fa permet d avoir des 
informations, mais pour faire reculer la 
Direction, seule la mobilisation du personnel 
peut compter, il faut etre realiste. (CFDT,
Kodak). (N)
Existing international structures were largely an 
abstraction for these rank and file activists and 
sometimes even a hindrance, as at Kodak, where FO was 
reluctant to join the Standing Conference because a 
similar body already existed within the international 
chemical workers' union, ICEF - which refused to work 
with the CGT- Similarly, the CGT was excluded from the 
international grouping of SKF unions because this latter 
body was attached to the ICFTU (FO and the CFDT were 
both members).
Although the Confederations asserted their 
solidarity with workers in struggle elsewhere, common 
cause was less easy to maintain- The following worker 
was only more outspoken than his comrades:
C'est les travailleurs espagnols et
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itaiiens qui beneficient de la fermeturs, il 
taut pas le nier... En appeier a la 
solidarity internationale, penser que c'est 
suffisant pour dire: 'Bon, on ne va pas
produire les choses qu'on a produites ,a 
Ivry. . . ' Ca serait trop bon, jpa! (CGT, SKF) . (0)
Given this reality, the CGT argued that its
'franco—fran^ais‘ line alone had the interests of French
workers at heart. Activists countered accusations of 
'economic chauvinism' by calling for 'complementary' 
arrangements to the benefit of workers in all countries 
rather than the anarchy of competition. As noted in Ch.
7, in effect, it was attempting to 'freeze' a given
international division of labour to preserve jobs. 
Confederation officials stressed the need for 
co—operation, too, arguing that present arrangements 
benefited only the powerful transnational groups, not 
any particular set of workers.
The 'franco-franpi s ' approach also fitted in with a 
central tenet of CGT economic thinking, on the 
feasibility of a national road to economic recovery. 
Furthermore, along with selective protectionism, giving 
priority to supporting industry at home (whatever the 
price advantages of imported goods) served to emphasise 
criteria other than the financial ones and underline the 
point that the loss of jobs was not inevitable, but 
could be avoided through different policies.
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The Uncertain Outlook for Industrial Relations
The 1981-86 period saw a major remoulding of the 
legislation covering industrial relations, designed to 
encourage more employer— union contact and the spread of 
bargaining- Yet, as Duncan Gallie (1985) concludes, the 
Auroux laws have done little as yet to fundamentally 
alter the structure of French industrial relations.
One major reason for this, again, is the attitude of 
the patronat which was not at all inclined to enter 
into the spirit of the reforms.
More importantly, despite the increased means 
allowed the unions, little was done to change real 
structures of power within the workplace: indeed, the
Socialists expressly stated that powers of decision were 
to remain solely with management.
But it is doubtful, as noted above, if any of the 
Confederations seriously wanted anything different, and 
the CGT always seemed unlikely to enter in good faith 
into any new contractual order. At least as far as the 
CGT is concerned, the new institutions are simply being 
used in the old battles, an eventuality suggested by 
Eyraud and Tchobanian (1984).
It is interesting that the new Right wing government 
in 1986 appeared in no hurry to dismantle the existing 
industrial relations structures, its 'deregulation' 
effort being put instead into making the procedures for 
redundancy easier for employers and reducing the legal 
restrictions on certain types of employment contracts.
9/45
Even the pre-election talk of ending union 'monopoly' — 
that is, the right of legally recognised unions alone to 
present candidates in the -first round of workplace 
elections - has been dropped.
It would seem that, in general, the. unions do not 
worry the employers or the government at the moment and 
there is nothing in the Auroux legislation to force 
employers to behave much differently from in the past: 
negotiations can be routine and end without agreement, 
information can be withheld for a variety of reasons. 
The one completely new institution, the qroupe 
d 'expression. has restricted terms of reference even in 
the law and many groups have ended up as little more 
than quality circles, organised within existing company 
structures.
The attitude of the employers is summed up in the 
rebuff given to the CFDT's Jean—Paul Jacquier 
(ironically a prominent 'modernist') by an employer at a 
conference early in 1985:
Nous sommes en train de reussir sans les
propositions de la CFDT. (Liaisons Sociales.
R642, 6th February 1985). (P)
Industrial restructuring and the political and 
economic stakes referred to by D. Marsden (1985) in his 
more sanguine view of the Auroux reforms do not appear 
to have strengthened the unions' hand in any appreciable 





j demonstrated, the lack of stability in French IR and
management's refusal to concede any ground to the unions 
has not in the past harmed French competitiveness, at 
least in comparison with the UK and its consensual' 
system.
French employers have long held the unions at arm's 
length, conceding only what they have been forced to. 
However, in recent years, the technique has been refined 
by a concern to achieve a minimal form of employee 
consent. Thus, there has been a proliferation of quality 
circles and various informal workplace groups in which 
the worker is invited to contribute opinions on various 
aspects of a company's operations; many qrouoes 
d 'expression seem to function in a similar way.
Some employer pressure groups have advocated a kind 
of workplace bargaining on pay and conditions with such 
informal1y-constituted groups. These talks would not 
comply with the legal obligation to negotiate as set out 
in the law introduced by Auroux but such 
decentralisation is near the top of the employers' 
agenda and both the CFDT and the CGC might accomodate a 
move in this direction. The upheaval of Auroux followed 
by the election of a government with radical, free 
market pretentions has clearly thrown up many fresh 
ideas and an unsettled period is likely in France before 
new trends harden.
The Effectiveness of 'Proposition Force Unionism'
Whatever happens, it seems that the unions have
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-failed in their efforts to put the issue of employment 
onto the negotiating table. As stressed above, employers 
have adamantly refused any concessions on this issue: 
employment decisions are a function of industrial policy 
and financial imperatives; at best, the unions are given 
a right to information and consultation 1, such as it 
is, does not imply any active part in the 
decision—making process.
At the time of writing, it seems that the CGT, 
partly for political reasons, is paying less attention
to company plans and putting more emphasis on hard-line, 
defensive action and anti—government mobilisation. That, 
at least, would be consistent with the thesis offered 
here that the CGT's interest in union proposals was less 
a strategic than a tactical change brought about by 
political events since 1978.
The CFDT still has faith in 'counter-plans' and in 
the potential results to be had from serious
negotiations: the CGC and CFTC, too, adopt what they see 
as a 'responsible', cooperative approach to industrial 
matters though their interventionist ambitions are less 
prominent than those of the CFDT simply because they are 
much smaller organisations.
So does 'proposition force unionism' stand up as a 
model for trade union action in the current French 
economic crisis?
Its achievements might be measured at two levels: 
the unions' influence on events and the attraction of 
this type of unionism for the workforce.
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In terms of its success in saving jobs or even 
putting the unions in a position to influence employment 
in a positive way at local, branch or national level, 
'proposition force unionism' has made little impact, for 
all the reasons set out here and in the previous two 
chapters.
So what of its success in bringing back workers to 
the unions? This is important because the density of 
French trade union membership, already low, has fallen 
sharply over the last decade and the changed tactics 
were designed not only to address the problem of 
employment in a more concrete way but also to attract a 
wider section of the workforce.
Immediately, ‘proposition force' advocates are faced 
with a problem: in the difficult times of the 1980s, it
is F0, the one Confederation which vociferously refuses 
any involvement in what it sees as management functions, 
which has fared best in terms of membership and in the 
national workforce 'elections'. On the face of it, this 
is something of a paradox: the nature of work and
employment is evolving fast yet the most attractive 
Confederation appears to be the one that makes a virtue 
of its immutability, not to say immobilism.
It may be that the greater prominence of F0 in 
recent years is in part a construct of the press and 
even more so of academic observers. Researchers and 
academics — in France as well as other countries — have 
concentrated overwhelmingly on the CGT and CFDT since 
the latter emerged in its 'deconfessionalised' form in
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1964 and FQ has been neglected, despite its important 
role in industrial and national negotiations and in the 
Social Security system.
Nonetheless, FO's gains in elections are real 
enough, as noted in Ch 1. The two most obvious reasons 
far this are its distance from the government (which 
meant that it was not tainted like the two avowedly Left 
unions when the government became unpopular) and its 
lack of pretentions in an increasingly complex political 
and economic environment: the emphasis on purchasing
power is clear-cut and Bergeron's simple, repeated 
certainties are ultimately comforting.
In not claiming to have ail the answers to 
unemployment and not seeing it as its role to find any, 
it left itself free to concentrate on negotiating 
redundancy terms and preventing a collapse of the 
welfare system. When the 'solutions' of the CGT and CFDT 
failed to move the Government or employers, FO, by 
concentrating on the social plans which companies were 
prepared to discuss, could lay claim to realism, 
responsibility and, often, success.
The very continuity of its line ensured that its 
policies were more accessible than those of the CGT and 
particularly the CFDT. FO's approach hardly looked set 
for success at the start of the Socialist period in 
office: although the new government wanted to encourage
employer—union negotiations, it was aiming at enterprise 
level talks and FO was not as well implanted there as 
the CGT and CFDT; furthermore, a government wages freeze
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and strict CNF'F guidelines during this period gave 
little scope to negotiators. However, the point is that 
FO did not have to alter its essential willingness to 
negotiate (in contrast with the -former reluctance at the 
CGT and CFDT) and this supported its reputation for 
fighting equally hard for the workers whatever the 
government in power.
On its own terms, then, FO's unionism has been 
conspicuously successful. However, its very 'minimalism' 
means that as a long-term strategy for union action in a 
rapidly changing economic environment it is 
insufficient. FO is particularly strong in the civil 
service and hospitals — a relatively secure base to fall 
back upon. It does not appear to have made recruitment 
in small industries or among temps, contract workers, 
etc, its priority and more than the other 
Confederations, its policies and structures are geared 
towards those in work, in 'normal' jobs. The collective 
agreements which FO champions have so far failed to 
tackle the problem of short-term contracts and other 
'precarious' work forms, or technology, for instance, 
and FO rigidly refuses any questioning of acauis. 
implicitly rejecting any dilution of benefits even when 
these may generate employment for others.
The CFDT's approach goes in the opposite direction 
but it has not been as successful in gaining — or 
holding onto — members as FO. This is partly due to its 
specific stands - on civil servants' national insurance 
contributions and its support for rigueur, for example —
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but also due to its mode of functioning: policy debate 
within the CFDT sometimes reaches a level of abstraction 
which makes it difficult to relate to particular issues 
and competing 'currents' within the Confederation give 
the impression of turmoil on occasion. It. is certainly a 
more difficult union to be active in, or even a member 
of, than the relatively solid FO or CGT.
This, of course, is disastrous for the C F D T ’s 
recentraqe policy which was designed to anchor the union 
closer to the workers, to attract members by a serious 
effort to improve immediate conditions. A stronger union 
could then make further advances in a radical direction: 
autogestion thus became a moving process rather than a 
model of society.
Instead, workers have been confused or even angered 
by the Confederation's 'realism'. Part of the problem, 
ironically, was due to the uncomfortable proximity of 
the (unexpected) Mitterrand victory to the recentraqe: 
this policy had been designed to move the union away 
from action in the party political arena because the 
Confederation leaders expected the Right to be in power 
for a long time; in the post—May 1981 context, the 
CFDT's 'new realism' began to look suspiciously like 
moderation to help a Left-wing government — which, in 
the French context, meant the union had a dangerous 
image problem <7’> .
The CGT faced the same problem of being associated 
with the government but its growing militancy from the 
start of 1984 was seen as being dictated by the PCF and
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it was reproached afresh for subordinating union action 
to political considerations. The espousal of 'new 
criteria of management' failed to catch the public 
imagination and its interventions in the field of 
employment have failed to arrest the decline in 
membership recorded in Ch. 1.
Overall, then, the French unions seem to have had 
very little concrete success in the crucial field of 
employment and, at the end of the period under 
discussion, the movement as a whole seemed even weaker 
than at the start.
Most disappointed of all must have been the CFDT: 
despite its openness towards the employers and the fact 
that many of its active supporters found themselves in 
top political posts under the Socialists, its only real 
influence seemed to be on the intellectual debates of 
the period. Whatever the input of sympathisers inside 
ministerial offices, the views of mi 1itants on the 
ground and of leading officials were largely 
disregarded, leading to frustration at all levels. 
Worse, the CFDT may even have lost its position as 
second largest Confederation to FO.
For all that, the CFDT approach to the problem of 
employment still seems the one mast likely to have any 
impact. It has moved furthest in its willingness to see 
the post-war 'settlement' between labour and the 
employers redefined to take into account the changed 
environment of the 19S0s and this leaves it best placed
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of all the Conf ederati ons to tackle new issues. But it 
still has much to do if it is to reconcile the interests 
of those in work and those seeking it and inspire 'new 
forms of solidarity'.
Significantly, rank and file activists that were 
interviewed - from all the Confederations except FO - 
felt the need to make the effort of putting forward 
argued responses to management plans, even if they had 
few illusions about the likelihood of their success.
The majority of French activists now accept that 
they have to 'dirty their hands' and join battle with 
the employers on what used to be taboo ground: all they 
need now are the troops to back them up...
NOTES
1. SCOP: 'Societe Co—operative Ouvriere de 
Production' - a workers' co-operative.
2. See R. Samuel, New Socialist, April 1985, for 
similar criticism of the British mineworkers' stance on 
worker participation in management.
3. In mid-1986, further divisions seemed to be 
appearing: there were suggestions that FEN, startled by
the success of FO in recruiting in the education sector, 
was considering widening its field of membership to 
include other branches of the state sector. Mergers with 
smaller, autonomous unions were moated in the press and 
even some form of organic link with the PS, but to date 
little appears to have come of all this. (See Le Monde, 
16th May and 1st July 1986; and L 'Humanite, 21st June
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1986).
4. Elsewhere, such demands have been termed 
'transitional demands : proponents know they cannot be 
met but see them as a means o-f discrediting re-formist 
policies and perhaps gaining converts to insurrectionary 
parties or causes- See, for example, the article by 
Patrick Seyd (New Socialist, 27, May 1985) on the 
auto—dissolution of Hard Left groups whose members then 
pursued their old policies inside the Labour Party.
5. Cf. the surprisingly neutral account of FO's 
November 1984 Conference in L 'Humanite, 24th November 
1984. Shortly after the flexibility talks, a CGT 
official confided to me, not grudgingly but as though 
this was something he was not accustomed to admitting:
'Iis sont de bons syndicalistes, quand meme.' This was 
accompanied by remarks about the CFDT being unsound, 
'never true revolutionaries'.
6. That is, the pursuit of local and sectoral gains 
which have no wider implications and little class 
content.
7. Contrast the public statements of leading British 
trade unionists in 1986—7 about the 'priority' of 
getting a Labour government elected which effectively 
meant determining policy with one eye on the opinion 
polls and generally keeping a low profile.
TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'All we wanted to do here was find work... 
That's not co-management! If we'd wanted to run the
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-firm, we would have set up a co—operative right at the 
start-' (CGT, SKF).
(B) 'Our aim is to say: there are a number o-f
products which have been abandoned and a number of 
others which could still be profitable in the short or 
medium term- The Americans took these away from us and 
we have to try and create new activities... It's simply 
with that objective in mind — nothing at all to do with 
co—management.' (CFDT, Kodak).
(C) 'For the CGT, discussion and negotiation only 
have any meaning and potential when conceived as a 
moment of action, of mobilisation.' (Louis Viannet, Le 
Monde. 26th April 19B6) .
(D) '... reconquer, in the most noble sense of the 
term, the making of demands as the fundamental raison 
d'etre of the trade union.' (Ibid).
(E) 'You shoot at the pianist till he plays right, 
but you never take over from h i m . ' (Adam et a l , 1972: 
77-8).
(F) '... the union has no vocation to manage.' (CGT 
offici al).
(G) 'The employer remains in charge of management 
decisions but not of the choice of the criteria which
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inform them-' (ibid).
(H) 'We don't take decisions- We make proposals, we 
assist, if you like, with the knowledge that we have of 
the firm and its problems... The problems of individuals 
have a direct relationship with the problems of the 
firm. But we don't get involved on the level of policy 
in the sense that we don't take decisions. We've got no 
responsibility for decisions.' (CGT, Kodak).
(I) The most insecure position of the lot is being 
on the dole.' (CFDT official).
(J) 'It is not easy to talk about work sharing and 
giving priority to the low paid in a firm where the 
average salary is getting on for 13,000 francs a 
month... ' (Svndicalisme Hebdo. 9th February 1984).
(K) 'Solidarity, at a time of recession, is not a 
value that people put first.' (CFDT official).
(L) '...union pluralism is a reality in French 
society and one we want to maintain.' (Auroux, cited in 
Liaisons Sociales. 1984: 165).
(M) 'With the obligatory wage negotiations, you go 
in, you get nowhere. You don't get anything if you don't 
have a position of strength. That's the reality of class 
war. That's all there is to it.' (CGT, Kodak)-
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< hi > Those meetings with the English were good 
because they let us get hold of information; but to 
force management to retreat, only the mobilisation of 
the workforce counts, you've got to be realistic-' 
(CFDT, Kodak).
(0) 'It's the Spanish and. Italian workers who 
benefit from the closure, you can't deny it... Calling 
for international solidarity, thinking it's enough to 
say: "OK, so the stuff that used to be made at Ivry
won't be produced..." That would be too good to be 
true!' (CGT, SKF) .
(P) 'We re succeeding quite well without the 




In Syndicalisms Hebdo of March 15th 1984, almost a 
century to the day after French workers were first 
allowed by law to combine in syndicats. CFDT leader 
Edmond iiaire warned that trade unionism was at a 
crossroads. Maire was specifically referring to that 
form of unionism which looked beyond the simple 
improvement of conditions and sought universal 
emancipation, the best organised sections of the 
workforce using their strength to aid the weak.
For some commentators, the union movement has 
already lost its way or, at least, it has been overtaken 
as a social force by other more vital social groups0 ’ .
Touraine et al (1984; see also his contribution to 
Faire, 1979) argue that the crisis of trade unionism is
due to a decline in class consciousness as social 
divisions based on class become blurred, the attraction 
of other socio-economic models fades and industrial 
culture makes way for 'post-industrialism'. For these 
authors, the economy is no longer at the heart of all 
struggle and economic actors are therefore no longer the 
heralds of social change. In their place one finds the 
burgeoning single issue movements and the most important 
contribution of the trade unionist towards change now 
lies in helping these fledgeling movements to 
consolidate and guiding them in their efforts to get 
problems tackled by social and political institutions.
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If the thesis o-f declining working class 
consciousness is correct, it would be potentially more 
serious in France than most other Western countries 
since the majority Confederations there have 
traditionally recruited and retained their active 
members by ideological appeal as much as the prospect of 
financial or other gain.
There is clearly some empirical basis for Touraine's 
claims in the decline of the CGT '(see Ch 1): its solidly 
class-based unionism is still a force amongst industrial 
workers, yet its attractiveness to the workforce as a 
whole has been in steady decline for 20 years.
However, the implication of this school of thought 
is that status, consumption and 'life-style' are the new 
motors of social change. Unions are seen as peripheral 
to these cultural questions, Touraine et al claim, 
because they have been incorporated into the industrial 
system: they are important political actors within the 
system and act merely to limit the harmful effects of 
its 'progress' rather than provide a focus of opposition 
as the environmentalists, the anti-nuclear activists, 
the feminists and the regionalists do.
This is a very gallic view of the original role of 
the trade unions, consistent, however, with the 
historical stance of the majority, 'revolutionary' wing 
of the French labour movement until the late 1970s. Yet, 
as the evidence in the main body of this thesis
suggests, some - if not all - French unions jhave begun to rethink
I
their strategies and practices *-n the
I
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last decade, and precisely in order to bring the union 
movement back into closer contact with a workforce whose 
ambitions and interests have altered and diversified 
over the years.
Whatever the current accent placed on consumption 
and (1 ife-)style, paid employment — or the lack of it - 
remains central to the life experience of most adults. 
In fact, this may be truer today than for a long time as 
women increasingly combine parti'fcipation in the labour 
market with family commitments42’.
Those in work (and, indeed, those without work) 
still need some collective body to defend their 
interests: trade unions can fill this role providing 
they listen to what their membership or electorate is 
saying and build policy around this, guiding and leading 
the membership without taking for granted the direction 
it wishes to go in.
Landier (1981), while cataloguing what he sees as 
the failings of the French unions, is more reserved 
about signalling their demise. However, as might be 
expected from an observer who is a regular at personnel 
management seminars, he does forecast the (necessary) 
end of the politicised unionism which has predominated 
in the past. His 1981 book is rather sceptical about the 
transformation of the CFDT, which is understandable as 
the CFDT's notoriously vague programme was prone to 
conflicting interpretations as rival factions sought to 
take over and mould recentraqe after their own vision.
In subsequent essays (for example, in Intersocial.
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No. H i *  March 1985), Landier has highlighted the 
support o-f the CFDT for a new contractual relationship 
between employers and unions and correctly situated the 
Confederation in the 'reformist' camp.
Reflecting the new direction taken by employers' 
organisations, Landier sees the future of industrial 
relations in France as lying in negotiations at the 
workplace level (Intersocial. No. 112, April 1985) - and 
not necessarily with the unions!' any elected body (the 
CE, DPs or an ad hoc grouping) is seen as sufficiently 
representative.
In the 1981 book, Landier argued that trade union 
action in France was invariably corporatiste. meaning, 
here, aimed at advancing sectoral interests: class
rhetoric was merely camouflage. He predicted that the 
new labour laws to be introduced by the Socialists would 
only serve to strengthen these 'tendances au 
corporatisme cl justif ication ideologique '.
Clearly, Landier and other observers from a 
management perspective would like to see collective 
representation reduced to the level of staff 
associations or company unions. But this is the 
narrowest form of 'corporatisme'. and a particularly 
anodyne form, designed to pose the least problems for 
employers.
Even if Landier's analysis of the factors behind the 
decline of French unionism are broadly accurate, his 
prognosis could only have any validity if industrial 
relations are looked at in a totally ahistorical
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context. While it may be true (as many in the CFDT and 
CGT would concede) that revolutionary unionism lost 
much goodwill through the neglect of the day to day 
concerns of the workforce, the long term transformative 
vision of these Confederations would still have great 
appeal if aperationable alongside the addressing of 
more immediate issues.
Despite the changes outlined in this thesis, this 
vision still sets French unionism apart from movements 
in other Western countries where lip service, at most, 
is paid to notions of social change. Furthermore, in 
France, this ideological perspective informs the 
doctrine and activity of activists at all levels. One 
union activist among the white collar staff at Renault 
informed me:
Si je suis militant CGC, c est pour 
vehicuier une certaine conception de 
1 'entreprise et de 1'encadrement. Tout comme 
a la CGT on vehicule une certaine conception 
de la societe. (A)
This CGC member was trying to distinguish his union 
from the CGT by contrasting the latter 's socio-political 
aims with the CGC's own preoccupations, more rooted in 
the workplace.
Yet the notion implicit in this vision is also 
political in a sense — the idea of management and 
workers pulling together for the good of all,
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transcending inevitable divergences of interest through 
discussion and negotiation.
The point is that such theorising informs the 
activity of French activists of all persuasions much 
more than it does that of, say, British.shop stewards. 
In the past, this doctrinal approach was one barrier to 
change among union activists. This has been gradually 
broken down - the CGC notion outlined above would 
probably be shared by some elements in the CFDT — but 
both the CFDT and CGT still share a concern to see a 
renovated social order. The 'new realism" of the former 
may have pushed this aspect of its unionism into the 
background yet the CFDT still claims a political voice 
for itself — indeed, it has strengthened its political
voice by refusing to fall in behind the pronouncements
of the parties of the Left.
It is hard in the 1980s to continue portraying the 
French labour movement as ‘revolutionary', especially 
when what is probably now the second largest
Confederation, FO, makes it a point of principle to stay 
outside the party political debate and concentrates on 
the narrowest of issues relating to working conditions.
Nonetheless, that does not mean that French labour 
has moved towards any norm that might have been
envisaged by the 'convergence' theorists and liberal 
pluralists. A century of experience is not easily 
unlearnt. This is one of the difficulties that union 
leaders have had to grapple with in the period under 
review: the compromise which is still emerging will have
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to take into account the 'ideological baggage' a French 
mi 1itant carries around with him (or her) and which 
still sets him apart.
Thus, the unions' main problem in the 19S0s is how 
to update their programmes to take account o-f the 
economic transformations underway, new employer policies 
and the scourge of mass unemployment, without alienating 
the active membership which may well cling onto the old 
ideals, the identity incentives' (to use the vocabulary 
of Lange et a l , 1982: 221) which bound the mi 1itants to 
their Confederation.
The ideological difficulties inherent in any change 
of approach are magnified in France by the existence of 
five competing Confederations and a multitude of 
autonomous syndicats and Federations. As outlined above, 
in times of economic growth, this competition was 
invariably translated into surenchere: in the straitened 
times of the 1980s, it often means denouncing as 
betrayal any hint of compromise over the question of 
redundancies.
For employment is the central concern of the labour 
movement at the current time and is likely to remain so 
in the foreseeable future. Thus, as Erbes—Seguin (1984) 
has noted, a redefinition of the negociable is now 
required. Na longer can wage rises be used as a 
surrogate for all other demands — that would simply 
buttress the comfortable position of workers in 'core' 
industries and banish larger and larger groups to the 
insecure periphery. One of the strengths of French
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unionism has been its class basis, its presumption to 
speak for ail workers, whether members or not; that 
virtue now has to be redirected towards a solution to
the problem of employment, one which does not attempt to
stifle all change but which nonetheless may have to
accept a redefinition of the conditions of employment
(in its largest sense) in the interests of the greatest 
number — including those out of work that the 
Confederations have belatedly begfQn to organise.
Amadieu and Mercier (1986) argue that this 
transformation of the negociable. coinciding as it has 
with doctrinal change within the CFDT in particular, has 
been opposed by some activists who still think in terms 
of distributing a surplus rather than keeping a company 
afloat. The evidence of my own research suggests that 
union leaders and many activists have made the necessary 
change in approach and objectives but have failed to 
marry the new concerns with the historical and 
ideological bases of their unionism. This has 
contributed to the confusion of workers and ordinary 
members and perhaps even played a part in a certain 
retreat from collectivist solutions (Cf. Kourchid, 
1977a, 1977b and 1983).
A further problem — a major one — has been the 
negative response of the patronat to union demands for a 
wider role in industrial planning, and its attempt to 
bypass the unions even in their more traditional fields 
of activity.
French employers have long been more hostile to
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organised labour than their counterparts in many
comparable countries. In the 1980s, riding a free
market, ideological wave which has covered much of the 
developed world, they have added a certain discipline to 
their approach, preparing a coherent programme to
counter the social and economic arguments of bath the
political and the union left. In the process, those 
‘progressive1 employers sought out by the CFDT in the 
late 1970s have been silenced.
Crucially, the patronat has tended to win the 
economic arguments without conceding any ground to the 
unions over new criteria for industrial planning. A no 
doubt genuine concern over redundancies led to some 
enhancement of earlier agreements to help those whose 
jobs disappeared but the underlying purpose of recent 
employer initiatives has been to weaken job security and 
leave individuals more and more to the whims of the 
market, undermining collective guarantees on the way.
As the problems of employment thrown up by 
recession, technology and the new world economic order 
mount, it is vital for the unions to confront them in a 
positive manner. If they simply dismiss the employers' 
arguments on flexibility, for instance, they run the 
risk not only of leaving the workers open to abuses they 
are too weak to fight but also of aiding the process of 
their own marginalisation, highlighting their own 
irrelevance as the employers would have it.
Some of the Confederations have conceded the need 
for a partial loosening of the tight legislative
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-framework governing industrial life in France but it is 
clear they cannot go too far down this path without 
alienating their membership, especially as the benefits 
to the workers of such a transformation are as yet 
unproven.
The CFDT in particular has invested heavily in 
establishing a 'realistic* image yet this strategy looks 
flawed.
One aspect of its new 'responsibility' was the
downgrading of strike activity which, whatever the
intention, underpinned the demobilisation of the
workforce that followed the political disappointments of 
the late 1970s. Instead of national strikes and blanket 
responses to economic problems, the CFDT resolved to 
seek solutions closer to the point of production, 
organising the workers to study a situation and present 
employers with reasoned proposals which would form the 
basis for negotiations between two parties with 
admittedly different priorities.
However, as we have seen, the response from managers 
was generally negative and no real areas of consensus 
were allowed to emerge despite the concessions of the 
CFDT.
Perhaps there were too many discordant notes struck 
on the union side but the good faith of the employers 
also has to be questioned. Negotiations still seemed to 
be viewed by them according to short—run calculations of 
the rapports de force, as was clearly revealed by their 
approach to the two major sets of national negotiations
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which came at either end o-f the period under study- In 
the working hours negotiations concluded in July 1981, 
the employers were desperate to reach agreement to 
pre-empt a legislative move that they feared would 
introduce a more drastic cut; but in the 'retraining and 
redeployment‘ talks of May 1935, it soon became clear 
that the CNPF had no interest in coming to any agreement 
since it expected an imminent change of government to 
produce many of the alterations -.it desired without the 
need for concessions an its own side.
Despite the Auroux laws, the patronat- by most 
accounts, was still little inclined to negotiate on 
change in the workplace and an apparent trend towards 
decentralised negotiations actually threatened the 
unions since the employers' aim appeared to be to 
circumvent them.
Against this background, the CFDT's emphasis on 
bargaining with management looked dangerous to many of 
its own activists. There were sound historical reasons 
for the mi 1itants' fears, as one commentator pointed out 
in the aftermath of the December 1984 flexibility' 
talks:
Historiquement, disposant du pouvoir,
(le patronat) disposait de 1 initiative en 
matiere sociale. Par son inflexibilite en la 
matiere, profitant de toutes les occasions et 
ne cedant qu'a la force, il a necessairement 
secrete une defiance profonde a son egard et
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justifi^ au bout da compte la source legale 
schappant a sa volants directe et s'imposant 
a lui, comme source 'sicurisante' du droit 
du travail aux yeux des syndicate. (Roudil,
19B5: 90). (B>
The continuing re-fusal of the employers to see the 
unions as industrial partners can only confirm the 
average activist's reliance on strong legal safeguards 
to provide minimum protection for the workforce.
The CFDT press has made much of those agreements its 
synaicats have reached with local employers on working 
time, shift patterns and related employment levels but 
research needs to be done to ascertain how extensive 
such agreements are. And it remains to be seen how long 
reprieves negotiated in return for concessions on 
flexible working hold up.
A more immediate question - and this was one factor 
in the rejection of the flexibility' protocol by CFDT 
activists — is whether any trade union should be 
involved in underwriting the kind of 'creeping 
precarisationf currently under way in France.
Thus far, most of the concessions seem to be coming 
from the employees, either in terms of a reduction in 
real pay (to offset a reduction in the working week even 
though output tends to remain constant), less secure 
contracts or even unemployment. The employers argue that 
such 'flexibility' is necessary to allow a company to 
respond quickly to changes in markets and that this will
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eventually produce a strong economy which will be for 
the good of aii. However, in the short term, the unions 
have few means of ensuring that those workers who make 
the sacrifices are actually given something approaching 
a 'fair deal', even within the constraints of a firm's 
financial health.
Managerial reluctance to cede the 'right to manage' 
was unsurprising. More unacceptable for the unionists I 
met was that even the Left govenment, once it had 
legislated for greater rights to information and opened 
up the possibility of intervention, seemed reluctant to 
back plans prepared by the unions with the workers' 
interests to the fore.
Some observers (Huiban and Landier in particular, in 
their various publications) place an exaggerated stress 
on what an 'enlightened' 'proposition force unionism' 
might achieve simply through action at local level and 
agreements with employers. The scale of the problems 
currently affecting employment suggest that a direct 
influence on national political policies is also vital.
Given the importance of the political context for 
French unionism historically, the ideal situation seemed 
to exist between 1981 and 1986 for the unions to 
influence policy in an unprecedented way.
A government was in power which, at least in the 
beginning, had radical pretentions and which had a 
mandate to reduce unemployment through a programme 
involving an expanded state sector and a commitment to a 
form of industrial democracy.
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Activists -from the two largest (in 1981) 
Confederations took Lip posts as advisers to Ministers 
and the union influence was clearly visible in the new 
labour legislation introduced by Jean Auroux.
Yet ultimately, just as they made little impression 
on the employers in spite of their new rights, so the 
unions failed to gain any lasting increase in power at 
the national level - witness their inability to 
influence government economic and industrial policy when 
priorities were altered from 1982-3. fhe major factor 
here - again - is the fragmentation of the movement, for 
the unions ended the 1981—6 period much as they entered 
it, dispersed and in disarray, leaving employers and 
government to play one off against another whenever 
necessary.
There was no realignment in the union movement to 
match that on the political left where Mitterrand's PS 
secured the dominant position. In fact, the splits in 
the labour movement have been institutionalsed by the 
acceptance of 'pluralism' to which £11 the 
Confederations except the CGT subscribe.
Under this curious 'pluralism', mi 1itants tend to 
make ideological and political choices as to which 
Confederations they will be active in but subsequently 
have to water down — or at least attempt to disguise - 
any party political orientations in order not to 
alienate a wider audience still attached to the 
tradition of non-alignment. This effectively precludes 
the kind of organic party—union links common in northern
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Europe- As Ei Benhammer (1935) has noted, French 
socialists and left-wing unionists may talk dismissiveiy 
of 'social democracy' yet the absence of close relations 
helps explain the disarray of the Left in power and the 
hesitancy of the unions in mobilising behind the 
government.
In a world where it is increasingly difficult to 
distinguish some 'pure' field of 'industrial matters from 
the wider economic and political arena, the historic 
mistrust of party political activity built into French 
union doctrine badly needs to be overhauled if the 
political and union wings of the labour movement are 
both to be fully effective.
However, the Leninist 'transmission belt' model is 
clearly inappropriate as it tends to subordinate the 
short and medium term interests of the workers to 
political considerations. The model once suggested by 
Edmond Maire — the union debating a programme with the 
Farties of the Left, pushing the interests of the 
workers but accepting that the responsibi1ities of 
government may entail a certain adaptation of priorities 
depending on circumstances - never had the backing of 
all in the CFDT and further experience of the Left in 
government from 1981—6 has again brought to the surface 
lingering 'workerist' myths as well as understandable 
reservations concerning the definition of political 
priorities. Yet this period has also surely shown the 
need for workers to be directly represented at the 
centre of political power, the need, therefore, for some
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kind of formai party link.
Again, however, some minimum consensus as to goals 
and tactics is vital, yet for the immediate future the 
CGT (like the PCF) seems to have opted out of the 
debate. Its slide back into an uncomplicated 
oppositionaiism seems destined to further loosen its 
grip on the industrial working class and the 'spoiling 
capacity' that it retains is a poor replacement for the 
more thoughtful, positive approach which was struggling 
to emerge in the early I9S0s.
In the past, the stimulus for change within the CGT 
(which meant practically the whole of the labour 
movement until the late 1940s) has more often than not 
been political in nature: this was particularly the case 
with the various schisms and reunifications and also 
includes the ending of the CGT-CFDT 'unity in action' 
pact.
Equally, the attitude of managers and employers has 
helped shape the behaviour and doctrine of the unions.
Gallie (1983) explains the more radical nature of 
French workers as a whole by the grievances, based in 
the workplace, which a left-wing political and union 
movement have been able to amplify and channel into an 
oppositional force.
These factors are still pertinent in the 1980s, yet 
the environment is now quite different in major respects 
and their impact on the workforce is therefore also 
markedly different.
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The French patronat has pushed through its 
ago!ornament□ (Weber, 1936) and, moving -from a 
reactionary to a 'progressive' stance, adopted new 
personnel policies (Morville, 1985) which aim to co-opt 
the workers, individually, into the enterprise culture 
rather than browbeat them into submission to managerial 
authori ty.
That trend goes a long way towards explaining the 
apparent lack of impact of the changes in col1ective 
institutions brought in by Auroux (the individual 'right 
of expression’ of a worker on his working environment 
has been taken over by the employers and channeled into 
a quality circle' function).
On the party political front, the period under 
review has seen the decline of the PCF in local, 
national and European elections, its replacement as 
leading party of the Left by the PS and the subsequent 
transformation of the latter into a moderate, reformist 
social democratic party striving to come to terms with 
the restructuring of the capitalist economy and changing 
social formations<3>.
The implications for the unions are clear: they,
too, must evolve and formulate new policies more in tune 
with the aspirations of the workforce but still push for 
reforms to counteract the worst effects of economic 
change.
The CFDT has grasped this but the CGT, while 
adapting its practices and modernising its analyses, has 
failed to shift sufficiently from an anti—capitalism
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which both reduces its credibility for an increasingly 
large number of workers and lends too many of its 
proposals an 'impossibi1ist' air. It is unlikely to 
change as long as the PCF retains effective control of 
its major constitutional bodies and the Party appears to 
be clinging on to this control all the harder as its 
political base is eroded.
If Bailie's hypotheses are correct, then the 
combination of a 'softer', more subtle employer approach 
and the demise of the 'revolutionary' politics capable 
of moulding any discontent would seem to herald a more 
stable phase of industrial relations in France.
Yet the present calm may be deceptive. Discontent 
may appear residual in the current climate but it is 
more probably merely latent and frustrations can easily 
spill over into industrial action if the workers 
perceive the new employer attitudes to be superficial; 
and if the legitimate channels of communication are 
weakened further, those same frustrations are always 
capable in France of welling up into serious social 
disturbances. Furthermore, the still growing body of 
unemployed people and those in insecure employment form 
a sizeable bloc whose anger might just as easily find a 
destructive outlet.
If the CGT is unwilling or unable seriously to 
address these problems, the most interesting question 
then concerns the areas of agreement that the reformist 
Confederations - including now the CFDT — can find 
without either being reduced to 'lowest common
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denominator' demands which do not seriously challenge 
the employers' reading of the crisis or, on the other 
hand, simply repeating traditional positions (for 
example, on the sanctity of acquis) which fail to 
address new and serious issues and leave the employers — 
and governments — free to impose their own solutions.
In assessing the prospects, it is hard to see much 
scope for agreement. To be sure, overall, there have 
been some unforeseen developments in France over the 
last decade. Even the fact of investigating a company's 
financial state, then seeking to influence its plans, 
was an important change of practice for those unions —
the majority wing of the labour movement until recently 
— which had traditionally been opposed to any 
involvement with the capitalists.
What is more, the fact this ’proposition force’ approach 
was adopted by a wide variety of workers was interesting.
Although French academics (such as Casassus, 1979) often 
refer to the Lucas workers' initiative as breaking new 
ground for trade unionists (and in terms of its 
proposals for alternative products it is still in 
advance of all the plans I came across) it was largely 
an isolated venture in Britain and 'counter-plans' have 
been scarce despite the massive job cuts of the 1980s. 
In contrast, France has witnessed a veritable movement, 
encompassing a wide variety of plans sponsored for the 
most part by the CBT and CFDT.
Yet, given its lack of success with employers, the 
biggest single effect of the French 'counter—pian
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movement' may, ironically, have been to drive a further 
wedge between the main Confederatione, which have 
differed in both the details of plans and in their 
strategic intent in putting them forward (or refusing 
to) .
The CFDT has led the way in seeking to bargain over 
employment, accepting the introduction of 'non—standard' 
forms of contract, local alterations to employment law 
and the loss of some benefits if they are replaced by 
others which might enhance job prospects or help the 
modernisation effort of a company- The CGT and FO, 
meanwhile, have both refused to 'barter' acquis and have 
been vociferous in denouncing what they see as a 
betrayal of the workers by the CFDT.
Not that this has brought the CGT and FO any closer 
together: precisely, the latter sees the former's
interest in management as an aspect of communist 
subversion, further proof that the CGT is not an 
independent trade union but the industrial arm of a 
political party.
Obviously, the decline in employment is of great 
concern to the French public and, a priori. one might 
have assumed that any positive attempts to arrest this 
decline would have helped the unions rebuild their 
influence and standing. This has not been the case, for 
two main reasons: first, the unions have been unable to 
impose their reading of the economy and, particularly 
with the reordering of the Left governments priorities 
from 19S2—3, the arguments of the employers and the
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Right have won the day. Secondly — and this contributed 
greatly to the first problem — there was no agreement on 
the union side on how to proceed, either in terms of 
aims or tactics. Even when the unions farced their plans 
(or demands) to the centre-stage, the public has been 
confronted by a cacophony of voices which makes it all 
the harder to revise 'common sense' views, especially 
when these are repeated by economic actors such as 
company chiefs deemed to be authorities in the matter. 
If FO has managed to come through the recent period 
relatively strengthened, it is because the grand public 
has proved more receptive to its policies: its spokesmen 
have restricted themselves to straightforward
commentaries on the economic situation and its 
activists, for the most part, have negotiated redundancy 
packages which answer the problems identified by 
employers who have set the agenda in this as in other 
f i elds.
This, too, may be represented as 'responsible' trade 
unionism yet redundancy packages, whatever the terms for 
those displaced, no longer look like a sufficient 
response to the social and economic problems thrown up 
by the structural changes in the national and 
international economy and the rapid development of new 
technologies.
The political solutions adopted by practically all 
the developed countries seem to indicate a reformulation 
of the 'post—war settlements' which had full employment 
and comprehensive social security systems at their
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centre. IncrBasingly, aaciai provision is being cot 
back, essential community services are put back into the 
marketplace and the commitment to -full employment has 
been qualified or implicitly abandoned.
Again, and this cannot be emphasised enough, the 
divisions in the French labour movement facilitate the 
employers' task. Despite the advances of the past decade 
charted in this thesis, the historic disintegration of
••y
organised French labour continues to weigh heavily on 
its present capacity for action and it is hard to see 
any change in this situation in even the medium t e r m <4).
There has been a certain realignment during the past 
decade and, as a result, it is no longer appropriate to 
talk of the French unions as ’revolutionary' in their 
majority. This has long been something of a misnomer: 
even the CGT works for socialist transformation through 
the ballot bo;< and the CFDT — despite the qauchiste 
militancy of the post-1968 period — has always sought a 
democratic road to socialism.
But nowadays the CFDT seems to have all but 
abandoned socialism as a goal, although a certain 
respect for the sensitivity of the activists ensures 
that its leaders ritually refer to their 'vision of 
change' - quickly balancing that, however, with 
professions of pragmatism and realism (see, for example, 
the interview with Edmond Maire in Le Monde, May 22nd,
1986).
This has various implications for the likely 
evolution of French unionism. On the one hand, the CFDI
Cone/22
is now well equipped doctri.nally (and technically, with 
its splendid new -facilities and large staff in 
Beileville) to tackle the issues of most concern to the 
workforce. It is well positioned to advance workers' 
claims in areas such as economic and industrial policy 
where their interests have not been well represented in 
the past. Recentraqe has broken down the ideological 
barriers to such an attempt to improve conditions within 
the capitalist system and, given^ the gravity of the 
current situation, the decision to 'dirty one's hands' 
rather than indulge in futile posturing was an essential 
first step.
On the other hand, the pragmatism advocated by some 
of the CFDT 'ultra—modern!sts' rests on unproven theses 
— notably that deregulation will help employment 
prospects and that bargaining can better serve the mass 
of workers than guarantees enshrined in laws. By 
offering concessions against rewards which are in the 
nature of things uncertain, the CFDT may be selling 
workers short, sanctioning the emergence of a 
multi-layered labour market far more unjust than the one 
it currently inveighs against, with the 'well protected' 
workers in the industrial core and the masses outside, 
in small firms and service industries. In particular, 
some CFDT leaders seem complacent about the quality of 
the new jobs on offer and rather too trusting of modern 
employers whose talk of worker participation and 
individualised job specifications may only be a cover 
for increased manipulation and exploitation.
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The CGT is alive to these dangers but its negative, 
defensive attitude since the demise of the PS—PC 
alliance has tended to blunt the effectiveness of its 
genuine criticisms for all but the committed — and these 
are getting fewer and fewer as the former bastions in 
heavy industry close or retrench while the culture and 
myths which sustained a revolutionary working class 
movement fade, The refusal to re—examine acquis has 
reinforced the unbending image of the CGT, 
understandable given the way each advance has had to be 
wrenched from a hostile patronat but arguably no longer 
in the overall interests of the workers due to the 
modern company's need for suppleness.
FO's rigidity, born of a similar view of the 
sanctity of acquis and the Code du Travail, is tempered 
somewhat by its espousal of la politique contractuelle 
and its willingness to sign agreements, in part to 
distinguish itself from the CGT. Yet its recent advance 
seems to be the result of an opportunistic decision to 
highlight its apolitical image to attract those 
disaffected by the trials of the Left in government and 
the refusal to treat industrial policy as a proper 
target for union action leaves it voluntarily on the 
sidelines as far as the major problems of the labour 
force are concerned.
The CGC and CFTC, meanwhile, will retain their 
special constituencies but can only hope to have any 
impact on industrial matters in conjunction with the 
larger Confederations, in ad hoc alliances.
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It was necessary for th,e French unions to attempt some change of 
direction at the turn of the decade, not only to tackle the growing 
problem of employment, but also, indeed, to guarantee their survival.
For, if they cannot influence events in the type of firm examined 
here, where they are at their strongest, their credibility as a 
social force is diminished.
The verdict must be that their efforts were not conspicuously 
successful, either in defending jobs or attracting members.
The 'proposition force’ approach might be seen as a necessary but 
not a sufficient change: studies on aspects other than emploi are 
needed to complement this piece of research and highlight attempts 
at renewal in other spheres of union activity.
Now that the limits of the approach are clear, the unions must 
think again about how best to defend their members' immediate interests.
In 1988, as this conclusion is being written, internal debate is 
sharpened in all three major confederations by a leadership battle: 
Maire, Bergeron and Krasucki are all likely to stand down in the coming 
months.
It is not impossible that the more reasoned unionism struggling to 
emerge in the early 1980s could lose ground, and a more aggressive 
unionism of mobilisation could be on the agenda, not only in the CGT.
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Most observers of the French labour scene agree on 
one paint at least: the future of the workers movement
remains quite open'. (Kesseiman and Groux, 1984: 322;
see also Lange et a l , 1982).
The industrial relations environment has altered 
dramatically during the last decade as a result of
industrial, political and legislative change, but also
due to the conscious strategic -decisions of the unions 
themselves.
Even if it is not clear cut and still being held 
back by political considerations and worries about union 
'purity', a feature of the period under review has been 
the unions' growing desire to influence the 
transformations under way now rather than merely oppose 
them in the name of some greater socio-political 
transformation to come.
Whether this influence ever amounts to much depends
greatly on the alliances forged between the union
movement's constituent parts, as well as with potential 
sympathisers outside, in the single issue movements, the 
regions but particularly in the political arena.
At the time of writing, although internal renovation 
has at least enabled the unions to begin addressing the 
real issues, their capacity to weigh on events in the 
future seems far from assured.
NOTES
1) The 'crisis of unionism' is not restricted to
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Finance. Labour groups in other industrialised countries 
face similar problems to a greater or lesser degree. See 
the introduction to this thesis and the contributions to 
the ECWS conference on 'The Role of Trade Unions in the 
Coming Decade', Maastricht, November 20-22nd, 1985,
especially the closing summary by Georges Spyropaulos. 
(Many of the papers are now published in Spyropoulos 
(ed.) 1987).
2) The female participation rate in France rose from 
41.9 percent in 1975 to 45.4 percent in 1984 while the 
male rate fell to 66.8 from 71.2 percent during the same 
period. (Source: Annuaire Statistique de la France
(1985). Paris: INSEE.
3) A similar restructuring of the Left and 
centre—left is taking place, naturally with local 
variations, right across the developed world in, for 
example, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Australia and the UK, 
to name only those countries where recent election 
results have confirmed the trend.
4) A stirring of revolt by railway workers and 
others in the public sector as 1987 began hardly 
signified a revival: the various Confederations were 
left trying to gain control of events as rank—and-file 
organisations made all the running while the issues 
which caused the strike were the traditional ones of pay 
and gradings (though a clumsy attempt by management to 
rewrite rotas also fuelled the dispute). (An account of 
the strike is given in Bridgford, 1987).
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TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS
(A) 'If I'm a CSC activist, it's in order to put 
over a certain conception of the firm and the people who 
run it. Just as, in the CGT, they put over a certain 
conception of society.' (CSC, Renault).
<B) 'Historically holding power, the employers also 
held the initiative in social matters. Through their 
inflexibility here, taking advantage o-f any opportunity 
and only giving in to -force, they necessarily engendered 
a deep mistrust and justified, when all's said and done, 
the legal process slipping from their direct will and 
imposing itself on them as the process of labour law 
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C0MITE5 D 'ENTREPRI5E RESULTS
(expressed as a percentage of votes cast)




1966 50.8 19. 1 2.4 8.0 4.2 3.5 12.0
1967 45.0 17.7 2. 1 7.5 3.9 3.9 19.9
1968 47.9 19.3 2.9 7.7 5. 1 5.4 11.7
1969 40. 3 18.2 2.7 7.0 4.9 5.9 20.4
1970 46.0 19.6 2.7 7.3 5.5 7.0 11.9
1971 43.3 18.9 2. 1 7.6 4. 7 6.2 17.0
1972 44. 1 18.9 2.6 7. 6 5.6 7. 1 14. 1
1973 40.8 19.6 2.6 7.7 5. 1 5.2 19.0
1974 42.7 18.6 2.6 8. 3 5.3 6.2 15.7
1975 38. 1 19.4 2.6 8.4 5.7 6. 1 19.0
1976 41.5 19. 1 2. 7 9.3 5. 3 7.0 14.6
1977 37.4 20. 2 3. 0 9.0 5.4 5.7 18.8
1978 38.5 20. 4 2.7 10.0 6.6 5.2 16.3
1979 34.4 20.5 3. 1 9.7 5.8 4.8 21.2
1980 36.5 21.3 2.9 11.0 6. 0 5.0 16.8
1981 32.0 22.3 2.9 9.9 6. 1 4. 1 22. 2
1982 32. 3 22.8 2.9 11.7 7.0 4. 4 18.4
1983 28. 5 21.9 4.0 11.1 6.5 4.7 22.8
(Source: Ministers du Travail - published in
Liaisons Sociales. Document L/12S, 21st February 1985).
APPENDIX TWO
The Union Press
The CGT publishes a weekly magazine, Vie Quvriere. 
and a fortnightly organ, Le Peuple. which carries formal 
statements, records of official meetings, etc.
Amongst its other publications is a quarterly 
review, Analyses et Documents Economiaues.
The CFDT has a monthly magazine, CFDT Magazine, and 
a weekly paper for its members, CFDT Syndicalisme Hebdo. 
Every two months, it publishes a theoretical review, 
CFDT Aujourd'hui.
FO has a weekly paper, Force Quvriere Hebdo. 
includes a magazine supplement, approximately 
month.
The CFTC publishes, monthly, CFTC Syndicalisme.
The main CGC organ is the monthly Cadres et 
Maitrise.
Mention should also be made of Liaisons Sociales. an 
independent body which runs an information service for 
personnel officers, trade unionists, etc on all aspects 
of industrial relations, with the accent on labour law. 
It is based at 5, avenue de la Republique, 75011 PARIS.
Finally, R^sister is a grassroots magazine and forum 
for debate aimed mainly at CGI and CFDT members.
which
every
APPENDIX THREE: A NOTE ON 7IELDW0RK
The information contained in the studies and other new 
material was gathered mainly through interviews with activists 
in each company involved* The usual procedure, after making 
contact, was to interview the secretary of the workplace 
branches and return later to interview other activists, 
individually where possible, in groups if pressure of time 
meant this was the best way of obtaining a wide number
of responses.
This latter course frequently had the interesting 
effect of highlighting differences of emphasis which might 
not have emerge & from one-to-one discussions*
The interviews were guided by a schedule of 34 questions* 
The first six related to the personal history of each
activist within his/her company and Confederation*
The specific case was raised by asking the activists 
what they considered were the real reasons for the problems 
in their company - the national/international crisis, 
company strategy, new technology, etc* I then sought to 
establish how far activists agreed with the Counter-plan* 
approach and how their plans were drawn up* A key area 
probed in this section was the degree of involvement sought 
in management, and what tensions this may have thrown up* 
Activists were then asked how they situated their 
action in the context of their Confederations* policies on 
industry and employment*
The final twelve questions tackled the wider issues 
relating to employment before moving on to more general 
but related areas — the *flexibility* talks and the 
Auroux laws* (However, these were more often than not 
brought up earlier by the activists)*
The last question asked directly about the nature of 
union activity under a Left government in France. It was 
introduced by reference to the U.K. labour movement model* 
Since much of the fieldwork was done during, or just after, 
the 1984-1985 miners’ strike, the group interviews in 
particular often ended in illuminating discussions on the 
differences between industrial relations in the U.K. 
and in France*
The Kodak interviews were conducted in January 
and February 1985* with a total of 14 activists - 
six from the CGT/UGICT, five from the CFD.-Q? and three 
FO* (Group discussions, in all cases, obviously only 
involved activists from one Confederation only).
I visited the SKF works on three occasions while 
it was dtill under the control of CGT occupiers in 
April 1985. Only CGT members remained active: I 
interviewed two at length and held one group discussion*
I went to Rouen twice in March and May 1985* 
visiting the St Etienne Chapelle Darblay works on both 
occasions.
There, I interviewed two CGT activists individually 
and spent a day in informal discussion with others* I  
also interviewed three members of the CGC branch - one a
foreman, the other two junior white-collar staff.
It proved impossible to interview any of the CFDT 
activists for reasons apparently to do with internal 
local union politics. This disagreement between company 
activists and regional CFDT officials is raised in 
relevant section of the case studies chapter.
The CFDT secretary at Chapelle Darblay withdrew at 
the last minute from a planned meeting, informing me 
that I needed clearance from the Rouen office. I 
arranged a meeting with the relevant officer but he 
did not keep the appointment when I returned to Rouen.
Cne of his colleagues gave me various documents concerning 
the dispute but claimed she did not have enough first­
hand knowledge to answer the questions.
I visited the Renault Billancourt complex on several 
occasions between April and June 1985* interviewing 
senior members of the CGT, CFDT, CGC and FO branch, 
and also holding a discussion with CFDT activists.
Interviews were held with officers from all five 
Confederations who had responsibility for economic and 
industrial matters, as well as participants in the 
flexibility negotiations from each organisation. I 
returned to Paris in June 1986 to clarify certain points 
with CFDT and CGT officials.
Both these Confederations allowed me free access to 
their documentation centre/library.
I attended the Confederal Conferences of FO 
(Vincennes, November 1984), the CFTC (Marseilles, 
November-Deeember 1984) and the CFDT (Bordeaux, June 
"1985), and was able to discuss my work informally with 
delegates*
My attempt to get accreditation for the CGT Congress 
in Montreuil, November 1985, was unsuccessful, but I 
was able to pick up documentation on the spot.
■
I decided against meeting with management in the 
companies concerned since this might have jeopardised 
contacts with the unions, which was naturally my 
priority. However, I interviewed officials of the 
main employers1 body, the CNPF, on their attitude 
towards the developments examined in this thesis*
The union press was kept under constant review, as 
was the national and specialist press, and an extensive 
cuttings collection built up*
I was able to consult studies and discuss work in 
progress at various research centres in France, notably 
at CHESST, CNAM, LEST AND CEVIPOF, but above all 
with the researchers of the Groupe De Sociologie Du 
Travail. I was given access to the library of IRES, 
the trade union resource and research centre set up 
with the backing of the Mauroy government and, unusually, 
all the main Confederations plus FEN*
